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Abstract 
In this thesis, we study the problem of the exploration of unknown environments populated with 
entities by affective autonomous agents. The goal of these agents is twofold: (i) the acquisition of 
maps of the environment – metric maps – to be stored in memory, where the cells occupied by the 
entities that populate that environment are represented; (ii) the construction of models of those 
entities. We examine this problem through simulations because of the various advantages this 
approach offers, mainly efficiency, more control, and easy focus of the research. Furthermore, the 
simulation approach can be used because the simplifications that we made do not influence the 
value of the results. With this end, we have developed a framework to build multi-agent systems 
comprising affective agents and then, based on this platform, we developed an application for the 
exploration of unknown environments. This application is a simulated multi-agent environment in 
which, in addition to inanimate agents (objects), there are agents interacting in a simple way, 
whose goal is to explore the environment. 
By relying on an affective component plus ideas from the Belief-Desire-Intention model, our 
approach to building artificial agents is that of assigning agents mentalistic qualities such as 
feelings, basic desires, memory/beliefs, desires/goals, and intentions. The inclusion of affect in the 
agent architecture is supported by the psychological and neuroscience research over the past 
decades which suggests that emotions and, in general, motivations play a critical role in 
decision-making, action, and reasoning, by influencing a variety of cognitive processes (e.g., 
attention, perception, planning, etc.). Reflecting the primacy of those mentalistic qualities, the 
architecture of an agent includes the following modules: sensors, memory/beliefs (for entities - 
which comprises both analogical and propositional knowledge representations -, plans, and maps 
of the environment), desires/goals, intentions, basic desires (basic motivations/motives), feelings, 
and reasoning. 
The key components that determine the exhibition of the exploratory behaviour in an agent are 
the kind of basic desires, feelings, goals and plans with which the agent is equipped. Based on 
solid, psychological experimental evidence, an agent is equipped in advance with the basic desires 
for minimal hunger, maximal information gain (maximal reduction of curiosity), and maximal 
surprise, as well as with the correspondent feelings of hunger, curiosity and surprise. Each one of 
those basic desires drives the agent to reduce or to maximize a particular feeling. The desire for 
minimal hunger, maximal information gain and maximal surprise directs the agent, respectively, 
to reduce the feeling of hunger, to reduce the feeling of curiosity (by maximizing information 
gain) and to maximize the feeling of surprise. The desire to reduce curiosity does not mean that 
the agent dislike curiosity. Instead, it means the agent desires selecting actions whose execution 
maximizes the reduction of curiosity, i.e., actions that are preceded by maximal levels of curiosity 
and followed by minimal levels of curiosity, which corresponds to maximize information gain. 
The intensity of these feelings is, therefore, important to compute the degree of satisfaction of the 
basic desires. For the basic desires of minimal hunger and maximal surprise it is given by the 
expected intensities of the feelings of hunger and surprise, respectively, after performing an 
action, while for the desire of maximal information gain it is given by the intensity of the feeling 
of curiosity before performing the action (this is the expected information gain). 
The memory of an agent is setup with goals and decision-theoretic, hierarchical task-network 
plans for visiting entities that populate the environment, regions of the environment, and for going 
to places where the agent can recharge its battery. New goals are generated for each unvisited 
 x 
entity of the environment, for each place in the frontier of the explored area, and for recharging 
battery, by adapting past goals and plans to the current world state computed based on sensorial 
information and on the generation of expectations and assumptions for the gaps in the 
environment information provided by the sensors. These new goals and respective plans are then 
ranked according to their Expected Utility which reflects the positive and negative relevance for 
the basic desires of their accomplishment. The first one, i.e., the one with highest Expected Utility 
is taken as an intention. 
Besides evaluating the computational model of surprise, we experimentally investigated 
through simulations the following issues: the role of the exploration strategy (role of surprise, 
curiosity, and hunger), environment complexity, and amplitude of the visual field on the 
performance of the exploration of environments populated with entities; the role of the size or, to 
some extent, of the diversity of the memory of entities, and environment complexity on 
map-building by exploitation. The main results show that: the computational model of surprise is 
a satisfactory model of human surprise; the exploration of unknown environments populated with 
entities can be robustly and efficiently performed by affective agents (the strategies that rely on 
hunger combined or not with curiosity or surprise outperform significantly the others, being 
strong contenders to the classical strategy based on entropy and cost). 
  xi 
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Resumo alargado em língua portuguesa 
ste capítulo descreve sucintamente o conteúdo desta tese. Uma exposição mais 
pormenorizada dos diversos aspectos da tese podem ser encontrados nos capítulos 
subsequentes, escritos em língua inglesa. Começamos com uma introdução do tema da 
tese, a que se segue a descrição da questão a investigar. Depois, apresentamos a abordagem 
adoptada para investigar essa questão e, posteriormente, a avaliação experimental realizada. Por 
fim, apresentamos as conclusões, nas quais se incluem as contribuições científicas e algumas 
questões que, ao ficarem sem resposta, constituem objecto de um trabalho futuro. 
1.1 Introdução 
A ciência ainda está longe de saber como é que a mente humana funciona. Um dos seus mais 
intricados aspectos é a relação entre emoção e racionalidade. Durante muitos anos assumiu-se que 
as emoções eram obstáculos à inteligência. Desde Platão, vários filósofos delinearam uma 
fronteira entre razão e emoção, assumindo que as emoções interferem com a racionalidade e que 
são factores potenciadores de um raciocínio incorrecto. Em Phaedrus, Platão compara a parte 
racional da alma a um condutor de uma carruagem que deve controlar os cavalos que simbolizam 
a parte emocional da alma [Plato, 1961]. Hoje em dia, os cientistas são tidos como os paradigmas 
da racionalidade, e o pensamento racional é geralmente assumido como sendo independente do 
pensamento emocional. Esta visão tradicional sobre a natureza da racionalidade separa claramente 
razão de emoção. Para que um ser humano seja racional, não deverá permitir a influência das 
emoções no raciocínio. No entanto, estudos recentes feitos no âmbito da Neurociência indicam 
precisamente o contrário, ao mostrarem que as emoções têm um papel fundamental em processos 
cognitivos como a percepção, aprendizagem, atenção, memória, e principalmente planeamento e 
tomada de decisões, bem como em outros aspectos habitualmente associados ao comportamento 
racional básico. Na verdade, estudos recentes com pacientes com lesões no córtex pré-frontal 
sugerem um papel crítico das emoções na tomada de decisão [Bechara et al., 1997; Churchland, 
1996; Damásio, 1994]. Embora os pacientes consigam responder com sucesso a uma variedade de 
testes de memória e de inteligência, quando colocados em situações da vida real eles parecem ser 
incapazes de tomar decisões correctas. Aparentemente, estes pacientes denotam uma falta de 
faculdades de intuição, que segundo vários investigadores podem ser baseadas em memórias de 
experiências emocionais passadas. Estas descobertas levaram António Damásio e seus colegas a 
sugerir que o raciocínio humano e a tomada de decisões envolvem vários mecanismos a diferentes 
níveis, desde os que regulam funções básicas do corpo até àqueles que se relacionam com 
raciocínio e tomada de decisão. Um aspecto particularmente interessante e novo deste ponto de 
vista é o de o raciocínio também depender das emoções e sentimentos que lhes estão associados. 
A perspectiva evolucionária da emoção permite uma melhor compreensão do seu papel no 
pensamento racional e na tomada de decisão. Este papel é parte integrante das principais funções 
da emoção: proporcionar a sobrevivência e o bem-estar. De facto, a sobrevivência e o bem-estar 
de alguém dependem obviamente das decisões tomadas ao longo da vida. Decisões erradas podem 
conduzir-nos a situações más ou mesmo fatais. Nesta perspectiva, e com base na sua influência na 
tomada de decisão, as emoções não são obstáculos à racionalidade, nem sequer adereços 
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desnecessários do ser humano, mas sim aspectos vitais para a inteligência e, consequentemente, 
para tudo o que desta depende. 
Quando um ser humano atinge os seus objectivos avalia como positivo este facto, enquanto 
que, quando o contrário acontece, resultam emoções negativas [Carver & Scheier, 1990]. As 
emoções são, deste modo, consideradas como prémios ou castigos. Um ser humano normalmente 
age de uma determinada forma porque espera que esse comportamento o faça sentir-se melhor 
(ver, por exemplo, [Thayer et al., 1994]). De acordo com princípios simples de reforço, os seres 
humanos repetem usualmente acções que tiveram consequências emocionais positivas no passado. 
Isto constitui uma espécie de hedonismo na medida, segundo estas ideias, os seres humanos 
procuram o prazer e evitam a dor. Mas este tipo de hedonismo não explica todas as variedades do 
fenómeno da motivação. Ao contrário destas teorias de hedonismo e neo-hedonismo [W. Cox & 
Klinger, 2004; Mellers, 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 2000], existe uma outra teoria, ou classe de 
teorias, para o efeito motivacional da emoção na tomada de decisão e na acção, que pode ser 
denominada teoria dos impulsos de acção específicos de emoções [Frijda, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; 
B. Weiner, 2005]. Esta defende que existem tendências de acção para cada emoção (por exemplo, 
evitar o perigo quando se sente medo, atacar em caso de raiva, ajudar quando se sente pena, etc.). 
O hedonismo assume a existência de um único desejo básico, enquanto que a teoria dos impulsos 
de acção específicos de emoções assume uma visão pluralista da motivação [Havercamp & Reiss, 
2003; McDougall, 1908; Reiss, 2000; Schwartz, 1992; B. Weiner, 1980] ao defender a existência 
de vários desejos básicos (por exemplo, curiosidade, poder, hedonismo, etc.). No entanto, alguns 
investigadores acreditam que o princípio do prazer está aqui presente embora de forma indirecta. 
Motivação e emoção são conceitos que estão muito relacionados e, por isso, nem sempre é fácil 
estabelecer uma fronteira entre eles. Emoção e motivação dependem da relação entre um 
organismo e o ambiente. A motivação é relacionada com a geração de objectivos e da acção, 
enquanto que a emoção diz respeito à avaliação do ambiente por parte do agente. No caso da 
emoção, a ênfase está em como uma determinada situação provoca determinados sentimentos 
numa pessoa. No caso da motivação, o interesse é colocado na forma como um indivíduo actua 
perante uma determinada situação [Kuhl, 1986]. De uma forma geral, a motivação é definida 
como sendo o conjunto de factores que levam a que um organismo se comporte de uma 
determinada forma num determinado momento. 
Uma das características do ser humano é a sua irreverente tendência para explorar as partes 
desconhecidas do mundo que o rodeia. Embora a exploração já exista desde o aparecimento do 
Homem, o seu auge pode ser considerado durante a Época dos Descobrimentos, um período que 
se iniciou no começo do século XV e que terminou nos primórdios do século XVII, período este 
durante o qual navegadores Europeus (Portugueses, Espanhóis, Ingleses, etc.) viajaram “por 
mares nunca dantes navegados”, descobrindo novas regiões e culturas. Estes grandes feitos, 
juntamente com a exploração do espaço sideral, dos planetas e satélites do sistema solar nos 
nossos dias, constituem um exemplo fidedigno do espírito de explorar da espécie humana. Não 
existem limites para a exploração humana: desde vulcões inóspitos, montanhas e oceanos 
enormes, até planetas agrestes como Marte, e satélites hostis como Titã e a Lua, o ser humano está 
constantemente a tentar adquirir conhecimento do ambiente apesar muitas vezes da adversidade 
deste. 
Mas o que é que motiva este comportamento? A “atenção selectiva” de James [James, 1890], a 
“catexia” de Freud [Freud, 1938], e o “instinto de curiosidade” de McDougall [McDougall, 1908] 
são conceitos fundamentais da relação entre motivação e o comportamento de exploração. Desde 
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há muito tempo que este comportamento de exploração tem sido expresso pela ideia de que os 
organismos respondem à novidade e à mudança no ambiente que habitam quando as suas 
necessidades básicas (sede, fome, etc.) estão satisfeitas. Quando a novidade e a mudança não 
existem no ambiente, os organismos têm tendência a procurá-las. Evidências deste 
comportamento em diversas espécies foram descritas por vários autores [Lester, 1969]. No ser 
humano, este tipo de comportamento está patente desde as primeiras horas de vida, tal como foi 
documentado por vários investigadores que estudaram a atenção selectiva (uma forma simples de 
comportamento de exploração) em recém-nascidos. Os recém-nascidos preferem certos padrões 
visuais em vez de outros. Eles não dão igual importância a todos os estímulos. Exploram o 
ambiente com os olhos, fixam o olhar nos objectos mais interessantes, i.e., naqueles que lhes 
proporcionam novos estímulos. 
Alguns dos investigadores que demonstraram que os organismos tendem a explorar objectos ou 
locais novos na ausência de necessidades básicas chamam-lhe necessidade de explorar [Butler, 
1953, 1954, 1957, 1958; Montegomery, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955]. Outros, tais como Berlyne 
[Berlyne, 1950] e Shand [Shand, 1914], adoptaram as ideias de McDougall sobre curiosidade. 
Para estes últimos autores, a curiosidade é o conceito psicológico que tem sido directamente 
relacionado com este tipo de comportamento. Berlyne considera que a curiosidade é inata, mas 
que também pode ser adquirida. Ele defende que um novo estímulo causa curiosidade, que 
diminui com a contínua exposição ao estímulo [Berlyne, 1950]. Num trabalho posterior [Berlyne, 
1955, 1960, 1967], Berlyne reformulou e completou a sua anterior teoria sobre a curiosidade. Para 
além da novidade, Berlyne considera que outras variáveis como a mudança, complexidade, 
incerteza, incongruência, o inesperado e o conflito também determinam este tipo de 
comportamento relacionado com actividades de exploração e investigação. Partilhando ideias 
similares com Berlyne e McDougall, Shand [Shand, 1914] considera a curiosidade como uma 
emoção primária que define como sendo um simples impulso para conhecer, que controla e 
sustém a atenção e provoca os movimentos do corpo que permitem que se adquira informação de 
um objecto. Estas abordagens estão bastante relacionadas com o conceito de “interesse-excitação” 
proposto pela teoria das emoções diferenciadas para explicar a exploração, a aventura, a 
resolução de problemas, criatividade e a aquisição de capacidades e competências quando não 
existem necessidades básicas [Izard, 1977, 1991]. De facto, os termos curiosidade e interesse são 
usados geralmente como sinónimos, por exemplo, por Berlyne. Nunnally e Lemond [Nunnally & 
Lemond, 1973] fizeram experiências sobre os efeitos da novidade e complexidade na exploração 
visual. Concluíram que novidade e conflito de informação provocam e são responsáveis pela 
manutenção da atenção. 
Em suma, não existem dúvidas que a novidade causa curiosidade/interesse, conceitos estes que 
estão na base do comportamento de exploração. No entanto, a novidade parece não ser suficiente 
para explicar todos os tipos de comportamento de exploração. Outras variáveis como a mudança, 
a complexidade, a incerteza, a incongruência, o inesperado e o conflito também determinam o 
comportamento de exploração. Algumas destas variáveis provocam surpresa, outro conceito 
psicológico que explica este comportamento. Avanços recentes no domínio da Neurociência 
indicam que a emoção influencia os processos cognitivos dos humanos, particularmente o 
planeamento e a tomada de decisão [Adolphs et al., 1996; Bechara et al., 1997; Damásio, 1994]. 
Sendo um processo de tomada de decisão, a exploração de ambientes desconhecidos é assim 
forçosamente influenciada pela emoção. Existe, deste modo, um vasto leque de motivações por 
detrás da tarefa de exploração. 
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A mente humana parece ser paradoxalmente ilimitada. Para enriquecerem as suas capacidades 
de lidar com situações adversas ou problemas, os seres humanos foram capazes de construir 
sistemas, chamados agentes artificiais, que tentam fazer de forma inteligente coisas tal como ou 
melhor que os humanos: percepcionar o ambiente e produzir acções correctas. Isto constitui um 
paradoxo porque é simultaneamente a prova da engenhosa faceta da mente humana de ultrapassar 
as suas limitações, mas também de reconhecer as suas limitações em lidar com certas situações ou 
pelo menos em lidar facilmente com elas. O objectivo da Inteligência Artificial é precisamente o 
de entender e construir tais agentes inteligentes artificiais. Obviamente, esses agentes não 
possuem (ainda) os órgãos dos sentidos, os efectores e a mente dos seres humanos, mas em vez 
disso possuem câmaras, braços robóticos, software, etc. No entanto, esses agentes exibem formas 
de percepção, de raciocínio e tomada de decisão, e de actuação. Embora não possam fazer todas 
as coisas que os seres humanos fazem, talvez façam outros tipos de coisas melhor que os seres 
humanos. Até à data, quase todas as capacidades dos seres humanos foram exploradas pela 
Inteligência Artificial, incluindo, sem surpresa, a exploração de ambientes desconhecidos. 
A exploração de ambientes desconhecidos por agentes artificiais (normalmente robots) tem sido 
uma área de investigação bastante activa. A exploração pode ser definida como sendo o processo 
de selecção e execução de acções no sentido de adquirir o máximo de conhecimento do ambiente. 
Deste processo resultam modelos físicos do ambiente. Desta forma, a exploração de ambientes 
desconhecidos envolve a construção de mapas, mas não se confina a este processo. De facto, 
podem identificar-se dois aspectos distintos na exploração. Primeiro, o agente ou robot tem de 
interpretar a informação adquirida pelos seus sensores para que possa obter uma correcta 
representação do estado do ambiente. Este é o problema da construção de mapas. Este problema 
de mapeamento tem vários aspectos que têm vindo a ser estudados intensamente, dos quais se 
destacam a localização do veículo durante o mapeamento e a construção de mapas apropriados do 
ambiente. A representação fidedigna do ambiente nos mapas depende destes factores. Este 
problema fundamental em robótica móvel é chamado de localização e mapeamento simultâneo e 
pode ser definido como um problema do tipo “ovo-e-galinha”: enquanto o robot navega num 
ambiente desconhecido, deve incrementalmente construir um mapa do que o rodeia e, ao mesmo 
tempo, ser capaz de se localizar nesse mapa construído. O segundo, mas não menos importante 
aspecto da exploração de ambientes desconhecidos, é o de o agente ou robot seleccionar os pontos 
de observação onde se vai colocar de forma a que os seus sensores adquiram informação nova e 
útil. Trata-se, neste caso, do problema de exploração propriamente dito. Este envolve conduzir o 
veículo de tal forma que todo o ambiente seja coberto pelos seus sensores. A representação 
fidedigna do ambiente no mapa depende também desta escolha dos pontos de observação durante 
a exploração. 
Infelizmente, a exploração de ambientes desconhecidos consome recursos dos agentes tais 
como tempo e energia. Existe uma situação de compromisso entre a quantidade de conhecimento 
adquirido e o custo para o adquirir. O objectivo de um explorador é o de obter o máximo de 
conhecimento do ambiente ao mínimo custo (tempo/energia). Várias técnicas têm sido propostas e 
testadas em ambientes simulados e reais, em ambientes externos e internos, usando um só agente 
ou múltiplos agentes. Os domínios de exploração incluem a exploração do espaço sideral e dos 
planetas e satélites destes (por exemplo, Marte, Titã e a Lua), a procura de meteoritos na 
Antártida, o mapeamento do fundo dos oceanos, a exploração de vulcões, mapeamento de 
interiores de edifícios, etc. A principal vantagem de usar agentes artificiais nestes ambientes em 
vez de seres humanos é a de a maioria destes ambientes serem hostis, sendo a sua exploração uma 
tarefa demasiado perigosa para os seres humanos. No entanto, muito há ainda para se fazer 
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especialmente em ambientes dinâmicos tais como os supracitados. Estes ambientes reais possuem 
normalmente vários objectos. Por exemplo, os escritórios contêm cadeiras, portas, caixotes do 
lixo, etc., e as cidades são formadas por diversos tipos de edifícios (casas, hospitais, igrejas, etc.). 
Muitos destes objectos são não estacionários, i.e., as suas localizações podem variar ao longo do 
tempo. Este aspecto é motivo de investigação na senda de novos algoritmos de geração de mapas 
que representem os ambientes como conjuntos de objectos. Pelo menos, tais modelos dos objectos 
deverão permitir a um robot anotar as mudanças que ocorrem no ambiente. Por exemplo, um 
robot de limpezas ao entrar num escritório à noite deverá ficar a saber facilmente que um caixote 
do lixo foi mudado de local. Um robot deverá fazer isto sem necessidade de ter de construir o 
modelo do caixote do lixo novamente a partir das novas observações. A representação de objectos 
oferece uma outra importante vantagem relacionada com o facto de muitos ambientes possuírem 
vários objectos do mesmo tipo. Por exemplo, a maioria das cadeiras de escritório são exemplos de 
uma mesma cadeira genérica e por isso são semelhantes, tal como acontece com a maioria das 
portas, caixotes do lixo, etc. Como estes exemplos sugerem, vários objectos partilham os mesmo 
atributos formando classes de objectos que são de primordial importância para a robótica móvel. 
Em particular, algoritmos que adquirem propriedades (aparência, movimento) de classes de 
objectos poderiam ser capazes de transferir essas propriedades de um objecto para outro dentro da 
mesma classe. Isto teria um impacto profundo na exactidão dos modelos de objectos e na rapidez 
com que esses modelos podem ser adquiridos. Por exemplo, se um robot de limpezas entrar num 
compartimento que nunca visitou antes, poderá perceber que um determinado objecto dentro 
desse compartimento tem uma aparência semelhante à de outros objectos vistos noutros 
compartimentos. Este robot pode então ser capaz de adquirir o mapa deste objecto mais 
rapidamente. Por outro lado, o robot poderá prever as propriedades deste novo objecto, tais como 
o facto de ser não estacionário, sem precisar de ter visto este objecto a mover-se. Um outro 
aspecto a ter em consideração para além do problema dos ambientes dinâmicos é o da autonomia 
dos robots que necessita forçosamente de ser melhorada, como acontece por exemplo na 
exploração planetária que continua a ser demasiado dependente do ser humano (os planos são 
determinados por um operador humano, bem como os pontos a visitar). 
Tal como foi mencionado anteriormente, a emoção é essencial para a sobrevivência, bem-estar 
e comunicação dos seres humanos, desempenhando um papel central em actividades cognitivas 
tais como a tomada de decisão, o planeamento e a criatividade. Nesta ordem de ideias, podemos 
colocar as questões: Porque não dotar agentes artificiais com emoções de forma a tirarem 
benefício das mesmas tal como os seres humanos o fazem? O que podem os agentes artificiais 
afectivos fazer melhor do que aqueles que não são afectivos? O que é que a emoção pode oferecer 
aos agentes artificiais? Certamente, nem todas as vantagens de que os seres humanos beneficiam 
são aplicáveis aos agentes artificiais. No entanto, podemos encontrar uma série de situações em 
que se vislumbra a vantagem emocional como por exemplo: sistemas de geração de voz a partir 
de texto, dando uma entoação mais natural ao discurso; entretenimento; medicina preventiva; 
ajuda a pessoas autistas; animais de estimação artificiais; agentes pessoais que podem seleccionar 
música, notícias, etc., para uma pessoa de acordo com o seu estado de humor; obtenção do 
“feedback” de clientes face a um produto específico através da aferição da sua resposta 
emocional, etc. Tais aplicações requerem capacidades de reconhecimento, expressão, e 
sentimento de emoções [Picard, 1997]. Embora esta influência da emoção no raciocínio tenha sido 
esquecida durante algum tempo na área de Inteligência Artificial, assistiu-se na última década a 
uma inversão desta situação, uma vez que estas capacidades de reconhecimento, expressão, e 
sentimento de emoções têm vindo a ser envolvidas em modelos computacionais de emoção e 
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motivação (por exemplo, [Bates, 1994; Botelho & Coelho, 1998; Dias & Paiva, 2005; Elliott, 
1992; Macedo & Cardoso, 2001a, 2001b; Maes, 1995; Oliveira & Sarmento, 2003; Ortony et al., 
1988; Paiva et al., 2004; Pfeifer, 1988; Picard, 1997; Reilly, 1996; Schmidhuber, 1991]). Algumas 
das aplicações que poderão tirar partido da emoção estão já desenvolvidas ou a serem 
desenvolvidas (por exemplo, animais de estimação artificiais capazes de expressar emoções, 
emoção em sistemas de conversão de texto em voz, etc.) e, desta forma, já não pertencem ao 
domínio da ficção científica. No entanto, muitas delas precisam certamente de melhoramentos. 
Outras aplicações, como o computador HAL [Clarke, 1997], estão ainda na prateleira da ficção 
científica. 
No que se refere particularmente à exploração de ambientes desconhecidos, poderá ser 
vantajoso ter em conta as emoções neste processo. Pelo que sabemos, não existe praticamente 
nenhum trabalho que use explicitamente emoções neste tipo de tarefa (excepção feita a 
[Blanchard & Cañamero, 2006; Oliveira & Sarmento, 2002; Velásquez, 1997], embora a 
abordagem seja superficial e o objectivo não seja a completa exploração de ambientes com 
entidades). Poderemos entender que alguns estudos sobre exploração consideram implicitamente 
formas rudimentares de motivações. Por exemplo, quando alguns trabalhos referem o uso de 
equações matemáticas que avaliam o ambiente em termos da quantidade de informação para um 
agente ou que calculam o custo para obter determinada informação, estão, de certa forma, a 
modelar no agente formas rudimentares, por exemplo, de curiosidade/interesse e fome, 
respectivamente. Tais trabalhos estão na verdade a considerar variáveis, como a novidade, 
incerteza, diferença ou mudança, que, de acordo com teorias da Psicologia, estão na base do 
processo de desencadeamento da curiosidade/interesse. 
Para construir agentes artificiais que ajam e pensem como os humanos [S. Russell & Norvig, 
1995], devemos conferir a esses agentes, entre outras, a capacidade de explorar ambientes 
desconhecidos de uma forma semelhante à humana. Tendo em conta, por um lado, as diversas 
teorias da Psicologia a relacionar emoções e motivações com comportamento de exploração nos 
humanos, e por outro, a evidência vinda da Neurociência suportando que a emoção influencia 
capacidades cognitivas como a tomada de decisão e planeamento (de notar que a exploração é um 
processo que envolve tomadas de decisão), é razoável considerar que a emoção e a motivação, ou 
se quisermos simplesmente a motivação no seu significado mais lato, influenciam esta actividade. 
Podemos sonhar com um robot a explorar Marte ou outro corpo celeste inóspito, evitando 
situações perigosas porque é capaz de sentir medo, seleccionando as coisas mais interessantes 
para visitar/analisar porque é capaz de sentir surpresa e curiosidade ou uma forma de interesse, 
sendo alarmado para recarregar a bateria porque é capaz de sentir fome, etc. Podemos também 
imaginar esse robot a mapear o ambiente que o rodeia e a construir modelos dos objectos que 
visita e analisa para que possam ser usados no futuro, não só como forma de simplificar o 
processo de exploração (conforme mencionado anteriormente), mas também como meios que 
contribuam para a sua sobrevivência e promovam o seu bem-estar. Obviamente, nesta tese não 
podemos ir tão longe, mas podemos fazer uma tentativa modesta de sermos uns dos precursores. 
Neste sentido, desenvolvemos um sistema multi-agente no qual os agentes são providos de 
sentimentos e desejos básicos. Outros módulos importantes da arquitectura destes agentes são o 
da memória e do raciocínio. Este último é, na verdade, essencialmente um planeador, i.e., um 
sistema que estabelece sequências de decisões. Embora esta plataforma multi-agente tenha outras 
aplicações potenciais, nesta tese, usámo-la apenas para o estudo do problema de exploração de 
ambientes desconhecidos que contêm entidades (objectos e outros agentes) por parte de agentes 
autónomos e afectivos. Assim, usando esta plataforma construímos um ambiente multi-agente no 
Resumo alargado em língua portuguesa  7 
 
qual, para além de entidades inanimadas (objectos), existem também agentes animados que 
interagem de uma forma simples e cujo objectivo é explorar o ambiente, mapeando-o, analisando-
o, estudando-o e avaliando-o. 
1.2 Afirmação da Tese/Questão de Investigação 
Nesta tese tentamos verificar a hipótese de que a exploração de ambientes desconhecidos que 
contêm entidades pode ser feita de uma forma robusta e eficiente por agentes capazes de processar 
motivações e emoções. Ao investigar o papel de algumas emoções e motivações neste tipo de 
tarefa, este trabalho demonstra os benefícios do uso de agentes afectivos na execução desta 
actividade de exploração. Além disso, estudamos a influência, nas emoções e motivações e 
consequentemente na “performance” da exploração, de outras variáveis/aspectos dos agentes e do 
próprio sistema multi-agente, como a memória dos agentes e a diversidade do ambiente. 
1.3 Abordagem 
Nesta tese, estudamos o problema da exploração, por agentes autónomos afectivos, de ambientes 
desconhecidos contendo entidades. Neste tipo de trabalho com ambientes multi-agente, podemos 
seguir dois tipos de abordagem: usar ambientes simulados ou reais. Alguns investigadores 
constroem softbots que depois usam em ambientes simulados para testar teorias e algoritmos. 
Outros optam por construir robots que colocam em ambientes reais. Era necessário escolher entre 
estas duas abordagens. 
A simulação tem vantagens. Por exemplo, podemos ter resultados de um algoritmo muito mais 
rapidamente usando softbots em ambientes simulados do que usando robots em ambientes reais. 
O investigador é capaz de fazer experiências sem as restrições temporais e financeiras 
habitualmente associadas ao uso de robots. Além disso, as simulações permitem ao investigador 
focar-se exclusivamente no aspecto preciso do problema em questão. Acrescente-se ainda o facto 
de o investigador ter mais controlo das variáveis do sistema envolvidas na experiência. 
No entanto, os ambientes simulados também têm algumas desvantagens. Para construir um 
softbot que modele um robot, o investigador tem de abstrair aspectos essenciais do robot que está 
a ser modelado. Esta abstracção envolve necessariamente algum grau de simplificação. Em 
robótica móvel isto acontece principalmente na modelação dos sensores. Os sensores simulados 
são na maior parte das vezes diferentes dos reais. Embora a investigação baseada em tais 
simplificações possa conduzir a bons resultados, existe sempre o perigo de no processo de 
simplificação se terem ignorado aspectos essenciais do robot de tal forma que os resultados não 
sejam válidos quando o robot for testado em ambiente real. Por esta razão, a simulação é 
considerada uma boa abordagem desde que todas as variáveis que possam influenciar os 
resultados no mundo real estejam presentes no modelo computacional. Escolhemos usar 
simulações pelas vantagens mencionadas acima e porque as simplificações que fizemos 
(apresentadas mais à frente nesta secção) não influenciam os resultados. Por exemplo, assumimos 
que os agentes conhecem a sua localização precisa mediante GPS porque este não é um aspecto 
relevante para testar a influência das emoções e motivações na exploração. 
Desenvolvemos um sistema multi-agente que compreende agentes afectivos. Embora 
antevejamos um potencial alargado para este sistema multi-agente (isto depende principalmente 
do tipo de objectivos e planos colocados na memória dos agentes), nesta tese estudamos a 
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capacidade dos agentes afectivos explorarem ambientes desconhecidos. Desta forma, não estamos 
a usar o sistema multi-agente em problemas comuns como o controlo de processos, 
entretenimento, ou eComerce, mas sim para o problema de exploração de ambientes 
desconhecidos, e mais especificamente, para a simulação desta actividade. A exploração de 
regiões inóspitas, como planetas, por robots móveis é um exemplo de um domínio onde esta 
capacidade é necessária. Outro exemplo é a “World Wide Web”. 
Tendo o sistema multi-agente como plataforma, desenvolvemos um ambiente simulado no qual, 
para além de entidades inanimadas (objectos), existem agentes que interagem de uma forma 
simples. Estes agentes analisam, estudam, avaliam e constroem o mapa do ambiente.  
Adoptamos a abordagem de considerar os agentes como agindo e actuando como humanos [S. 
Russell & Norvig, 1995] e baseamo-nos nas principais ideias da arquitectura 
“Belief-Desire-Intention” (BDI) para direccionar a nossa implementação. Na nossa plataforma, a 
arquitectura de um agente (Figura 1) inclui os seguintes módulos: sensores, memória (para 
entidades, planos e mapas do ambiente), desejos/objectivos, intenções, desejos básicos 
(motivações básicas), sentimentos, e raciocínio. A componente chave que determina o 
comportamento dos agentes é o tipo de objectivos, planos, desejos básicos e sentimentos que lhe 
são conferidos. Neste caso específico de comportamento de exploração, objectivos e planos para 
visitar entidades e regiões do ambiente, e para recarregar a bateria são colocados na memória dos 
agentes. No nosso caso, e de acordo com os estudos mencionados anteriormente, o agente é 
equipado com os desejos básicos de fome mínima, ganho de informação máximo (redução da 
curiosidade), e surpresa máxima. Cada um destes desejos básicos levam o agente a reduzir ou 
maximizar um determinado sentimento. O desejo de fome mínima, ganho de informação máximo 
e surpresa máxima conduzem o agente a reduzir o sentimento de fome, a reduzir o sentimento de 
curiosidade (através da maximização do ganho de informação) e a maximizar o sentimento de 
surpresa. É de salientar que o desejo de redução da curiosidade não significa que o agente não 
goste de se sentir curioso. Significa que o agente deseja seleccionar acções que maximizem a 
curiosidade antes destas serem executadas, porque após a sua execução é esperada a maximização 
do ganho de informação e, portanto, que haja uma maximização da redução da curiosidade. A 
intensidade dos sentimentos é importante para calcular o grau de satisfação dos desejos básicos. 
Para os desejos básicos de fome mínima e surpresa máxima, o grau de satisfação é dado pelos 
valores esperados para as intensidades dos sentimentos de fome e surpresa, respectivamente, após 
a execução de uma acção, enquanto que para o desejo básico de ganho de informação máximo é 
dado pela intensidade do sentimento de curiosidade antes da execução da acção (a curiosidade é, 
de certa forma, o ganho de informação esperado). A memória do agente é dotada de objectivos e 
planos para visitar entidades e regiões do ambiente, e para recarregar a bateria porque a sua 
execução pode levar o agente a satisfazer os desejos básicos. Os próximos parágrafos descrevem 
com mais detalhe os módulos da arquitectura e as suas relações. 
A memória de um agente armazena informação (crenças) sobre o mundo. Esta informação 
inclui a configuração do mundo que o rodeia, como a posição das entidades (objectos e outros 
agentes animados) que o habitam, a descrição dessas próprias entidades, e descrições dos planos 
executados pelas entidades. A informação é armazenada em várias secções da memória. Existe 
um mapa métrico para modelar espacialmente o ambiente físico que rodeia o agente. As 
descrições das entidades (estrutura física e função) e planos são armazenados na memória de 
episódios e na memória semântica. 
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Seguindo a perspectiva pluralista da motivação [Havercamp & Reiss, 2003; McDougall, 1908; 
Reiss, 2000; Schwartz, 1992; B. Weiner, 1980], o módulo dos desejos básicos contém um 
conjunto de desejos básicos que definem o comportamento do agente. Com base nos estudos 
sobre as motivações do comportamento de exploração descritos anteriormente, consideramos, 
conforme dito acima, os seguintes desejos básicos: fome mínima, ganho de informação máximo 
(redução da curiosidade), e surpresa máxima. O desejo da fome mínima e do ganho de 
informação máximo (redução da curiosidade) estão entre os dezasseis desejos básicos de Reiss 
[Reiss, 2000]. Estes desejos básicos são representados numa função matemática, a função da 
Utilidade Esperada (UE), que avalia estados do ambiente em termos da relevância positiva e 
negativa para os desejos básicos. Para além de obedecer ao princípio da Máxima Utilidade 
Esperada [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995], esta função é a combinação das funções de Utilidade 
Esperada de cada desejo básico. Representa, no nosso caso, a aversão à fome e o gostar de 
surpresa e ganho de informação. Para satisfazer os desejos básicos o agente deseja visitar 
entidades e regiões que ainda não visitou e locais onde pode recarregar a bateria (por exemplo: 
visitEntity(y), visitLoc(x), rechargeBattery()). Estes novos objectivos são automaticamente 
gerados pelo agente através da adaptação a novas situações de objectivos do passado, sendo de 
seguida ordenados de acordo com a sua preferência (utilidade) e só então são tidos como 
intenções logo que um plano seja gerado para eles. 
 
 
Figura 1 – Arquitectura de um agente. 
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O módulo dos sentimentos recebe informação sobre o estado do mundo e calcula as 
intensidades dos sentimentos. Seguindo Clore [Clore, 1992], este módulo inclui sentimentos 
afectivos (aqueles que estão ligados ao prazer), sentimentos cognitivos e sentimentos corporais. 
As últimas duas categorias unem-se para formar a categoria dos sentimentos não afectivos. Como 
foi dito anteriormente, os sentimentos são de primordial importância para o cálculo do grau de 
satisfação dos desejos básicos. 
O módulo de raciocínio recebe informação sobre o estado interno e externo do mundo e calcula 
e devolve uma acção que entretanto foi seleccionada para ser executada. O agente começa por 
calcular o estado actual do mundo mediante a geração de expectativas ou suposições para as faltas 
de informação do ambiente proporcionada pelos sensores. Então, novos desejos/objectivos (por 
exemplo, visitEntity(y), visitLoc(x), rechargeBattery()) são gerados com base na memória de 
planos, e a sua Utilidade Esperada é calculada com base no grau de satisfação dos desejos básicos 
estimado para a execução das acções necessárias para o cumprimento desses objectivos. De 
acordo com esta Utilidade Esperada, o conjunto de objectivos do agente é ordenado e para cada 
um é gerado um plano (ver, por exemplo, [Erol et al., 1994b]). O objectivo do topo da lista, i.e., o 
de maior Utilidade Esperada é então considerado como intenção. 
O planeador é o núcleo do módulo de raciocínio. O agente usa o planeador que combina 
técnicas de “Decision-Theoretic Planning” com a metodologia de “Hierarchical Task-Network 
Planning” para poder lidar com domínios reais, dinâmicos e onde existe incerteza. Ao contrário 
do clássico “Hierarchical Task-Network Planning”, o planeador pode gerar planos em domínios 
onde não existe uma teoria do domínio. Isto é conseguido mediante o uso de casos de planos com 
sucesso no passado em vez dos habituais métodos de decomposição de tarefas do “Hierarchical 
Task-Network Planning” clássico. O planeador gera uma variante de uma “Hierarchical 
Task-Network” – uma espécie de árvore AND/OR de tarefas condicionais probabilísticas – que 
expressa todas as possíveis decomposições de uma rede de tarefas inicial. A Utilidade Esperada 
dos planos alternativos é calculada de antemão, quando a “Hierarchical Task-Network” é 
construída, com base nos sentimentos esperados se o plano for executado pelo agente. É atribuída 
maior Utilidade Esperada a planos cuja execução se espera que produza maior satisfação dos 
desejos básicos. 
Uma vez seleccionada a abordagem de simulação, assumimos alguns aspectos que nos parecem 
não interferir com os propósitos desta tese: 
• Confinamos o conjunto de sentimentos e desejos básicos àqueles que foram sugeridos 
como tendo uma relação com o comportamento de exploração dos humanos. Assim, 
conforme dito anteriormente, consideramos apenas os desejos básicos fome mínima, 
ganho de informação máximo (redução da curiosidade), e surpresa máxima, que estão 
associados aos sentimentos de fome, curiosidade/interesse, e surpresa; 
• Não consideramos as componentes de reconhecimento e expressão emocional, 
restringindo o modelo ao processo de activação das emoções; 
• Não nos dedicamos ao problema do reconhecimento de aspectos tais como a forma 
geométrica dos objectos ou de partes deles. Assumimos que o agente é capaz de 
reconhecer algumas formas geométricas, o que nos permitiu concentrar apenas no esboço 
de algoritmos baseados nesta capacidade; 
• Assumimos que os agentes têm conhecimento das suas localizações precisas. Deste modo, 
não abordamos o problema SLAM (“Simultaneous Localization and Mapping”), 
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principalmente o seu aspecto relacionado com a localização, uma vez que o mapeamento 
é de certa forma considerado; 
• Assumimos que os agentes possuem sensores ideais, i.e., a informação capturada pelos 
sensores é livre de ruído. 
1.4 Experimentação 
Como projecto de investigação que é, o processo de avaliação experimental foi conduzido 
começando por uma análise de dados exploratória que resultou na obtenção de um modelo causal 
envolvendo as variáveis do sistema. A esta fase seguiram-se experiências confirmatórias das 
hipóteses geradas no estudo exploratório [P. Cohen, 1995]. Esta experimentação segue a 
abordagem de outros investigadores do problema da exploração de ambientes desconhecidos que 
têm testado em ambientes simulados e reais diferentes abordagens para a exploração, alterando 
variáveis do sistema, como a configuração e complexidade do ambiente, a estratégia de 
exploração de um agente e o seu campo de visão. 
Para testar a abordagem adoptada nesta tese para a exploração de ambientes desconhecidos, 
investigamos experimentalmente a relação entre as variáveis independentes e dependentes do 
sistema. 
As variáveis dependentes descrevem aspectos de aferição da execução da tarefa de exploração 
de ambientes desconhecidos. A eficiência e a eficácia são habitualmente os dois parâmetros para 
avaliar uma tarefa. No que diz respeito à exploração, a eficiência pode ser medida pela quantidade 
de informação adquirida do ambiente por unidade de tempo. Um agente explorador que seja capaz 
de adquirir mais conhecimento que outro num mesmo tempo, ou o mesmo conhecimento em 
menos tempo é mais eficiente. A eficácia refere-se à aquisição correcta e completa da informação 
de um ambiente finito. Um agente explorador eficaz é capaz de explorar correcta e completamente 
um ambiente. Na nossa abordagem, a informação adquirida por um agente explorador é dada por 
três variáveis: a percentagem do mapa do ambiente adquirido (número ou percentagem de células 
conhecidas ou, numa perspectiva diferente, inconsistência entre o mapa construído e o mapa real), 
o número ou percentagem de modelos de entidades adquiridos (número ou percentagem de 
entidades visitadas) e a diversidade de modelos de entidades adquiridos (número ou percentagem 
de entidades diferentes visitadas). Estas medidas estão relacionadas uma vez que, para o mesmo 
ambiente, quanto maior for o número de modelos de entidades adquiridos, maior a probabilidade 
de ter adquirido mais informação do ambiente. 
Outro aspecto importante a ter em conta na avaliação da exploração é o facto de esta ser um 
processo que envolve dois passos: selecção dos pontos de observação de forma a que os sensores 
adquiram informação nova e útil, e interpretação correcta dessa informação adquirida pelos 
sensores. O primeiro passo prepara o segundo. É de vital importância para a eficiência e eficácia 
de uma estratégia de exploração. A selecção de pontos de informação que proporcionem a 
aquisição do máximo de informação a um baixo custo (tempo e energia) contribui para a 
eficiência da tarefa de exploração. Por outro lado, esses pontos de informação devem ser 
seleccionados de tal forma que se garanta a aquisição de toda a informação do ambiente. A fase 
de construção do mapa relaciona-se mais com a eficácia do que com a eficiência, embora 
influencie também esta. De facto, diferenças no tempo de interpretação da informação dos 
sensores tem normalmente um impacto menor na eficiência em comparação com as diferenças no 
tempo de viajar de um lugar para outro. Estas últimas são habitualmente maiores que as primeiras. 
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Pelo contrário, a eficácia da exploração depende muito da interpretação correcta da informação. 
Interpretações erradas levam a mapas incorrectos, o que significa uma falha parcial da exploração. 
Assim, a avaliação da exploração deverá ter em conta estas duas fases da exploração. No nosso 
caso específico, as simplificações estabelecidas na nossa abordagem asseguram que o agente 
adquire correctamente toda a informação do ambiente após a sua exploração exaustiva que 
também é garantida, i.e., qualquer que seja a estratégia no final da exploração de um ambiente o 
agente terá sempre a mesma informação. Por esta razão, não faz sentido medir a eficácia uma vez 
que esta será sempre 100%. Deste modo, as duas medidas, eficiência e eficácia, fundem-se numa 
só: eficiência ou se quisermos podemos chamar-lhe simplesmente “performance” da exploração. 
Se o conhecimento é o mesmo no final da exploração, as diferenças residem então apenas no 
tempo gasto ou energia consumida para adquirir esse conhecimento. De forma a simplificar a 
experimentação, assumimos que um agente consome uma unidade de energia ao deslocar-se uma 
célula no ambiente. Além disso, e uma vez que um agente está sempre em constante movimento 
no ambiente, assumimos também que demora uma unidade de tempo a deslocar-se uma célula, o 
que nos permite estabelecer que consome uma unidade de energia por unidade de tempo. Desta 
forma, estas variáveis são também fundidas numa só. Postas estas considerações, a “performance” 
da exploração completa de um ambiente pode ser dada pelo tempo (energia) requerido para 
explorar todo o ambiente (i.e., tempo/energia requerido para adquirir informação de todas as 
células do ambiente - variável “teenv”), pelo tempo (energia) requerido para visitar todas as 
entidades do ambiente (i.e., tempo/energia requerido para adquirir todos os modelos de entidades 
do ambiente - variável “teent”), e pelo tempo (energia) necessário para visitar todas as entidades 
diferentes do ambiente (i.e., tempo/energia requerido para adquirir todos os modelos diferentes 
das entidades do ambiente - variável “tedent”). Estas são então as variáveis dependentes ou 
variáveis de resposta da experimentação. Trata-se, portanto, de um estudo multivariável. 
As variáveis independentes correspondem às várias propriedades dos agentes afectivos e do 
ambiente que habitam. No que se refere às propriedades dos agentes, as variáveis independentes 
representam os sentimentos e desejos básicos associados, tamanho da memória e diversidade do 
seu conteúdo, campo de visão, etc. No que diz respeito ao ambiente, representam aspectos como o 
tamanho do ambiente e a diversidade de entidades que o habitam. No fundo, estamos interessados 
em avaliar os vários aspectos dos módulos da arquitectura de um agente que influenciam a 
exploração, bem como eventuais interacções entre eles. Avaliamos essencialmente a influência 
dos módulos que processam os sentimentos na eficiência da exploração. Por outras palavras, 
avaliamos a estratégia de exploração baseada em afecto. A este respeito, devemos garantir 
previamente que os modelos computacionais dos sentimentos espelhem os dos humanos. 
Decidimos não avaliar os modelos da curiosidade e da fome por traduzirem fielmente as teorias da 
Psicologia que lhes atribui uma simples linearidade. De facto, a curiosidade é equacionada à 
novidade e à incerteza, e a fome à necessidade de energia. O problema reside no modelo da 
surpresa que aparenta ser não linear de acordo com algumas teorias da Psicologia. Por isso, 
testamos a validade do nosso modelo da surpresa. Do que aqui foi dito, pode concluir-se que é 
ponto assente que estamos mais interessados no processo de selecção dos pontos de observação, 
i.e., na estratégia de exploração. No entanto, não descuramos a avaliação do processo de 
mapeamento, embora, na nossa abordagem, este resida na geração de expectativas sobre o mundo. 
Avaliamos apenas a sua principal vantagem que consiste na possibilidade de construção de mapas 
mediante o uso de conhecimento adquirido em prévias explorações do mesmo ou de outros 
ambientes. 
Resumo alargado em língua portuguesa  13 
 
Em suma, a nossa experimentação consiste principalmente na avaliação dos efeitos e eventuais 
interacções das estratégias de exploração (com base na surpresa, curiosidade e fome) (variável 
“strat”), da complexidade do ambiente (variável “envComp”) e da amplitude do campo visual dos 
agentes (variável “visField”) na “performance” dos agentes exploradores de ambientes 
desconhecidos providos de entidades [Macedo & Cardoso, 2004c]. No entanto, para assegurar que 
esta experimentação assente em modelos de sentimentos válidos, avaliamos o modelo da surpresa 
[Macedo & Cardoso, 2001a; Macedo et al., 2004]. Embora não sendo directamente relacionado 
com a questão de investigação desta tese e, por isso, menos relevante, é também avaliado o efeito, 
no processo de construção de mapas mediante o uso de conhecimento, do tamanho da memória e 
de certa forma da sua diversidade de conteúdos, e da complexidade do ambiente [Macedo & 
Cardoso, 2004e, 2005a]. Os próximos parágrafos descrevem sucintamente as experiências que nos 
permitiram tirar conclusões sobre estas avaliações. 
O nosso modelo inicial da surpresa propunha que a intensidade de surpresa “sentida” por um 
agente causada por um evento X é proporcional ao grau de “não esperança” que o agente tinha de 
X (calculada com base nas frequências dos eventos existentes na memória do agente). De acordo 
com a Teoria da Probabilidade, o grau de esperança de um evento X acontecer é dado pela sua 
probabilidade subjectiva P(X). Deste modo, a improbabilidade de X, denotada por 1-P(X), define 
o grau de “não esperança” de X. A intensidade da surpresa causada por X deveria então ser uma 
função monótona crescente de 1-P(X). Em duas experiências com este modelo, em que 
comparámos o grau de surpresa sentido por humanos com o “sentido” por um agente artificial, 
perante questões sobre eventos hedonicamente neutros (com sequências de símbolos) e sobre 
edifícios, encontrámos uma forte evidência a favor deste modelo. No que se refere às questões 
com eventos hedonicamente neutros, encontrámos diferenças na ordem de 6.5% entre o agente 
artificial e a média dos humanos se considerarmos apenas a surpresa sentida relativamente a uma 
parte do evento, e na ordem de 2.2% se considerarmos os eventos no seu todo. Foram, no entanto, 
encontrados resultados piores com questões relacionadas com edifícios, provavelmente porque 
neste domínio os humanos e o agente possuem conhecimento distinto: 47% para uma parte de um 
edifício e 5% para edifícios no seu todo. 
Este modelo tinha várias limitações, nomeadamente ao não explicar correctamente certas 
situações de surpresa tais como a aparente inexistência de surpresa quando ocorre o evento mais 
esperado de um conjunto de eventos. No sentido de obtermos um modelo computacional mais 
completo para a surpresa, realizámos um estudo teórico seguido por um empírico de várias formas 
de calcular a intensidade da surpresa [Macedo et al., 2004]. Estes estudos, realizados no domínio 
das eleições políticas e de desportos, sugerem que a função S(X) = ))()(1(log2 XPYP −+  é a 
mais apropriada (pelo menos nestes domínios). 
Fizemos uma experiência para avaliar os efeitos da surpresa, curiosidade e fome na 
“performance” da exploração exaustiva de ambientes providos de entidades. Na verdade, este 
estudo corresponde ao estudo dos efeitos desses sentimentos e correspondentes desejos básicos na 
estratégia de exploração dos agentes afectivos da nossa abordagem. Das várias combinações da 
surpresa, curiosidade e fome resultam sete estratégias: estratégia de exploração direccionada 
baseada somente na fome; estratégia de exploração direccionada baseada somente na curiosidade; 
estratégia de exploração direccionada baseada na curiosidade e na fome; estratégia de exploração 
direccionada baseada somente na surpresa; estratégia de exploração direccionada baseada na 
surpresa e na fome; estratégia de exploração direccionada baseada na surpresa e na curiosidade; 
estratégia de exploração direccionada baseada na surpresa, curiosidade e fome. A “performance” 
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destas sete estratégias resultantes das combinações destes três sentimentos e desejos básicos que 
lhes estão associados foram comparadas entre si e também com outras duas estratégias, uma 
puramente aleatória [Thrun, 1992a] e outra baseada na distância a atravessar e na quantidade de 
informação (definida pela entropia) que se espera adquirir [Stachniss & Burgard, 2003]. Esta 
última estratégia corresponde à estratégia clássica de exploração. 
A experiência consiste em correr o agente a partir de uma localização constante, com todas as 
estratégias (uma de cada vez) em vários ambientes de três categorias diferentes de complexidade. 
A complexidade dos ambientes é definida pela diversidade de entidades que contêm e pelo 
número de entidades com estrutura e/ou função similar. Ambientes de baixa complexidade 
contêm somente três tipos de entidades diferentes com somente dois tipos de funções, o que 
significa que dois tipos de entidades têm em comum a função, diferindo somente na estrutura. Os 
ambientes de complexidade média contêm em média sete tipos de entidades diferentes e em 
média quatro tipos diferentes de funções. Por fim, nos ambientes de complexidade elevada todas 
as entidades são diferentes e têm em média cinco tipos diferentes de funções, embora algumas 
tenham em comum estrutura ou a função. Todos os ambientes têm o mesmo número de entidades 
(doze). As doze posições das entidades são também constantes em todos os ambientes. Estes 
aspectos (tamanho do ambiente, posições das entidades e número de entidades) são constantes 
para evitar maior variabilidade na variável complexidade do ambiente o que poderia tornar 
obscura a influência da estratégia de exploração na “performance”. De facto, a alteração de 
qualquer uma destas variáveis resulta na alteração do tempo/energia requerido para explorar 
completamente um ambiente. 
O procedimento consiste então em correr o agente nos doze ambientes simulados, cada vez com 
uma estratégia diferente. Este processo é repetido duas vezes, uma com uma amplitude do campo 
de visão pequena e outra com uma amplitude do campo de visão grande. Considerando que um 
problema/tarefa de exploração é definido pelo par ambiente-campo de visão, isto corresponde a 
correr o agente com uma determinada estratégia em 24 problemas/tarefas de exploração. No final 
de cada uma destas sessões, mediu-se o tempo/energia requerido para adquirir a informação sobre 
todas as células, o tempo/energia requerido para adquirir a informação sobre todas as entidades, e 
o tempo/energia requerido para adquirir a informação sobre todas as entidades diferentes. Estas 
são então as variáveis dependentes como foi dito anteriormente, enquanto que a estratégia é uma 
variável independente (também chamada factor ou tratamento). Embora outras abordagens 
possam ser seguidas, consideramos que os problemas/tarefas de exploração são as unidades 
experimentais (participantes ou sujeitos). Uma vez que cada tarefa de exploração é executada com 
todas as estratégias, i.e., cada participante recebe cada um dos tratamentos ou condições das 
variáveis independentes ou níveis dos factores, trata-se de um design experimental com medidas 
repetidas (também chamado design experimental intra-sujeitos). Designs de medidas repetidas 
permitem-nos obter uma grande quantidade de informação a partir de um número reduzido de 
sujeitos mediante a obtenção de vários dados a partir de um mesmo sujeito [P. Cohen, 1995; D. 
Cox & Reid, 2000; Dowdy et al., 2004; Mason et al., 2003; Montgomery, 2001; Murphy & 
Myors, 2004; I. Weiner, 2003]. Considerando que tudo o resto é igual, existe menos variabilidade 
num conjunto de medidas repetidas obtidas de um mesmo sujeito do que num conjunto de 
medidas independentes, cada umas das quais obtida de um sujeito diferente. Além disso, designs 
com medidas repetidas permitem-nos tirar partido do facto de várias observações correlacionadas 
constituírem uma informação mais verdadeira sobre um sujeito do que uma única observação que 
é o que se obtém num design sem medidas repetidas. Por fim, designs com medidas repetidas 
permitem-nos a identificação e remoção de fontes de variância em dados que são tratados como 
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erros em designs sem medidas repetidas. Em particular, o design de medidas repetidas 
permite-nos estimar ou remover efeitos sistémicos dos sujeitos que não podem ser estimados ou 
controlados em designs sem medidas de repetição. Uma consequência disto é o facto de o poder 
de detectar efeitos de factores experimentais intra-sujeitos (estratégia de exploração) ser maior em 
comparação com o que seria se usássemos um design sem medidas repetidas. É de notar que, 
conforme dito anteriormente, existem variáveis nesta experiência que podem exercer alguma 
influência nas variáveis dependentes, mas que não têm qualquer interesse para os objectivos desta 
experiência e que, por esta razão, são mantidas constantes. Exemplos dessas variáveis são a 
posição das entidades, o número de entidades nos ambientes (doze), o número de outros agentes 
num ambiente (0), o nível da bateria do agente (1000 unidades), o planeador, etc. 
Considerando esta informação a respeito da experiência, podemos conceber pelo menos três 
designs experimentais diferentes dependendo dos factores que se considerem. 
O factor principal da nossa experiência é sem dúvida a estratégia. Existem nove níveis para este 
factor, cada um dos quais correspondendo a uma das estratégias de exploração cujas médias de 
“performance” pretendemos comparar. A tarefa/problema de exploração pode ser outro factor, 
embora possamos não considerar os seus efeitos. Neste caso, temos um design experimental com 
medidas repetidas e com apenas um factor. Para analisarmos estatisticamente os dados 
observados neste design, fazemos uso da análise de variância “one way” com medidas repetidas. 
Este design experimental considera a estratégia como factor intra-sujeito. Cada tratamento 
corresponde a um dos nove níveis do factor. 
 
Este design permite-nos testar a hipótese nula sobre a igualdade dos efeitos do factor estratégia: 
H0: α1=α1=…=α9=0 (não existe nenhum efeito da estratégia) 
H1: pelo menos um αi≠0, i=1,…,9 
Os valores do nível de significância obtidos são apresentados na Tabela 1. 
Tabela 1 – Resumo dos resultados obtidos com o design experimental com medidas repetidas 
e com apenas um factor. 
 Univariável Conservativo Multivariável 
 strat strat Strat 
teenv <0.001 <0.001 
teent <0.001 =0.025 
tedent <0.001 <0.001 
<0.001 
 
No entanto, podemos querer saber quais os efeitos da tarefa/problema de exploração, para além 
dos efeitos da estratégia, bem como a sua interacção na “performance” de exploração do agente. 
Neste caso, temos um design experimental factorial com dois factores e com medidas repetidas. 
A estratégia é um factor intra-sujeito ao passo que a tarefa/problema de exploração é um factor 
entre-sujeito. Este design com medidas repetidas”two way” pode ser dividido em dois designs 
que resultam da aplicação ou não do princípio experimental de blocking ao factor da tarefa de 
exploração. Este princípio pode ser aplicado para reduzir a variância causada pelo uso de 
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ambientes com diferentes complexidades ou diferentes amplitudes do campo de visão. Neste caso, 
estas variáveis podem ser consideradas como factores nuisance. Daqui resultam dois possíveis 
designs factoriais com medidas repetidas e com dois factores: design com medidas repetidas em 
que o problema/tarefa é um factor (chamado one-line-per-level setup - sem blocking) e design 
com medidas repetidas com blocking (a complexidade do ambiente ou o campo de visão podem 
ser usados para agrupar os sujeitos – problemas/tarefas de exploração). Consideramos este último 
tipo de design com blocking, que por sua vez pode ser divido em outros dois: design com medidas 
repetidas com três blocos de tarefas/problemas (a variável complexidade do ambiente é usada para 
agrupar os sujeitos - problemas/tarefas de exploração - em três grupos: ambientes de baixa, média 
e elevada complexidade) e design com medidas repetidas com dois blocos de tarefas/problemas de 
exploração (a variável campo de visão é usada para agrupar os sujeitos em dois grupos: campo de 
visão curto e longo). 
Estes designs factoriais com medidas repetidas e com dois factores, sendo a um deles aplicado 
o princípio de blocking, permitem-nos testar a hipótese nula sobre a igualdade dos efeitos do 
factor estratégia: 
H0: α1=α1=…=α9=0 (não existe nenhum efeito da estratégia) 
H1: pelo menos um αi≠0 , i=1,…,9 
Além disso, estes tipos de design permitem-nos testar a hipótese nula sobre a igualdade dos 
efeitos do factor que divide o problema/tarefa em categorias – complexidade do ambiente no 
primeiro tipo de design, ou campo de visão no segundo tipo de design: 
H0: βj=0 , para todos os j (não existe nenhum efeito da categoria do problema/tarefa) 
H1: pelo menos um βj≠0 
Por fim, permitem-nos determinar se a estratégia ou a categoria do problema/tarefa interagem: 
H0: (αβ)ij=0 , para todos os i,j (não existe efeito de interacção) 
H1: pelo menos um (αβ)ij≠0 
Por outras palavras, estes designs factoriais com blocking permitem-nos responder a três 
questões: (a) qual o efeito da estratégia?; (b) qual o efeito da categoria do problema/tarefa 
(complexidade do ambiente ou campo de visão)?; e (c) estas duas variáveis interagem, i.e., o 
efeito da estratégia depende da categoria do problema? 
Os valores do nível de significância obtidos são apresentados na Tabela 2 e Tabela 3. 
A estratégia é indubitavelmente um factor fixo. No entanto, para que os resultados sejam 
generalizados a todos os problemas de exploração, poderemos seleccioná-los aleatoriamente de 
uma população de problemas de exploração. Neste caso temos um terceiro tipo de design com 
dois factores, um fixo e outro aleatório. Este design é semelhante ao anterior. Assim, considera-se 
a estratégia como factor intra-sujeito e o problema/tarefa como factor entre-sujeito. Ao contrário 
do design anterior, este último factor é aleatório porque os problemas/tarefas considerados são 
apenas representativos de uma classe infinita de problemas/tarefas para os quais queremos 
generalizar os resultados. O princípio de blocking é usado com os mesmos objectivos de redução 
da variância, mas neste caso só faz sentido ser a complexidade do ambiente a variável de 
agrupamento, pois o campo de visão assume apenas dois valores e, portanto, é uma variável fixa, 
inviabilizando a aleatoriedade da escolha. O factor problema/tarefa é, desta forma, “aninhado” no 
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factor complexidade do ambiente. Keppel [Keppel, 1991] sugeriu que este design pode ser 
alternativamente concebido como um design de três factores, sendo estes a estratégia, a 
complexidade do ambiente e o problema/tarefa. Os primeiros são considerados fixos, enquanto 
que o último é aleatório. Adoptámos esta nomenclatura. 
 
Tabela 2 - Resumo dos resultados obtidos com o design experimental com medidas repetidas e 
com dois factores, com blocking (a complexidade do ambiente foi usada para agrupar os 
sujeitos – problemas/tarefas de exploração). 
 Univariável Conservativo Multivariável 
 strat envComp strat × envComp strat envComp strat × envComp strat strat × envComp 
teenv <0.001 0.823 0.997 <0.001 - - 
teent <0.001 0.144 1.00 <0.001 - - 
tedent <0.001 <0.001 0.048 <0.001 - 
0.21 
0.175 
0.181 
<0.001 <0.001 
 
Tabela 3 - Resumo dos resultados obtidos com o design experimental com medidas repetidas e 
com dois factores, com blocking (a amplitude do campo de visão foi usada para agrupar os 
sujeitos – problemas/tarefas de exploração). 
 Univariável Conservativo Multivariável 
 strat visField strat × visField strat visField strat × visField strat strat × visField 
teenv <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 - <0.001 
teent <0.001 0.781 <0.001 0.019 - 
0.072 
0.071 
0.071 
tedent <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 - <0.001 
<0.001 <0.001 
 
Este design factorial permite-nos testar a hipótese nula sobre a igualdade dos efeitos do factor 
estratégia: 
H0: α1=α1=…=α9=0 (não existe nenhum efeito da estratégia) 
H1: pelo menos um αi≠0 , i=1,…,9 
Além disso, permite-nos testar a hipótese nula sobre a igualdade dos efeitos do factor que 
divide o problema/tarefa em categorias – complexidade do ambiente: 
H0: β1=β2=β3=0 (não existe nenhum efeito da categoria do problema/tarefa) 
H1: pelo menos um βj≠0, j=1,2,3 
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Por fim, permitem-nos determinar se a estratégia ou a categoria do problema/tarefa interagem: 
H0: (αβ)ij=0 , para todos os i,j (não existe efeito de interacção) 
H1: pelo menos um (αβ)ij≠0 
Por outras palavras, este design permite-nos responder a três questões: (a) qual o efeito da 
estratégia?; (b) qual o efeito da categoria do problema/tarefa (complexidade do ambiente)?; e (c) 
estas duas variáveis interagem, i.e., o efeito da estratégia depende da categoria do problema? 
Existe, contudo, um aspecto importante a realçar: estas questões são respondidas relativamente a 
todos os problemas de exploração. 
Os valores do nível de significância obtidos são apresentados na Tabela 4. 
 
Tabela 4 - Resumo dos resultados obtidos com o design experimental com medidas repetidas e 
com três factores. 
 Univariável 
 strat envComp strat x envComp 
teenv <0.001 0.823 0.997 
teent <0.001 0.144 1 
tedent <0.001 <0.001 0.048 
 
Poderíamos ainda considerar um outro tipo de design experimental no qual a estratégia, o 
ambiente e o campo de visão seriam os três factores. No entanto, uma vez que no nosso caso esta 
seria uma experiência factorial sem replicação, i.e., existiria uma só observação por célula 
(condição), teríamos que usar a técnica de não considerar um destes factores para permitir que os 
dados fossem analisados estatisticamente [Montgomery, 2001]. Por esta razão, este procedimento 
transformaria o design three way em two way. 
 
Todas as análises experimentais indicaram que existe evidência sobre um efeito significativo da 
estratégia de exploração nas três medidas de “performance”. 
Não encontramos evidência sobre o efeito do factor complexidade do ambiente no 
tempo/energia necessário para explorar o ambiente completamente e todas as entidades. No 
entanto, encontramos evidência sobre um efeito significativo deste factor no tempo/energia 
necessário para explorar todas as entidades diferentes. Não encontramos evidência do efeito de 
interacção entre a estratégia e a complexidade do ambiente sobre o tempo/energia necessário para 
explorar o ambiente completamente e todas as entidades. Existe, contudo, alguma dúvida sobre o 
efeito de interacção entre a estratégia e a complexidade do ambiente sobre o tempo/energia 
necessário para explorar todas as entidades diferentes: parece ser significativo sob o pressuposto 
da esfericidade e não significativo sob o teste “Lower Bound”, permanecendo não significativo 
após as correcções Huynh-Feldt and Greenhouse-Geisser. Poderemos então concluir que não 
existe o efeito de interacção entre a estratégia e a complexidade do ambiente sobre o 
tempo/energia necessário para explorar todas as entidades diferentes no nível 0.05. No entanto, 
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estas conclusões são alteradas pelos testes multivariável que indicam uma interacção significativa 
entre estratégia e complexidade do ambiente sobre o tempo/energia necessário para explorar todas 
as entidades diferentes. O design three way indica também a existência deste efeito de interacção. 
Encontramos um efeito significativo da amplitude do campo de visão no tempo/energia 
necessário para explorar todo o ambiente e todas as entidades diferentes, mas parece não existir 
tal efeito no tempo/energia necessário para explorar todas as entidades. Encontramos também 
evidência sobre o efeito de interacção entre a estratégia e a amplitude do campo de visão sobre 
tempo/energia necessário para explorar todo o ambiente. Existe, contudo, alguma dúvida sobre 
este efeito de interacção sobre o tempo/energia necessário para explorar todas as entidades: o teste 
foi significativo sob o pressuposto da esfericidade e não significativo sob o teste “Lower Bound”, 
permanecendo não significativo após as correcções Huynh-Feldt e Greenhouse-Geisser. Podemos 
assim concluir que não existe este efeito de interacção sobre o tempo/energia necessário para 
explorar todas as entidades no nível 0.05, mas existe tal efeito no nível 0.071. Estas conclusões 
são, no entanto, alteradas pelos testes multivariável que indicam a existência deste efeito de 
interacção. Nesta perspectiva, pode dizer-se que o efeito da estratégia é de certa forma controlado 
pela amplitude do campo de visão. 
As estratégias que têm em conta a fome, quer isoladamente ou combinada com a curiosidade e 
a surpresa, apresentam melhor prestação que as restantes que têm em conta a surpresa e/ou a 
curiosidade. 
A estratégia baseada na fome é a que requer menos tempo/energia porque o agente visita os 
destinos (entidades ou células fronteira) que estão mais perto do local em que se encontra, 
evitando assim a travessia de longas distâncias como acontece com outras estratégias. Esta 
estratégia é, no entanto, de pouco valor porque não tem em conta as características das entidades 
ou regiões, dependendo somente das posições das entidades. Para ambientes com entidades 
diferentes, mas com iguais localizações, a eficiência é a mesma. Esta estratégia pode ter piores 
prestações que outras se o objectivo for visitar as entidades diferentes de um ambiente o mais 
rápido possível. De facto, isto poderá acontecer se as entidades diferentes se localizarem nas 
últimas posições a serem visitadas. 
A estratégia baseada na curiosidade faz com que o agente seleccione para visita as entidades e 
células fronteira que se estima maximizarem a novidade e entropia. São estas as entidades e 
células fronteira que proporcionam mais informação. No entanto, estas entidades e células 
fronteira não são frequentemente aquelas que estão mais perto, fazendo com que o agente se 
desloque por vezes grandes distâncias para obter o que ele espera ser uma elevada quantidade de 
informação nova. Os trajectos do agente são por esta razão erráticos e por isso mais morosos. 
A estratégia baseada na surpresa faz com que o agente se desloque para entidades que 
contenham algo inesperado e que por esta razão provoquem surpresa. Esta estratégia relaciona-se 
bastante com a baseada na curiosidade, uma vez que ambas conduzem o agente a seleccionar 
destinos que proporcionem novidade e entropia. Existem contudo diferenças. Por exemplo, se a 
função de uma entidade tem elevada entropia com dez ou vinte funções equiprováveis, a 
curiosidade é elevada, mas a surpresa é nula. Para provocar surpresa, uma entidade ou região 
deverá, portanto, conter entropia, mas também se deverá verificar a condição de que os eventos 
não sejam equiprováveis. Além disso, quando existe baixa entropia (por exemplo, quando existem 
várias funções possíveis para uma entidade em que uma delas tem uma elevada probabilidade), a 
curiosidade é baixa mas a surpresa esperada é alta. Assim, esta estratégia motiva o agente a 
20  Resumo alargado em língua portuguesa 
 
deslocar-se para entidades de que se espera obter informação inesperada e não somente 
informação nova (esta é também forçosamente inesperada). Neste ponto, a curiosidade e a 
surpresa são semelhantes. Outra diferença importante entre estas duas estratégias é a de as células 
fronteira poderem causar uma curiosidade positiva, mas assume-se que não causam surpresa. 
Assim, embora ao usar estas duas estratégias o agente se comporte de maneira diferente, a 
“performance” é bastante similar e os trajectos de exploração, de certa forma erráticos, indicam 
que atravessa distâncias longas e desnecessárias que têm um forte impacto negativo na sua 
eficiência. 
Quando a curiosidade e a surpresa são tidas em conta de forma independente ou combinadas 
com a fome, as trajectórias erráticas dão lugar a outras mais ordenadas e por isso a maior 
eficiência. De facto, a motivação para visitar entidades ou regiões longínquas que causam 
curiosidade ou de que se espera causar surpresa é refreada pela fome que se espera sentir nesses 
destinos. O resultado são estratégias que favorecem delicadamente entidades ou células fronteira 
que não estão demasiado longe, que causam uma considerável curiosidade e/ou de que se espera 
causar uma considerável surpresa. 
Finalmente, uma outra experiência permitiu avaliar o processo de construção de mapas sem 
explorar o ambiente (não é permitido ao agente sair da posição inicial), i.e., baseando-se somente 
no conhecimento inicial que é dado ao agente ou que este adquiriu previamente ao explorar 
ambientes similares. Com o objectivo de determinar eventuais efeitos de diferentes níveis de 
conhecimento e da complexidade do ambiente na qualidade dos mapas construídos, o agente é 
colocado em vários ambientes de três tipos diferentes de complexidade (baixa, média e alta), cada 
vez com um nível de memória diferente. Concluiu-se que quanto maior o conhecimento, melhor a 
qualidade dos mapas e que quanto maior a complexidade do ambiente menor a qualidade dos 
mapas. Concluiu-se também que com uma memória de, por exemplo, quatro ou cinco elementos 
consegue-se reduzir para metade a inconsistência inicial do mapa. Este dado levanta uma outra 
questão de investigação relativamente aos resultados da experiência anterior: será que colocando 
o agente com conhecimento inicial adquirido noutros ambientes similares não se conseguem 
melhores “performances”? Tudo parece indicar que sim. É que os resultados da experiência 
anterior dependem muito da fiabilidade do processo de construção de mapas baseado na geração 
de expectativas. Se este processo for impreciso, os resultados serão deturpados porque o cálculo 
da surpresa esperada e da curiosidade basear-se-ão em dados incorrectos. 
1.5 Conclusões 
Nesta tese, estudámos o problema da exploração de ambientes desconhecidos que contêm 
entidades por agentes afectivos. O objectivo destes agentes afectivos exploradores é duplo: (i) 
aquisição e armazenamento em memória de mapas do ambiente – mapas métricos – nos quais as 
células ocupadas pelas entidades presentes no ambiente são representadas; (ii) construção de 
modelos dessas entidades. Examinámos o problema através de simulações devido às várias 
vantagens que esta abordagem oferece nomeadamente eficiência, maior controlo e melhor 
focalização da investigação. Esta abordagem de usar simulações só é possível porque as 
simplificações que fizemos não aparentam influenciar o valor dos resultados. Com esta 
abordagem da simulação em vista, desenvolvemos uma ferramenta para construir sistemas 
multi-agente que compreendam agentes afectivos e depois, com base nesta ferramenta, 
desenvolvemos uma aplicação para a exploração de ambientes desconhecidos, muito embora 
outras potenciais aplicações existam. Esta aplicação é um ambiente multi-agente simulado no 
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qual, para além de agentes inanimados (objectos), existem agentes exploradores interagindo de 
uma forma simples e cujo objectivo é explorar o ambiente, mapeando-o, analisando-o, 
estudando-o e avaliando-o. 
As componentes da arquitectura que determinam o comportamento de exploração de um agente 
são os tipos de objectivos, os planos, os sentimentos e os desejos básicos. O agente possui 
objectivos para visitar entidades, regiões e sítios onde pode recarregar a sua bateria. Com base em 
estudos da Psicologia, o comportamento de exploração de um agente tem sido descrito desde há 
muito tempo pela ideia de que os organismos respondem à novidade e à mudança no ambiente 
que habitam quando não têm necessidades básicas (fome, sede, etc.). Se a novidade e mudança 
não estão presentes no ambiente, eles têm tendência para a procurar. Outras variáveis como a 
incerteza e conflito têm sido apontadas como determinantes do comportamento exploratório. A 
curiosidade/interesse é activada pela novidade, mudança e incerteza, enquanto que a surpresa é 
outro aspecto que é activada pela novidade, mudança e conflito. Isto explica porque confinámos 
as motivações básicas à fome mínima, ganho de informação máximo (redução da curiosidade) e 
surpresa máxima, e aos sentimentos correspondentes de fome, curiosidade, e surpresa. Cada um 
dos desejos básicos faz com que o sentimento correspondente seja maximizado ou reduzido. Os 
desejos básicos de fome mínima, ganho de informação máximo (redução da curiosidade), e 
surpresa máxima, direccionam o agente a minimizar o sentimento de fome, a maximizar o 
sentimento de surpresa e a reduzir o sentimento de curiosidade. O desejo de redução da 
curiosidade não significa que o agente não gosta de sentir curiosidade. Significa sim que o agente 
deseja executar acções que lhe façam sentir o máximo de curiosidade antes da sua execução, e, 
portanto, que conduzam a uma maximização da aquisição de informação após a sua execução e, 
consequentemente, a uma maximização da redução da curiosidade. A intensidade destes 
sentimentos é, assim, de primordial importância para calcular o grau de satisfação dos desejos 
básicos. Para a fome mínima e surpresa máxima, o grau de satisfação é dado pela fome e surpresa 
estimadas para depois da execução da acção, respectivamente, enquanto que para o ganho de 
informação máximo, é dado pela curiosidade sentida antes da execução da acção (a curiosidade é 
assim vista como o ganho de informação esperado). 
O ciclo de raciocínio/tomada de decisão de um agente pode ser descrito resumidamente da 
seguinte forma. Cada agente, num determinado instante, analisa o ambiente à procura de 
entidades e calcula o estado actual do mundo (localização, estrutura e função dessas entidades) 
baseando-se na informação sensorial e na geração de expectativas para a informação em falta. O 
resultado deste passo é um conjunto de casos de entidades, cada um descrevendo uma entidade 
percepcionada. Depois, a memória de episódios e o mapa métrico são actualizados com base 
nesses casos de entidades. Então, novos objectivos do tipo visitEntity são gerados para cada 
entidade não visitada que se encontre no campo de visão com base nas tarefas-objectivo de planos 
do passado. Além disso, um objectivo do tipo visitLoc é gerado para cada célula fronteira 
[Yamauchi, 1998] (um outro tipo de objectivo é rechargeBattery). Os objectivos são então 
ordenados de acordo com a sua Utilidade Esperada [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995] que é calculada 
com base na contribuição do seu cumprimento para a satisfação dos desejos básicos. O primeiro 
objectivo da lista ordenada, i.e., o objectivo com maior Utilidade Esperada é considerado como 
intenção e um plano que foi previamente gerado para o seu cumprimento é executado. 
Foram feitas três experiências principais. Uma conduziu à obtenção e avaliação de um modelo 
para a surpresa, outra consistiu no estudo dos efeitos na estratégia de exploração dos desejos 
básicos e correspondentes sentimentos, da complexidade do ambiente e da amplitude do campo de 
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visão, e outra consistiu na avaliação do processo de mapeamento usado pelo agente. Os resultados 
permitem concluir que o modelo computacional da surpresa é satisfatório, que a exploração de 
ambientes pode ser robusta e eficientemente realizada por agentes afectivos, e que, quanto maior a 
informação em memória e menor a complexidade do ambiente, melhores as estimativas feitas 
pelo agente na construção de mapas. 
 
A próxima secção descreve detalhadamente as principais contribuições científicas desta tese, ao 
passo que a subsequente apresenta as limitações e questões não respondidas mais relevantes e 
identifica eventuais rumos de investigação para que se possam ultrapassar essas limitações e para 
que se possam encontrar respostas para essas questões. 
1.5.1 Contribuições Científicas 
As principais contribuições desta tese são: 
• Exploração direccionada por afecto. A maioria das estratégias de exploração descritas na 
literatura assentam no cálculo da quantidade de informação a adquirir, considerando 
algumas também o custo de aquisição dessa informação. A nossa estratégia de exploração 
tem em conta estes aspectos, mas segue uma abordagem que tem como referência a forma 
como os humanos exploram, i.e., consideramos que o que leva um agente a adquirir o 
máximo de informação a um baixo custo reside na intensidade das motivações para 
reduzir a zero o sentimento de fome, maximizar a informação a adquirir (estimada pela 
intensidade do sentimento de curiosidade/interesse antes da aquisição da informação), e 
maximizar o sentimento de surpresa. São estas as motivações para reduzir ou maximizar 
sentimentos que conduzem o comportamento de um agente explorador. Por outras 
palavras, em vez de maximizarmos a quantidade de informação e minimizar o custo da 
sua aquisição, a nossa abordagem reside na maximização das motivações, sendo que as 
intensidades da surpresa e curiosidade são tidas como positivas, ao passo que a 
intensidade da fome é tida como negativa. Desta forma, privilegia-se indirectamente a 
selecção de acções que conduzam à aquisição de informação a baixo custo. 
• Mapas tridimensionais de entidades. Os mapas desempenham um papel primordial em 
qualquer abordagem para a exploração de ambientes, ou não fossem eles o mecanismo de 
representação desses ambientes. Os mapas baseados em grelhas (grelhas de ocupação) são 
usados frequentemente. Nós propomos uma variante destes mapas chamada mapas de 
entidades. Estes são grelhas de ocupação diferentes nas quais cada célula <x,y,z> contém 
informação sobre quais as entidades que podem ocupá-la e respectivas probabilidades de 
isso acontecer. Este tipo de mapas resulta do facto de considerarmos que o objectivo da 
exploração de ambientes não é só o mapeamento do terreno, mas principalmente a 
aquisição de modelos das entidades que os habitam. Isto advém de uma outra diferença da 
nossa abordagem de exploração relativamente à maioria das outras abordagens: nós 
consideramos os ambientes como conjuntos de entidades. Esta perspectiva parece ser 
adequada para dar resposta ao desafio proporcionado pelos ambientes dinâmicos 
tridimensionais ao permitir manter a informação das posições das entidades. Ao contrário 
da maioria das abordagens, nós consideramos ambientes tridimensionais representáveis 
em mapas tridimensionais. Estes apresentam vantagens numa grande variedade de 
aplicações. Por exemplo, os arquitectos podem usar modelos tridimensionais para a 
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esquematização através de tecnologias de realidade virtual. Equipas de emergência, como 
os bombeiros, podem usar modelos tridimensionais para estudar a melhor forma de 
actuação em locais perigosos. Estes modelos tridimensionais são obviamente úteis para 
robots que operem em ambientes urbanos. 
• Modelo computacional da surpresa. Propomos um modelo computacional para a surpresa 
que se baseia em modelos da Psicologia nos quais se defende que a surpresa é causada 
pelo inesperado. Um aspecto importante deste modelo computacional é o de não atribuir 
surpresa ao evento mais esperado de um conjunto de eventos. 
• Incorporação de sentimentos numa arquitectura do tipo BDI. Ao propormos uma 
arquitectura do tipo BDI com qualidades mentais adicionais como os sentimentos e os 
desejos básicos, cumprimos o objectivo de estender a arquitectura BDI clássica. 
• Uma abordagem para a definição da personalidade dos agentes. A Utilidade Esperada é 
uma função matemática que avalia os estados do mundo em termos da sua relevância 
positiva e negativa para os desejos básicos. É uma combinação de várias funções de 
Utilidade, uma para cada desejo básico. De acordo com a perspectiva pluralista da 
motivação [Havercamp & Reiss, 2003; McDougall, 1908; Reiss, 2000; Schwartz, 1992; 
B. Weiner, 1980], os desejos básicos contribuem para a definição da personalidade nos 
humanos. Essa função representa, no nosso caso, a aversão à fome, o gosto pela surpresa 
e pelo ganho de informação. A contribuição destas funções de Utilidade para a função da 
Utilidade Esperada global pode ser configurada, o que permite definir a personalidade dos 
agentes, dando por exemplo mais peso à fome, etc. 
• Um modelo para a geração de expectativas. Infelizmente o mundo real não é claro para os 
agentes. Estes raramente têm acesso a todo o ambiente, principalmente porque as 
componentes de percepção e compreensão do ambiente são incompletas e incorrectas. É 
de facto demasiado difícil obter toda a informação de um ambiente complexo e dinâmico 
e é bastante provável que a informação acessível sofra distorções. No entanto, uma vez 
que o sucesso dos agentes depende muito da completude da informação sobre o estado do 
mundo, os agentes têm de seguir mecanismos alternativos para construir bons modelos do 
mundo, mesmo e especialmente quando este mundo é incerto. Propomos um modelo 
Bayesiano para a geração de suposições e expectativas para preencher lacunas na 
informação resultante da observação do mundo. Este modelo assenta em estudos de várias 
áreas, como a Psicologia, Ciências Cognitivas, e Etologia, que sugerem que os humanos 
e, no geral, os animais costumam ultrapassar esta limitação através da geração de 
suposições ou expectativas. 
• Um processo de mapeamento tridimensional baseado na geração de expectativas. A 
maioria das abordagens de mapeamento são aplicadas a ambientes bidimensionais. No 
entanto, tal como foi dito anteriormente, os mapas tridimensionais podem ser úteis em 
múltiplas aplicações. Nesses domínios de aplicação, é de todo o interesse existirem 
métodos que possam gerar modelos tridimensionais a um baixo custo e com o mínimo de 
intervenção humana. Neste sentido, propomos uma técnica probabilística de mapeamento 
bastante simples para estes ambientes. Esta técnica assenta numa negociação entre o 
modelo de geração de expectativas anteriormente descrito e exploração do ambiente. 
• ProCHiP (“Probabilistic, Case-based, Hierarchical task-network Planning”). Quando se 
pretendem aplicar sistemas de planeamento clássico ao mundo real, depressa se descobre 
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que os pressupostos em que assentam esses sistemas são bastante limitativos. Na verdade, 
cada um desses pressupostos leva o planeador a ignorar aspectos relevantes da maioria 
dos domínios de planeamento reais. O mundo real é, de facto, caracterizado pela presença 
de incerteza sob diversas formas. Para ultrapassar estas limitações, têm sido 
desenvolvidos diversos planeadores probabilísticos. No entanto, alguns planos no mundo 
real têm um formato hierárquico. Este aspecto motivou o aparecimento da técnica de 
planeamento com “Hierarchical Task-Networks” que consiste na aplicação de 
esquemas/métodos de redução para gerar uma hierarquia de tarefas. Contudo, o 
desenvolvimento de conjuntos de métodos que permitam a geração de todos os planos 
para muitas das aplicações reais demonstrou ser impraticável. O planeamento baseado em 
casos é uma técnica bastante prometedora para resolver este problema. Esta tese inclui a 
descrição de um planeador, chamado ProCHiP, que combina as técnicas de planeamento 
baseado em casos, planeamento com “Hierarchical Task-Networks” e planeamento 
probabilístico. 
• Um ferramenta multi-agente baseada em afecto. Os agentes inteligentes são um novo 
paradigma para o desenvolvimento de software. Este novo paradigma de programação, 
também chamado programação orientada a agentes (um outro termo é computação 
baseada em agentes), parece ser apropriado para se lidar com certos domínios, oferecendo 
uma variedade de benefícios em comparação com outros paradigmas de programação 
como a programação orientada a objectos. Um considerável número de linguagens ou 
ferramentas têm sido propostas para permitir que as aplicações baseadas em agentes 
sejam projectadas e construídas facilmente. Nesta tese apresentamos o AMAS 
(“Affect-based Multi-Agent System”), um sistema multi-agente baseado nas ideias da 
computação afectiva e também em ideias do modelo BDI. Este sistema foi usado como 
plataforma para desenvolver a aplicação para a exploração de ambientes desconhecidos 
por agentes afectivos. O AMAS foi desenvolvido para ser usado como uma ferramenta 
para o desenvolvimento de aplicações baseadas em agentes. No entanto, encontra-se ainda 
numa versão preliminar. Por enquanto, é apenas um protótipo que precisa de 
melhoramentos e avaliação experimental. A versão actual é apropriada para aplicações 
nas quais as entidades (agentes) estão distribuídas num ambiente físico. É o caso da 
exploração de ambientes desconhecidos que é a única aplicação desenvolvida com o 
AMAS até ao momento. Exemplos de outras aplicações potenciais são o controlo de 
tráfico aéreo e logística de transportes (UM Translog). 
 
Outros aspectos que também caracterizam esta tese são: 
• Avaliação da qualidade dos mapas. Os mapas construídos pelos agentes exploradores 
devem ser avaliados para permitir tirar conclusões sobre a sua “performance”. Propomos 
uma abordagem que consiste em comparar os mapas construídos com aqueles que deviam 
ser construídos se os agentes fossem ideais, i.e., com os mapas que representam correcta e 
completamente o ambiente. Em experimentação com simulações isso pode ser facilmente 
conseguido através de um método que compara célula a célula dois mapas, contando as 
diferenças entre eles. 
• Modelo computacional da fome. Este modelo é bastante simples, reflectindo a 
necessidade de uma fonte de energia por parte de um agente. A fome é expressa 
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simplesmente pela diferença entre a capacidade máxima de energia que um agente pode 
armazenar e a que tem num determinado momento. 
• Geração autónoma e ordenamento de objectivos. Para que os agentes sejam totalmente 
autónomos, têm de ser capazes de gerar os seus próprios objectivos. Além disso, quando 
existem múltiplos objectivos simultaneamente, é difícil conseguir atingi-los 
simultaneamente. Assim, os agentes devem ser capazes de os ordenar de acordo com uma 
determinada regra de ordenamento. Propomos um algoritmo para gerar e ordenar os 
objectivos autonomamente. A fase de geração baseia-se na adaptação de objectivos de 
planos anteriores ao estado actual do mundo conforme percepcionado pelos sensores do 
agente. O ordenamento dos objectivos é feito tendo em conta a Utilidade Esperada 
calculada para cada objectivo. 
1.5.2 Trabalho Futuro 
O trabalho apresentado nesta tese é apenas um passo no longo caminho que há para percorrer no 
estudo do uso de agentes afectivos para desempenharem tarefas como a exploração de ambientes 
desconhecidos. Contudo, pensamos que esta tese proporcionou uns alicerces sólidos para um 
importante e interessante tópico da área de agentes autónomos e sistemas multi-agente. Embora 
esta tese proporcione uma demonstração prometedora do benefício e influência das emoções e 
motivações na exploração de ambientes desconhecidos, levanta contudo uma série de questões 
que deixámos sem resposta, deixando portanto espaço para trabalho futuro em várias áreas. De 
facto, tal como qualquer outro trabalho de investigação, não será surpreendente que levante mais 
questões do que aquelas que responde. Como afirma Bertrand Russell [B. Russell, 1959], “o que é 
importante não é tanto as respostas que são dadas, mas sim as questões que são colocadas”. 
Algumas destas questões e trabalho futuro são listadas de seguida: 
• A generalidade do AMAS baseia-se principalmente na especificação do mundo, dos 
agentes, e dos planos disponibilizados aos agentes. As primeiras duas especificações não 
requerem o desenvolvimento de código em qualquer linguagem de programação. No 
entanto, a última exige a implementação de tarefas primitivas em C++. Até ao momento, 
os módulos dos desejos básicos e dos sentimentos encontram-se confinados ao conjunto 
de motivações que, de acordo com estudos da Psicologia e Neurociência, são essenciais 
para a exploração. De igual modo, as tarefas primitivas dos planos estão limitadas àquelas 
que são necessárias à exploração. A extensão desta plataforma de modo a que possa ser 
usada para desenvolver outras aplicações requer a extensão desses módulos, a 
implementação de outra tarefas primitivas em C++, e a extensão do módulo de geração de 
objectivos de forma a que outros objectivos possam ser gerados mediante a aplicação de 
estratégias de adaptação diferentes da substituição, ou permitindo que os agentes aceitem 
objectivos dados por outros agentes. Em suma, outras emoções, tais como o medo, a fúria, 
etc., e outras necessidades devem ser modeladas. No que diz respeito às tarefas 
primitivas, elas estão até ao momento confinadas à PTRANS, ATTEND e INGEST, que 
são baseadas nos actos primitivos de Schank [Schank, 1972]. Acreditamos que é possível 
lidar com outras aplicações através da implementação de todos os actos primitivos de 
Schank. Este seria um importante contributo para se conseguir a generalidade do AMAS, 
uma vez que se todos eles estiverem implementados, a especificação de uma aplicação 
não dependeria do desenvolvimento de código em C++. No entanto, só poderemos chegar 
a conclusões sobre este aspecto quando tivermos em mãos outras aplicações. A extensão 
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do módulo responsável pela geração autónoma e ordenamento de objectivos (ver 
pormenores mais à frente) baseia-se principalmente na consideração de outras estratégias 
de adaptação. 
• A memória dos agentes beneficiaria da existência de mapas qualitativos/topológicos em 
simultâneo com os já existentes mapas métricos. Mapas métricos e qualitativos exibem 
vantagens e desvantagens ortogonais. Contrariamente aos mapas métricos, os qualitativos 
não contêm informação geométrica ou métrica, mas somente as noções de proximidade e 
disposição geográfica. Os mapas topológicos são representações mais eficientes para 
ambientes estruturados (por exemplo, edifícios), nos quais lugares distintos são frequentes 
(por exemplo, corredores, portas). O agente navega localmente entre lugares e, por isso, 
erros de movimentação não se acumulam globalmente como acontece nos mapas métricos 
onde existe um único sistema de coordenadas global. Ao invés, em ambientes não 
estruturados, nos quais o reconhecimento dos lugares é mais complexo, um robot que use 
somente informação topológica para se localizar pode facilmente desnortear-se. Assim, é 
lógico considerar a combinação das duas abordagens para se tirar partido das vantagens 
de ambas. Isso permite que a representação em mapas beneficie da eficiência dos mapas 
topológicos e da consistência e acuidade espacial dos mapas métricos. 
• Na versão actual do AMAS, um agente não gera a representação analógica dos objectos a 
partir da proposicional e vice-versa [Kosslyn, 1980, 1985; Kosslyn et al., 1988]. No 
entanto, esta conversão é necessária se quisermos “transportar” os agentes para o mundo 
físico real. 
• O modelo actual da surpresa pressupõe que esta é causada por entidades. Uma extensão 
deste modelo é necessária para lidar com eventos (conflito entre expectativas - 
incorporadas na versão actual em acções probabilísticas - e eventos futuros). De facto, a 
surpresa não é só causada por entidades físicas, mas também pelo conflito entre 
expectativas e qualquer informação adquirida do ambiente. Uma vez que as expectativas 
podem ser geradas também para, por exemplo, acções, o modelo actual da surpresa é 
certamente incompleto. 
• Implementação da acção PTRANS usando uma variante determinista de iteração do valor, 
um algoritmo de programação dinâmica bastante popular [Bellman, 1957; Howard, 1960]. 
Esta é a abordagem seguida por [Anguelov et al., 2002; Biswas et al., 2002]. 
• Seria interessante estudar a inclusão de comportamento reactivo, combinando-o com o 
deliberativo (já existente), dando origem a uma arquitectura híbrida. Esta talvez seja a 
melhor arquitectura para agentes. Um agente com tal arquitectura possui duas 
componentes: uma que permite ao agente planear e decidir o que fazer usando uma 
abordagem simbólica; e outra que permite ao agente reagir a eventos externos de uma 
forma rápida e simples. Poderemos ainda considerar outras componentes, tais como 
raciocínio reflexivo ou meta-raciocínio, que permitam ao agente auto-avaliar os seus 
processos internos ao raciocinar sobre o seu próprio raciocínio e informação interna. 
• A versão actual do AMAS inclui um algoritmo para permitir aos agentes a geração e 
ordenamento de objectivos. Este algoritmo pode ser melhorado no sentido de permitir 
ultrapassar algumas das suas limitações como por exemplo a impossibilidade de um 
agente suspender tarefas que está a executar (os planos são rígidos, não sendo permitido 
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ao agente colocar em espera uma tarefa que está a realizar para executar outra(s)) e a 
resolução de conflitos entre tarefas de vários agentes. 
• Tornar mais eficiente o processo de decisão que se baseia no cálculo da Utilidade 
Esperada de uma tarefa. Existem alguns trabalhos cujas ideias podem vir a ser 
aproveitadas tais como a Teoria do Marcador Somático [Damásio, 1994] e a Teoria da 
Prospecção [Kahneman & Tversky, 1979]. 
• Incorporação de técnicas de negociação, colaboração e coordenação no AMAS de forma a 
permitir desenvolver uma técnica de planeamento multi-agente para a qual a versão actual 
do ProCHiP está consideravelmente preparada, ao permitir a determinação do 
identificador do agente que executa determinada tarefa. 
• Evolução do AMAS para uma linguagem de programação orientada a agentes que 
permita desenvolver várias aplicações em diversos domínios como por exemplo na 
exploração da “World Wide Web”, bases de dados, controlo de tráfego aéreo, etc. 
• Incorporação do software de um agente num robot, o que deve envolver a consideração de 
métodos para o problema da localização e mapeamento simultâneo (SLAM) tais como o 
EM [Burgard et al., 1999; Liu et al., 2001; McLachlan & Krishnan, 1997] e inclusão de 
um modelo de reconhecimento de padrões como, por exemplo, [Margaritis & Thrun, 
1998]). 
• Investigação de técnicas de cooperação e colaboração entre agentes exploradores. 
• O AMAS é apropriado para lidar com ambientes dinâmicos. No entanto, este aspecto 
ainda não foi explorado, pelo que se apresenta como um desafio importante a ter em 
consideração.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
his chapter introduces the subject of this thesis. We commence by presenting an initial 
motivation, followed by the thesis statement or research question and an account of how 
the research question will be addressed. Subsequently, we describe the main contributions 
of our thesis. Finally, we present the organisation of this document. 
1.1 Motivation 
Science is still far from knowing how the human mind functions. One of the most intricate issues 
is the relationship between emotion and rationality. For many years, it was assumed that emotions 
are obstacles to intelligence. Since Plato, most philosophers have drawn a sharp line between 
reason and emotion, assuming that emotions interfere with rationality and have nothing to 
contribute to good reasoning. In his dialogue, the Phaedrus, Plato compared the rational part of 
the soul to a charioteer who must control his steeds, which correspond to the emotional parts of 
the soul [Plato, 1961]. Today, scientists are often taken as the paragons of rationality, and rational 
thought is generally assumed to be independent of emotional thinking. This traditional view on 
the nature of rationality has proposed that emotions and reason do not mix at all. For a human 
being to act rationally, he should not allow emotions to intrude in his reasoning processes. 
Research in neuroscience, however, has recently provided biological evidence indicating quite the 
contrary, showing that emotions play a fundamental role in perception, learning, attention, 
memory, and particularly planning and decision-making, as well as other abilities and 
mechanisms we tend to associate with basic rational and intelligent behaviour. In particular, 
recent studies of patients with lesions of the prefrontal cortex suggest a critical role for emotions 
in decision-making [Bechara et al., 1997; Churchland, 1996; Damásio, 1994]. Although the 
patients studied can perform well on a variety of intelligence and memory tests, when faced with 
real-life situations they seem to be unable to make good decisions. Apparently, these patients lack 
intuitive abilities, which, as many researchers think, may be based on memories of past emotions. 
These findings motivated Damásio and colleagues to suggest that human reasoning and 
decision-making involves several mechanisms at different levels, extending from those that 
regulate basic body functions, to those that deal with more cognitive control of complex 
strategies. An interesting and novel point of this view is that reasoning also depends on emotions 
and the feelings accompanying them. 
The evolutionary consideration of emotion has contributed to understand its role in rational 
thought and decision-making. This role of emotion in the cognitive processes is considered just as 
another contribution to the main functions of emotion on humans: survival and well-being. 
Actually, survival and well-being depend on the decisions made during a lifespan. Wrong 
decisions may lead us to bad situations or even death. Thus, emotions are not obstacles to 
rationality, nor even harmless luxuries, but instead vital to intelligence. 
If a human agent efforts lead him/her to attain an intended goal he/she tend to evaluate this 
outcome positively, and if his/her actions are thwarted the resulting emotion tends to be negative 
[Carver & Scheier, 1990]. Emotions are thus taken as rewards or punishments. Humans often do 
T 
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things because they anticipate that they will make them feel better in some way (e.g., [Thayer et 
al., 1994]). According to simple principles of reinforcement, humans are more likely to repeat 
actions that had pleasant affective consequences in the past. But hedonism of this kind cannot 
account for all varieties of motivational phenomena. Opposed to those theories of hedonism and 
neo-hedonism [W. Cox & Klinger, 2004; Mellers, 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 2000], there is another 
theory or class of theories for the motivational effect of emotion on decision-making and action 
called emotion-specific action impulses theory [Frijda, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; B. Weiner, 2005]. 
These defend that there are emotion specific action tendencies for separate emotions (e.g., to flee 
or avoid danger in case of fear, to attack in case of anger, to help in case of pity, to make up for in 
case of guilt). Hedonism assumes the existence of a basic desire while emotion-specific action 
impulses theory assumes a pluralist view of motivation [Havercamp & Reiss, 2003; McDougall, 
1908; Reiss, 2000; Schwartz, 1992; B. Weiner, 1980] by defending the existence of various basic 
desires (e.g., curiosity, power, hedonism, etc.). However, some theorists believe that the pleasure 
principle is indirectly at work even in these cases. 
Motivation and emotion are thus highly intertwined and it is not always easy to establish clear 
boundaries between them. Emotion and motivation both depend on the relationship between the 
organism and its environment. Generally, motivation is defined as factors that cause an organism 
to behave in a certain way at a certain time. Motivation is more related with goal generation and 
action, while emotion is concerned with evaluative aspects of the relation of an agent with its 
environment. In the case of emotion, the emphasis is on how the situation makes the person feel. 
In the case of motivation, it is how the individual acts with respect to the situation that is of 
interest [Kuhl, 1986]. 
One of the features that characterize human beings is the tendency to explore the unknown 
parts of the environments they inhabit. Although exploration has existed as long as human beings, 
its peak is seen as being during the Age of Exploration, a period from the early 15th century and 
continuing into the early 17th century, when European navigators traveled around the world 
discovering new worlds and cultures. These big endeavours, together with the exploration of the 
outer space, the planets and satellites of our solar system today, are remarkable examples of the 
exploratory spirit of humankind. There are no limits for human exploration: from inhospitable 
volcanoes, mountains or oceans, to hostile planets such as Mars, and satellites such as Titan and 
the Moon, human beings are always trying to know more about their environment in spite of its 
adversity. 
But what motivates this exploratory behaviour? James’ “selective attention” [James, 1890], 
Freud’s “cathexis” [Freud, 1938], and McDougall’s “curiosity instinct” [McDougall, 1908] are 
fundamental concepts concerning the relationship between motivation and exploratory behaviour. 
This exploratory behaviour has for a long time been expressed by the idea that organisms respond 
to the novelty and change in the environment they inhabit in the absence of known drives (thirst, 
hunger, etc.), and if novelty and change is not present in the environment, organisms tend to seek 
it. Evidence for this behaviour in a variety of species was provided by a number of authors 
[Lester, 1969]. In human beings, this kind of behaviour is already present in infants even in the 
first hours of life, as documented by a number of researchers who have studied selective attention 
in infants which is a simple form of exploratory behaviour. Infants prefer certain visual patterns 
over others. They do not treat with equal importance the multitude of stimuli. They explore the 
environment with their eyes, gazing at the more interesting objects which are those that provide 
novel stimuli. Some of the early researchers who showed that organisms tend to explore novel 
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objects or places in the absence of any known drives, called it the exploratory drive [Butler, 1953, 
1954, 1957, 1958; Montegomery, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955]. Among the investigators that have 
adopted the ideas of McDougall about curiosity are Berlyne [Berlyne, 1950] and Shand [Shand, 
1914]. For these authors, curiosity is the psychological construct that has been closely related with 
this kind of behaviour. Considering that curiosity was innate and that it could also be acquired, 
Berlyne [Berlyne, 1950] argues that novel stimulus elicits curiosity, which diminishes with 
continued exposure to the stimulus. In later work [Berlyne, 1955, 1960, 1967], Berlyne elaborated 
and extended his early theory of curiosity. In addition to novelty, other variables such as change, 
surprisingness, complexity, uncertainty, incongruity and conflict also determine this kind of 
behaviour related to exploratory and investigative activities. Sharing similar ideas with Berlyne 
and McDougall, Shand [Shand, 1914] defined curiosity as a primary emotion consisting of a 
simple impulse to know, which controls and sustains the attention and provokes the body 
movements that allow one to acquire information about an object. These approaches are closely 
related to the emotion concept of interest-excitement proposed by the differential emotions theory 
to account for exploration, adventure, problem solving, creativity and the acquisition of skills and 
competencies in the absence of known drives [Izard, 1977, 1991]. In fact, the terms curiosity and 
interest are used more or less as synonyms, for instance, by Berlyne. Nunnally and Lemond 
[Nunnally & Lemond, 1973] carried out a series of experiments on the effects of novelty and 
complexity on visual exploration. They concluded that information conflict and novelty elicit and 
hold attention. 
In conclusion, there is no doubt that novelty elicits curiosity/interest which is the psychological 
construct that accounts for exploratory behaviour. However, novelty seems to be insufficient to 
explain all exploratory behaviour. In addition to it, other variables such as change, surprisingness, 
complexity, uncertainty, incongruity and conflict also determine exploratory behaviour. Some of 
these variables elicit surprise, another psychological construct that also accounts for exploratory 
behaviour. If we also consider the recent advances in neuroscience that indicate that emotion 
influences the cognitive tasks of humans, and particularly planning and decision-making [Adolphs 
et al., 1996; Bechara et al., 1997; Damásio, 1994], exploration of unknown environments, as a 
decision-making process, is thereby influenced by emotion. Thus, ultimately, we may consider 
that there is a multitude of motivations and emotions behind the exploratory behaviour. 
We may also relate exploration to creative evaluation. In fact, surprisingness and related 
concepts such as unpredictability or unexpectedness have been pointed out as relevant 
characteristics of a creative product, in addition to other commonly noted features such as 
novelty, originality, interestingness and appropriateness (also defined as usefulness, aesthetic 
value, rightness, etc.) [Boden, 1992, 1995; Jackson & Messick, 1967; Koestler, 1964; Lubart, 
1994; Macedo, 1998; MacKinnon, 1962; Moorman & Ram, 1994; Ritchie, 2001; Saunders & 
Gero, 2001]. Furthermore, Boden argued that there is a distinction between mere novelty and 
creativity [Boden, 1995]. In her opinion, that distinction resides on the fact that creative products 
are not only novel but also unpredictable, unexpected and therefore surprising. According to 
Boden, unpredictability is the essence of creativity: creative products amaze us, shock us and 
delight us mainly because they are unexpected or unpredictable. The nature of the link between 
surprise and creativity is very strong. Surprise is usually considered as a property of a creative 
product, i.e., almost every creative product causes surprise at least the first time it is perceived. 
This means that the exploration of environments populated with objects may involve a kind of 
creative evaluation of those objects in that those that elicit more surprise, which are original, 
valuable, and different are those that amaze, shock and delight us and therefore are those that are 
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more interesting, getting our attention and probably provoking actions, i.e., visits in order 
examine them. 
The human mind seems to be paradoxically unbounded. In order to extend their capabilities to 
deal easily with adverse situations or problems, humans were able to build systems, so-called 
artificial agents, that attempt to do intelligently similar things as they do or even better: accept 
percepts from the environment and generate actions correctly. This is paradoxical because it is 
simultaneous a proof of the ingenious aspect of human mind for going beyond itself but also a 
proof of the self awareness of its limitations to deal with certain situations or at least to deal with 
those situations easily. Attempting to understand and build those intelligent agents is the goal of 
the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Obviously, those agents do not (yet) possess the sensors, 
effectors and the mind of human beings, but instead cameras, robotic arms, software, etc. Yet, 
those agents exhibit forms of perception, forms of reasoning and decision-making, and forms of 
acting. Although they cannot do all the things humans do, perhaps they can do other sorts of 
things better than humans. To date, almost with no exception, all the capabilities of humans have 
been explored by AI and related fields such as Multi-Agent Systems, Robotics, or Distributed 
Artificial Intelligence, including, unsurprisingly, exploration of unknown environments. 
Exploration of unknown environments by artificial agents (usually mobile robots) has, in fact, 
been an active field of research. Exploration may be defined as the process of selecting and 
executing actions so that the maximal knowledge of the environment is acquired. The result is the 
acquisition of models of the physical environment. So, exploration of unknown environments 
involves map-building but it is not confined to this process. Actually, this kind of exploration can 
be considered as two distinct topics. First, the agent or robot has to interpret the findings of its 
sensors so as to make accurate deductions about the state of its environment. This is the problem 
of map-building. This mapping problem itself has several aspects that have been studied 
intensively in the past. Among the most important aspects are the localization of the vehicle 
during mapping and the acquisition of appropriate models of the environment. The accuracy of 
the map depends on these factors. This fundamental problem in mobile robotics is called 
Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) and is defined as a kind of chicken-and-egg 
problem as follows: while a robot navigates in an unknown environment, it must incrementally 
build a map of its surroundings and, at the same time, localize itself within the built map. The 
second but not less important aspect of exploration of unknown environments is that the agent or 
robot has to select its viewpoints so that the sensory measurements contain new and useful 
information. This is the problem of exploration itself. It involves guiding a vehicle in such a way 
that it covers the environment with its sensors. The accuracy of the map also depends on this 
choice of view-points during exploration.  
Unfortunately, exploring unknown environments requires resources from agents such as time 
and power. There is a trade-off between the amount of knowledge acquired and the cost to acquire 
it. The goal of an explorer is to get the maximum knowledge of the environment at the minimum 
cost (e.g., minimum time and/or power). Several techniques have been proposed and tested either 
in simulated and real, indoor and outdoor environments, using single or multiple agents. The 
exploration domains include planetary exploration (e.g., Mars, Titan or lunar exploration), the 
search for meteorites in Antarctica, underwater mapping, volcano exploration, map-building of 
interiors, etc. The main advantage of using artificial agents in those domains instead of humans is 
that most of them are extreme environments making their exploration a dangerous task for human 
agents. However, the autonomy of agents still needs to be improved, as happens for instance in 
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planetary exploration which is still too human dependent (the plans are determined by a human 
operator as well as the interesting points to visit). Moreover, there is still much to be done 
especially in dynamic environments such as those mentioned above. Apart from the aspect of 
danger, real environments also contain objects. For example, office environments possess chairs, 
doors, garbage cans, etc., cities are comprised of many different kinds of buildings (houses, 
offices, hospitals, churches, etc.), as well as other objects such as cars. Many of these objects are 
non-stationary, that is, their locations may change over time. This observation motivates research 
on a new generation of mapping algorithms, which represent environments as collections of 
objects. At a minimum, such object models would enable a robot to track changes in the 
environment. For example, a cleaning robot entering an office at night might realize that a 
garbage can has moved from one location to another. It might do so without the need to learn a 
model of this garbage can from scratch, as would be necessary with existing robot mapping 
techniques. Object representations offer a second, important advantage, which is due to the fact 
that many environments possess large collections of objects of the same type. For example, most 
office chairs are examples of the same generic chair and therefore look alike, as do most doors, 
garbage cans, and so on. As these examples suggest, attributes of objects are shared by entire 
classes of objects, and understanding the nature of object classes is of significant interest to 
mobile robotics. In particular, algorithms that learn properties of object classes would be able to 
transfer learned parameters (e.g., appearance, motion parameters) from one object to another in 
the same class. This would have a profound impact on the accuracy of object models, and the 
speed at which such models can be acquired. If, for example, a cleaning robot enters a room it has 
never visited before, it might realize that a specific object in the room possesses the same visual 
appearance of other objects seen in other rooms (e.g., chairs). The robot would then be able to 
acquire a map of this object much faster. It would also enable the robot to predict properties of 
this newly seen object, such as the fact that a chair is non-stationary, without ever seeing this 
specific object move.  
As mentioned above, emotion is essential for survival, well-being and communication in 
humans because, among other functions, it plays a central role in cognitive activities such as 
decision-making, planning and creativity. So, the question is why don’t artificial agents take 
advantage of emotions as humans do? What can emotional artificial agents do better than those 
that are not based on emotion? What can emotion offer to artificial agents? Certainly, not all the 
advantages that humans may benefit from are applicable to artificial agents. However, we are able 
to consider a number of situations in which we can see the emotional advantage such as in 
text-to-speech systems (by giving more intonation to speech), and in areas such as entertainment, 
preventive medicine, helping autistic people, in artificial pets, personalised agents that can act on 
the behalf of someone by selecting news, music, etc., according to someone’s mood, consumer 
feedback by measuring the emotions of consumers when dealing with a specific product, etc. 
Such applications require the abilities to recognise, express and experience emotions. Although 
research in AI has almost neglected the significant role of emotion in reasoning, this has already 
been addressed to some extent in present computational models of emotion (e.g., [Bates, 1994; 
Botelho & Coelho, 1998; Dias & Paiva, 2005; Elliott, 1992; Macedo & Cardoso, 2001a, 2001b; 
Maes, 1995; Oliveira & Sarmento, 2003; Ortony et al., 1988; Paiva et al., 2004; Pfeifer, 1988; 
Picard, 1997; Reilly, 1996; Schmidhuber, 1991]). This means some of those applications in which 
emotion may be advantageous are already implemented (e.g., artificial pets that are able to 
express emotions, emotion in text-to-speech systems, etc.) and hence they no longer only belong 
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anymore to science fiction, although they may require further improvements. Yet, other 
applications still belong to the realms of science fiction such as the computer HAL [Clarke, 1997]. 
In the specific case of the exploration of unknown environments, it might be useful to take 
emotions into consideration in the process. As far as we know there is almost no work explicitly 
using emotions in this kind of task. We may consider that a few studies on exploration implicitly 
consider rudimentary forms of some motivations. For instance, when a few studies in the field of 
exploration make use of mathematical formulas that evaluate the parts of the environment that 
contain most information for the agent or evaluate the cost of acquiring it, they are, to some 
extent, modelling rudimentary forms, for instance, of interest or curiosity/interest and hunger, 
respectively. They are actually considering variables such as novelty, uncertainty, difference or 
change, which are, according to psychological studies, at the foundation of the process of 
elicitation of curiosity/interest. 
In order to accomplish the task of building artificial agents that act and think like humans [S. 
Russell & Norvig, 1995], we should be able to give an agent the ability to explore unknown 
environments, in a human-like fashion, in addition to other human features. Furthermore, given 
the evidence from psychology and neuroscience that emotion plays a central role in cognitive 
abilities such as decision-making and planning, and considering that exploration involves 
decision-making, it is reasonable to consider that emotion and motivation influence that activity. 
We might dream of a robot exploring Mars or any other inhospitable planet, avoiding dangerous 
situations because it can experience fear, selecting the interesting things to visit because it can 
experience surprise and curiosity or some sort of interest, remembering to recharge batteries 
because it can feel hunger, etc. In addition, we might think of such a robot mapping the 
environment and building models of the objects it visits and analyzes so that they can be used in 
the future, not only to facilitate exploration, but also to provide better ways to survive and 
promote well-being. Obviously, in this thesis we can’t go to this extreme, but we may make a 
modest attempt to be one of the forerunners. Thus, we have developed a multi-agent system in 
which agents are affective in that they exhibit explicit models of emotions which play an 
important role in motivation. Besides the module of feelings which incorporates the models of 
emotions, other important modules are basic desires (basic motivations/motives), memory and 
reasoning. This latter module includes a sequence decision-maker, i.e., a planner. Although this 
platform has other potential applications, in this thesis, we use it to study the problem of exploring 
unknown environments populated with entities (objects and other agents) by autonomous, 
affective agents. Hence, using this platform we built a multi-agent environment in which, in 
addition to inanimate entities (objects), there are also animate agents interacting in a simple way 
and whose goal is to explore the environment, mapping, analyzing, studying and evaluating it. 
1.2 Thesis Statement/Research Question 
This thesis asserts that exploration of unknown environments populated with entities can be 
robustly and efficiently performed by affective agents. We investigate the role of some emotions 
and motivations on the performance of this task. We also examine the influence on those 
emotions and motivations, and consequently on exploration performance, of other 
aspects/variables of the agents and multi-agent system, such as the agents’ amplitude of the visual 
field, memory size and diversity of the memory contents as well as environment size and 
diversity. 
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1.3 Approach 
In this thesis, we study the problem of exploring unknown environments populated with entities 
by affective autonomous agents. These agents are affective as they incorporate explicit models of 
affects, a broad term commonly used to all the kind of emotion, which play an important role in 
their motivations. 
In this kind of work with multi-agent environments, one has two distinct approaches: using a 
simulated or a real environment. Some researchers build softbots and then use them in a simulated 
environment to test theories and algorithms. Others choose to build real world robots and run 
them on real world environments. It was necessary to choose between these two approaches. 
Simulation has advantages. For example, one can see the results of an algorithm much more 
quickly using softbots in simulated environments than robots in real environments. The researcher 
is able to do experiments without the constraints of time and expense associated with using a real 
robot. In addition, simulations allow the researcher to focus more tightly on the precise aspect of 
the problem in which he or she is interested. If for example the research is centred on path 
planning there may be little value in worrying about the mechanical engineering problems of 
building a physical robot. Moreover, the researcher has more control over the variables of the 
system involved in the experiments. 
But simulated environments have also a few disadvantages. To build a softbot that model a real 
robot the researcher has to abstract the essential features of the robot being modelled. This 
abstraction necessarily involves some degree of simplification. In mobile robotics this is most 
often noticeable in the modelling of sensors. Simulated sensors are most of the times different 
from real sensors. Although research based on such simplifications may well produce useful 
results, there is always the danger that in the simplification process one has ignored a vital 
property of the robot so that the results will not be valid when tested on a real robot. Therefore, 
simulation is a good approach if all the variables that influence the results in real world are 
captured by the computer model. We chose to use simulations for the advantages just mentioned 
above and because the simplifications (presented below in this section) that we made do not seem 
to influence the results. For instance, we made the assumption that the agents know their 
localization precisely (e.g., by using GPS) because this is not relevant to test the influence of 
emotion and motivation in exploration. 
We have developed a multi-agent system comprising affective agents. Although we foresee a 
rather broad potential for this multi-agent system (as we will see in Chapter 6 and throughout the 
thesis, this depends mainly on the kind of basic desires, feelings, goals and plans installed in the 
memory of the agents), in this thesis we examine the ability of the affective agents to explore 
unknown environments. Therefore, we are not exactly applying the multi-agent system to any of 
the problems to which they are commonly applied such as process control, entertainment, or 
eComerce, but instead to the problem of exploring unknown environments, and, more precisely, 
to its simulation. Domains in which this ability is required include the exploration of inhospitable 
geographic regions, such as planets, by mobile robots. Another example is the World Wide Web. 
Taking the multi-agent system as a platform, we developed a simulated environment in which, 
in addition to inanimate entities (objects), there are agents interacting in a simple way whose goal 
is to explore the environment. In doing so, they analyze, study and evaluate it and build its map. 
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We adopted the approach of considering agents as acting and thinking like humans [S. Russell 
& Norvig, 1995] and took the main ideas of the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) architecture to 
guide our architecture. Note, however, that we did not implement the BDI logic. In our platform, 
the architecture of an agent includes the following modules: sensors, memory/beliefs (for entities, 
plans, and maps of the environment), basic desires (basic motivations/motives), desires/goals, 
intentions, feelings, and reasoning. The key components that determine the exhibition of the 
exploratory behaviour in an agent are the kind of basic desires, feelings, goals and plans with 
which the agent is equipped. In our case, and according to the studies mentioned above, the agent 
is equipped in advance with the basic desires for minimal hunger, maximal information gain 
(reduce curiosity), and maximal surprise. Each one of these basic desires drives the agent to 
reduce or to maximize a particular feeling. The desire for minimal hunger, maximal information 
gain and maximal surprise directs the agent, respectively, to reduce the feeling of hunger, to 
reduce the feeling of curiosity (by maximizing information gain) and to maximize the feeling of 
surprise. It is important to note that the desire to reduce curiosity does not mean that the agent 
dislike curiosity. Instead, it means the agent desires selecting actions that maximize curiosity 
before performing them, because after executing them it is expected that they maximize 
information gain and therefore that they maximize the reduction of curiosity. The intensity of 
these feelings is, therefore, important to compute the degree of satisfaction of the basic desires. 
For the desires of minimal hunger and maximal surprise it is given by the expected intensities of 
the feelings of hunger and surprise, respectively, after performing an action, while for the desire 
of maximal information gain it is given by the intensity of the feeling of curiosity before 
performing the action (this is the expected information gain). The memory of agents is setup with 
goals and plans for visiting entities that populate the environment, regions of the environment and 
for going to places where the agent can recharge its battery. These are the goals and plans whose 
execution may lead to satisfy the basic desires with which the agent is equipped in advance for the 
purpose of exploration. The next paragraphs explain in more detail the modules of the architecture 
as well as their relationships. 
The memory of an agent stores information (beliefs) about the world. This information includes 
the configuration of the surrounding world such as the position of the entities (objects and other 
animated agents) that inhabit it, the description of these entities themselves, and the descriptions 
of plans executed by those entities. The information is stored in several memory components. 
There is a metric (grid-based) map to spatially model the surrounding physical environment of the 
agent. Descriptions of entities (physical structure and function) and plans are stored both in the 
episodic memory and in the semantic memory. 
Following the pluralist view of motivation [Havercamp & Reiss, 2003; McDougall, 1908; 
Reiss, 2000; Schwartz, 1992; B. Weiner, 1980], the module of basic desires (basic 
motivations/motives) contains a set of basic desires that drive the behaviour of the agent. Taking 
into account the studies about the motivations of exploratory behaviour described in the previous 
section, we considered, as noted above, the following basic desires: the desire for minimal hunger, 
maximal information gain (reduce curiosity), and maximal surprise. The desire for minimal 
hunger and for maximal information gain (reduce curiosity) are among the 16 basic desires 
proposed by Reiss [Reiss, 2000]. These basic desires are represented in a mathematical function, 
the Utility Function that evaluates states of the environment in terms of the positive and negative 
relevance for the basic desires. This function obeys the Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) 
principle [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995]. This Utility Function is a combination of the Utility 
Functions of each desire. It represents, in our case, the aversion against hunger and the like of 
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surprise and information gain. To satisfy the basic desires of minimal hunger, maximal 
information gain and maximal surprise, the agent desires to visit previously unvisited entities, 
regions of the environment and places where it can recharge its battery (e.g., visitEntity(y), 
visitLoc(x), rechargeBattery()). These goals are automatically generated by the agent by adapting 
past goals to new situations giving rise to new goals which are then ranked according to its 
preference (utility) and then taken as intentions once a plan is generated for them. The reason for 
trying to achieve a goal might be because that achievement corresponds to a state of the 
environment that makes it satisfy one or several basic desires. 
The module of feelings receives information about a state of the environment and outputs the 
intensities of feelings. Following Clore [Clore, 1992], we include in this module affective, 
cognitive, and bodily feelings. The latter two categories are merged to form the category of 
non-affective feelings. This means that this module is much broader than a module of emotion that 
could be considered. Feelings are of primary relevance to influence the behaviour of an agent, 
because computing their intensity the agent measures the degree to which the basic desires are 
fulfilled. 
The reasoning module receives information from the internal/external world and outputs an 
action that has been selected for execution. The agent starts by computing the current world state. 
This is performed by generating expectations or assumptions for the gaps in the environment 
information provided by the sensors. Then, based on the basic desires and the memory of plans, 
new desires/goals (e.g., visitEntity(y), visitLoc(x), rechargeBattery()) are generated and their 
Expected Utility (EU) computed based on the estimated degrees to which the basic desires are 
satisfied by executing the actions required to achieve them. According to this EU, the set of these 
goals of the agent are ranked, and a Hierarchical Task-Network (HTN) plan (e.g., [Erol et al., 
1994b]) is generated for each one so that they can be achieved. The first one, i.e., the one with 
highest EU is taken as an intention. 
The planner is the core of the reasoning module. The agent uses a planner that combines the 
technique of decision-theoretic planning with the methodology of HTN planning in order to deal 
with uncertain, dynamic large-scale real-world domains. Unlike in regular HTN planning, the 
planner can generate plans in domains where there is no complete domain theory by using cases 
of previously successful plans instead of methods for task decomposition. It generates a variant of 
a HTN – a kind of AND/OR tree of probabilistic conditional tasks – that expresses all the possible 
ways to decompose an initial task network. The EU of alternative plans is computed beforehand at 
the time of building the HTN and it is based on the expected feelings of the agent if the plan is 
executed. Plans that are expected to satisfy more (on average) the basic desires (e.g., more 
information gain, less hunger and more surprise) are assigned a higher EU. 
Unlike planning, that is directly a part of the deliberative reasoning module, exploration is an 
activity that results from it, depending on the kind of goals generated. When performing 
exploration, the aim of an agent is twofold: (i) the acquisition of maps of the environment – 
metric maps – where the cells occupied by the entities populating the environment are 
represented; (ii) and the construction of models of those entities. Exploration may be performed 
by single or multiple agents. Each agent autonomously generates goals for visiting unknown 
entities or regions of the environment (goals of the kind visitEntity or visitLoc) and builds an HTN 
plan for each one. As noted before, goals and plans that are expected to satisfy more the basic 
desires are preferred. Thus, each agent performs directed exploration using an action selection 
method based on the maximization of the satisfaction of basic desires. 
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Having selected the simulation approach, we have made several assumptions that we think do 
not interfere with the purposes of this thesis, as follows: 
• We confine the list of emotions and motivations to those that have been suggested as 
being closely related with exploratory behaviour in humans. That is, we consider only the 
feelings of surprise, curiosity/interest, and hunger, and the basic desires of minimal 
hunger, maximal information gain and maximal surprise; 
• We do not address the components of emotional recognition and expression, restricting 
the model to the elicitation of emotions; 
• We do not address the problem of recognizing aspects such as shapes of the objects or 
shapes of parts of them in a given environment. In the sequel we will assume that the 
robot can recognize some sets of shapes in objects and proceed to design algorithms 
based on this ability; 
• We assume that the agents know their location precisely. Hence we avoid the SLAM 
problem, and particularly the localization problem since mapping is to some extent 
addressed by us; 
• We assume that the agents possess ideal sensors, i.e., what is captured by a sensor is free 
of noise. 
 
In order to confirm the hypothesis of this thesis that exploration of unknown environments 
populated with entities can be robustly performed by affective agents, we did a few experimental 
procedures. 
First, we defined how exploration is evaluated. Following the research performed by others 
working on the problem of exploring unknown environments, there are two common dimensions 
for evaluating it: efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency may be measured by the amount of 
knowledge acquired from the environment per unit of time. An efficient explorer acquires 
maximal knowledge in a minimal time. An agent that is able to acquire more knowledge in a time 
t1 is more efficient than another agent that acquires the same knowledge in a time t2>t1, which 
means that, from another point of view, for the same time t3, the former agent is able to acquire 
more knowledge than the latter. On the other hand, effectiveness is related to acquiring the 
information of a finite environment correctly and completely. An effective explorer is able to 
explore the entire environment. An effective agent is more efficient than another if it explores the 
entire environment before the other. In our approach, knowledge is measured in three 
complementary but related dimensions: the amount of the occupancy map acquired, the number 
and the diversity of models of entities acquired. These three dimensions are profoundly related 
since, for the same environment, the more models of entities acquired, the higher the probability 
of having acquired more information about the occupancy map. Another important aspect to take 
into account in the evaluation of exploration is that it is a two step process, involving the selection 
of viewpoints so that the sensory measurements contain new and useful information, and the 
interpretation of the findings of the sensors so as to make accurate deductions about the state of 
the environment. The first step prepares the second. It is of primary importance for the efficiency 
and effectiveness of an exploration strategy. Selecting the viewpoints that provide maximum 
information at a low cost (energy or time) enables an efficient exploration task. On the other hand 
those viewpoints should be selected so that all the information of the environment is acquired. 
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The map building step is more concerned with effectiveness, although it also influences 
efficiency. In fact, although it might involve more or less time to interpret the information 
provided by the sensors, this seems to have much less weight on efficiency, in comparison to the 
time taken to travel from place to place. On the contrary, the effectiveness of the exploration 
depends on the accuracy of the interpretation of the information provided by the sensors. Wrong 
interpretations may lead to inaccurate maps which means a partial failure in exploration. So, an 
evaluation of any exploration should take into account these distinct steps. 
Second, in order to know whether affective agents can perform exploration efficiently and 
effectively, we did not confine to running an affective agent and measure its performance. Instead, 
we compared its performance with ordinary agents (i.e., non-affective agents). Furthermore, we 
went further and study what variables influence its behaviour, i.e., which affective components 
make it perform better. We therefore compared different exploration strategies. In our case, we 
compared the strategies resulting from the combination of surprise, curiosity and hunger. 
Third, to guarantee that this comparison is valid, the agents should have good models of 
curiosity, surprise and hunger. We therefore ensured that their computational models are faithful 
to those of humans. This means that the computational models of surprise, curiosity and hunger 
should be valid models by accurately capturing the features of human models. 
Finally, to test the robustness of affective agents when performing exploration, we tested them 
in several environments of different complexities, with different visual ranges. 
In order to test the approach adopted in this thesis for exploring unknown environments, which 
relies on using affective agents, we experimentally investigated the relationship between the 
variables of the system, i.e., between variables that correspond to several aspects of affective 
agents such as emotions, motivations, memory size and diversity, etc., as well as variables that 
represent features of the environment such as environment size and diversity and (dependent) 
variables describing features of the exploration of unknown environments, such as efficiency and 
effectiveness (map quality). As a research project, this process was conducted starting by an 
exploratory data analysis which has led to a causal model involving the variables of the system 
and subsequently by confirmatory experiments in order to verify the hypothesis generated in the 
exploratory experiment [P. Cohen, 1995]. This experimentation follows the research performed 
by others working on the problem of exploring unknown environments. In fact, various 
researchers have tested, both in simulated and real world environments, different approaches to 
exploring unknown environments by changing some features of the system, such as the 
environment configuration and complexity, the number of agents, and their exploration strategies. 
1.4 Scientific Contribution 
The main contributions of this thesis are: 
• Affect-directed exploration. Most of exploration strategies proposed in the literature rely 
on information gain and a few of them also consider the cost of acquiring knowledge. Our 
exploration strategy also takes into account these features but in a human-like fashion, 
i.e., we consider that the variables that lead an agent to acquire maximal knowledge at 
minimal cost reside in affect, i.e., in emotion and motivation. Surprise, curiosity/interest, 
and hunger are the constructs that drive the behaviour of the agents. In other words, 
instead of directly maximizing knowledge gain and minimizing cost, our approach relies 
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on making the agent to move to places in which it expects feeling minimal hunger, 
maximal surprise and maximize information gain (maximizes the reduction of the feeling 
of curiosity). In this sense, our approach seems to be broader than most of the approaches 
presented in the related literature so far. 
• Three-dimensional entity maps. Maps cannot be neglected in any approach to exploration 
of unknown environments. They constitute the way the environment is represented as it is 
continuously explored. Grid-based metric maps (occupancy grids) are extensively used to 
deal with this problem. We propose a variant of this kind of map called entity maps. 
These are represented by a slightly different occupancy grid in which each cell <x,y,z> is 
associated to a set of pairs that indicate the entities that may occupy that cell and the 
respective probability. This kind of map results from the features that characterize our 
exploration task, namely that it is not confined to terrain mapping but also and mainly to 
acquiring models of the entities that populate the environment. This stems from another 
chief difference to most approaches to exploration: we consider the environment as a 
collection of entities. This view of environments seems to be suitable to respond to the 
challenge of three-dimensional dynamic environments by keeping track of the changes of 
the positions of entities. In contrast to most of the approaches, we deal with 
three-dimensional environments. In fact, maps in our approach are three-dimensional 
maps. Three-dimensional maps are useful for a range of applications. For example, 
architects and building managers may use three-dimensional models for design and utility 
studies using virtual reality technology. Emergency crews, such as fire fighters, could 
utilize three-dimensional models for planning how to best operate at a hazardous site. 
Three-dimensional models are also useful for robots operating in urban environments. 
Finally, accurate three-dimensional models could be a great supplement to the video game 
industry, especially if the model complexity is low enough for real-time virtual reality 
rendering. 
• Computational model of surprise. We propose a computational model of surprise that 
relies on psychological models of surprise which maintain that surprise is elicited by 
unexpectedness. The model captures this idea and incorporates it in the computation of 
the intensity of surprise. Another feature, for example, is that the most expected event in a 
set of them does not cause surprise. 
• Computational model of curiosity/interest. In contrast to surprise, there are already a few 
computational models to account for curiosity/interest. We propose our own, based on the 
idea that novelty and uncertainty elicit curiosity/interest. 
• Incorporation of feelings into a BDI-like architecture. By proposing a BDI-like 
architecture with additional mentalistic qualities such as feelings and basic desires, we 
achieved the goal of extending the classic BDI architecture. 
• An approach for defining agent’s personality. The EU function is a mathematical function 
that evaluates states of the environment in terms of the positive and negative relevance for 
the basic desires. It is a combination of the Utility Functions of the basic desires. 
According to the pluralist view of motivation [Havercamp & Reiss, 2003; McDougall, 
1908; Reiss, 2000; Schwartz, 1992; B. Weiner, 1980], basic desires define the personality 
of humans. It represents, in our case, the aversion against hunger and the like of surprise 
and information gain. The contribution of these Utility Functions to the EU function can 
Chapter 1. Introduction  41 
 
be weighed, which means we can configure the personality of the agents by giving, for 
instance, more weight to curiosity than to hunger, etc. 
• A model for the generation of expectations. Unfortunately, the real world is not crystal 
clear to agents. Agents almost never have access to the whole environment, mainly 
because of the incompleteness and incorrectness of their perceptual and understanding 
components. In fact, it is too much work to obtain all the information from a complex and 
dynamic world, and it is quite likely that the accessible information suffers distortions. 
Nevertheless, since the success of agents depends heavily on the completeness of the 
information of the state of the world, they have to pursue alternatives in order to construct 
good models of the world, even (and especially) when this is uncertain. We propose a 
Bayesian model for the generation of assumptions or expectations to fill in gaps in the 
present observational information. Our model is motivated by studies that are provided 
from various areas, such as psychology, cognitive science, and ethology, which suggest 
that humans and, in general, animals attempt to overcome this limitation through the 
generation of assumptions or expectations. 
• A three-dimensional map-building process based on the generation of expectations. Most 
previous map-building approaches are applied to two-dimensional environments. As has 
already been described, three-dimensional maps are useful for a range of applications. In 
all of those application domains, there is a need for methods that can generate 
three-dimensional models at a low cost, and with minimum human intervention. We 
propose a straightforward probabilistic map-building technique for three-dimensional 
maps. This relies on the trade-off between exploitation and exploration. The exploitation 
relies on the model for the generation of expectations which enables the agent to make 
use of previously acquired knowledge about entities to generate assumptions/expectations 
for the entities that are visible, but not yet explored and therefore with missing 
information. 
• A multi-agent tool. Intelligent agents are a new paradigm for developing software 
applications. This new paradigm of programming, also called agent-oriented 
programming (agent-based computing is another common term), seems to be appropriate 
to deal with certain kinds of domains, offering a variety of benefits in comparison to other 
programming paradigms such as object-oriented programming. A considerable number of 
languages or tools have been proposed so that agent-based applications can be designed 
and built easily. We introduce AMAS (Affect-based Multi-Agent System), a multi-agent 
system based on the notion of affect and also on ideas of the BDI model, that was used as 
a platform to develop the application for the exploration of unknown environments by 
affective agents. AMAS was developed to be used as a framework for building 
agent-based applications in general. Yet, AMAS is still in a preliminary version. For now 
it is simply a prototype needing further improvements and experimental evaluation. The 
current version is suitable for applications in which the entities (agents) are distributed in 
a physical environment. This is the case of the domain of the exploration of unknown 
environments which is the only application developed with AMAS up to date. Examples 
of other potential applications are air traffic control, and transportation logistics (UM 
Translog). 
• Case-based, decision-theoretic, HTN planning. When we want to apply classical planning 
systems to problems that occur in uncertain, dynamic environments such as the real 
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world, we find that the assumptions they make can be severely limiting. Actually, each 
one of these assumptions leads the planner agent to ignore relevant aspects of most real 
world planning domains. In fact, the real world is characterized by the presence of 
uncertainty in different forms. In order to overcome these limitations, various 
probabilistic planning systems (decision-theoretic planners) have been developed. 
However, many planning decisions made in the real world are done in a hierarchical 
manner. This motivated the development of the HTN planning technique, which relies on 
the application of reduction schemas (methods) to generate a hierarchy of tasks. However, 
for many real-world applications, developing a collection of methods that completely 
models plan generation has been found to be unfeasible. Case-based planning is a 
promising technique to overcome this problem. This thesis includes the description of a 
planner, called ProCHiP (Probabilistic, Case-based Hierarchical Planning), which 
combines ideas from case-based planning, HTN planning, and decision-theoretic planning 
to deal with all these problems. It involves learning actions and their utility value. 
 
Other aspects that also characterize this thesis are: 
• Map quality evaluation. The maps built by the explorer agents must be assessed so that 
conclusions can be drawn with respect to their performance. We propose an approach that 
consists in comparing the maps built with those that should be built if the agent were an 
ideal agent, i.e., with a map that correctly represents the environment. In simulation 
experiments this can be easily achieved by comparing the maps cell by cell, counting the 
differences between them. 
• Computational model of hunger. This model is quite simple, reflecting the need of an 
energy source by an agent. This is simply expressed by the difference between the total 
amount of energy that an agent can store and the amount of energy that is available at a 
given time. 
• Autonomous generation and ranking of goals. In order to be fully autonomous, agents 
must be able to generate their own goals. Besides, when there are multiple goals 
occurring at the same time, it is impossible to accomplish them simultaneously. 
Therefore, agents should be able to prioritize them according to some ranking rule. We 
propose an algorithm to generate and rank goals autonomously. The generation phase is 
based on adapting goals from past plans to the entities that are within the agent’s sensors 
range. Prioritization is achieved by taking into account the EU computed for each goal. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The next chapter begins the examination of the problem of exploring unknown environments by 
affective agents by reviewing the work done in the related areas to date. At least seven areas are 
covered which reflects the wide range of subjects which had to be examined in order to deal with 
this problem. We divide those areas into two main categories: those that are central to this thesis 
and to which this thesis has a more direct contribution; and those areas to which this thesis does 
not have such a direct contribution but, because they are used frequently throughout the text, their 
central concepts must be presented in order to make this thesis more easy to read. The first areas 
are: agents and multi-agent systems, emotion and motivation, exploration of unknown 
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environments and the central area of this thesis, resulting from the combination of the previous 
three, which is the exploration of unknown environments by affective agents. Among the latter 
areas we present a review of knowledge representation, planning under uncertainty in dynamic 
environments (decision-theoretic planning), HTN planning, and creativity. 
Chapter 3 introduces the prototype of the multi-agent system. This presentation is made from a 
general perspective. Hence, illustrative examples may not belong solely to the problem of 
exploration. When appropriate, examples from domains other than the exploration of unknown 
environments are given. The architecture of affective agents is described, including their modules 
such as sensors, memory (for entities, plans, and maps of the environment), goals and intentions, 
basic desires, feelings, and reasoning. Subsequently, the application of that affective-based multi-
agent system to the problem of exploring unknown environments is presented. It includes a 
description of the exploration strategy as well as an illustrative example of it. 
Chapter 4 describes the evaluation of our approach to the problem of exploring unknown 
environments. This evaluation involves the evaluation of aspects of the main processing modules 
of the architecture of agents that influence the exploration of unknown environments, especially 
the modules of basic desires and feelings. 
Chapter 5 describes the evaluation of the work presented in this thesis by comparing it with 
other related studies. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, we conclude with a summary of our contributions to the central areas of 
this thesis and describe some problems and issues that remain for future work. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
his thesis is about affective agents that exhibit the ability to explore unknown 
environments. We build on ideas and concepts developed in the fields of agents and 
multi-agent systems as well as on affective computing (emotion and motivation) and 
exploration of unknown environments. Other related areas include knowledge representation, 
planning under uncertainty in dynamic environments, hierarchical task-network planning, and 
creativity. Recent advances in psychology and neuroscience recognize the influence of emotion 
and motivation on reasoning, decision-making, and planning. This influence has been taken into 
account in several agent-based systems. In fact, the attribute of personality has been ascribed to 
agents, considered as almost as important as any other property such as reasoning (e.g., [Etzioni & 
Weld, 1995]). 
In this chapter, we start our examination of the problem of exploring unknown environments by 
affective agents by reviewing the work done in related areas to date. Since, our thesis builds 
primarily on the fields of exploration, affective computing, and agents and multi-agent systems, 
we begin by reviewing each one of these fields independently. Firstly, we consider the field of 
agents and multi-agent systems, secondly, we shift to affective computing, and then we delve into 
exploration. Subsequently, we address the subject that joins together these primary fields, i.e., the 
subject of exploring unknown environments with affective agents. Finally, in order to understand 
our thesis, we briefly introduce, in a single section, the other specific fields that are also closely 
related but not central to our thesis. Such secondary areas are: knowledge representation, planning 
under uncertainty, hierarchical-task-network planning, and creativity. Although our work provides 
a contribution to these areas, mainly to hierarchical-task network planning, planning under 
uncertainty, and creativity, we decided not to include in this thesis any kind of evaluation of the 
parts of our work related to these areas, since this is not the goal of this thesis. Instead, the work 
that we did is used as a supporting tool. Hence, we decided not to incorporate an extensive 
description of these areas because they are not central to the subject of this thesis, however, we 
think some description is essential in that it provides an introduction to the terminology and ideas 
that are frequently used throughout this thesis. 
2.1 Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 
2.1.1 Agent: Definition and Taxonomies 
The concept of agent was first introduced a few decades ago [Hewitt, 1977; McCarthy, 1959]. At 
the present time there are several other terms that are used such as intelligent agents, software 
agents and autonomous agents. The term agent is elusive. If we take a look at the most relevant 
papers on the subject, we verify that there is no universal definition of the term agent. Instead 
there is a myriad of definitions (see [Bradshaw, 1997; Franklin & Graesser, 1997; Luck & d’ 
Inverno, 2001]). To avoid introducing here an endless list of definitions, we present just a few of 
them that generically capture the idea of an agent. According to Wooldridge and Jennings 
[Wooldridge, 2001; Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995b], “an agent is a computer system that is 
T 
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situated in some environment, and that is capable of autonomous action in this environment in 
order to meet its design objectives”. Franklin and Graesser [Franklin & Graesser, 1997] consider 
an agent as “a system situated within and part of an environment that senses that environment and 
acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and so as to effect what it senses in the future”. 
Another generic definition is proposed by Russell and Norvig [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995]: “an 
agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors and acting 
upon that environment through effectors”. More definitions may be found in [Franklin & 
Graesser, 1997]. 
However, perhaps the most appropriate approach to define the term agent has been to 
characterize it according to certain aspects, i.e., describing the attributes that it must possess. 
Wooldridge and Jennings [Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995b] distinguish between weak and strong 
notions of agency. The former is less controversial and conceptualizes an agent as exhibiting the 
following list of properties: 
• Autonomy: the ability to operate independently, i.e., to make its own decisions without 
the intervention of humans or others; 
• Social ability: the ability to interact by negotiation and cooperation with other agents; 
• Reactivity: the ability to perceive and respond to changes in the environment; 
• Proactiveness: the ability to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the initiative. 
The strong notion of agency is much more controversial, although it is well accepted by 
researchers working in AI. According to this notion, in addition to the properties of the weak 
notion, agents are characterised by other attributes that belong to humans. Hence, in addition to 
autonomy, social ability, reactivity, and proactiveness, agents possess explicit mentalistic qualities 
such as knowledge, belief, intention, and obligation [Shoham, 1993], or even emotion (e.g., 
[Bates, 1994; Wright, 1997]). 
Based on the works described in [P. Cohen et al., 1994; Etzioni et al., 1993; Etzioni & Weld, 
1994; Knoblock & Arens, 1994], Etzioni and Weld [Etzioni & Weld, 1995] listed the following 
set of characteristics that agents are expected to exhibit: 
• Autonomy, including goal-oriented, collaborative, flexible and self-starting behaviour; 
• Temporal continuity: an agent is a running process, not a transitory or an ephemera 
event; 
• Character: the property of possessing a credible personality or emotional state; 
• Communication: the ability to communicate with other agents, including humans; 
• Adaptability: the ability to learn and improve with experience; 
• Mobility: the ability to transport itself from one place to another; 
Several researchers have attempted not only to describe the attributes that agents should 
possess, but also distribute agents into classes or categories, i.e., they have proposed taxonomies 
for agents, according to the attributes they exhibit. Agents sharing similar attributes fall into the 
same class. The different classes result from the various combinations of the attributes that agents 
might possess. Examples of those classes are mobile agents, interface agents, information agents, 
etc. Thus, what defines a class or category of agents is the set of attributes that characterises it. 
This approach lists the attributes of restricted classes of agents instead of the general class of 
Chapter 2. Background  47 
 
agents. We present, as an example, the taxonomy of agents proposed in [Nwana, 1996; Nwana & 
Ndumu, 1997] as well as the attributes that are taken into account to classify agents. Other well 
known taxonomies have been proposed by Gilbert and colleagues [D. Gilbert et al., 1995], Moulin 
and Chaib-draa [Moulin & Chaib-draa, 1996], Franklin and Graesser [Franklin & Graesser, 1997], 
and Müller [Müller, 1998]. 
Nwana and Ndumu [Nwana, 1996; Nwana & Ndumu, 1997] suggest a typology for agents 
based on the following dimensions: 
• Mobility: static or mobile; 
• Thinking/behaviour paradigm: deliberative or reactive; 
• Autonomy, cooperation and learning (these were considered the three primary 
attributes that agents should possess); 
• Role: information or internet; 
• Number of agent philosophies combined: hybrid or non hybrid; 
• Versatile, trustworthiness, temporal continuity, ability to fail gracefully, and mentalistic 
attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions or even emotions (these were considered 
the secondary attributes). 
According to Nwana, the combination of these dimensions gives rise to multiple categories of 
agents, such as static deliberative collaborative agents, mobile reactive collaborative agents, etc. 
However, because some of those categories do not exist in practice, he confined the list to the 
following categories: 
• Collaborative agents; 
• Interface agents; 
• Mobile agents; 
• Information/internet agents; 
• Reactive agents; 
• Hybrid agents; 
• Smart agents. 
2.1.2 Agent Architectures 
Besides knowing both the attributes that characterise agents and the different types of agents that 
exist, it is important to know how agents are built, which are their constituent component modules 
and how these modules fit together and interact. Three main approaches have been proposed 
[Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995a, 1995b]: deliberative architectures, reactive architectures, and 
hybrid architectures. The first is also known as the symbolic AI paradigm or classical approach, 
assuming that the agent possesses an explicit, internal, symbolic model of the environment, 
employing logical or pseudo-logical reasoning in order to decide what actions to perform. On the 
contrary, the second approach does not assume that agents have symbolic models, while their 
behaviour is characterised by responding to the stimulus provided by the present state of the 
environment. The third approach, a combination of the previous two, attempt to involve both 
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reaction and deliberation in an effort to adopt the best of each approach. We now describe in more 
detail each one of these approaches, providing some examples. 
The deliberative architecture has been extensively addressed by symbolic AI researchers. These 
researchers have long assumed that planning is an essential component of any artificial agent. 
Whether based on the forerunner STRIPS [Fikes & Nilsson, 1971] or on any other more recent 
approaches to planning such as those combining decision theory and utility theory 
(decision-theoretic planning) [Blythe, 1999a] or relying on hierarchical techniques [Erol et al., 
1994b], various AI planning systems have been used as the primary component of artificial 
agents. 
Besides AI planning, different deliberative architectures have been proposed based on the 
attitudes of belief, desire and intention [Bratman et al., 1988; A. Rao & Georgeff, 1991, 1995]. 
Examples of those architectures are IRMA [Bratman et al., 1988] and GRATE* [Jennings, 1993]. 
Based on a widely respected theory of rational action [Bratman et al., 1988], the BDI model of 
rational agency relies on giving primacy to beliefs, desires, and intentions in rational action. It is 
therefore a quite intuitive model that is based on practical reasoning – the process of reasoning 
that humans use everyday when deciding moment by moment which action to perform next. As in 
humans, a BDI agent has beliefs, i.e., information about the world, desires, i.e., states of the world 
that it prefers and wishes to happen, and intentions, i.e., the subset of the desired states of the 
environment the agent is committed to achieving. 
However, the symbolic paradigm has generated a host of difficult problems which look 
insoluble in general. Examples of these problems are complexity (some problems, such as the 
planning task mentioned above, require algorithms of considerable complexity), and difficulty in 
solving some problems which people seem to manage easily (such as representing common sense 
knowledge). In order to overcome these difficulties, an alternative architecture for building 
intelligent agents has been proposed, called reactive architecture. Based on the findings of 
ethological research, Brooks [Brooks, 1985, 1986] argued that instead of building complex agents 
in simple worlds, we should follow the evolutionary path and start building simple agents that are 
able to bring fast, specific behaviours to bear in order to survive in the world much like animals 
do. The architecture that he proposed, called the subsumption architecture, is built in layers. Each 
layer gives the system a set of pre-wired behaviours. The higher levels build upon the lower levels 
to create more complex behaviours. The behaviour of the system as a whole is the result of many 
interacting simple behaviours. The layers operate asynchronously. The layers of the subsumption 
architecture are composed of networks of finite state machines augmented with timers called 
augmented finite state machines. The timers enable state changes after pre-programmed periods of 
time. Each augmented finite state machine has an input and output signal. When the input of an 
augmented finite state machine exceeds a predetermined threshold, the behaviour of that 
augmented finite state machine is activated (i.e., the output is activated). The inputs of augmented 
finite state machines come from sensors or other augmented finite state machines. The outputs of 
augmented finite state machines are sent to the agent’s actuators or to the inputs of other 
augmented finite state machines. Each augmented finite state machine also accepts a suppression 
signal and an inhibition signal. A suppression signal overrides the normal input signal. An 
inhibition signal causes output to be completely inhibited. These signals allow behaviours to 
override each other so that the system can produce coherent behaviour. The use of augmented 
finite state machines results in a tight coupling of perception and action, producing the highly 
reactive response characteristic of subsumption systems. However, all patterns of behaviour in 
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these systems are pre-wired. Augmented finite state machines are the only units of processing in 
the architecture. Thus, there are no symbols. Several additional extensions [Mataric, 1992] have 
been proposed to pure reactive subsumption systems. These extensions are also known as 
behaviour-based architectures. Capabilities of behaviour-based systems include landmark 
detection and map building, learning to walk, collective behaviours with homogeneous agents, 
group learning with homogeneous agents, and heterogeneous agents. A number of key features 
result from this architecture: no explicit knowledge representation is used; behaviour is distributed 
rather than centralized; response to stimuli is reflexive – the perception-action sequence is not 
modulated by cognitive deliberation; the agents are organized in a bottom-up fashion (thus, 
complex behaviours are fashioned from the combination of simpler, underlying ones); agents are 
extremely simple in terms of the amount of computation they need to do. Other examples of 
reactive architectures are those proposed in [Agre & Chapman, 1987; Chapman & Agre, 1986; 
Kaelbling & Rosenschein, 1990]. 
Various researchers defend the notion that the best architecture to build agents is that of 
combining the deliberative and reactive ones. An agent with such architecture exhibits two 
components: one that enables the agent to plan or decide what to do in a more complex fashion 
based on symbols; another that enables the agent to react to external events in a faster and simpler 
way. Examples of this kind of architecture are TouringMachines [Ferguson, 1992] and InterRRaP 
[Müller, 1997]. 
Recently, researchers such as Minsky [Minsky, 2000, 2006] and Sloman and colleagues 
[Sloman et al., 1994] have defended an architecture for agents that incorporates reactive and 
deliberative components in addition to other components such as reflexive reasoning or 
meta-management which, broadly speaking, involves reasoning about the internal information and 
reasoning processes which implies the existence of self monitoring and self evaluation functions. 
Russel and Norvig [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995] distinguish four main types of agent 
designs/structures: simple reflex agents; agents that keep track of the world; goal-based agents; 
and utility-based agents. Simple reflex-agents correspond to the above mentioned reactive 
architecture, while agents that keep track of the world, goal-based agents, and utility-based agents 
correspond to two different kinds of deliberative architectures. In reflex-agents the decisions are 
pre-computed. Goal-based agents are much more evolved, flexible agents in comparison with 
reflexive agents. They employ reasoning about the desires of the agent. Utility-based agents 
decide what to do based on an evaluation of the outcomes of their actions. The alternative world 
states resulting from their possible actions are compared and the action that leads to the world 
state that provides higher happiness to the agent is preferred. 
A closely related approach has been presented by Wooldridge [Wooldridge, 2001] in order to 
identify abstract architectures for intelligent agents. He also distinguishes between purely reactive 
agents, agents with state, and well as expressing the relevance of utility functions to the 
decision-making process of an agent. 
2.1.3 Agent Environments 
Agents cannot be dissociated from the environment they inhabit. Environments can be classified 
according to the following aspects [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995]: accessible versus inaccessible, 
deterministic versus nondeterministic, episodic versus non-episodic, static versus dynamic, and 
discrete versus continuous. 
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An environment is classified as accessible if the agent’s sensors perceive the complete state of 
the environment, otherwise it is inaccessible. In a deterministic environment, and contrary to what 
happens in a nondeterministic environment, the next state of the environment is completely 
determined by the current state and the actions selected by the agents. The category of episodic 
environment relies on the notion of episode. Each episode consists of the agent perceiving and 
then acting. In an episodic environment, as opposed to non-episodic environment, the agent need 
not think ahead because episodes are independent from each other, which means an agent’s action 
depends just on the episode itself and never on the actions performed in previous episodes. While 
an agent is making a decision, the environment may or may not change. In the former case the 
environment is classified as dynamic while in the latter case it is called static. In a discrete 
environment there is a limited number of distinct, clearly defined perceptions and actions, while 
in a continuous environment there is an immeasurable number of choices for action and 
perception. 
2.1.4 Multi-Agent Systems: definition and taxonomies 
When more than one agent (whatever the properties or architecture they have) are put together in 
an environment (no matter what properties it has), interacting with one another, the result is called 
a multi-agent system [Weiss, 1999; Wooldridge, 2001]. This interaction implies that additional 
capabilities are required by agents, in addition to those already exhibited by the individual agents 
such as planning, learning, etc. In fact, the interaction between agents requires abilities such as 
cooperation, coordination and negotiation. Moreover, the capabilities of learning or planning may 
also be different in order to adapt to the social aspect of the environment. 
Decker [Decker, 1987] presents a taxonomy for the field of distributed artificial intelligence 
based on the following dimensions: 
• Agent granularity (coarse versus fine); 
• Heterogeneity of agent knowledge (redundant versus specialised); 
• Methods of distributing control (benevolent versus competitive, team versus 
hierarchical, static versus shifting roles); 
• Communication possibilities (blackboard versus messages, high-level versus low-level, 
content). 
From an application perspective, Parunak [Parunak, 1996] argues that the most important 
characteristics of a multi-agent system are: 
• System function; 
• Agent architecture (degree of heterogeneity, deliberative versus reactive); 
• System architecture (communication, protocols, and human involvement). 
Stone and Veloso [Stone & Veloso, 1997] present a taxonomy for multi-agent systems along 
the following agent aspects: degree of heterogeneity and degree of communication. The three 
combinations of these dimensions give rise to the classification of multi-agent systems as 
homogeneous non-communicating agents, heterogeneous non-communicating agents, and 
heterogeneous communicating agents. 
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Logan [Logan, 1998] outlines a classification scheme for agent-based systems along the 
following dimensions: the features of the environment in which the agent system is embedded, the 
types of actions it can perform, and the kinds of goals and beliefs that can be attributed to it. 
Other overviews of distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems are, for instance, 
[Bond & Gasser, 1988; Vlassis, 2003]. 
2.1.5 Agent and Multi-Agent Systems Applications 
Today, multi-agent systems have already been applied to a wide range of domains. Two main 
types of agent applications have been distinguished: those in which agents are decision-makers, 
i.e., they are implemented to act instead of or to advice humans (decision making is placed in the 
hands of agents), or as simulation tools, i.e., they are implemented in order to provide a better 
understanding of a certain system. Another common approach to divide agent applications is that 
of distinguishing between single-agent and multi-agent systems [Wooldridge, 2001]. Whatever 
the type of application, its implementation is based on the key abstraction of agent rather than 
procedures, abstract data types or objects. Nowadays, intelligent agents are a new paradigm for 
developing software applications [Jennings, 2001; Wooldridge, 1998, 2001]. This new paradigm 
of programming, also called agent-oriented programming (agent-based computing is another 
common term) [Shoham, 1990, 1993] seems to be appropriate to deal with certain kinds of 
domains, offering a variety of benefits in comparison to other programming paradigms such as 
object-oriented programming, expert systems or distributed computing. Those domains to which 
they are more suitable include problems that are inherently (physically or geographically, or even 
in terms of time) distributed, where independent processes can be clearly distinguished, or those 
requiring the interconnection and inter-operation of multiple autonomous systems. The usefulness 
and benefits of multi-agent systems are clearly claimed in [Jennings & Wooldridge, 1997; Stone 
& Veloso, 1997]. 
A considerable number of languages or tools have been proposed so that agent-based 
applications can be designed and built easily. Among them, we may refer to AGENT0 [Shoham, 
1993], PLACA [Thomas, 1993], PRS [Georgeff & Ingrand, 1989; Georgeff & Lansky, 1987; K. 
Myers, 1997] and all the latter BDI-based multi-agent tool, which in a way or another are based 
on PRS, such as JACK [Busetta et al., 1999; Howden et al., 2001], dMARS [d’Inverno et al., 
1997], AgentSpeak [Bordini et al., 2002; Bordini & Moreira, 2004; A. Rao, 1996], JADEX 
[Pokahr et al., 2005], SPARK [Morley & Myers, 2004], and 3APL [Dastani et al., 2003] 
languages. A more comprehensive description of these and other agent-oriented programming 
languages can be found in [Badjonski, 2003; Nwana & Wooldridge, 1996; Wooldridge & 
Jennings, 1995a]. Besides these tools, methodologies to support the analysis and design of agent-
based systems have also been developed [Iglesias et al., 1998; Wooldridge, 2001] such as GAIA 
[Wooldridge et al., 1999, 2000], and the AAII [Kinny et al., 1996] which relies on the PRS-based 
BDI technology [Georgeff & Lansky, 1987] and dMARS system [d’Inverno et al., 1997]. As a 
complement to these tools, various studies have been made so that the development of an 
agent-based system is successfully performed [Wooldridge & Jennings, 1998, 1999]. 
Regarding the type of domain application, agents have been applied in a huge variety of areas 
such as workflow and business process control, manufacturing and traffic control, information 
retrieval and management, electronic commerce, social simulation, air traffic control, air-combat 
modelling, patient monitoring, health care, games, interactive theatre and cinema [Jennings et al., 
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1998; Jennings & Wooldridge, 1997; Luck et al., 2003; Parunak, 1999; Wooldridge, 2001]. 
However, more application domains are expected to be covered in the next few years. A few of 
the most prominent applications in the above mentioned domains are considered below. Our aim 
is not to make a complete survey, but instead to present representative examples which are 
historically significant in those above mentioned domains. Other applications of the extensive list 
are presented in conference proceedings (e.g., of the International Joint Conference on 
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems [Dignum et al., 2005; Gini & Ishida, 2002; Jennings 
& Tambe, 2004; Nakashima et al., 2006; Wooldridge & Rosenschein, 2003]), and journals (e.g., 
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems – e.g., [Wooldridge & Sycara, 2006]) of the area. 
ARCHON [Jennings, 1996b], a software platform for building multi-agent systems, is perhaps 
the best known agent-based process control system that has been applied in different domains, 
including electricity transportation management and particle accelerator control. 
In manufacturing, applications have addressed areas of configuration design of manufacturing 
products, collaborative design, scheduling and controlling manufacturing operations, controlling a 
manufacturing robot, and determining production sequences for a factory. YAMS [Parunak, 1987] 
is an agent-based system whose goal is to efficiently manage the production process at the various 
factories belonging to a single company. Each one of these factories and each one of its 
components is represented by an agent. 
Currently undergoing field trials at Sydney airport, OASIS [Ljunberg & Lucas, 1992] is an 
air-traffic control system implemented using the AII methodology [Kinny et al., 1996] relying on 
PRS-based BDI technology [Georgeff & Lansky, 1987] and dMARS system [d’Inverno et al., 
1997]. Its aim is to assist an air-traffic controller in managing the flow of aircraft at an airport, 
offering estimates of aircraft arrival times, monitoring aircraft progress against previously derived 
estimates, informing the air-traffic controller of any errors, and finding the optimal sequence in 
which to land the aircraft. To do that, each aircraft that enters Sydney airspace and the various 
air-traffic controller systems are represented by an agent. 
The complex problem of information overload, resulting from the large amount of information 
that is available nowadays in information repositories such as databases, e-mails or the Web, 
requires effective solutions. These solutions are, broadly speaking, information filtering, so that 
only the relevant information is provided, and information gathering, by effectively and 
efficiently selecting the information that meets our requirements. Agents have been widely 
proposed as a suitable approach to implementing these solutions. To do so, agents may be used to 
search the information repositories, acting on behalf of some user. There are already a few 
applications based on these ideas, such as MAXIMS, NewT [Maes, 1994] and Zuno Digital 
Library (ZDL) [Jennings & Wooldridge, 1997]. MAXIMS is an electronic mail filtering agent that 
learns to prioritize, delete, forward, sort, and archive mail messages on behalf of a user. The agent 
monitors the user and uses the actions the user makes as a lesson on what to do. Depending upon 
threshold limits that are constantly updated, MAXIMS will guess what the user will do. Upon 
surpassing a degree of certainty, it will start to suggest to the user what to do. NewT is an Internet 
news filtering program that takes, as input, a stream of Usenet news articles, and gives, as output, 
a subset of these articles that is recommended for the user to read. The user gives NewT examples 
of articles that would and would not be read, and NewT will then retrieve articles. The user then 
gives feedback about the articles, and thus NewT will then be trained further on which articles to 
retrieve and which articles not to retrieve. NewT retrieves words of interest from an article by 
performing a full-text analysis using the vector space model for documents. The ZDL system is a 
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multi-agent system that enables a user to obtain a single, coherent view of incoherent, 
disorganized data sources such as the World Wide Web. Agents in ZDL play one of three roles: 
consumer – represents end users of the system, who can be thought of as consuming information; 
producer – represents content providers who own the information that customers consume; and, 
facilitator – mapping between consumers and producers. Consumer agents in the system are 
responsible for representing the user’s interests. They maintain models of users, and use these 
models to assist them, by proactively providing information they require, and shielding them from 
information that is not of interest. ZDL thus acts both as an information filter and an information 
gatherer. 
Although it is still not fully autonomous, an increasing amount of trade is being undertaken by 
agents in eCommerce, and there are already several interesting applications. Kasbah [Chavez & 
Maes, 1996], a simple electronic marketplace in which agents buy and sell goods, is one of them. 
Another is Jango [Doorenbos et al., 1997], a personal shopping assistant able to search on-line 
stores for product availability and price information. 
In workflow and business process management, the aim is to automate the processes of a 
business, ensuring that a document flow is maintained and managed within an organization. 
Developed for British Telecom, ADEPT [Jennings, 1996a] is an example of an agent-based 
workflow management system, aimed at providing customers with a quote for the installation of a 
network that satisfies the customer’s requirements. In ADEPT, agents were created for the British 
Telecom departments that are involved in this activity, namely the Customers Service, Design, 
Surveyor, and Legal departments. In addition, an agent was also created for each person in those 
departments. ADEPT uses an architecture that has been developed in the GRAETE* [Jennings, 
1993] and ARCHON [Jennings, 1996b] projects. 
Guardian [Hayes-Roth et al., 1995] is one of the earliest and perhaps the best known system in 
patient monitoring. Developed for Surgical Intensive Care Units, it manages patient care. Other 
examples of more recent applications of agent-based systems in medicine are described in [Cortés 
et al., 2002; Moreno, ; Shankararaman, 2000]. 
In entertainment and leisure, agents have an obvious role in computer games, interactive theater 
and cinema, and virtual environments. These domains are characterized by involving animated 
characters, which can obviously be represented by agents. Hence, it is no surprise that agents have 
been used to develop computer games such as the highly successful Quake [idSoftware] or 
Creatures [Gameware], which provides a rich, simulated environment containing a number of 
synthetic agents that a user can interact with in real-time. Several other applications of 
agent-based techniques to computer games are described in [Wavish & Graham, 1996]. Agents 
have also been used in cinema to play out roles analogous to those played by real, human actors, 
such as in Titanic [Cameron, 1997]. More recently, the Massive agent system [MassiveSoftware], 
the premier used for generating crowd-related visual effects and character animation, was used to 
achieve visually impressive battle-scenes in the second of the Lord of the Rings film trilogy, The 
Two Towers [Walsh et al., 2002]. Although the battle scene was broadly predetermined, the 
movement and action of each individual character is controlled by perceiving and responding to 
the artificial environment and to other characters. Finally, the development of believable agents 
has been investigated in order to construct simulated worlds consisting of synthetic characters that 
have human-like behaviour. The aim is to give users the experience of living in those worlds 
interacting with those synthetic characters and not merely watching them. The OZ project [Bates, 
1994] is a nice example of this kind of agent-based application in which agents exhibit an 
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emotional component. The next section is entirely devoted to emotional and motivational-based 
agents, including references to some applications. Other examples of agent-based systems applied 
to virtual environments may be found in conferences of the field such as the International 
Working Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents (e.g., [Gratch et al., 2006; Panayiotopoulos et 
al., 2005; Rist et al., 2004]). 
Simulation based on multi-agent systems is undoubtedly competing with other simulation 
approaches such as object-oriented or discrete event simulation [Davidsson, 2001]. In the 
particular case of social simulation, agents are used to simulate the behaviour of human societies 
[N. Gilbert & Conte, 1995; N. Gilbert & Doran, 1994; Moss & Davidsson, 2001]. Each agent 
represents an individual or an organization. A similar approach was considered to simulate traffic 
control [Oliveira & Duarte, 2005]. 
A more comprehensive descriptions of domain applications and specific agent systems may be 
found, for instance, in [Jennings et al., 1998; Jennings & Wooldridge, 1995, 1997; Luck et al., 
2003; Oliveira, 1999; Parunak, 1999; Sycara, 1998; Wooldridge, 2001]. Although a number of 
agent-based systems have now been deployed, and a much greater number of advanced prototypes 
for real world problems have been built, many problems remain unsolved and challenges still 
remain [Aylett et al., 1998; Luck, 1999; Nwana & Ndumu, 1999]. 
In the next section we will describe applications of emotional agents. Furthermore, in the 
subsequent section we cover applications of agents in the domain of exploration of unknown 
environments. 
2.2 Emotion and Motivation 
2.2.1 Introduction to Emotion and Motivation: definitions, terminology and 
typology 
As argued by many researchers, particularly those defending the strong notion of agency, agents 
possess explicit mentalistic qualities such as knowledge, belief, intention, and obligation 
[Shoham, 1993], or even emotions (e.g., [Bates, 1994; Davis & Lewis, 2003]). This enables 
agents to manifest the attributes of personality or of a “believable” character [Etzioni & Weld, 
1995]. To do so, agents have to recognize, express and have/experience emotions [Picard, 1997]. 
For instance, Izard [Izard, 1991] considers emotion as a subsystem of personality together with 
other subsystems such as the homeostatic, drive, perceptual, cognitive, and motor systems. 
If a human agent efforts lead him/her to attain an intended goal he/she tends to evaluate this 
outcome positively, and if his/her actions are thwarted the resulting emotion tends to be negative 
[Carver & Scheier, 1990]. Emotions are thus taken as rewards or punishments. Humans often do 
things because they anticipate that they will make them feel better in some way (e.g., [Thayer et 
al., 1994]). According to simple principles of reinforcement, humans are more likely to repeat 
actions that had pleasant affective consequences in the past. But hedonism of this kind cannot 
account for all varieties of motivational phenomena. Opposed to those theories of hedonism and 
neo-hedonism [W. Cox & Klinger, 2004; Mellers, 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 2000], there is another 
theory or class of theories for the motivational effect of emotion on decision-making and action 
called emotion-specific action impulses theory [Frijda, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; B. Weiner, 2005]. 
These defend that there are emotion specific action tendencies for separate emotions (e.g., to flee 
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or avoid danger in case of fear, to attack in case of anger, to help in case of pity, to make up for in 
case of guilt). Hedonism assumes the existence of a basic desire while emotion-specific action 
impulses theory assumes a pluralist view of motivation [Havercamp & Reiss, 2003; McDougall, 
1908; Reiss, 2000; Schwartz, 1992; B. Weiner, 1980] by defending the existence of various basic 
desires (e.g., curiosity, power, hedonism, etc.). However, some theorists believe that the pleasure 
principle is indirectly at work even in these cases. 
Motivation and emotion are thus highly intertwined and it is not always easy to establish clear 
boundaries between them. Emotion and motivation both depend on the relationship between the 
organism and its environment. Generally, motivation is defined as factors that cause an organism 
to behave in a certain way at a certain time. Motivation is more related with goal generation and 
action, while emotion is concerned with evaluative aspects of the relation of an agent with its 
environment. In the case of emotion, the emphasis is on how the situation makes the person feel. 
In the case of motivation, it is how the individual acts with respect to the situation that is of 
interest [Kuhl, 1986]. 
Among the many possible ways of classifying human mental functions, one of the most widely 
accepted (e.g., [Hilgard, 1980]) defines three separate areas of cognition (thinking), affect 
(feeling), and conation (willing). Emotion is one of the most important and thoroughly explored 
forms of affect, and motivation is essentially related to conation. 
In order to clarify further this tangled relation between motivation and emotion, we present the 
typology of motivation proposed by Izard [Izard, 1977, 1991]. He defined motivation as involving 
some stimulus that influences behaviour. He identified the following types of motivation: 
reflexes, instincts, drives, and emotions. Reflexes are automatic responses that require no 
evaluation or appraisal of the stimulus, i.e., no decision is made about how to behave (e.g., the eye 
blink produced when an object approaches the face; pupil dilation). Instincts involve hormonal 
changes within the body as well as some appraisal or judgement (e.g., the first flight of a swift). 
Drives are the physiological, survival needs basic to all animal life (e.g., hunger, thirst, comfort or 
pain avoidance, sex). Emotion is experienced as a feeling that motivates, organizes, and guides 
perception, thought, and action (e.g., fear, love, interest, happiness, etc.). 
Other terms related to the notions of emotion and motivation are emotional state, emotional 
expression, emotional experience, feelings, drives, and mood. An emotional state refers to the 
mental and physical state of someone who has an emotion. Since it is of internal nature, the 
emotional state cannot be directly observed by someone else, but it may be inferred, for instance, 
from the expression of emotions. The term of emotional expression refers to what is revealed to 
others, voluntarily or not. Usually, when one experiences an emotion the emotional expression 
produced is involuntary and provides clues that others may observe to guess his/her emotional 
state. Emotional experience refers to everything one consciously perceives of the emotional state. 
This term is sometimes related with the term feelings. However, the concept of feeling is 
generally more related with sensations. Drives are, according to Izard, another important 
subsystem of personality and also an important kind of the motivational system. Generally, drives 
are internal conditions or impulses that activate behaviour to reduce a need and restore 
homeostasis. Mood is commonly associated with a long term affective state (hours, days or 
longer) in opposition to emotion which lasts, according to psychologists, at most, a few minutes. 
Various authors claim the existence of basic, fundamental or primary emotions, although there 
is no consensus on which emotions meet the criteria to be classified as such. For instance, 
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according to Izard the list of the basic emotions includes those that have the following properties: 
distinct and specific neural substrates, distinct and specific configuration of facial movements or 
facial expression, distinct and specific feelings that achieve awareness, that are derived through 
evolutionary-biological processes, and have organizing and motivational properties that serve 
adaptive functions. Izard considers that the emotions that exhibit these properties are interest, 
enjoyment, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, and fear. For Ekman [Ekman, 1992] the 
underlying factor that characterizes fundamental emotions is that they have universal facial 
expressions. For this author, anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness and surprise are classified as 
fundamental emotions. For the list of fundamental emotions considered by other authors see 
[Ortony et al., 1988], pp 27. 
Emotions have been considered as positive or negative according to their desirable or 
undesirable consequences. However, there are emotions that could be either positive or negative. 
This is the case of surprise, whose consequences, depending on the situation that elicits it, are 
either negative or positive. For instance, when someone is confronted with an unexpected event 
that also causes fear, the resulting feelings are negative, while the contrary happens when the 
unexpected event does not elicit fear but rather happiness. This means that surprise is not itself 
negative or positive but instead neutral. What is positive or negative is the event [Reisenzein, 
2000b]. 
In order to characterise an emotion, there are several aspects that should be known such as its 
neurophysiology, its expression, its causes, its phenomenology, and its functions. Among these, 
neurophysiology, expression, and phenomenology are widely accepted as the three main 
components of emotion [Izard, 1991]. Neurophysiology refers to the body changes that 
accompany emotion. Expression is concerned with the distinct facial, vocal, gestual and bodily 
configuration that is associated to an emotion. Finally, phenomenology pertains to the subjective 
experience of that emotion, i.e., the feelings that are attached to an emotion. Izard describes basic 
emotions individually in terms of those aspects. 
2.2.2 Emotion Theories 
Although, a lot of research has been done about emotion and motivation, there are too many 
questions lacking a consensual answer. In fact, there are no clear answers to questions such as 
“How are emotions induced?”, “Are emotions physical or cognitive?”, “How are they caused?”, 
“Why do they exist?”, “How does someone recognize the emotional state of another person?”, 
and even “What is the definition of emotion?”, or “What are motivations?”. Philosophers, 
psychologists, neuroscientists, ethologists, biologists, and recently AI researchers, have attempted 
to answer these questions which just proves that this is a very complex, multidisciplinary 
phenomenon. The result is a myriad of emotion theories (for an overview see [Buck, 1984; Frijda, 
1986; Lazarus, 1991; Mandler, 1984; Plutchik & Kellerman, 1980-1990; Strongman, 1998]). For 
instance, Strongman categorized those emotion theories according to the particular facets they 
emphasize, which are mainly: phenomenological, physiological, behavioural, cognitive, 
developmental, social, and clinical. Phenomenological theories are primarily concerned with the 
nature of emotional experience. Behavioural theories focus on what is directly observable and 
measurable, regarding emotion as a response rather than a state of the organism. Physiological 
theories rest on the belief that emotions have a biological base, focusing on finding the substrate 
of emotion in the central and peripheral nervous system, as well as in the endocrine system. 
Cognitive theories stress that emotion is related to cognition and particularly that emotions are to 
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do with evaluations, focusing on the nature and functioning of the process of appraisal. 
Developmental theories state that emotion has to be dealt with from the viewpoint of change, 
mainly throughout the life span of an entity. Social theories conceptualize emotion as a social 
phenomenon, focusing on the matter of emotional expression and recognition amongst other 
social interactions. Clinical theories link psychopathologies to emotional dysfunction, and thus 
emotion is seen as playing a central role in mental disorders. In addition to these categories of 
theories, Strongman also describes, from a historical perspective, the earliest emotion theories that 
are the background of current theories. Also, a reference is made to theories defended outside 
psychology. Phenomenological theories are too incomplete because they only account for the 
subjective aspect of emotion. Behavioural theories are currently almost inactive, mainly because 
they are too limited, leaving many aspects of emotion unexplained. Physiological theories are far 
more complete, explaining various aspects of the emotion phenomena. Cognitive theories form a 
very large group of emotion theories. In fact, almost all theories of emotion relate it with 
cognition. These theories are very complex and complete, covering many aspects of emotion. 
Social and clinical theories are not particularly impressive. Because of their completeness, the 
cognitive and physiological theories are the most relevant categories of emotion. They complete 
each other by emphasizing two different but complementary facets of emotion: the physical and 
the mental component. 
2.2.3 Origins and Functions of Emotion and Motivation 
The origins and functions of emotions and motivations can be explained from an evolutionary 
perspective. This constitutes the psycho-evolutionary theory of emotion [Plutchik, 1980a, 1980b, 
1980c]. Motivations, in the broad sense that encompasses emotions, emerged and changed during 
the course of evolution. This is also the claim of Darwin’s [Darwin, 1965] evolutionary theory 
which states that emotions are a by-product of evolutionary history. The first organisms had a 
very rudimentary motivational system, obviously with no cognitive appraisal. However, they were 
able to survive by using simple approach and avoidance reactions such as those required to 
approach nutritive substances and to avoid toxic substances. These ideas were incorporated into 
the theory of motivation proposed by Freud [Freud, 1938] in the form of pleasure (approach) and 
pain (avoidance) principle. So, it is easy to understand why the basic motivations such as reflexes, 
instincts and drives (e.g., hunger, thirst, pain avoidance, sex, and elimination of body waste) 
emerged somehow in the species. They are necessary for survival and physical well-being. 
Although reflexes and instincts are rigid and stimulus dependent, they provide ways of responding 
and adapting to a limited set of environment situations [Izard, 1991]. However, they are almost 
not present in human beings. Exceptions are for instance the eye blink. The basic drives enables 
animals, for instance, to find food, water, shelter, maintain the species, and to eliminate waste 
products. 
However, as our ancestors became more complex, a period of maturation and learning was 
required for the offspring to become able to forage and fend for themselves. During the majority 
of that period of complete dependence of the offspring, a strong motivation is required not only to 
keep the caregiver (usually the mother) near the offspring but also vice-versa. Such strong 
motivations could not be so basic, such as reflexes, instincts or drives, but instead what is called 
emotions, such as love. So, a clear reason of why emotions emerged is the mother-infant bond, 
which can be proved by noting that such a bond may exist for a long period or permanently 
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[Ainsworth et al., 1978; Shiller et al., 1986]. Therefore, there is no doubt that one of the functions 
of emotion is to insure social bonding between infant and caregiver [Izard, 1991]. 
Another reason why emotions emerged is to ensure a means of communication between infant 
and mother and facilitate communication between adults [Izard, 1991]. In fact, numerous studies 
of emotional development show that before the infant speaks, it informs the caregivers about its 
internal state such as feeling pain or hunger through the physical expression of emotions such as 
distress. Another example of the repertoire of signals that the child possesses is, for instance, the 
expression of interest/joy or anger when it is involved positively with the environment or is 
frustrated, respectively. 
Further reasons and functions of emotion come from psychological and neuroscience research 
over the past decades, which suggests that emotions play a critical role in decision-making, action 
and performance, by influencing a variety of cognitive processes (e.g., attention [Izard, 1991; 
Meyer et al., 1997; Ortony & Partridge, 1987; Reisenzein, 2000b], planning [Gratch, 1999], etc.). 
On the one hand, recent research in neuroscience [Damásio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996] supports the 
idea of the importance of emotions in reasoning and decision-making. For instance, results from 
recent studies of patients with lesions of the prefrontal cortex suggest an important role of 
emotions in decision-making. On the other hand, there are a few theories in psychology relating 
emotion to decision-making and action [Andrade, 2005; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003]. For 
instance, in the specific case of emotions, as outlined by [Reisenzein, 1996], within the context of 
the belief-desire theories of action (the dominant class of theories in today’s motivation 
psychology) it can be suggested that emotions are action goals, that emotions are, or include 
action tendencies, that emotions are, or include goal-desires, and that emotions are mental states 
that generate goal-desires. 
It seems that this role of emotions in cognitive processes, such as decision-making, has a 
primary reason, survival and well-being, as happens with basic motivations [Damásio, 1994]. As 
complex organisms begin to live in complex environments, basic motivations such as drives or 
instincts do not seem sufficient to guarantee survival. In such environments such as those 
inhabited by humans nowadays, hunting or running away from predators are not anymore the 
important activities that we recognize from archaeology or history. In general, they are not as 
necessary as they were for our ancestors. For instance, we now go to the supermarket to buy meat 
instead of hunting for it. However, there are now different forms of hunting, different predators in 
the complex human society. Today, we need to decide or plan our personal and social actions so 
that we can survive in such a complex human society. According to Damásio, emotions play a 
central role in these new strategies of survival just as drives or instincts did for our ancestors and 
still do for us, functioning as survival mechanisms. The way this happens is explained by his 
Somatic-Marker Hypothesis which states that that decisions that are made in circumstances, 
whose outcome could be potentially harmful or advantageous, and are similar to previous 
experience, induce a somatic response used to mark future outcomes. When the situation arises 
again the somatic marker will signal the danger or advantage. Thus, when a negative somatic 
marker is linked to a particular negative future outcome it serves as an alarm signal that tells us to 
avoid that particular course of action. If instead, a positive somatic marker is linked to a positive 
outcome, it becomes an incentive to make that particular choice. 
The adaptive function of these somatic markers of emotional reactions (good and bad) is to help 
us simplify decisions by quickly eliminating some courses of action from consideration (because 
they are connected to bad situations). Without these somatic markers, we do not learn to avoid 
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bad situations, we cannot simplify our decision processes (by winnowing down choice sets to a 
manageable size) and exhibit indecision. 
In summary, the main functions of emotions and motivations may be reduced to: 
communication, survival and well-being. However, each emotion and motivation individually has 
its specific functions. As examples, we will examine some of those emotions and their functions. 
The functions of other motivations such as drives are more easily perceived (thirst signals the 
need for water, hunger the need for food, etc.). 
Interest/curiosity played a central role in the evolution of human beings, serving adaptive 
functions developed over the course of humankind’s existence. It influences learning by 
supporting investigation, exploration, and creativity. 
Anger played a critical role in coping with some of the challenges and dangers which occurred 
during the evolution of human beings, and thereby it was essential for survival of the species. In 
fact, anger mobilizes energy for action, making individuals more capable of defending 
themselves. 
Disgust enables individuals to reject distasteful and potentially dangerous substances even in 
the absence of sensations of taste or odor. In evolution, disgust probably helped motivate animals 
to maintain an environment and their own body in sufficiently sanitary conditions for their health 
and to prevent them, for instance, from eating spoiled food. 
The primary function of fear is perhaps to motivate cognition and action that lead to safety and 
security. Fear enables individuals to protect themselves from dangerous situations. 
Joy is a reward for an experiment. It usually comes after the accomplishment of a goal. 
Surprise plays an important role in cognitive activities, especially in attention focusing and 
learning (e.g., [Izard, 1977, 1991; Meyer et al., 1997; Ortony & Partridge, 1987; Reisenzein, 
2000b]. According to Meyer and colleagues (e.g., [Meyer et al., 1997]), surprise has two main 
functions, informational and motivational, that together promote both immediate adaptive actions 
to a surprising event and the prediction, control and effective dealings with future occurrences of 
the same event. 
2.2.4 Affective Artificial Agents 
In the previous section, we described the main functions of emotion for human beings. As we 
saw, the main advantages are: communication, survival and well being. The role of emotions in 
cognitive processes such as planning or decision-making is essential for this achievement. So, we 
may ask the question of “Why don’t agents take similar advantages from emotion?” [Cañamero, 
1998]. As mentioned above, an affirmative answer to this question is argued by many researchers, 
particularly those defending the strong notion of agency (e.g., [Bates, 1994; Shoham, 1993]). 
They do so because this enables agents to manifest the attributes of personality or of a 
“believable” character [Etzioni & Weld, 1995]. The ascription of affective features to agents gives 
rise to terms such as emotional agents, believable agents [Bates, 1994], motivational agents, 
affective agents, or affective computers [Picard, 1997]. Mainly based on the recent advances in 
psychology and neuroscience mentioned above, such agents are expected to plan, decide, learn or 
reason better than those that do not take advantage of emotions. Although the field is in an initial 
phase, several applications have already been appointed to affective agents. Some of those 
applications are entirely new, appearing only with the advent of emotional agents because they 
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can only be conceived with the concept of agents with affective abilities, while others constitute 
simply a different approach of dealing with problems that, up to now, were solved ignoring the 
influence of emotion on cognitive abilities. Some of those applications are still science fiction 
while others are already implemented. Among the former is, for instance, a computer such as 
HAL [Clarke, 1997]. Among presently existing emotion-based systems we may find the Tok 
architecture developed in the Oz project [Bates, 1994; Reilly, 1996]. We will now take a closer 
look at these and other related systems that incorporate models of affect. Our objective is not to 
survey all the work done in this area but simply to give representative examples of emotion-based 
computer systems. Other examples of these systems may be found in proceedings of the 
conferences of the area such as the First International Conference on Affective Computing & 
Intelligent Interaction [Tao et al., 2005], the International Conference on Intelligent Virtual 
Agents (e.g., [Gratch et al., 2006; Panayiotopoulos et al., 2005; Rist et al., 2004]), the annual AISB 
Convention symposia (e.g., [Aylett & Canãmero, 2002; Canãmero, 2005; Johnson, 2001, 2004]), 
the AAAI Fall Symposia (e.g., [Canãmero, 2001]), and the Affective Computing Workshop of the 
Portuguese International Conference on Artificial Intelligence [Paiva et al., 2005]. Those systems 
can be organized into three main groups: those systems that recognize emotions, those that 
express emotions, and those that generate or synthesize emotions. The first and the second group 
can be merged into a single one, because most of the systems that recognize emotions also address 
the issue of expressing emotions. Most of the emotion-based computer systems are about 
generating or synthesizing emotions and about the influence of emotions on cognitive processes 
such as decision-making. 
Ekman and Friesen [Ekman & Friesen, 1977] developed a theory, called Facial Action Coding 
System, for associating expressions, and more precisely the muscular movements used to generate 
them, to a number of discrete categories of emotions. Essa and Pentland [Essa & Pentland, 1997] 
augmented this system to non-local spatial patterns and to include time components. The result is 
a system that is able to recognize facial expressions from video. It relies on information about 
facial shape and physical knowledge of facial muscles. For faster recognition, they developed 
another model [Essa & Pentland, 1995] which is not based on physical information but rather on 
templates of facial motion energy. Yacoob and Davis [Yacoob & Davis] also developed a model 
for facial expression recognition based on templates of motion energy, although their method is 
slightly different in that they consider combinations of templates and sub-templates (e.g., just for 
the mouth or eye area). 
Recognition of emotions is not confined to facial expression. There has been previous work on 
emotional expression recognition from speech and from physiological information. For instance, 
Vyzas and Picard [Vyzas & Picard, 1999] developed a method, based on physiological data 
collected from an actress, for offline and online recognition of the emotional state of a person 
deliberately expressing one of eight emotions. The recognition method relies on a set of features 
extracted from physiological signals (electromyogram, blood pressure, skin conductivity, and 
respiration) measured from the surface of the skin of the person expressing emotion. 
One of the most remarkable works that addresses the expression of emotions is that of Breazel 
and Scassellati [Breazeal, 1999; Breazeal & Scassellati, 1999]. They developed Kismet as a test 
bed for learning social interactions in situations involving an infant (the robot) and her caretaker 
(a human). Kismet is a head with active stereo vision and configurable facial features – eyelids, 
ears, eyebrows, and a mouth. Humans can interact with it either by direct, face-to-face exchange 
or by showing it a toy. Kismet is able to successfully negotiate the caregiver into presenting the 
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robot with toys when it is bored, and to engage in face to face exchange when it is lonely. The 
caregiver instinctively responds to the robot’s affective state to promote its well being – 
presenting the robot with pleasing stimuli, avoiding the presentation of noxious stimuli, and 
taking care not to overwhelm nor under-stimulate the robot. Perception, attention, internal drives, 
emotions, and motor skills are integrated in Kismet’s software architecture to provide social 
interactions. Kismet performs a variety of proto-social responses (affective, exploratory, 
protective and regulatory responses) by means of various natural social cues such as gaze 
direction, posture, and facial displays. These facial displays include expressions analogous to 
happiness, sadness, surprise, boredom, anger, calm, displeasure, fear, and interest. These nine 
different facial expressions are used to manipulate its human caretaker into satisfying its internal 
drives – a social drive, a stimulation drive, and a fatigue drive. These drives and emotions form 
together the motivation system of Kismet. The robot’s emotions are a result of its affective state. 
The affective state of the robot is represented as a point along three dimensions: arousal (i.e. high, 
neutral, or low), valence (i.e. positive, neutral, or negative), and stance (i.e. open, neutral, or 
closed). The affective state is computed by summing up contributions from the drives and 
behaviours. The proto-social responses enable the adult to interpret kismet’s actions as 
intentional. In Kismet, low-level perceptual inputs are combined with high-level influences from 
motivations and habituation effects by the attention system. 
Thrun and colleagues [Schulte et al., 1999; Thrun et al., 1999] developed Minerva, a mobile 
robot that gives guided tours to visitors of the Smithsonian’s Museum of American History. 
Minerva displays emotional states – neutral, happy, sad, and angry – using a caricaturized face 
and simple speech. Although the emotions are not an integral part of the robot’s architecture, the 
emotional states arise as a consequence of travel-related interaction (e.g., anger results from its 
inability to move due to the presence of people), and their expression aims at affecting this 
interaction towards achieving the robot’s goals – travelling from one exhibit to the next one, 
holding people’s attention when describing an exhibit, and attracting people to participate in a 
new tour. 
Feelix [Cañamero & Fredslund, 2000] is a humanoid-looking LEGO robot capable of 
displaying several emotional expressions in response to direct physical contact. Inspired by 
psychological theories about emotions in humans, Feelix implements two complementary 
emotion models, one concerning the “universal” facial expressions of basic emotions, and the 
other postulating a principle for emotion activation based on general stimulation patterns that 
Cañamero and Fredslund associate to discrete basic emotions. They characterize emotions in 
terms of the continuous dimensions of valence and arousal. They confined the set of emotions 
modelled to those proposed by Ekman [Ekman, 1992] as basic emotions (with the exception of 
disgust): anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. Interaction with Feelix is only 
through tactile stimulation on the feet, causing the touch sensors to be pressed. To distinguish 
between different kinds of stimuli, they use duration and frequency of presses. Information about 
presses is analyzed in terms of duration and frequency, and based on this analysis, a message 
encoding Feelix’ current emotional state and its intensity are used to control the face. 
One of the most common approaches to synthesize emotions is of a cognitive kind. Many of 
these approaches rely on the so-called Ortony, Collins, and Clore’s (OCC) model [Ortony et al., 
1988] which, although it is not a computational model, is very popular in the field of AI because it 
is suitable for implementation in computers. A central idea in this model is that emotions are 
reactions involving valence. The overall structure of the OCC model is based on grouping 
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emotions by their eliciting conditions: events, agents, and objects. Events are simply people’s 
interpretations of things that happened; objects are also a very straightforward level of perception; 
and agents are both human and non-human beings, as well as inanimate objects or abstractions 
such as institutions. Therefore, the OCC model proposes that emotions are the results of three 
types of subjective appraisals: the appraisal of the pleasingness of events with respect to the 
agent’s goals; the appraisal of the approval of the actions of the agent or another agent with 
respect to a set of standards for behaviour; and, the appraisal of the liking of objects with respect 
to the attitudes of the agent. Based on types of emotions, the structure of the OCC model has three 
main ramifications, corresponding to the three types of subjective appraisals, or, in other words, to 
the three ways people react to the world. The first ramification relates to emotions which arise 
from aspects of objects such as liking, disliking, etc. This constitutes the single class in this 
branch, namely the one called attraction which includes the emotions love and hate. The second 
branch is concerned with emotions that are related to consequences of events with respect to the 
person who experiences the emotion or with respect to some other person. As a reaction to them, 
one can be pleased, displeased, etc. This gives rise to a further division of this branch into another 
two branches: one concerned with the consequences of events to the person who experiences the 
emotion, and another related to the consequences of events to some other person. This latter 
branch includes the class fortunes-of-others that includes the following emotions: happy-for, 
resentment, gloating, and pity. The first two correspond to desirable consequences of events for 
others, while the latter two refer to undesirable consequences of events for others. The branch 
concerned with the consequences of events to the person who experiences the emotion includes a 
further division with respect to the prospect of an event. This prospect may be relevant or not. In 
the first case the class of well-being emotions is constituted by, including emotional terms such as 
joy, distress, sadness, happiness, or unhappiness. They reflect upon one’s well-being, and are 
simply default cases of being pleased or displeased. In the latter case, the class of prospect-based 
emotions is constituted which includes the emotions of hope and fear. However, four additional 
emotions are also considered to result from reacting to the prospect of positive and negative 
events, namely satisfaction, fears-confirmed, disappointment, and relief. The first two arise when 
the prospect of a positive or negative event is believed to have been confirmed, while the latter 
two arise when the prospect of a positive or negative event is believed to have been disconfirmed. 
The third branch of the structure is related to agents. It also has only one class, namely the 
attribution class, comprising the following emotions: pride, shame, reproach, admiration. 
Another additional class of emotions can be referred to as compound class. It is called 
wellbeing/attribution compound and it involves the emotions of gratification, remorse, gratitude, 
and anger. 
The OCC model has been very popular in AI, and used, for instance, in the Affective Reasoner 
[Elliott, 1992, 1993, 1994; Elliott & Siegle, 1993], the Tok architecture developed in the Oz 
project [Bates, 1994; Reilly, 1996], and [Dias & Paiva, 2005]. 
In the Affective Reasoner, Elliot and Siegle simulate simple worlds populated with agents 
capable of responding emotionally. Agents are given unique pseudo-personalities modelled as 
both a set of appraisal frames representing their individual goals, principles, preferences, and 
moods, and as a set of channels for the expression of emotions. Combinations of appraisal frames 
are used to create agents’ interpretations of situations that occur in the simulation. These 
interpretations, in turn, can be characterized by the simulator in terms of the eliciting conditions 
for emotions. As a result, in some cases agents have emotions which then may be expressed in 
ways that are observable by other agents, and as new simulation events which might perturb 
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future situations. Additionally, agents use a case-based heuristic classification system to reason 
about the emotions of other agents, and to build representations of those other agents’ 
personalities that will help them to predict and explain future emotional episodes involving those 
observed agents. 
Gratch [Gratch, 1999] proposes a model of cognitive appraisal called plan-based appraisal. This 
model relies indirectly on the OCC theory of cognitive appraisal in that it re-implements Elliott’s 
construal theory, which, as described above, is in turn a computational account of the OCC theory 
of cognitive appraisal. In construal theory, events are matched against knowledge structures called 
construal frames. These frames evaluate events against an agent’s goals, social standards (norms 
of behaviour), and preferences (the appealingness of domain objects). Construal frames make two 
determinations. First they assess if the event is of relevance to the agent. If so, they extract several 
high-level features of the event that are later used to assess the emotional response. Collectively, 
these features are referred to as an emotion eliciting condition relation. Plan-based appraisal 
departs somewhat from the spirit of construal theory, specifically in the handling of events. 
Construal theory centers appraisal on events and uses the construal frames to derive the 
relationship between events and goals. In contrast, plan-based appraisal centers appraisals on 
goals and uses the planner’s domain-independent threat detection processes to determine the 
significance of events to goals. To implement the appraisal scheme, Gratch provides definitions 
for each of the emotion eliciting conditions in terms of syntactic features of the current plans in 
working memory. Gratch associates an appraisal frame with each goal in the plan structure. 
Emotion eliciting conditions describe properties of each goal such as the agent that owns it, and 
its desirable or undesirable disposition. 
The Oz project [Bates, 1992, 1994; Bates et al., 1992; Loyall & Bates, 1991; Mateas, 2002; 
Reilly, 1996; Reilly & Bates, 1992] at the Carnegie Mellon School of Computer Science is 
developing technology for high quality interactive fiction and virtual realities. The goal is to 
provide users with the experience of living in dramatically interesting micro-worlds that include 
emotional agents. An Oz world comprises a simulated physical environment, the agents that live 
in the environment, a user interface and its associated theory of presentation and style, and a 
theory of drama, which plans and controls the overall flow of events in the world. In order to 
provide users with the experience of living in dramatically interesting micro-worlds the users of 
the system have to suspend their disbelief when interacting with an Oz world. This is achieved by 
making the agents that populate these worlds look real in a number of ways such as: displaying 
competent action in the world, reaction to a changing environment, goal-directed behaviour, 
appropriate emotions, individual personality traits, social skills, language skills, and some degree 
of intelligent inferring about the world around them. These capabilities are partially divided into 
the various communicating components or subsystems of the agent architecture, called Tok [Bates 
et al., 1992], developed in the Oz project. For instance, goal-reactivity is handled by the 
subsystem called Hap [Loyall & Bates, 1991], while Em subsystem [Reilly, 1996; Reilly & Bates, 
1992] handles most of the emotional and social aspects of the agents’ behaviour. Em’s model of 
emotion is based largely on the OCC cognitive model of emotion and has demonstrated some 
ability to produce reasonable emotional behaviour for Oz agents. Em can also model simple social 
relationships between agents, how these relationships change over time, and how these 
relationships interact with emotion and behaviour. 
In spite of the extensive implementation of the OCC model, an alternative cognitive model has 
been recently proposed by Roseman and colleagues [Roseman, 1991; Roseman et al., 1996; 
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Roseman et al., 1990] which likewise seems to be easy to implement in computers. This new 
appraisal theory relies on the categorization of the appraisals people make about events that cause 
emotions. The six appraisals that give rise to seventeen emotions are: unexpectedness which 
elicits surprise; motivational state and situational state, i.e., whether the agent aims to get a reward 
(appetitive motive) or to avoid a punishment (aversive motive), and whether the situation fits the 
agent’s motive (situations consistent with getting a reward elicit joy; situations consistent with not 
getting punishment cause relief; situations inconsistent with getting a reward produce sadness; 
situations inconsistent with not getting punishment produce distress; probability, i.e., whether the 
outcome is certain or uncertain (hope and fear are elicited by uncertainty); control potential, i.e., 
whether the agent is able to control a negative event (frustration or disgust may arise); problem 
type, i.e., whether an event is negative because it hinders a goal (this gives rise to frustration) or 
because it is simply intrinsically negative (this gives rise to disgust); agency, i.e., events are 
caused by other agents (elicits liking-love, dislike, anger, or contempt) or by the self (elicits pride, 
regret, guilt, or shame). 
Another usual approach to synthesize emotions is of a physical kind. This corresponds to 
considering low-level non-cognitive aspects as the basis for the generation of emotions. We have 
already described examples of synthesizing emotions using this approach when we described 
Feelix and Kismet above. Another work, also from Cañamero, uses physiological parameters to 
model emotions, too [Cañamero, 1997]. In this work, Cañamero investigated some aspects in 
which emotions can affect the behaviour of artificial creatures. These inhabit a two-dimensional 
world, the Gridland, and they are endowed with motivational states and a set of basic emotions. 
She distinguishes between motivations and emotions. Motivations constitute the basic mechanism 
that regulates the stability of the creature’s internal state necessary for survival, adaptation, and 
autonomy, driving behaviour selection. On the other hand, emotions contribute to maintaining this 
stability acting as a second order mechanism on top of motives. Creatures consist of three types of 
elements: a set of physical attributes such as hardness, brightness, the amount of organic matter, 
etc., a set of physiological variables that define their bodily state, and a collection of agents of 
different sorts. The set of basic emotions are modelled by some of those agents. 
Among other works that follow this physiological mechanisms to generate emotions we may 
find Velásquez’s work [Velásquez, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999] which relies on similar 
foundations to those followed in [Breazeal & Velásquez, 1998]. Velásquez developed Cathexis, a 
distributed, computational model for the dynamic nature of different affective phenomena, such as 
emotions, moods, and temperaments, and their influence on the behaviour of synthetic 
autonomous agents. Cathexis was later extended to a computational model of emotion-decision-
making. Like in [Breazeal & Velásquez, 1998], emotions, moods, and temperaments are modelled 
in Cathexis as a network composed of especial emotional systems similar to Minsky’s 
“proto-specialist” agents. Each of these proto-specialists represents a specific emotion family such 
as fear or disgust. Within each proto-specialist, different sensors monitor both external (e.g., 
events in the environment) and internal (e.g., drive levels, feedback from sensorimotor processes) 
stimuli for the existence of the appropriate conditions that would elicit the emotion represented by 
that particular proto-specialist. These sensors are arranged into four different groups: neural, 
sensorimotor, motivational, and cognitive. These sensors represent different kinds of both 
cognitive and non-cognitive emotion activation systems. Input from these sensors either increases 
or decreases the intensity of the emotion proto-specialist to which they belong. Associated with 
each proto-specialist are two threshold values. The first threshold controls the activation of the 
emotion. That is, once the intensity goes above this threshold, the emotion proto-specialist 
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releases its output signal to other emotion proto-specialists, and to the behaviour system which in 
turn selects an appropriate behaviour according to the state of these emotional systems. The 
second threshold specifies the level of saturation for that emotion proto-specialist. This is 
consistent with real life emotional systems in which levels of arousal will not exceed certain 
limits. Another important element associated with an emotion proto-specialist is a decay function 
which controls the duration of the emotion episode. All of these emotion proto-specialists run in 
parallel and are constantly updating their intensities. In Cathexis and in its further emotion-based 
decision-making extension, the behaviours are directed, in the majority of cases, towards 
satisfying needs and interacting with humans. Examples of such behaviours include 
approach-person, play, request-attention, and avoid-obstacle. The behaviour is accompanied by a 
facial expression, body posture, and vocal expression. In order to test the Cathexis model, he 
created two synthetic agents, one called Simón representing a young child, and another called 
Yuppy which is an emotional pet robot. 
This work of Velázquez as well as that of Cañamero [Cañamero, 1997], also described above, 
are also examples of the extensive list of works that explore the influence of emotion on cognitive 
processes. In this case emotion is a bias mechanism that directs behaviour and decision-making. 
Others examples are the works described in [Frijda, 1986; Kitano, 1995; Pfeifer, 1988]. 
The Cognition and Affect project [Beaudoin, 1994; Scheutz et al., 2000; Sloman, 1998; Sloman 
& Logan, 1999; Wright, 1997; Wright et al., 1996] at Birmingham University proposes that for 
certain purposes it is useful if the deliberative processes in which internal actions are performed 
can be monitored, evaluated and possibly modified. Accordingly, they argue that, in addition to 
the reactive and deliberative layers commonly seen in several hybrid agents’ architectures, a 
further layer, called meta-management, is useful, for instance, to monitor deliberative processes 
and detect that certain strategies are more effective than others. Thereby, the resulting 
architecture, called CogAff, divides the agent’s cognitive system into three interacting layers 
corresponding to the reactive, deliberative and meta-management reasoning mechanisms. All 
these layers receive appropriate sensory input using perceptual mechanisms and each one 
processes information at different levels of abstraction, besides all of them being able to generate 
action. Each layer serves a particular purpose in the overall architecture, but layers can also 
influence one another. This tripartite division provides support for the following three types of 
emotions: primary emotions, such as fear, that are triggered within reactive mechanisms; 
secondary emotions, such as shame, that are triggered in the deliberative layer; and, tertiary 
emotions, such as adoration or humiliation, that involve the meta-management layer, though they 
may be initiated elsewhere. This architecture has been the basis for developing a range of systems 
using the SimAgent Toolkit [Sloman & Logan, 1999]. 
In spite of the emotion-based systems just described above that are already a reality, there are 
several challenges that should be overcome in order to successfully build agents that recognize, 
express and experience emotions. Picard proposes features that are required to consider that a 
computer is able to recognize, express and experience emotions. According to Picard, in order to 
recognize emotions a computer should (a) receive a variety of input signals such as voice, hand 
gestures, etc.; (b) based on pattern recognition techniques, perform feature extraction and 
classification on these signals; (c) based on knowledge about how emotions are generated and 
expressed, predict underlying emotion; (d) get information about the individual such as his/her 
personal goals, etc., in order to recognize his/her emotions in an efficient and effective manner; 
(e) based on the emotional state of the computer, be able to recognize ambiguous emotions; (f) 
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output the names or descriptions of the recognized emotions. On the other hand, expressing 
emotions requires that computers: (a) receive instructions from its emotion generation module or 
from someone else about the emotion(s) to express; (b) have two alternative ways for activation of 
emotional expression: intentional (triggered by a deliberative decision) or spontaneous; (c) the 
affective state of the computer and the affective expression should influence each other; (d) the 
expression of the present affective state should be easier than any other affective states; (e) the 
relevant social norms determine when, where and how the computer expresses emotions; (f) 
output of the emotional expression which may comprise visible or vocal signals such as synthetic 
voice, animated face, gestures, etc. Finally, a computer can be said to experience emotion if it 
possesses the following five components exhibited by a healthy human emotional system: (a) it 
has behaviour that appears to arise from emotions; (b) it has fast primary emotional responses to 
certain inputs; (c) it can cognitively generate emotions; (d) it can experience emotions, including 
cognitive awareness, physiological awareness and subjective feelings; (e) there should be an 
interaction between emotions and the other cognitive and physical components such as memory, 
perception, decision-making, learning, goals, attention, planning, prioritizing, etc. 
The issue concerning whether or not computers can feel is open to much discussion. Accepting 
this, one might say that computers are not human beings and there are a lot of differences that 
justify the reasoning which suggests it is inappropriate to incorporate human-like emotions in 
computers. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to make them express and have variations of 
human emotions or even totally different emotions that can only happen in computers. These and 
other questions are, at present, being discussed in the field of emotion. Another issue that has 
activated an intensive discussion is the ethical matter of providing computers with emotions. 
2.3 Exploration of Unknown Environments 
2.3.1 Human Exploratory Behaviour 
One of the features that characterize human beings is the tendency to explore the unknown parts 
of the environments they inhabit. Although exploration has existed as long as human beings, its 
peak is seen as being during the Age of Exploration, a period from the early 15th century and 
continuing into the early 17th century, when European navigators traveled around the world 
discovering new worlds and cultures. These big endeavours, together with the exploration of the 
outer space, the planets and satellites of our solar system today, are remarkable examples of the 
exploratory spirit of humankind. There are no limits for human exploration: from inhospitable 
volcanoes, mountains or oceans, to hostile planets such as Mars, and satellites such as Titan and 
the Moon, human beings are always trying to know more about their environment in spite of its 
adversity. But what motivates this exploratory behaviour? James’ “selective attention” [James, 
1890], Freud’s “cathexis” [Freud, 1938], and McDougall’s “curiosity instinct” [McDougall, 1908] 
are fundamental concepts concerning the relationship between motivation and exploratory 
behaviour. This exploratory behaviour has for a long time been expressed by the idea that 
organisms respond to the novelty and change in the environment they inhabit in the absence of 
known drives (thirst, hunger, etc.), and if novelty and change is not present in the environment, 
organisms tend to seek it. Evidence for this behaviour in a variety of species was provided by a 
number of authors [Lester, 1969]. In human beings, this kind of behaviour is already present in 
infants even in the first hours of life, as documented by a number of researchers who have studied 
selective attention in infants which is a simple form of exploratory behaviour. Infants prefer 
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certain visual patterns over others. They do not treat with equal importance the multitude of 
stimuli. They explore the environment with their eyes, gazing at the more interesting objects 
which are those that provide novel stimuli. Some of the early researchers who showed that 
organisms tend to explore novel objects or places in the absence of any known drives, called it the 
exploratory drive [Butler, 1953, 1954, 1957, 1958; Montegomery, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955]. 
Among the investigators that have adopted the ideas of McDougall about curiosity are Berlyne 
[Berlyne, 1950] and Shand [Shand, 1914]. For these authors, curiosity is the psychological 
construct that has been closely related with this kind of behaviour. Considering that curiosity was 
innate and that it could also be acquired, Berlyne [Berlyne, 1950] argues that novel stimulus 
elicits curiosity, which diminishes with continued exposure to the stimulus. In later work 
[Berlyne, 1955, 1960, 1967], Berlyne elaborated and extended his early theory of curiosity. In 
addition to novelty, other variables such as change, surprisingness, complexity, uncertainty, 
incongruity and conflict also determine this kind of behaviour related to exploratory and 
investigative activities. Sharing similar ideas with Berlyne and McDougall, Shand [Shand, 1914] 
defined curiosity as a primary emotion consisting of a simple impulse to know, which controls 
and sustains the attention and provokes the body movements that allow one to acquire information 
about an object. These approaches are closely related to the emotion concept of 
interest-excitement proposed by the differential emotions theory to account for exploration, 
adventure, problem solving, creativity and the acquisition of skills and competencies in the 
absence of known drives [Izard, 1977, 1991]. In fact, the terms curiosity and interest are used 
more or less as synonyms, for instance, by Berlyne. Nunnally and Lemond [Nunnally & Lemond, 
1973] carried out a series of experiments on the effects of novelty and complexity on visual 
exploration. They concluded that information conflict and novelty elicit and hold attention. In 
conclusion, there is no doubt that novelty elicits curiosity/interest which is the psychological 
construct that accounts for exploratory behaviour. However, novelty seems to be insufficient to 
explain all exploratory behaviour. In addition to it, other variables such as change, surprisingness, 
complexity, uncertainty, incongruity and conflict also determine exploratory behaviour. Some of 
these variables elicit surprise, another psychological construct that also accounts for exploratory 
behaviour. If we also consider the recent advances in neuroscience that indicate that emotion 
influences the cognitive tasks of humans, and particularly planning and decision-making [Adolphs 
et al., 1996; Bechara et al., 1997; Damásio, 1994], exploration of unknown environments, as a 
decision-making process, is thereby influenced by emotion. Thus, ultimately, we may consider 
that there is a multitude of motivations and emotions behind the exploratory behaviour. 
2.3.2 Exploration of Unknown Environments by Artificial Agents 
As defended by many researchers, learning is a crucial capability of intelligent agents [Alonso et 
al., 2001; Etzioni & Weld, 1995; Huhns & Singh, 1998; S. Russell & Norvig, 1995]. In order to 
be intelligent, agents have to autonomously and independently make decisions. That is, it is 
impossible for the agent designer to foresee all the situations that an agent might encounter and to 
program it with the decisions to make in those situations. Therefore, agents have to adapt and 
learn from their interaction with the environment they inhabit. They have to learn to behave 
optimally. In most cases, they probably have to build good models of the world so that those 
models can be helpful to improve their performance. Learning research has been mostly 
independent of agent research and only recently it has been connected with agents and multi-agent 
systems [Huhns & Weiss, 1998; Imam, 1996; Sen, 1996; Weiss, 1997, 1998; Weiss & Sen, 1996]. 
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Approaches to learning may further be divided into two main categories: passive and active 
learning [Thrun, 1995]. 
In the passive learning paradigm, a learner is a pure observer, learning only through observing 
its environment. A stream of training data is generated by the environment according to some 
unknown probability distribution. Examples of passive learning tasks are the clustering, 
classification, or prediction of future data. Passive learning techniques can be subdivided into 
order-free and order-sensitive approaches. Order-free approaches rest on the assumption that the 
temporal order in which the training data arrives does not matter for the task to be learned. It is 
assumed that the training examples are generated independently according to a stationary 
probability distribution. The majority of machine learning approaches fall into this category. For 
example, unsupervised learning usually aims at characterizing the underlying probability 
distribution or grouping the data, while supervised learning is concerned with approximating an 
unknown target function (conditional probability) from a set of observed input-output examples. 
On the other hand, in order-sensitive approaches temporal order of the training data carries 
information relevant to the learning task. This happens, for instance, when consecutive training 
examples are conditionally dependent on each other, and learning about these dependencies is 
crucial for the success of the learner. Time series prediction and speech recognition are examples 
for order-sensitive learning domains. 
In the active learning paradigm, the learner interacts with its environment, i.e., the learner 
possesses the ability to execute actions during learning, which have an impact on the generation 
of training data. This way, it can, to a certain extent, control what it learns. An important 
challenge is the decision of what actions a learner should perform to maximize learning results. 
Like passive learning, active learning can also be split into order-free and order-sensitive cases. 
Like order-free passive learning, order-free active learning rests on the assumption that the 
temporal order in which the training data arrives does not matter for the task to be learned which 
means that, in this particular case, it relies on the assumption that what is observed in the 
environment depends only upon the most recently executed action. Perhaps the best-known 
approach of this kind is learning by queries, which is characterised by the fact that the available 
actions are queries for values of an unknown target function. The environment provides 
immediate responses (answers) to these queries. On the contrary, in order-sensitive active 
learning, temporal order of the training data carries information relevant to the learning task, 
which means that observations may depend on the sequence of actions performed by the learner. 
In fact, actions influence the state of the environment, and the state of the environment determines 
what the learner observes. For example, approaches to learning optimal control (like airplane 
control, or game playing) fall into this category. 
Exploration might be defined as the process of selecting actions in active learning. In order to 
learn efficiently, an agent should execute actions that are more informative for the learning task, 
i.e., actions whose outcomes are expected to provide more knowledge should be preferred. In fact, 
most of the approaches employ an action selection process that relies on the principle of 
knowledge gain maximization. However, the heuristics used to estimate knowledge gain differs. 
Several exploration techniques have been proposed [Thrun, 1992a, 1992b, 1995]. Since they are 
somewhat ad hoc, the effectiveness of these exploration techniques depends on the kind of 
environments and learning tasks at hand. Although those exploration techniques may be applied 
to active learning in general, they were primarily inspired by the literature of reinforcement 
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learning and neural nets [Thrun, 1992a, 1995]. So, before introducing them, we will examine the 
field of reinforcement learning. 
Reinforcement learning [Dietterich, 1997; Kaelbling et al., 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998] is an 
area of machine learning which addresses how an autonomous agent can learn long-term 
successful behaviour through interaction with its environment. The term “reinforcement learning” 
has its roots in behavioural psychology, in particular in Pavlovian models of reward learning in 
animals. Reinforcement learning might be defined as the problem confronting an agent that must 
learn behaviour through trial-and-error interactions with a dynamic environment. It differs from 
the more well studied problem of supervised learning, in that the learner is not given input-output 
samples of the desired behaviour. Rather, the learner is only supplied scalar feedback regarding 
the appropriateness of the actions, after they have been carried out. A procedure or rule π for 
choosing each action a given state s is called the policy of the learner, and it can be formalized as 
a function a = π(s). Hence, a policy is the agent’s decision-making function that maps states to 
action. The goal of reinforcement learning algorithms is to compute the optimal policy which 
maximizes some long-run measure of reinforcement. However, in order to find the optimal policy, 
it is necessary to prove that every off-policy action leads to expected results that are worse than 
the actions of the optimal policy. This is where exploration plays its role. In this situation, it is 
essential to explore alternative actions to determine whether they are worse (or better) than the 
actions of the optimal policy. The strategy of always taking the action that appears to be optimal 
based on the current value function is called the pure exploitation strategy. It has been shown that 
pure exploitation strategy does not always find the optimal policy. Hence, online reinforcement 
learning algorithms must balance exploitation with exploration. This is one of the challenges that 
arises in reinforcement learning and not in other kinds of learning: the trade-off between 
exploration and exploitation. To obtain a lot of reward, a reinforcement learning agent must prefer 
actions that it has tried in the past and found to be effective in producing reward. But to discover 
such actions it has to try actions that it has not selected before. The agent has to exploit what it 
already knows in order to obtain reward, but it also has to explore in order to make better action 
selections in the future. The dilemma is that neither exploitation nor exploration can be pursued 
exclusively without failing at the task. The agent must try a variety of actions and progressively 
favour those that appear to be best. Earlier theoretical research on the efficiency of exploration in 
this context of reinforcement learning and control learning [Thrun, 1992a, 1992b] indicate the 
importance of the exploration strategy for the efficiency of learning control. 
Exploration strategies have been grouped into two main categories: undirected and directed 
exploration [Thrun, 1992a, 1992b, 1995]. Strategies belonging to the former group, such as 
random walk exploration, Boltzman distributed exploration, and semi-uniform distributed 
exploration use no exploration-specific knowledge and ensure exploration by merging 
randomness into action selection. In random walk exploration actions are generated randomly 
with uniform probability distribution, regardless of expected exploration costs or rewards. 
Boltzmann distributions and semi-uniform distributions provide ways to combine random 
exploration with exploitation. These distributions explore by flipping coins, but the likelihood of 
individual actions is determined by the task-specific exploitation utility. In Boltzmann 
distributions, the likelihood of picking an action is exponentially weighted by its utility, and in 
semi-uniform distributions the action with the largest utility has a distinct high probability of 
being executed. On the contrary, strategies belonging to the latter group of directed-exploration, 
such as counter-based exploration, counter-based exploration with decay, error-based exploration, 
and recency-based exploration, rely heavily on exploration specific-knowledge for guiding the 
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learning process. Counter-based exploration evaluates states on the basis of how often they 
occurred. Actions leading to states that occurred least are preferred. Counter-based exploration 
with decay extends the previous strategy by taking into account the information of when a state 
occurred. The more recent an occurrence of a state, the more the occurrence contributes to the 
counter value of that state. Error-based exploration is another extension of counter-based 
exploration by memorizing the latest change of the utility estimation of each state. The strategy 
prefers actions leading to states whose utility value has recently changed most. Recency-based 
exploration prefers actions leading to states which occurred less recently. 
Reinforcement learning is the kind of learning where only parts of the environment have to be 
known in order to perform optimally. In fact, in this case the task is to learn control/behaviour, 
and therefore exploring parts of the state space that are irrelevant for task learning control is 
undesired. On the contrary, if the learning task is not control/behaviour but rather the construction 
of a map or world model as happens in exploration of unknown environments by mobile robots, 
the learning goal is not to find the optimal policy, but instead to acquire the physical map of the 
surrounding unknown environment. These models of the environment are revealed to be essential 
for carrying out tasks such as planning and navigation. To build such maps, the agent has to select 
actions to move to locations in the environment where the agent can gain knowledge through the 
senses. So, exploration of unknown environments may be divided into two steps: selection of 
viewpoints in which the sensors may capture new and useful information about the environment, 
and interpretation of that environment information provided by the sensors at those viewpoints. 
The former step is usually called the exploration step. Several exploration strategies have been 
proposed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the process. The latter step is commonly 
referred to as map-building. Likewise, several methodologies have been proposed for this step. 
Before introducing exploration strategies and map-building algorithms, let us present the 
frameworks used to represent the environment which underlie both steps. 
The acquisition of a map or model of the environment cannot be performed without a way of 
representing the environment. A wide variety of types of world models or maps have been 
proposed. They may be split into two main categories: metric maps (also referred to as occupancy 
grids or grid-based maps) (e.g., [Borenstein & Koren, 1991; Moravec, 1988; Moravec & Elfes, 
1985]) and qualitative maps (also referred as topological maps) (e.g., [Engelson & McDermott, 
1992; Kortenkamp & Weymouth, 1994; Kuipers & Byun, 1991]). For a survey about mapping 
and other possible classifications (e.g., feature-based maps such as volumetric and elevation 
maps, polygons, etc.) of the types of maps see [Leal, 2003; Lee, 1996; Thrun, 2002b]. 
Metric maps are grids (two-dimensional or three-dimensional) with each cell of the grid 
representing some amount of space in the real world: each grid-cell in the map has an occupancy 
value attached, which measures the robot’s subjective belief whether or not its center can be 
moved to the center of that cell (i.e., the occupancy map models the configuration space of the 
robot). 
Qualitative maps are generally represented as graphs, where nodes represent distinctive places 
or landmarks (e.g., corridors, doorways, etc.) and arcs that join nodes represent direct paths 
between places. 
Metric and qualitative maps exhibit orthogonal strengths and weaknesses. Contrary to metric 
maps, qualitative maps contain no geometric or metric information, but only the notions of 
proximity and order. Topological maps are more efficient representations for structured 
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environments (e.g., buildings), where distinctive places (e.g., corridors, doorways, etc.) are more 
frequent. The agent navigates locally between places and therefore movement errors do not 
accumulate globally as happens in metric maps, where there is a single, global coordinate system. 
Conversely, in unstructured environments, where place recognition is more complex, a robot 
using purely topological information for localization, can easily become lost. In this kind of 
environment the metric-based approach proves to be better because the agent usually has the 
opportunity to realign itself with the global coordinate system that defines the metric map. 
Qualitative maps are also more compact in that they represent only interesting places and not the 
entire environment and therefore facilitate fast planning. On the other hand, metric maps are 
easier to learn. So, it is reasonable that efforts have been made to combine both approaches so that 
the strengths of both representations can be used. This enables the map representation to benefit, 
for instance, from the efficiency of topological maps, and from the spatial consistency and 
accuracy of metric maps. Examples of those hybrid approaches are [Chatila & Laumond, 1985; 
Choset & Nagatani, 2001; Simhon & Dudek, 1998; Thrun, 1998; Thrun, Bücken et al., 1998]. 
With respect to map-building, the following major paradigms have been considered [Thrun, 
2002b]: Kalman filter techniques, approaches based on Dempster’s expectation maximization 
algorithm, occupancy grid techniques, and techniques for learning object models. All algorithms 
in robotic mapping share the same mathematical foundation: they are all probabilistic and 
versions of Bayes filters. This stems from the fact that mapping is characterized by uncertainty 
and sensor noise. Kalman filter techniques estimate the map and the robot location. The resulting 
maps usually describe the location of landmarks, or significant features in the environment, 
although recent extensions exist that represent environments by large numbers of raw range 
measurements. Approaches based on Dempster’s expectation maximization address the problem 
of determining whether sensor measurement recorded at different points in time correspond to the 
same physical entity in the real world. Object mapping seeks to identify objects in the 
environment, which may correspond to ceilings, walls, doors that might be open or closed, of 
furniture and other objects that move. 
In order to be accomplished successfully, exploration has not only to guarantee the acquisition 
of knowledge of the entire environment but also to do that efficiently: the problem is to minimize 
the time needed to explore the entire environment. With this aim, several exploration strategies 
have been proposed for single agents (e.g., [Choset & Nagatani, 2001; Dudek et al., 1991; 
Edlinger & von Puttkamer, 1994; González-Bãnos et al., 1999; Kuipers & Byun, 1991; 
Moorehead et al., 2001; Stentz, 1994; Taylor & Kriegman, 1993; Thrun, 1993; Thrun et al., 2005; 
Yamauchi et al., 1999]), mostly following a greed strategy to acquire unknown terrain. 
Furthermore, there is a serious amount of theoretical work providing a mathematical analysis of 
the complexity of exploration strategies, including comparisons for single robots (e.g., [Albers & 
Henzinger, 2000; Albers et al., 2002; Deng et al., 1991; Deng & Papadimitriou, 1998; Koenig, 
Tovey et al., 2001; Lumelsky et al., 1990; N. Rao et al., 1993]). The multi-agent approach to 
exploration has been examined by, e.g., [Berhault et al., 2003; Billard et al., 2000; Burgard et al., 
2000; Burgard et al., 2002; Burgard et al., 2005; W. Cohen, 1996; Grabowski et al., 2003; 
Koenig, Szymanski et al., 2001; Rekleitis et al., 2001a; Roy & Dudek, 1997, 2001; Simmons et 
al., 2000; Yamauchi, 1998]. 
To develop an exploration strategy one could be motivated by earlier research on exploration in 
the context of reinforcement learning [Thrun, 1992a]. Theoretical results on the efficiency of 
exploration indicate the importance of the exploration strategy for the amount of knowledge 
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gained, and for the efficiency of learning control in general. It has been shown that for certain 
hard deterministic environments that an autonomous robot can be confronted with, exploration 
strategies such as “random walk” result in an expected learning time that scales at least 
exponentially with the number of states the environment can take [Whitehead, 1991]. In contrast, 
more thoughtful exploration techniques, such as “go to the least explored location” have been 
shown to reduce the complexity to a small polynomial function in the size of the state space 
[Koenig, 1992; Thrun, 1992a]. While these results may be theoretically significant, their 
relevance and implications for practical research in robot exploration are unclear. This is because 
the best known worst-case bounds for the complexity of exploration are still too large to be of any 
practical meaning, given the complexity of environments and state spaces faced by a robot acting 
in the real world. Furthermore, the theoretical results ignore the ability of mobile robots to gain 
knowledge by sensing their environment, which allows the robots to make predictions for 
neighbouring locations. Such predictions, of course, may drastically reduce the number of 
exploration steps. However, the intuition behind the theoretical results carries over to mobile 
robot domains. An efficiently exploring robot should not explore by selecting actions randomly. 
Instead, it should actively move to poorly explored parts of the environment, in order to maximize 
knowledge gain. Most of the exploration strategies follow this principle. Almost all of them have 
some model that keeps track of how well the environment is explored, and then, based on this 
knowledge, the robot is moved to poorly explored regions. 
Exploration strategies may be classified into categories according to the features they exhibit. 
For instance, Lee [Lee, 1996] identifies the following four categories into which the existing 
exploration strategies may fall: human control, reactive control, approaching the unknown, and 
optimal search. The human control category refers to those strategies in which the selection of the 
view points is made by a remote human operator whose decisions are transmitted to the agent and 
then executed by it. The reactive control category includes those strategies that involve a reactive 
algorithm to control the agent during the map-building task. The category of approaching the 
unknown comprises those strategies in which the agent chooses to move to those regions of its 
environment about which it knows least. Associated to the task of terrain acquisition, the 
strategies that fall into the category of optimal search, assume that the agent possesses ideal 
sensors and rely on a mathematical analysis of the problem of finding all objects in the agent’s 
environment, minimizing the length of the path travelled by the robot during exploration. 
Moorehead and colleagues [Moorehead et al., 2001] propose a different classification for 
exploration strategies, based on the level of consideration of environment information. He 
suggests the following five categories: patterned search, human goal selection, active vision, find 
new terrain, and autonomous exploration. 
Pattern search strategies are based on a previously defined path, commonly with a raster pattern 
and less frequently with a spiral pattern (e.g., [Shillcutt et al., 1999]), to cover the environment. 
Most of the strategies that fall into this category are almost environment independent as they do 
not take into account the environment information. Furthermore, some of those strategies require 
that the map of the environment be given at the start of the exploration task [Choset & Pingon, 
1997; Zelinsky et al., 1993], while others are able to adapt to the environment to a certain degree 
(for instance, changing the predefined path so that obstacles that are detected are avoided [Acar & 
Choset, 2000; Cao et al., 1988; Hert et al., 1996]). 
Human goal selection category is quite similar to Lee’s category of human control. In fact, 
strategies that fall into this category center the decision-making process on a human, who decides 
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where the agent should move to and thus agents that use these strategies are not completely 
autonomous. Moorehead includes in this category the strategy used by Sojourner on planet Mars 
[Mishkin et al., 1998] and path planners such as those described in [Bresina & Washington, 2000; 
Brumitt & Stentz, 1998; Estlin et al., 2001; Laubach et al., 1998; Stentz, ; Volpe et al., 2001]. 
Active vision strategies create a model of the environment and then plan the next sensor view to 
maximize the expected improvement in the model fit to the data. Although they consider the 
amount of information to be collected, they usually do not take into account the costs to achieve 
it. Moreover, they are restricted to simple environments such as those involving polygonal 
objects. The strategies described in [Maver & Bajcsy, 1993; Whaite & Ferrie, 1995] are included 
in this category. 
Dividing the environment into two parts, the seen and unseen parts, the strategies belonging to 
the category of finding new terrain usually make the agent move to the closest unseen part 
[Yamauchi et al., 1998, 1999]. Among other strategies that fall in this category, there are those 
that consider the amount of unseen terrain to select the place where to go and also the costs of 
reaching it [Simmons et al., 2000], although, most of these approaches do not consider the cost. 
Finally, the autonomous exploration category includes those strategies that are totally 
autonomous, i.e., the agent that uses those strategies is able, by itself, to decide where to go, 
considering the information to be gained. Examples of those approaches are described in [Elfes, 
1995; Estlin et al., 1999; Thrun et al., 2000; Thrun, Fox et al., 1998]. 
In spite of the classification of exploration strategies mentioned above, we may also identify the 
following set of key features to characterize the approaches to exploration of unknown 
environments: domain application, type of environment (indoor versus outdoor, dynamic versus 
static), type of map/world model (metric, topological or hybrid, two-dimensional versus 
three-dimensional), degree of autonomy (human controlled versus autonomous), thinking 
paradigm (reactive, deliberative or hybrid), method for movement selection (whether the 
information gain is considered or not, whether the costs are considered or not), and kind of testing 
approach (simulation and/or real). In the case of multi-agent approaches we consider in addition 
the multi-agent techniques (cooperation, collaboration, whether communication is used), and 
aspects of the multi-agent architecture (properties such as heterogeneous versus homogenous, or 
centralized versus decentralized architecture). Some of these dimensions are common to those of 
agent classifications presented in Section 2.1. We will now describe examples of approaches to 
exploration in the light of these dimensions (the summary of this survey is presented later in Table 
2-1 and on Table 2-2 for single and multi-agent approaches, respectively). For the sake of the 
organization of the presentation of these approaches, we will start by those focusing on single 
agents and then on those that rely on recent advances in multi-agent techniques, such as 
coordination and collaboration, that have lead to the more powerful exploration strategies that 
have been proposed for teams of agents. 
Albers and colleagues [Albers & Henzinger, 1997, 2000; Albers et al., 2002] study the 
exploration problem where a robot has to construct a complete map of an unknown environment 
using a path that is as short as possible. The environment is populated with obstacles modelled by 
simple polygons. They concentrate on combinatorial aspects of the exploration problem rather 
than on geometric features. They assume that the environment is modelled by a directed, strongly 
connected graph. In this sense, the robot’s task is to visit all nodes and edges of the graph using 
the minimum number of edge traversals and determine a map, i.e., the adjacency matrix of the 
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graph. The robot visits an edge when it traverses the edge. A node or edge is explored when it is 
visited for the first time. The exploration algorithm tries to explore new edges that have not been 
visited so far. That is, starting at some visited node x with unvisited outgoing edges, the robot 
explores new edges until it gets stuck at a node y, i.e., it reaches y on an unvisited incoming edge 
and y has no unvisited outgoing edge. Since the robot is not allowed to traverse edges in the 
reverse direction, an adversary can always force the robot to visit unvisited nodes until it finally 
gets stuck at a visited node. The robot then relocates, using visited edges, to some visited node z 
with unexplored outgoing edges and continues the exploration. The algorithm tries to minimize 
the total number of edges traversed during all relocations. 
The work described in [Awerbuch et al., 1999; Betke et al., 1995] studies the problem of 
piecemeal learning of an unknown environment with rectangular obstacles which is modelled as 
an undirected graph. The robot’s goal is to learn a complete map of its environment while 
satisfying the piecemeal constraint that learning must be done a piece at a time, with the robot 
returning to the starting point after each learning phase. The authors argue that it may be best to 
organize the learning into phases, allowing the robot to return to the start position before it breaks 
down (highly probable in dangerous environments) or runs out of power. To ensure that the agent 
can reach any node in the graph and then get back to the start node, they assume the robot may 
traverse (2+α)R edges in one exploration phase, where α> 0 is some constant and R is the radius 
of the graph (the maximum of all shortest path distances between the start position and any node 
of the graph). The algorithm relies on the classical breath first search algorithm so that the robot 
does not move much further away from the start position than the distance from that start position 
to the unvisited node nearest to that start position. The authors also address the related problem of 
searching a graph for a particular distinguished location or treasure. They state that if this treasure 
is likely to be near the start position, then the robot should explore in a breath first search manner. 
The work described in [Anguelov et al., 2002; Biswas et al., 2002] is more related to 
map-building itself than to exploration. Viewing environments as collections of objects, the 
authors present an algorithm for learning object models of non-stationary objects found in office-
type environments. Their algorithm relies on the fact that many objects found in office 
environments look alike (e.g., chairs, trash bins). The algorithm involves a two-level hierarchical 
representation, the object template level at the top (a set of shape templates), and the physical 
object level (a set of shape models of concrete objects) at the bottom. This means the hierarchy 
model links individual objects with generic shape templates of object classes. Each object or 
template is represented by an occupancy grid map. The key difference between object models and 
templates is that each object model corresponds to exactly one object in the world, whereas a 
template may correspond to more than one object. Thereby, the algorithm, an instance of the 
popular EM algorithm [McLachlan & Krishnan, 1997], identifies classes of objects, in addition to 
learning plain object models. It learns shape models of individual object classes, from multiple 
snapshots of non-stationary objects of the same type, extracted from occupancy grid maps 
acquired at different points in time. By learning shape models of object types, in addition to shape 
models of individual objects, this approach is able to generalize across different object models, as 
long as they model objects of the same type. 
Choset and colleagues [Choset & Burdick, 2000; Choset & Nagatani, 2001; Choset & Pingon, 
1997; Choset et al., 2000] present an incremental procedure of constructing roadmaps of unknown 
environments. These roadmaps are geometric structures, in the form of a network of 
one-dimensional curves, that concisely represents the salient geometry of a robot’s environment 
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(its topology) and that a robot uses to plan a path between two points in an environment. The key 
connection between roadmaps and exploration is that, if the robot knows the roadmap then it 
knows the environment, i.e., if the robot constructs the roadmap, then it has effectively explored 
the environment. In this sense, exploration is seen as terrain mapping. In their work they focus on 
a roadmap, called a hierarchical generalized Voronoi graph. They present an incremental 
construction procedure of the hierarchical generalized Voronoi graph that requires only local 
distance sensor measurements. The algorithm uses distance information to numerically construct 
the hierarchical generalized Voronoi graph edges. Since sensors provide distance measurements, 
the numerical procedure readily uses raw sensor data to generate a small portion of a hierarchical 
generalized Voronoi graph edge. The robot then moves along this portion, and the procedure is 
repeated to generate the next segment. This incremental construction technique, therefore, 
automatically interleaves sensing with motion. The robot traces an edge until it reaches a node in 
the hierarchical generalized Voronoi graph, at which point it branches out to explore all edges 
emanating from that node. When all nodes have no unexplored directions (and all cycles have 
been traversed), the algorithm finishes. 
Deng and colleagues [Deng et al., 1991, 1997; Deng & Papadimitriou, 1998] consider the 
problem confronting a robot that has to explore an unknown room populated with polygonal 
obstacles. The goal of the robot is to learn its environment by making it possible that all points on 
the perimeter of the walls and of the obstacles must be visible from some point on the path. The 
efficiency of such an exploration task is given by the ratio of the expected effort (distance 
traversed) divided by the optimum amount of effort (i.e., the distance traversed if the robot knew 
in advance the environment). They present a competitive strategy by bounding this ratio by a 
constant. 
González-Bãnos and colleagues [González-Bãnos & Latombe, 2002; González-Bãnos et al., 
1999] investigate safe and efficient map-building strategies for a mobile robot with imperfect 
control and sensing. In the implementation, a robot equipped with a range sensor builds a 
polygonal map (layout) of a previously unknown indoor environment. The robot explores the 
environment and builds the map concurrently by patching together the local models acquired by 
the sensor into a global map. To build accurate models, it is crucial that the robot localizes itself 
precisely relative to previous sensing locations and integrates the information collected during 
navigation into the map (the so-called simultaneous localization and map building problem). They 
introduce the concept of a safe region, defined as the largest region that is guaranteed to be free of 
obstacles given the sensor readings made so far. Based on this concept they propose a next-best 
view algorithm to guide the robot through a series of good positions, where “good” refers to the 
expected amount and quality of the information that will be revealed at each new location. More 
precisely, at each iteration, the algorithm updates the map by computing the union of the safe 
region built so far with the local safe region generated at the new position. The new safe region is 
then used to select the next sensing position. To compute this position, the next-best view 
algorithm first generates a set of potential candidates. Next, it evaluates each candidate according 
to the expected gain of information that will be sensed at this position, the overlap necessary 
between the two partial environment maps (to ensure good alignment), and the motion cost 
required to move to the new position. This algorithm guarantees safe navigation despite an 
incomplete knowledge of the environment and sensor limitations (e.g., in range and incidence), 
and ensures sufficient overlap between each new local model and the current map, in order to 
allow registration of successive views even given the positioning uncertainties inherent to mobile 
robots. 
76  Chapter 2. Background 
 
The work presented in [Koenig, Tovey et al., 2001; Tovey & Koenig, 2003] describes a greedy 
mapping method of unknown environments. The robot has to map an initially unknown (they 
assume that the robot has no initial knowledge of the topology of the map), finite, undirected 
graph G = (V;E). The robot begins at some designated start vertex. When the robot is at a vertex 
v, it learns the vertices adjacent to v (that is, the vertices connected to vertex v by an edge), and 
can identify these vertices when it observes them again at a later point in time. The greedy 
mapping method they propose employs the basic principle of always moving the robot from its 
current location on the shortest path towards the closest location that is of interest, i.e., that it has 
not visited or observed yet (that is, unscanned – a vertex is unscanned if the greedy mapping agent 
has not yet learned all edges incident to it, or all vertices that the edges lead to) or it is informative 
(a vertex is informative if the agent can gain information about the graph when being in that 
vertex). This process is repeated until the terrain is mapped. The authors assume that the sensors 
provide information only about its close vicinity. They also make the assumptions that the robot is 
omni-directional, point-sized, equipped with only a radial short-distance sensor, and capable of 
error-free motion and sensing. The sensors onboard the robot uniquely identify its location and the 
neighbouring unobstructed locations. The authors argue that this assumption is realistic if the 
locations look sufficiently different or if the robot has GPS or a similar localization method 
available. 
Kuipers and Byun [Kuipers, 1996; Kuipers & Byun, 1991] developed a qualitative method for 
robot exploration, mapping, and navigation in large-scale spatial environments, which are defined 
as environments whose structure is at a much larger scale than the sensory horizon of the robot. 
The method, which relies on the spatial semantic hierarchy [Kuipers, 2000], may be briefly 
described as follows: location-specific control algorithms are dynamically selected to control the 
robot’s interaction with its environment; these algorithms define distinctive places and paths, 
which are linked to form a topological network description; finally, geometric knowledge is 
included onto the elements of the network. The exploration strategy may be summarized in the 
following steps: from a place, move into an open direction; select a trajectory control strategy 
which describes how a robot can follow the link connecting two distinctive places (e.g., following 
the midline of a corridor) and follow a path; detect a neighbourhood; select a distinctive measure 
(sensory function that enables distinguishing features by which a place becomes locally 
distinctive), and begin the hill-climbing strategy (to move to the point where some distinctiveness 
measure has its local maximum value); and, reach a local maximum that defines being at another 
distinctive place. The topological model, in which nodes correspond to distinctive places and arcs 
correspond to travel paths, is built as a side-effect of executing these steps. During exploration, 
the robot uses an exploration agenda to keep information about where and in which direction it 
should explore further to complete the map. For instance, if (Place1;Direction1) is in the 
exploration agenda, it means that a robot has previously visited Place1 and left it in some 
direction(s) other than Direction1. Therefore, in order to delete (Place1;Direction1) from the 
exploration agenda, the robot should either visit Place1 and leave in the direction Direction1, or 
return to Place1 from the direction opposite to Direction1. 
Lee and Recce [Lee, 1996; Lee & Recce, 1994] study the map-building and exploration 
capabilities of a mobile robot. Two types of fully metric maps are used: a feature-based map 
which describes the environment as a list of line and point features, and a grid-based map of the 
free space. The former is used mainly for localization, while the latter is used for path planning. 
They define a quality metric so that the maps built can be assessed. They tested and compared a 
set of exploration strategies that vary in the extent to which the developing map is used to guide 
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the exploratory movements. Thus, those strategies range from those which ignore the map 
completely and that are purely reactive, such as “wall-following” and “longest lines”, to those that 
make extensive use of the developing map to focus attention on the unexamined parts of the 
environment such as “supervised wall-following” and mainly “free-space boundaries”. 
“Wall-following” consists of two stages. First, the robot approaches the nearest object that it can 
detect. Then a repetitive process of scan, turn and move actions is executed so that the robot 
maintains an ideal distance from the nearest object. This strategy leads the robot to fall into traps, 
re-examine known objects, and repeat fruitless examinations. The “supervised wall-following” 
strategy overcomes these limitations since, in addition to following the boundaries of the objects 
as happens in “wall-following”, the robot takes into account the developing map to detect those 
inefficient behaviours. Like “wall-following”, “longest lines” strategy is totally reactive and was 
motivated by the human behaviour exhibited when exploring an environment. In fact, humans 
head into open regions of space instead of staying close to one of the walls. This was 
implemented by making the robot scan the environment and then head in the direction of the 
longest reading. After encountering an obstacle, the process is repeated. It has been proved that 
map quality could be increased rapidly in the early stages of exploration by performing this 
algorithm. In the “free-space boundaries”, the robot approaches the interesting regions of the 
environment. Interesting regions are defined as those free cells that are next to unknown cells of 
the map. 
Leonard and Feder [Leonard & Feder, 2000] consider the scenario of an autonomous 
underwater vehicle using forward-looking sonar to perform concurrent mapping and localization 
in an environment consisting of point-like features. The vehicle senses features in the 
environment through range and bearing measurements. These measurements are used to create a 
map of the environment and concurrently to localize the vehicle. The algorithm divides the 
environment into multiple globally-referenced sub-map regions. Sub-map regions overlap slightly 
to prevent excessive map switching. If the vehicle travels into an area for which no sub-map 
exists, a new sub-map is created. If the vehicle travels into a previously visited region, then the 
earliest created sub-map containing the current estimated vehicle location is retrieved and either 
cross-map relocation or cross-map updating is performed. 
Moorehead and colleagues [Moorehead, 2001; Moorehead et al., 1999; Moorehead et al., 2001] 
present an exploration technique which takes into account the amount of information that can be 
gained from taking sensor readings as well as the cost of collecting this information. More 
precisely, the approach considers multiple metrics of information simultaneously, such as finding 
new terrain and identifying rock type, as it explores and these information metrics can be easily 
changed to perform new and different exploration tasks. Besides, they are expressed in the same 
units which means that these values can be added up to get a total expected information gain for a 
location without the need for many heuristically determined relation constants. The methodology 
considers the costs, such as driving, sensing and planning times, associated with collecting the 
information. Likewise, to avoid the need for heuristic unit conversions, the same units are used for 
all the costs. Exploration plans are produced which maximize the utility, information gain minus 
exploration costs, to the exploring robot. The technique was applied to two exploration problems: 
creating traversability maps and exploring cliffs. The authors argue that this technique is suitable 
for handling complex exploration tasks, such as searching for water, in the form of ice, on the 
Moon or signs of life on Mars. The map is a grid. Each cell in the map contains two vectors: a 
vector of cell properties or attributes and a vector of expected information gains. The vector of 
attributes includes the height (maximum height that the robot has perceived in the cell), 
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reachability (denotes the probability that a cell is reachable), traversability (represents how easy 
or safe it is for the robot to occupy the cell), and probability of cliff (binary attribute denoting the 
probability that a cell is part of a cliff). The vector of expected information gains has one element 
for each metric of information being considered by the explorer. Each element represents the 
expected amount of information to be gained, over the entire sensor footprint area, by taking a 
sensor reading in the cell for a particular information metric. The total expected information to be 
gained by taking a sensor reading in the cell is the sum of the expected information gained from 
each information metric. Five information metrics are included. The frontier information metric 
indicates how much unseen terrain the explorer can expect to see. This information metric is used 
to attract the robot explorer to the boundary of its known and unknown world and fill in the blank 
spots in its map. The increase certainty weighted by the traversability information metric rewards 
the explorer for increasing the density of sensor readings in a cell and thus increasing the height 
certainty. The reachability information metric rewards the robot for going to places which will 
most strongly impact on its knowledge of reachability. The viewing cliff faces information metric 
rewards the robot for seeing the face of a cliff. The lower elevations information metric rewards 
the robot for travelling to cells that have a lower elevation than the cell currently occupied by the 
robot. The behaviour of the explorer and the exploration task it performs is determined by the 
composition of these two vectors. Changing the elements of the attribute vector changes what 
information the explorer records about the environment. Changing the information gain vector 
changes the metrics used by the explorer to determine what is interesting. The application to other 
exploration tasks requires an adequate construction of the attribute and information gain vectors in 
the explorer’s map. There are two main planning algorithms: greedy planning and random walk. 
The former algorithm plans to the first sensor reading, i.e., it chooses the cell with the maximum 
utility. The latter generates a random number between 0 and 1. If the random number was less 
than or equal to the total expected information gain then the robot takes a sensor reading. If not, 
the robot moves randomly to an adjacent cell (each cell has equal probability except the previous 
cell occupied by the robot which has zero probability). 
Sim and Dudek [Sim, 1998, 2004; Sim & Dudek, 1998, 1999] developed a non-heuristic 
framework for autonomous exploration that is both domain and sensor independent. The 
framework is based on information theory: the robot is directed to acquire sensor readings from 
places where the ability of the map to predict the world is weakest, i.e., the robot is directed to 
move to the place that is globally optimal for data collection. The goal is to maximize certainty 
about the world, i.e., to optimize the robot’s knowledge or information about the world. In order 
to penalize actions that require the robot to travel long distances, the cost of executing an action is 
taken into account to select the optimal action. Hence, the utility of an action depends on the 
expected reduction of entropy that it may lead to and it is penalized by the cost of performing it. 
The occupancy grid is initialized to 0.5 everywhere, indicating the state of no information. 
Exploration is performed by first identifying a set of candidate poses which are eligible for 
exploration (those which are reachable considering the current occupancy grid). This occupancy 
grid is used to simulate the probability density function of a simulated sonar scan at each position. 
The pose whose sonar probability density function has highest entropy is selected as the optimal 
pose from which to take the next scan. 
Another work closely related to that of Sim is the work of MacKay [MacKay, 1992a, 1992b]. 
By exploiting Shannon’s entropy, MacKay shows that the optimal place from which to take the 
next sample observation is where the prediction of an observation is least certain. 
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Whaite and Ferrie [Whaite, 1998; Whaite & Ferrie, 1994] employ MacKay’s framework in 
their work for the purpose of obtaining object models. According to them, the optimal place from 
which to take an observation is that which maximizes prediction variance, i.e., the agent is 
directed to take sensor readings as it climbs the uncertainty gradient. 
In solving the object recognition problem, Arbel and Ferrie [Arbel, 2000; Arbel & Ferrie, 1999] 
also follow an information theoretical approach in that the sensor readings are directed to places 
which maximize the expected reduction in entropy of the probability distribution over possible 
object classes. 
Roy and colleagues [Roy et al., 1999; Roy & Dudek, 1997, 2001; Roy & Thrun, 1999] also 
apply information theory for the purpose of robot navigation, by defining an objective function for 
navigating to a goal position in a known world that is simultaneously intended to minimize the 
entropy of the probability density function defining the pose of the robot. The result is a tendency 
to direct the robot along the boundaries of obstacles, where the certainty of the robot’s pose can 
be improved. 
Stachniss and Burgard [Stachniss & Burgard, 2003, 2005] introduce a new probabilistic way to 
represent the belief of the robot about the state of the environment. They called it coverage maps. 
In contrast to occupancy grids, in which each cell is considered as either occupied or free, 
coverage maps represent in each cell of a given discretization a posterior about the amount this 
cell is covered by an object. The main motivation for coverage maps is the fact that some 
environments contain, for instance, walls that are not parallel to the x or y axis of the grid. 
Representing these objects requires the presence of grid cells which are only partly covered. 
Coverage maps deal with this problem by storing a posterior about its coverage for each cell. 
Coverage values range from 0 to 1. Whereas a coverage of 1 means that the cell is fully occupied, 
an empty cell has a coverage of 0. Since the robot usually does not know the true coverage of a 
grid cell, it maintains a probabilistic belief about the coverage of each cell. This probabilistic 
belief is given by a histogram over possible coverage values. More precisely, a histogram is 
associated to each grid cell, in which each bin contains the probability that the corresponding grid 
cell has that particular coverage. They also present a sensor model that allows the robot to 
appropriately update a coverage map upon sensory input and describe how coverage maps can be 
used to realize a decision-theoretic approach to exploration of unknown environments. The 
exploration strategy adopted for selecting the most favourable position from which to perform the 
next measurement to retrieve new information about its environment relies on the following 
aspects: the uncertainty of the robot in the map should be as small as possible, and the number of 
measurements to be incorporated as well as the distance travelled should be minimized. The 
uncertainty in the state of a particular cell is given by computing the entropy of the posterior for 
that cell. They present four strategies for choosing an appropriate position. One of those strategies 
drives the robot to the closest location at which the robot can gather information about a cell. 
Another strategy considers the expected information gain that can be obtained about the 
environment at a specific view-point, i.e., the change of entropy introduced by incorporating the 
measurement obtained at that location into the map. Yet another strategy restricts the search for 
potential vantage points, as performed by the previous strategy, to a local window until this has 
been explored, so that the distance travelled by the robot is minimized. Finally, another strategy 
combines the first and the second strategy. The simulation runs indicate that the strategy 
combining the maximum uncertainty reduction and the distance to be travelled yields the best 
trade-off between the number of necessary measurements and the length of the resulting paths. 
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Table 2-1 – Key features of some works on single agent exploration of unknown 
environments. 
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Albers Terrain mapping I/O Graph-based metric map (Adjacency matrix) 
A D/R Move to unvisited edges S 
Awerbuch Terrain mapping I/O Graph-based metric map (Adjacency matrix) 
A D/R Piecemeal exploration/move 
to unvisited edges 
 
Anguelov Object models I Metric map A D   
Choset Terrain mapping I/O Topologic map A R   
González-
Bãnos 
Terrain mapping I Metric map A  expected gain of information 
and cost 
 
Koenig Terrain mapping I/O Metric/Topological maps 
A R Information gain (interesting 
vertices) 
S/F 
Kuipers 
Terrain mapping I/O Topological map (some 
metric information) 
A D Based on an exploration 
agenda and a state-event 
diagram involving: moving to 
open spaces, detecting the 
neighbourhood, selecting 
trajectory control laws, and 
finding distinctive places 
S 
Leonard 
Terrain mapping 
(underwater) 
O feature-based metric 
map 
 
A  Predefined S/F 
Lee Buildings mapping 
I Metric map A D/R Reactive and information gain  
Moorehead 
Terrain mapping, 
searching for life, 
water 
O Metric map A D Combination of multiple 
information metrics including 
cost 
S/F 
Sim 
Terrain mapping I/O Metric map A D Maximization of expected 
entropy reduction and 
minimization of cost 
S 
Arbel 
Object 
recognition 
I/O  A D Maximization of expected 
reduction in entropy 
probability distribution over 
possible object classes 
S 
Roy 
Navigation I/O Metric map A D Minimize the entropy of the 
probability density function 
defining the pose of the robot 
S 
Whaite Object models construction 
    Maximization of expected 
entropy reduction 
 
MacKay Mapping     Maximization of expected entropy reduction 
 
Stachniss 
Terrain mapping I/O Metric map (Coverage 
maps) 
A D Maximization of expected 
entropy reduction and 
minimization of travel 
distance 
S 
Thrun Terrain mapping I Occupancy grid (metric map) 
A D Move to low confidence 
regions 
S/R 
Thrun, 1993 3-D Terrain mapping 
I/O 3-D map A/NA D Move to free space R 
Taylor 
Search of 
recognizable 
targets/landmarks 
 Topological map A  Move to unexplored landmark S/R 
Macedo 
Terrain mapping 
and object 
models 
I/O Metric map (entities) A D Affect-based (Maximization 
of  feelings resulting from the 
satisfaction of basic desires) 
S 
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Thrun [Thrun, 1993] describes COLUMBUS, an autonomous mobile robot, whose goal is to 
explore and model unknown, static environments, while avoiding collisions with obstacles. It 
employs an instance-based learning technique that generalizes from a finite set of 
examples/experiences (location associated to sensor measurements) to arbitrary new positions 
based on two neural networks for modelling the environment, one for sensor interpretation and 
another for confidence assessment. These networks encode the specific characteristics of the 
sensors as well as those of typical environments of a mobile robot, thus capturing knowledge 
independent of any particular environment the robot might face. The sensor interpretation network 
maps a single experience to an estimation of reward (regions which the robot can physically not 
enter are labelled with negative reward), i.e., distance measurements from the sonar sensor are 
mapped to expected reward (generalized occupancy). The confidence network maps a single 
experience to a scalar in [0; 1]. Once trained, these networks enable the robot to transfer 
knowledge from previously explored environments to new environments. Experiences are 
remembered explicitly. In addition, COLUMBUS makes use of an anytime planner based on 
dynamic programming for planning low-cost paths to poorly explored areas. This means 
exploration is achieved by navigating to low confidence regions. More precisely, a real-valued 
exploration utility is associated to each grid point in the discretized model that represents the 
environment. Initially, the exploration utility of each cell is set to the negative cumulative 
confidence (sum of the confidences of those data points that are close enough to the cell). This 
cumulative confidence is a straightforward measure to estimate the utility of exploring a location. 
The lower this cumulative confidence is, the less explored the cell is and the higher the (initial) 
exploration utility of the cell is, and vice versa. All grid points are then repeatedly updated 
according to the maximum exploration utility of their neighbours on the grid. 
Recently, there has been an increase in research on acquiring three-dimensional maps. Thrun 
and colleagues [Thrun et al., 2000; Thrun et al., 2005] describe a robot capable of autonomously 
exploring abandoned mines. However, the exploration involves following, what is essentially, a 
straight corridor with a slight bend to the right, which is significantly simpler than the general 
exploration problem of exploring many different hallways. Thrun and colleagues [Liu et al., 2001; 
Thrun et al., 2000] present a novel algorithm that combines ideas from the EM approach. The 
basic idea is to combine the idea of posterior estimation, a key element of the EM-based 
approach, with that of incremental map construction using maximum likelihood estimators, a key 
element of other incremental approaches. Most of the approaches, however, assume that the 
environment is static during the data-acquisition phase. Hähnel and colleagues [Hähnel et al., 
2001; Hähnel et al., 2002; Hähnel, Schulz et al., 2003; Hähnel, Triebel et al., 2003] consider the 
problem of creating maps with mobile robots in populated environments. Their approach uses a 
probabilistic method to track multiple people and to incorporate the estimates of the tracking 
technique into the mapping process. The technique was tested for generating two-dimensional and 
three-dimensional maps. 
Taylor and Kriegman [Taylor & Kriegman, 1993, 1998] consider the problem of exploring an 
unknown environment by a mobile robot equipped with a visual recognition system in search of 
one or more recognizable targets. The exploration algorithm is based on a representation of 
environments containing visual landmarks called the boundary place graph. The boundary place 
graph records the set of recognizable objects (landmarks) that are visible from the boundary of 
each configuration space obstacle. The exploration algorithm constructs the boundary place graph 
incrementally from sensor data. The robot is able to circumnavigate all of the obstacles that 
contain landmarks. The exploration algorithm causes the robot to perform a tour of the boundary 
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place graph of the environment where visiting a node in the place graph corresponds to 
circumnavigating the boundary of that obstacle. A landmark in the environment is considered 
explored if the robot has circumnavigated the configuration space obstacle that encloses that 
landmark. The algorithm assumes that at the beginning of the exploration, the robot can see at 
least one landmark from its current position. After selecting an unexplored landmark, a path is 
planned through an explored part of the boundary place graph to the region where that landmark 
is visible. Then, the robot approaches it and circumnavigates the boundary that contains it. 
Finally, the robot records any observed landmarks and updates the place graph. Once the robot 
has completely explored an environment, it can use the constructed representation to carry out 
further navigation tasks. 
We will now turn to the multi-agent approach to exploration. 
Amat and colleagues [Amat et al., 1997] developed a system constituted by a set of low cost, 
small autonomous vehicles that cooperatively explore unknown environments by using a 
master-multislave exploration strategy. Following a classical line of insect robots, these 
autonomous vehicles obtain partial information about the environment during their exploration 
runs and afterwards they supply it to a master robot that, in turn, is able to compute the most 
plausible map (position of walls and obstacles).. Each vehicle is provided with two kinds of 
sensors: infra-red proximity sensors for environment data acquisition, and a relatively accurate 
odometric system for the estimation of the vehicle position during its run. The vehicles have a 
partially random moving behaviour: they turn 45º randomly and every time they detect an 
obstacle, although a specific turn direction is not equally probable for all robots which makes 
them display different behaviour. They can also share environment information when they meet, 
which enables the master to get the information, not only from the vehicles that successfully 
return after an exploratory run, but also from those that cannot return, provided that they have 
encountered vehicles that have safely returned. When the master receives the information from 
the slaves, a two step, fuzzy-based map generation algorithm is applied. The first step comprises 
the fusion and completion of the map perceived by each robotic ant, taking into account that the 
same robotic ant can observe more than one portion of the same wall, and the second step consists 
in a global fusion and completion of the maps perceived by several team members. 
The work presented by Bender and Slonim [Bender & Slonim, 1994] focuses on the 
coordination of two robots. They theoretically analyze the complexity of exploring 
strongly-connected directed graphs with two robots. 
Burgard and colleagues [Burgard et al., 2000; Burgard et al., 2002; Burgard et al., 2005] 
consider the problem of collaborative exploration of an unknown environment by multiple robots. 
Instead of greedily guiding every robot to the closest unexplored area (frontier cell [Yamauchi, 
1997], i.e., an already explored cell which is an immediate neighbour of an unexplored cell), their 
algorithm explicitly coordinates the robots so that no two robots choose to visit the same target 
position or to visit a position that is in the visibility area of the other. This means it tries to 
maximize overall utility by minimizing the potential for overlap in information gain amongst the 
various robots. The algorithm simultaneously considers the utility of frontier cells and the cost for 
reaching these cells. The cost of reaching the current frontier cells is determined by computing the 
optimal path from the current position of the robot to all frontier cells based on a deterministic 
variant of value iteration, a popular dynamic programming algorithm [Bellman, 1957; Howard, 
1960]. The utility of a frontier cell is computed based on the expected visibility area of robots. 
Initially, the utility is set to 1 for all frontier cells. Whenever a target point is selected for a robot, 
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the expected visible area of that robot when it arrives there is computed and the utility of the 
adjacent points in distance d is reduced according to their visibility probability. The visibility 
probability of a cell in a certain distance d is the probability that the robot’s sensors cover objects 
at distance d. This is computed based on the number of times the sensors of the robot covered 
cells at distance d in the past. Therefore, the utility of a target location depends on the probability 
that this location is visible from target locations assigned to other robots. Coordination is achieved 
by trading off the utilities and the cost and by reducing the utilities according to the number of 
robots that are already heading towards a specific area. They demonstrate that the coordination 
technique, relying on assigning different target locations to the robots of the team, significantly 
reduces the exploration time compared to other approaches, such as those of Yamauchi 
[Yamauchi, 1998] and Singh and Fujimura [Singh & Fujimura, 1993] which are characterized by 
an uncoordinated exploration and more precisely by robots greedily approaching the closest 
unexplored part of the map although they share a joint map. 
Simmons and colleagues [Simmons et al., 2000] extended the approach presented in [Burgard 
et al., 2000] by distributing the computation to a large extent, and by using a more sophisticated 
notion of expected information gain that takes current map knowledge and the robots’ individual 
capabilities into account. The individual robots construct “bids”, which describe their estimates of 
the expected information gain and costs of travelling to various locations. A central executive 
receives the bids and assigns tasks in an attempt to maximize overall utility, while trying to 
minimize overlap in coverage by the robots. In both cases, the majority of the computation is done 
in a distributed fashion, by the individual robots, and the centralized modules combine and 
coordinate information in an efficient way. This approach enables the robots’ “bids” to be 
calculated in parallel, which facilitates scaling to larger numbers of robots and enables the robots 
to construct bids based on their own capabilities (sensor range, travel costs, etc.). Moreover, this 
allows for more subtle types of coordination, for example, allowing the robots to remain near one 
another if the map shows that they are separated by a solid wall. 
Berhault and colleagues [Berhault et al., 2003] study how to coordinate a team of mobile robots 
visiting a number of given targets in partially unknown terrain. Their approach is based on 
combinatorial auctions, where robots bid on bundles of targets rather than on single targets as 
commonly happens in bidding strategies for exploring unknown environments (e.g., [Simmons et 
al., 2000]). The idea is to take into account synergies between the targets in order to optimize 
exploration. Different combinatorial bidding strategies, such as bidding on all bundles with no 
more than n targets, and bidding on all bundles that contain only one or two targets, are proposed 
and their performance is compared with each other, as well as to single item auctions and an 
optimal centralized mechanism. The auctioneer is a virtual agent who has sole responsibility for 
holding auctions and determining their winners but has no other knowledge and cannot control the 
robots. Initially, no robot owns any targets. Whenever a robot visits a target or gains more 
information about the terrain, it shares this information with the other robots and the auctioneer 
starts a new auction that contains all targets that have not yet been visited. Simulation results 
achieved with a multi-robot simulator, called TeamBots, indicate that combinatorial auctions 
generally lead to significantly superior team performance than single item auctions and generate 
very good results compared to an optimal centralized mechanism. 
Billard and colleagues [Billard et al., 2000] investigate the influence of communication, of 
learning, and of the number of robots in the task of mapping the locations of objects in a dynamic 
environment. The investigation is performed through simulation, physical implementation, and 
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also with a theoretical framework based on probabilistic modelling. They designed a multi-robot 
system consisting of a group of worker robots whose task is learning the locations of objects. 
These robots are able to communicate their knowledge to each other as they meet. This 
knowledge is also communicated to a static database robot which each robot visits regularly, and 
which keeps an up-to-date account of the global state of the environment. The environment is split 
into zones. Each robot keeps track of the number of times it has crossed each zone. When it 
reaches the border between two zones, it turns towards the zone it has less visited with a randomly 
chosen angle of turn. The results of several experiments are compared with those predicted by the 
probabilistic model, and their agreement suggests that the probabilistic model is a good 
approximation of a multi-robot system. Those results indicate that this is a successful approach to 
learning the locations of objects that change frequently. 
Cohen [W. Cohen, 1996] considers the problem of collaborative mapping and navigation of 
teams of mobile robots. The team consists of a navigator that has to reach an initially unknown 
target location and a set of cartographers that randomly move through the environment to find the 
target location. When a robot discovers the goal point, the location is communicated among the 
cartographers to the navigator which then starts to move to the target location. 
Grabowski and colleagues [Grabowski et al., 2003; Grabowski et al., 2000] describe an 
approach for exploration of unknown environments by a team of robots based on maximizing the 
understanding of obstacles rather than the exposure of free space. They argue that their approach 
is suitable to deal with the problem originating from specular reflection. This is the phenomenon 
where the energy being emitted by the sensor strikes an adjacent object but the incidence angle is 
sufficiently shallow that it causes the return echo to be reflected away from the detector. Hence, 
specular reflection erroneously exposes regions beyond local obstacles, giving rise to false 
frontiers of exploration. So, they start with an existing obstacle point in the occupancy map and 
derive respective positions where a new sensor reading would better resolve the underlying 
obstacle. They adopt a simple method for generating the next best view for the robot based on the 
concept of regions of interest. These are not only on the frontiers of exploration but are also 
places that promise to give the robot highly useful sensor measurements in order to resolve 
obstacles. These regions of interest are built by fusing multiple inverse sensor models in much the 
same fashion as an occupancy map. The algorithm consists of finding the closest region of interest 
with the highest utility for sensing. More precisely, they generate a number of random exploration 
positions about the robot and keep only those that fall in a region of interest. From there, the 
algorithm selects the closest region of interest and plans a path through the occupancy map to 
guide the robot. Exploration is performed by a heterogeneous team of robots, one of them being 
the team leader. During the operation, each robot collects information locally about its 
surroundings. This data is transmitted to the team leader where it is used to build a local map 
centric to that robot. The team leader (or human operator) can utilize the robot’s local map 
information to direct the robot around obstacles, investigate anomalies or generate new paths. 
Besides this, the team leader can merge the information from several local maps into a single 
global map to provide a more comprehensive view of the environment to the user. Collaboration 
techniques are used to obtain relative position and orientation of the team with respect to each 
other. 
In another, but closely related, work to that is described in [Koenig, Tovey et al., 2001; Tovey 
& Koenig, 2003] and summarised above, Koenig and colleagues [Koenig, Szymanski et al., 2001] 
analyze different terrain coverage methods for ants which are simple robots with limited sensing 
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and computational capabilities. They consider environments that are discretized into equally 
spaced cells. Instead of storing a map of the environment in their memory, the ants maintain 
markings in the cells they visit. The authors consider two different strategies for updating the 
markings. The first strategy is “Learning Real-Time A*”, which greedily and independently 
guides the robots to the closest unexplored areas. The second approach is “Node Counting” in 
which the ants simply count the number of times a cell was visited. The paper shows that 
“Learning Real-Time A*” is guaranteed to be polynomial in the number of cells, whereas Node 
counting can be exponential. 
Although not concerned with exploration strategies, Mataric and Sukhatme [Mataric & 
Sukhatme, 2001] consider the problem of dynamically allocating tasks in a group of multiple 
robots satisfying multiple goals in space exploration. This work is motivated by recent and future 
interest in cooperating multiple robots engaged in space exploration. They present and compare 
three different multi-robot cooperation strategies to address this problem. In the first approach a 
robot grabs a task if it thinks it is qualified to perform it. In the second approach, task allocation is 
based on auctions. The third explores the trade-off between the first and the second approaches. 
Rekleitis ad colleagues [Rekleitis et al., 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Rekleitis et al., 2001a, 2001b] 
focus on the problem of reducing the odometry error during exploration. They separate the 
environment into stripes or triangles that are explored successively by the robot team. Whenever 
one robot moves, the other robots are kept stationary and observe the moving robot. The moving 
robot explores a triangle at a time. A dual graph is built in a manner that each stripe is represented 
by a vertex while for every adjacent stripe there is an edge linking their correspondent vertices. 
Although this approach can significantly reduce the odometry error during the exploration 
process, it is not designed to distribute the robots over the environment. Rather, the robots are 
forced to stay close to each other in order to remain within the visibility range. Thus, using these 
strategies for multi-robot exploration one cannot expect that the exploration time is significantly 
reduced. 
Roy and Dudek [Roy & Dudek, 1997, 2001] address the problem of how a pair of 
heterogeneous agents that cannot communicate with one another over long distances meet if they 
start exploring at different locations in an unknown environment. They argue that to rendezvous at 
distinctive locations (landmarks) is a good solution to overcome the problem of communication in 
multi-agent exploration in that it facilitates communication because they are close each other. 
This enables map sharing, in order to merge them into a global map. They propose several 
alternative algorithms to solve this “rendezvous” problem and show that multiple agents can 
perform exploration faster than a single agent, even in these situations in which rendezvous is 
required to facilitate communication between the agents. 
One approach towards cooperation between robots has been presented in [Singh & Fujimura, 
1993]. This approach especially addresses the problem of heterogeneous robot systems. During 
exploration each robots identifies “tunnels” to the, so far, unexplored area. If a robot is too big to 
pass through a tunnel it informs other robots about this tunnel. Whenever a robot receives such a 
message it either accepts this new task or further delegates it to smaller robots. In the case of 
homogeneous robots, the robots perform a greedy strategy similar to the system of Yamauchi and 
colleagues [Yamauchi, 1998; Yamauchi et al., 1998, 1999]. 
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Table 2-2 – Key features of some works on multi-agent exploration. 
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mapping 
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slave random 
exploration 
Master-multi-
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Heterogeneous 
Bender Terrain mapping 
I/O Topological 
map 
A     
Burgard 
Terrain 
mapping 
I/O Metric map A D Information gain 
(maximize  and 
cost 
Coordination: 
avoid assigning 
equal target 
locations for 
different robots; 
communication 
Centralized, 
Heterogeneous 
Billard 
Mapping 
objects 
I  A D/R Move to the zone 
it has less visited 
with an angle of 
turn randomly 
chosen 
Communication; 
collaboration 
Heterogeneous 
Cohen 
Terrain 
mapping; 
search of 
a target 
      heterogeneous 
Grabowski 
Terrain 
mapping 
I/O Metric map A D(team 
leader)/
R 
Information gain 
(regions of 
interest) 
Collaboration for 
each other 
localization 
Heterogeneous 
Koenig 
Terrain 
mapping 
I/O Metric/Topologi
cal maps 
A R Information gain 
(interesting 
vertices) 
 Homogeneous 
Berhault 
Terrain 
mapping 
I/O  A D  Coordination 
based on 
combinatorial 
auctions 
Centralized (in 
a virtual agent- 
the auctioneer); 
Homogenous 
Rekleitis 
Terrain 
mapping 
 Landmark-
based 
A  Depth-first search 
of the dual graph 
for selecting the 
next unexplored 
stripe; sweep each 
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Cooperative 
localization 
Decentralized; 
heterogeneous 
Roy 
Terrain 
mapping 
I/O Metric map A   Collaboration and 
communication 
through 
rendezvous 
Decentralized 
Singh Terrain mapping 
I/O Metric map A   Collaboration Heterogeneous 
Yamauchi Terrain mapping 
I/O Metric map A D Move to closest 
frontier 
  
 
Yamauchi and colleagues [Yamauchi, 1998; Yamauchi et al., 1998, 1999] present a technique 
to learn maps with a team of mobile robots. In this approach the robots exchange information 
about the map that is continuously updated whenever new sensor input arrives. They also use 
map-matching techniques to improve the consistency of the resulting map. A map is an evidence 
grid in which each cell is considered as open, unknown, or occupied, depending on whether its 
occupancy probability is less, equal, or greater than the prior probability (initially all of the cells 
are set to the prior probability of occupancy, which is 0.5), respectively [Yamauchi, 1997]. A 
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process analogous to edge detection and region extraction in computer vision is used to find the 
boundaries between open space and unknown space. Any open cell adjacent to an unknown cell is 
labelled a frontier edge cell. Adjacent edge cells are grouped into frontier regions. Any frontier 
region above a certain minimum size (roughly the size of the robot) is considered a frontier. Once 
frontiers have been detected within a particular evidence grid, all robots follow a greedy strategy 
and move to the closest frontier cell. The path planner uses a depth-first search on the grid, 
starting at the robot’s current cell and attempting to take the shortest obstacle-free path to the cell 
containing the goal location. 
2.4 Exploration of Unknown Environments with Affective Agents 
As described in Section 2.3.1, the relationship between exploration of unknown environments and 
emotion or motivation has not been ignored in fields such as Psychology, Ethology, or 
Neuroscience. However, as far as we know, there are almost no computational works in AI and 
robotics explicitly relating affective agents with exploration of unknown environments. Among 
the exceptions are the following works: [Whaite, 1998], [Breazeal, 1999; Breazeal & Scassellati, 
1999], [Blanchard & Cañamero, 2006], [Oliveira & Sarmento, 2002], and [Velásquez, 1997, 
1998a, 1998b, 1999]. For instance, Kismet [Breazeal, 1999; Breazeal & Scassellati, 1999] 
exhibits the proto-social response of exploration by searching for desired visual stimuli. 
Exploratory responses allow the “caregiver” to attribute curiosity, interest, and desires to the 
robot. Kismet possesses an attention system that enables it to select perceptual stimuli. Velásquez 
included in the drive system of his agents drives such as curiosity and also two other drives 
closely related to hunger, namely fatigue and “BatteryRegulation”. He also included surprise in 
the emotional system and related it to variables such as novelty, anticipatory expectancy, and 
other issues that have been considered essential components of a general attention system, 
including orienting to sensory stimuli, executive functions such as the detection of target events, 
and maintenance of a general “alert” state. Typical behavioural responses controlled by this 
system include look-around, orient-to-[stimulus], and look-at-[stimulus]. Anyway, neither of 
these latter two works addresses map-building nor considers exploration seriously, i.e., as a 
necessary step towards map-building. 
However, we might consider that other works implicitly include rudimentary forms of some 
motivations and emotions and relate them to exploration. For instance, when a few works in the 
field of exploration make use of mathematical formulas that evaluate the parts of the environment 
that contain more information for the agent or that evaluate the cost of acquiring it, they are, to 
some extent, modelling in the agent rudimentary forms, for instance, of interest, curiosity, or 
hunger. They are actually considering variables such as novelty, difference, uncertainty, or change 
which are, according to emotion theorists, the basis of the process of elicitation of those feelings. 
However, by doing so, those works are not following the approach of building artificial agents 
that act and think like humans [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995]. Further, none of those works 
considers the influence of unpredictability, unexpectedness, or surprinsingness on exploration. 
2.5 Other Related Fields 
In the course of the research study undertaken in the context of this thesis, namely in the 
construction of a multi-agent system, we used concepts from knowledge representation and 
reasoning theories, especially from the artificial intelligence fields of case-based reasoning, as 
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well as planning, specifically hierarchical task network and decision-theoretic planning. The 
contribution of our work to these areas is not directly in the scope of this thesis. However, the 
importance of this section and subsections to the understanding of subsequent chapters cannot be 
understated. In order to describe our work thoroughly, it was important to present the parts of it 
that involve techniques from those areas, which logically include concepts and terminology 
typical of them. Moreover, as mentioned earlier in Section 1.1, we have discovered a close 
relationship between the exploration of unknown environments and the evaluation of creative 
products. Therefore, in addition to these areas, the field of creativity, especially creative 
evaluation, must be discussed. 
Hence, this section includes an introduction to other fields that are required to understand this 
thesis, although they are not as central as exploration of unknown environments, emotion and 
motivation, or even agents and multi-agent systems. We start with knowledge representation, then 
we shift to planning under uncertainty in dynamic environments, subsequently we focus on the 
planning technique of hierarchical task-network planning, and finally we devote a few words to 
creativity. 
2.5.1 Knowledge Representation 
How the human mind represents the world is one of the questions that has been challenging 
cognitive science in its various perspectives for centuries, from psychologists, philosophers, 
linguists, neuroscientists, and more recently AI researchers. The uncertain and controversial ideas 
generated around this subject matter corroborate the lack of certain knowledge existing on the 
subject. However, knowledge representation plays a central and essential role in intelligent agents, 
and consequently when modelling them, as for example, in reasoning, problem solving, and 
thinking. 
The world comes into the human mind through the sensory system: humans see, feel, hear, 
taste, and smell. The sensory world is somewhat transformed and represented in the mind, into 
what is called mental representation or knowledge representation of the world in the mind. People 
have knowledge of the visual appearance of a house, the feel of objects (e.g., ice is cold), taste 
(e.g., sugar is sweet), odors (e.g., the odor of a perfume), and sounds. Moreover, people know 
what a bird is. Finally, people know skills that are difficult to express to others in any way but 
showing them (e.g., how to ride a bicycle). 
The knowledge represented in the mind is of different sorts. However, it is reasonable to 
classify it into a small number of categories. This has not been a consensual task, giving rise to 
different taxonomies of approaches to knowledge representation. Some of those taxonomies are 
presented as follows. 
Rumelhart and Norman [Rumelhardt & Norman, 1985] distinguish between a represented 
world and a representing world. The represented world corresponds to the external real world. 
The representing world must mirror some aspects of the represented world. Rumelhart and 
Norman distinguish three main families of representational systems: the propositionally based 
systems in which knowledge is represented as a set of discrete symbols or propositions, so that 
concepts are represented by formal statements; the analogical based systems in which the 
correspondence between the represented world and the representing world is as direct as possible; 
and, procedural based systems in which knowledge is represented in terms of active processes or 
procedures. 
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Stillings and colleagues [Stillings et al., 1989] maintain a taxonomy similar to that of 
[Rumelhardt & Norman, 1985], distinguishing between propositional, analogical (imagery) and 
procedural knowledge. In addition, Stillings and colleagues group propositional and analogical 
knowledge into declarative knowledge as opposed to procedural knowledge. Declarative 
knowledge refers to the static, fact-like nature of representations, while procedural knowledge 
concerns the processes that operate on that factual knowledge. 
Eysenck and Keane [Eysenck & Keane, 1991] define knowledge as the information that is 
represented mentally in a format and structured or organized in some manner. With respect to the 
format of knowledge they consider internal mental representations, as opposed to external (non-
mental) representations (pictorial or diagrammatic based representations such as maps, pictures, 
etc., and linguistic based representations such as stories, etc.), from two main perspectives: 
symbolic and distributed representations. Symbolic representations comprise both propositional 
and analogical (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, or kinetic image) representations. 
Distributed representations are linked to a connectionist approach to representing the world. 
Regarding the organization of knowledge, Eysenck and Keane suggest that there are two main 
kinds of knowledge organization: simple and complex organisation. Simple organization refers to 
how different entities can be grouped together under a common concept (object concepts) and 
also to relational concepts like “hit”, “buy”, “give”, etc. On the contrary, complex organization 
refers to how large groups of concepts (events and sequence of events – plans) are structured and 
used. Schemata, frames, MOPS and TOPS (described below) are examples of these complex 
knowledge structures. 
Sharing aspects with the previous taxonomies, McNamara [McNamara, 1994] proposed a 
taxonomy in which the primary division occurs between declarative and procedural knowledge. 
Declarative knowledge is the kind of knowledge that can be verbalized, visualized or declared in 
some manner, while procedural knowledge corresponds to skills, cognitive operations or 
knowledge of how to do things that can be represented by production rules. McNamara suggests 
two ways for representing declarative knowledge: analogical and symbolic representations. 
Analogical representations preserve properties of objects and events in an intrinsic manner, i.e., 
the representational system has the same inherent constraints as the system being represented 
(e.g., a bird is represented by its image). Analogical representations are related to all the senses 
like visual, spatial, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and motor. On the other hand, in 
symbolic representations, meanings or ideas are represented in propositions, each one having a 
relation and arguments (e.g., heavier(A,B) expresses the idea that an object A outweighs an object 
B). Propositions are the smallest units of knowledge that can stand as an assertion and that can be 
true or false. In propositional representations details are not covered. According to complexity, 
McNamara distinguishes between simple and complex knowledge representations. Simple 
knowledge representations, comprising the analogical, symbolic, and procedural representations, 
are the components of complex knowledge representations such as concepts, schemata, cognitive 
maps and mental models (described below). 
In short, there seems to be a consensual distinction between three main kinds of knowledge 
representations: analogical, propositional, and procedural. Also, declarative knowledge is 
commonly distinguished from procedural knowledge. Declarative knowledge can be represented 
by analogical and propositional (symbolic) representations. There is also some consensus on 
splitting simple knowledge representations from complex knowledge representations. We will 
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now take a look at the mental constructs or frameworks proposed to model knowledge 
representation in humans and extensively used in computers. 
Regarding analogical representation systems, most of the research has focused on visual 
imagery rather than on, for instance, auditory or olfactory imagery. One of the most remarkable 
works on visual imagery is by Kosslyn [Kosslyn, 1980, 1985]. Relying on the cathode ray tube 
metaphor, the basic idea of Kosslyn’s theory is that there are two fundamental kinds of 
representations of image information: surface and deep representation. The former corresponds to 
the visual image itself, while the latter refers to some sort of propositional representation from 
which the image can be generated. Kosslyn has also buttressed the evidence that spatial memories 
are of an analogical kind by showing that images of objects and of collections of objects are 
scanned in similar ways. Moreover, Kosslyn and colleagues [Kosslyn et al., 1988] as well as 
McNamara and colleagues [McNamara et al., 1992] have contributed by considering that 
temporal-order information is encoded in metric representations. That is, spatial memories encode 
not only the places occupied by objects but also when that happened. From this point of view, 
routes through the environment can be defined as temporally ordered sequences of scenes. This 
knowledge structure about the physical environment that is acquired and used, generally without 
concentrated effort, to find and follow routes from one place to another, and to store and use the 
relative positions of places, is often called the cognitive map [Kuipers, 1978, 1996, 2000, 2003; 
Kuipers & Byun, 1991]. An alternative formalism for analogical representation, called mental 
models, has been proposed by Johnson-Laird [Johnson-Laird, 1985]. 
With respect to procedural representations, production systems [Newell, 1973] are perhaps the 
most important formalism. This corresponds to if-then or condition-action statements. The action 
of a production is executed whenever the condition side of the production holds. 
The simplest of the propositional representation systems is semantic features or attributes in 
which concepts are represented by a weighted set of features or attributes. Frege [Frege, 1952] 
distinguishes two aspects of a concept: the intension, i.e., the set of attributes which define what it 
is to be a member of the concept; and, the extension, i.e., the set of entities that are members of 
the concept. From this point of view, the intension of, for instance, the concept “bachelor” 
comprises the following attributes: male, unmarried, and adult. The extension of this concept 
includes the pope, all priests, etc. Particularly related to this approach are the ideas of 
Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, 1953] who observed that concepts that are part of the natural world, 
such as bird, orange, chair, car, etc., are polymorphic. That is, their instances may be categorized 
in a variety of ways, and it is not possible to come up with a useful classical definition, in terms of 
a set of necessary and sufficient features, for such concepts. An answer to this problem is to 
represent a concept extensionally, defined by its set of instances or cases. 
Resulting from an effort to overcome the drawbacks of semantic features, the model proposed 
by Smith and colleagues [Smith et al., 1974] led to the separation of features into two types: 
defining features and characteristic features. While defining features are essential features of a 
category or concept, characteristic features are not necessary for the definition of a concept. For 
instance, “has feathers” is a defining feature for the concept “bird”, whereas “can fly” is a 
characteristic feature. In fact, all birds have feathers, but even though most of them can fly this is 
not a universal feature of birds. 
However, these approaches deal only with object concepts. Therefore, it becomes necessary to 
represent relations between concepts. Semantic networks [Quillian, 1966] were proposed with this 
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goal. They are directed, labelled graphs comprising a set of nodes interrelated by relations. 
Concepts are represented by nodes and their meaning is given by the relations it has with other 
concepts. One of the properties of semantic networks is inheritance, allowed by the relations “isa” 
and “subset”. For instance, “a isa b” means that the concept a is an instance of the concept b, 
while “a subset b” means that the concept a is a subset of the concept b. A drawback of semantic 
networks is that they became clumsy and unwieldy when they become large. 
Besides object concepts, there was the need to represent relational concepts such as “hit”, 
“bounce”, “collide”, etc. Although several approaches were proposed to deal with these kinds of 
concepts, most of them based on a propositional representation of the meaning of a relation, 
perhaps the most remarkable approach was proposed by Schank [Schank, 1972]. Called 
conceptual dependency, this approach proposed a representation for the knowledge contained in 
language. The goals of such representation were: it should be unique and unambiguous; it must 
express the meaning of a sentence in any language; it must be language independent; two different 
sentences with the same meaning must have the same representation; and, similar concepts must 
have the same representation. To achieve these goals Schank proposed that the core meaning of 
verbs may be reduced to 12 to 15 conceptual primitives, called primitive acts (e.g., ATRANS – 
transfer of possession, PTRANS – physical transfer from one location to another, etc.). A 
relational concept is represented by a schema with four variables: actor, act, object, and direction. 
These variables may be filled with a value. For instance, the act variable may be instantiated with 
one of the primitive acts such as ATRANS, PTRANS, etc. The actor refers to the subject that is 
responsible for the act, while the object is the direct object of the act. Each primitive act can be 
used to characterise many relations. For instance, ATRANS (transfer of possession) could be 
“receive”, “take”, “buy”, and “sell”. 
Semantic features deal only with word meaning while semantic networks and conceptual 
dependency include lexical and semantic knowledge. All these approaches try to represent 
knowledge in a single format. However, there was the need to focus on higher units of knowledge, 
so called supra-sentential knowledge. Minsky, Schank, and Rumelhart started the search of a 
solution for this problem suggesting very similar representation formalisms. Minsky [Minsky, 
1975] proposed a formalism called frames, Schank [Schank & Abelson, 1977] proposed another 
formalism called scripts (further elaborated into MOPs [Schank, 1982]), and Rumelhart and 
colleagues [Rumelhardt, 1980; Rumelhardt & Norman, 1985; Rumelhardt & Ortony, 1977] still 
another formalism called schemata. Although they have different names, they are aimed at the 
same goal: to structure knowledge into higher-order representational units. 
The concept of schema comes from Bartlett [Bartlett, 1932] and Piaget [Piaget, 1952]. 
However, the idea was not well accepted and only later did the idea become more widely used. 
Schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are 
schemata for generalised concepts of objects, situations, events, sequence of events, action and 
sequences of actions, etc. They have been used to account for our ability to make inferences in 
complex situations, to make default assumptions about unmentioned aspects of situations, and to 
generate predictions about what is likely to occur in the future. Rumelhart and Ortony 
[Rumelhardt & Ortony, 1977] list various features of schemata as follows. First, schemata have 
variables. Besides a constant part that represents the characteristics of a concept which are always 
true in all examples of the concept (e.g., the number of legs – four – for the concept “dog”), a 
schema has a variable part (e.g., the colour or size of the concept “dog”). Variables of this part 
have default values, i.e., there is information about what values to assume for variables when the 
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incoming information is unspecified. Second, schemata can embedded one within another. A 
schema is a configuration of sub-schemata, and so on. For instance, the schema of the “human 
body” consists of the schemata for the “head”, the “trunk”, the “arms”, and the “legs”. In turn, the 
schema for “head” comprises the schemata of the “eyes”, the “mouth”, etc. Some schemata are 
assumed to be primitive or undecomposable. Third, schemata represent knowledge at all levels of 
abstraction from ideologies and cultures to word meaning and sentential knowledge. Fourth, 
schemata represent knowledge rather than definitions. Schemata exist for semantic and episodic 
knowledge [Tulving, 1972]. These terms are attributed to Tulving, who agues that the episodic 
memory stores information about temporally dated episodes or events, and temporally spatial 
relations among these events, while semantic memory stores information necessary for language 
such as the meaning of words, rules to manipulate them, etc. For instance, the schema for the 
concept “bird” contains the definition of a bird (has feathers, can fly, etc.), facts and relationships 
about birds (e.g., what they eat, where they live, etc.), and our own experience with birds (e.g., 
knowledge about a particular bird that we saw recently, etc.). The first two kinds of knowledge 
about birds are referred to as semantic knowledge, while the third kind of knowledge is referred to 
as episodic knowledge. Finally, the fifth feature of schemata concerns viewing them as active 
processes that evaluate its appropriateness when input information is acquired. 
Script theory and its successor, dynamic memory theory [Schank, 1982, 1986] (including the 
notions of MOPs and TOPs which are more elaborated notions than scripts), are a variant of 
schemata that have been proposed to characterise people’s knowledge of commonplace event 
sequences such as going to a restaurant. With this dynamic memory theory, Schank also 
contributed to enlarging the list of categories of memory such as long-term, short-term, auditory 
memory, etc., by distinguishing the following three types of knowledge in his dynamic memory 
theory: particular situations or experiences of particular events (e.g., the knowledge about going 
to a restaurant last Tuesday); generalized events, i.e., general information about situations that is 
obtained from abstracting the common features or losing the details of those situations that have 
been experienced numerous times (e.g., healthcare assistants wear white uniforms); and, plan-like 
information (e.g., information about going to a restaurant). The first kind of knowledge is stored 
in what Schank called event memory, the second kind of knowledge is stored in situational 
memory, and the third kind of knowledge is stored in intentional memory. 
The taxonomies described above, as well as other works, yield various dualities, some of which 
are very controversial such as analogical versus propositional (symbolic) representations, 
procedural versus declarative, semantic versus episodic memory, and event versus situational 
versus intentional memory. Closely related to Schank’s categorization of memory is Cohen’s 
proposal [G. Cohen, 1989] of the existence of various types of contents in memory such as plans 
and actions, places, objects or events, faces, etc. These contents require different models and 
conceptual frameworks to represent them in memory. Hence there is a memory for plans and 
actions, a memory for places, etc. 
 
These knowledge representation formalisms allow an agent to possess a model of the world. 
The process of making the right decision by agents depends heavily on the quality of such a 
model of the environment that surrounds them. Unfortunately, the real world is not crystal clear to 
agents. Agents almost never have access to the whole environment, mainly because of the 
incompleteness and incorrectness of their perceptual and understanding components. In fact, it is 
too much work to obtain all the information from a complex and dynamic world, and it is quite 
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likely that the accessible information suffers distortions. Nevertheless, since the success of agents 
depends heavily on the completeness of the information of the state of the world, they have to 
pursue alternatives to construct good models of the world even (and especially) when this is 
uncertain. According to psychologists, cognitive scientists and ethologists [Kline, 1999; Piaget, 
1952], humans and, in general, animals attempt to overcome this limitation through the generation 
of assumptions or expectations1 to fill in gaps in the present observational information. Note, 
however, that not all those expectations generated to fill in gaps in the present observational 
information are made explicit. However, the reasoning of the agent may be improved if its model 
of the world contains also a good model of future worlds. In this case, the process cannot be 
confined to filling in gaps in the information provided by perception because there is no 
information at all of those worlds. In order to overcome this limitation, agents also exhibit the 
ability to make predictions about future states of the world taking into account the present world 
and inference processes. 
Gärdenfors [Gärdenfors, 1994] defends the idea that expectations are defeasible beliefs that are 
necessary to everyday reasoning. With respect to their cognitive origins, Gärdenfors argues that 
they are much like summaries of previous experiences. Thus, he suggests that they are the result 
of inductive reasoning. This is particularly related with Schank’s theory of dynamic memory. 
According to Schank, although a MOPs serve to organize our experiences that have been gathered 
from different episodes into sensible units organized around essential similarities, their main 
purpose is to provide expectations that enable the prediction of future events on the basis of 
previously encountered, structurally similar events. 
When the missing information, either of the present state of the world or of the future states of 
the world, becomes known to the agent, there might be an inconsistency or conflict between it and 
the assumptions or expectations that the agent has. As defended by Reisenzein [Reisenzein, 
2000b], Gärdenfors [Gärdenfors, 1994], Ortony and Partridge [Ortony & Partridge, 1987], etc., 
the result of this inconsistency gives rise to surprise. It also gives rise to the process of updating 
beliefs, called belief revision (e.g., [Gärdenfors, 1992]), which may be briefly described as a 
mechanism for changing repositories of information in the light of new information. These 
mechanisms can be used to incorporate new information into a knowledge container without 
compromising its integrity. If the new information to be incorporated is consistent with the 
knowledge stored in memory then this process is straightforward: simply add the new 
information. On the other hand, if the new information contradicts the knowledge stored in 
memory then great care must be exercised otherwise the introduction of an inconsistency will 
compromise the integrity of the knowledge base. In order to incorporate new information which is 
inconsistent with the knowledge base, the agent must decide what information it is prepared to 
give up. Belief revision attempts to model decisions concerning modifications to a knowledge 
repository. The guiding principles are that the changes should be both rational and minimal in 
some sense. Three main kinds of belief changes may be distinguished: expansion, revision, and 
contraction [Gärdenfors, 1992]. 
Case-based reasoning, in the context of artificial intelligence, is a problem solving and learning 
paradigm that relies on reusing the specific knowledge of previous and similar experiences or 
concrete problem situations (so-called cases or episodes) to solve a new problem [Aamodt & 
                                                     
1 Although some authors use the terms assumption and expectation as synonyms, there are authors that make a 
distinction between them defending that an expectation has to do with future world states while assumptions are 
related to the current world state. 
94  Chapter 2. Background 
 
Plaza, 1994; Kolodner, 1993]. Hence, a case or episode may be defined as a particular, previously 
experienced situation, which has been captured and learned so that it can be reused to solve future 
problems. A case-base or memory of cases is the storage structure that holds cases. Case-based 
reasoning is supported by the evidence that people use case-based reasoning in their daily 
reasoning. It is rooted in works such as that of Schank [Schank, 1982] on dynamic memory and 
the central role that the remembering of earlier situations (episodes or cases) and situation patterns 
(scripts, MOPs) has in problem solving and learning, and Gentner [Gentner, 1983] on analogical 
reasoning. Apart from this, case-based reasoning is also based on other works within philosophy 
and psychology such as those of Tulving [Tulving, 1972] or Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, 1953] on 
theories of concept formation, problem solving and experiential learning, 
A new problem is solved by retrieving the most similar past case(s), reusing or adapting the 
information contained in this(these) case(s), revising or evaluating the solution based on reusing 
the previous case(s), and retaining or learning the new case by storing it in the existing case-base 
[Aamodt & Plaza, 1994; Kolodner, 1993]. Four main processes are therefore involved in the case-
based reasoning cycle: retrieval, reuse, revision and retention. Together with these processes, case 
representation constitutes the primary features of case-based reasoning. 
Case representation refers to the contents of a case, the structure of the case, and the 
organization and indexing of cases in memory so that an effective retrieval and reuse is 
guaranteed. The need to keep to a minimum the knowledge engineering effort required to 
construct case libraries, and the need for efficiency are the two main reasons to use simple case 
representations in some case-based reasoning systems. These simple case representations usually 
comprise two unstructured sets of attribute-value pairs or case features: the problem and the 
solution features [Gebhardt et al., 1997]. There is no description of the relationships or constraints 
between the features of a case. Moreover, these simple case representations are characterised by 
having a low number of indexed features [Watson & Perera, 1997]. The retrieval simply involves 
the standard nearest neighbour algorithm. 
However, the construction of case-based reasoning systems in complex real-world domains 
critically requires complex case representations. Case-based reasoning systems for these domains 
are usually characterised by having a large problem space. As described by Watson and Perera 
[Watson & Perera, 1997], and Leake [Leake, 1996], the larger the problem space is, the more 
likely the case coverage is lower, and so, the more likely the case matching is poorer. 
Consequently, the system may propose distant and less useful solutions, which will require more 
adaptive effort. 
Hierarchical-structured representations of cases [Macedo et al., 1996; Watson & Perera, 1997] 
aid overcoming the drawback of large problem space as they provide the implementation of the 
divide and conquer approach, offering the ability to treat subparts of cases as fully-fledged cases. 
This way they enable solving complex problems by re-composition of sub-solutions [Maher & 
Zhang, 1991]: a large problem (or a large goal) is divided into several smaller sub-problems 
(sub-goals), which can be independently solved using case-based reasoning. This means that the 
problem space may be broken into sub-problem spaces, each one having less features than the 
higher level problem space. The benefit of considering cases as a set of pieces, called snippets 
[Redmond, 1990], instead of monolithic entities, can improve the results of a case-based 
reasoning system in that solutions of problems may result from the contribution of multiple cases. 
Therefore, they make it possible to minimise the problems that appear when using parts of 
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multiple monolithic cases, particularly, the considerable effort taken to find the useful parts in 
them. 
Graph-structured case representations, comprising objects and relations among them, are a 
suitable approach to dealing with the complex case representation problem, since they permit the 
ability to express the relations between any two objects in a case, they permit the variation of the 
set of relations used in different cases, they permit the continuous addition of new relations to the 
set of relations used in a continuously updated case library, and they permit the implementation of 
both hierarchical and non-hierarchical case decomposition. Consequently, they provide a more 
flexible and higher expressive power than attribute-value representations. However, they have the 
problem of requiring complex retrieval mechanisms (e.g., a structure similarity is usually needed) 
that causes significant computational costs and a hard case acquisition task. This is the main 
reason why some case-based reasoning systems have used representations that fall between graph-
structured and unstructured representations. 
2.5.2 Planning under Uncertainty in Dynamic Environments: Probabilistic and 
Decision-Theoretic Planning 
Planning is defined as the process of finding a course of action which should be executed to 
achieve some goal. The so-called classical planning problem is usually defined by three aspects: 
description of the initial state of the world, description of the agent’s goal, and description of the 
set of actions that can be performed (domain theory). The initial state is usually specified by 
giving a list of facts that hold true in it, and the goal description is usually a logical sentence using 
a subset of the facts as terms. Actions are usually described in terms of preconditions and effects 
where the precondition of an operator is a logical sentence describing the states in which the 
operator can legally be applied, and the effects describe the changes that will be brought about in 
a state if the operator is applied. Following STRIPS [Fikes & Nilsson, 1971], the effects are 
usually represented as a list of facts to be deleted from the current state and a list of facts to be 
added. 
Until recently, classical planning has been ruled by a number of problematic simplifying 
assumptions, notably the following [Pollack & Horty, 1999]: 
• The planning agent is omniscient, i.e., it knows all the relevant facts about its 
environment; 
• The actions that the agent can perform have definite outcomes, i.e., they are 
deterministic; 
• The goals presented to the agent are categorical, i.e., they are either achieved or not and 
there is no notion of partial satisfaction; 
• The agent is the only source of change in the environment, i.e., there are neither 
exogenous events nor other agents; 
• The goals presented to the agent remain unchanged throughout the process of planning 
and execution; 
• The actions that the agent can perform have neither temporal extent nor fixed times of 
occurrence. 
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While these systems represent significant technical achievements, when we want to apply them 
to problems that occur in uncertain, dynamic environments such as the real world, we find that 
these assumptions they make can be severely limiting. Each one these assumptions leads the 
planner agent to ignore relevant aspects of most real world planning domains. In fact, the real 
world is characterized by the presence of uncertainty in different manners. Unfortunately, the real 
world is not crystal clear to agents. Agents almost never have access to the whole environment, 
mainly because of the incompleteness and incorrectness of their perceptual and understanding 
components. Actually, it is too much work to obtain all the information from a complex and 
dynamic world, and it is quite likely that the accessible information suffers distortions. Besides, 
the environment can change while the planner agent is deliberating, especially because other 
agents may be changing the world through exogenous events that are not completely known or 
predictable. Finally, the outcomes of actions taken in the domain may be nondeterministic, and 
finally the goals of the agent may change over time perhaps unpredictably. These sources of 
uncertainty make the planning task harder. So, in these domains where actions may have several 
outcomes, a plan may consequently also have different possible outcomes, or, more appropriately, 
there are actually different alternative courses of action, each one with a specific probability value 
of achieving the goals to a certain degree. Hence, some of those alternative outcomes may be 
more valuable than others. Especial techniques are required to evaluate them. The benefits of 
executing a plan must be weighed against the costs. They must balance the potential of some plan 
achieving a goal state against the risk of producing an undesirable state and against the cost of 
performing the plan. This is particularly useful to prevent the agent suffering the consequences of 
undesired states of the world that may be achieved by executing the plan. 
Decision theory [Luce & Raiffa, 1957] provides an attractive framework for weighing the 
strengths and weaknesses of a particular course of action. Resulting from the combination of 
utility theory and probability theory [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995; Shafer & Pearl, 1990], decision 
theory provides artificial agents with processes to make “right” decisions. It relies on the 
expected-utility maximization approach founded by von Neumann and Morgenstern [von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944] and extended by Savage [Savage, 1953]. It is presumed that for 
every decision-maker there exists some real-valued function u, defined on the relevant set X of 
outcomes x1,x2,…xn, such that if one available action a results in probabilities pi over the outcomes 
xi (for i=1,…,n) and another available action b results in probabilities qi over the same outcomes, 
then the decision-maker (strictly) prefers action a to action b if, and only if, the statistically 
expected value of this utility function u is greater under a than under b. Formally, the criterion for 
choosing a is thus ∑∑ >
i
ii
i
ii xuqxup )()( . 
Hence, the process is reduced to a problem of expectation formation and maximization. The 
decision-maker is thus assumed to behave as if he correctly assigned probabilities to relevant 
random events and chose an action that maximized the expected value of his resulting utility. 
However, decision theory is certainly not a framework to build a plan with high EU. It can just 
provide a way to evaluate plans, but not build them. So merging it with AI planning was required 
to accomplish the goal of planning under uncertainty. The result is a technique called 
decision-theoretic planning [Blythe, 1998, 1999a, 1999b]. Several decision-theoretic planning 
approaches have been proposed and used successfully, some based on the extension of classical 
planning and others on Markov-Decision Processes (see [Blythe, 1999a; Boutilier et al., 1995; 
Littman & Majercik, 1997] for a survey). Unsurprisingly, these approaches result from relaxing 
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some of the overly strong assumptions of the classical planning paradigm. Not all the approaches 
address relaxing all the assumptions. Several planning features had to be modified and others 
introduced as described as follows. 
In an uncertain world, high-utility plans created in advance may need to have some actions that 
are conditional on future observations. Planning agents must be able to make observations of their 
domain during execution in order to use conditional plans, removing the need to assume 
omniscience (first assumption) [Collins & Pryor, 1995; Peot & Smith, 1992]. 
In order to eliminate the assumption of deterministic actions (second assumption), it is 
necessary to represent uncertain actions. To do that, one has to represent various alternative 
outcomes and their probabilities, conditional on the state. Providing a richer representation of 
action inevitably makes the planning problem harder, and planners must use a representation that 
expresses the different outcomes as concisely as possible while still being fully expressive 
[Blythe, 1998; Haddawy & Doan, 1994; Kushmerick et al., 1994, 1995; Younes, 2003]. 
Some planners relax the binary measure of goal achievement (third assumption) to allow partial 
satisfaction of goals [Haddawy & Doan, 1994; Williamson & Hanks, 1994]. Besides this, one 
must compute or estimate the EU of a plan. For the degenerate case, this is simply the probability 
of success. 
The assumption of static environment (fourth and fifth assumptions) has been relaxed by using 
techniques that rely on folding exogenous changes into the predicted outcomes of actions [Blythe, 
1998; Hanks et al., 1996]. This is also the approach used in the Markov-Decision Process 
framework [Boutilier et al., 1995]. Another approach, often called reactive planning or plan 
execution systems [Firby, 1994] addresses run time system behaviour and relies on low level 
behaviours that are responsive to changes in the world. 
Particularly, the assumption of static goals has been relaxed in works on deliberation 
scheduling which involves techniques for deciding which goals to attend to and when [Dean & 
Boddy, 1988]. 
Finally, there has been recent work on developing planners that reason about rich temporal 
constraints [Bacchus & Kabanza, 1996] and hence do away with the sixth assumption. 
In short, in most of these probabilistic or decision-theoretic planning frameworks, actions are 
usually probabilistic conditional actions, preferences over the outcomes of the actions are 
expressed in terms of a utility function, and plans are evaluated in terms of their EU. The main 
goal is to find the plan or set of plans that maximizes an EU function [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995], 
i.e., to find the optimal plan. However, this might be a computationally complex task. It is usually 
not feasible to search the entire space of plans to find the MEU plan. Indeed, computing the EU of 
a single plan can be prohibitively expensive because the number of possible outcomes can grow 
very large. So, in order to avoid specifying the value of each possible outcome, compact ways for 
specifying utilities as well as actions have to be found, and the interaction between them has to be 
considered. These constitute the main issues and challenges that have to be confronted in order to 
create such probabilistic, decision-theoretic planners that are able to deal with uncertainty. 
2.5.3 HTN Planning 
In the context of planning, a task network is a collection of tasks that need to be carried out, 
together with constraints on the order in which tasks can be performed, the way variables are 
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instantiated, and what literals must be true before or after each task is performed. Task networks 
are clearly represented by a graph in which nodes represent tasks and edges represent ordering 
relations between tasks. 
HTN planning [Erol et al., 1994a, 1994b; Erol, Hendler, & Nau, 1995; Erol, Hendler, Nau et 
al., 1995] is a planning methodology that solves planning problems, specified by a set of tasks 
that need to be performed (the initial task network) in addition to an initial state like that of 
classical planning, by recursively decomposing high-level tasks into simpler subtasks until tasks 
that can be directly executed are reached (so-called primitive tasks). This means that, unlike in 
action-based (also called STRIPS-like) planning [Fikes & Nilsson, 1971], there are two main 
types of actions in HTN planning: primitive tasks (also called operators or primitive actions) and 
non-primitive tasks (also called compound, decomposable, or abstract tasks). Primitive tasks are 
atomic or non-decomposable tasks or concrete actions that can be executed directly by the 
planning agent. Non-primitive tasks cannot be executed directly, because they represent activities 
that may involve performing several other tasks. The description of a planning domain includes a 
set of operators similar to those of classical planning, and also a set of methods. These methods 
provided by the domain theory indicate how the non-primitive tasks are decomposed into 
subtasks. A method associates a non-primitive task a with a task network t. It states that one way 
to accomplish the non-primitive task a is to achieve all the tasks in the task network t without 
violating the constraints in t. For each non-primitive task there may be more than one method. 
Each method is associated with various constraints that limit the applicability of the method to 
certain conditions and define the relations between the subtasks of the method. Methods result 
from the structured planning knowledge available in a domain. For example, in a travel planning 
domain, we might have the knowledge that one can reach a destination by either “taking a plane” 
or by “taking a train”. We may also know that “taking a plane” in turn involves “making a 
reservation”, “buying a ticket”, “taking a cab to the airport”, “getting on the plane”, etc. In such a 
situation, we can consider “taking a plane” as a non-primitive task (which cannot be directly 
executed by the agent). This abstract task can then be reduced to a plan fragment consisting of 
other non-primitive or primitive tasks (in this case: “making a reservation”, “buying a ticket”, 
“going to the airport”, and “getting on the plane”). This way, if there are some high-level 
problems with the “taking a plane” action and other goals (e.g., there is not going to be enough 
money to take a plane as well as pay the rent), we can resolve them before we work on low level 
details such as getting to the airport. 
In summary, HTN planning takes a partial plan p containing tasks (it might include primitive 
tasks in addition to non-primitive tasks), picks an abstract task t, and for each method (reduction 
schema) that can be used to reduce t, a refinement of p is generated with t replaced by the 
subtasks of the method. This basic HTN planning procedure is outlined in the following steps 
(adapted from [Erol, Hendler, & Nau, 1995]): 
1. Input a planning problem p. 
2. If p contains only primitive tasks, then resolve the conflicts in p and return the result. If 
the conflicts cannot be resolved, return failure. 
3. Choose a non-primitive task t in p. 
4. Choose an expansion for t. 
5. Replace t with the expansion. 
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6. Use critics to find the interactions among the tasks in p, and suggest ways to handle 
them. 
7. Apply one of the ways suggested in step 6. 
8. Go to step 2. 
 
The task network resulting from the application of HTN planning to an initial task network 
exhibits a hierarchical configuration and hence it is called HTN. This HTN is therefore a set of 
tasks with temporal and hierarchical constraints between them. When the initial task network 
comprises a single root task, the resulting HTN has the structure of a tree. 
HTN planning is suitable for many real world planning domains since many planning decisions 
made in the real world are done in a hierarchical manner. Besides, reduction schemas (methods) 
are readily available in those domains. A number of HTN planning systems have been developed 
and applied to real world domains such as those described in [Clement et al., 2001; Dix et al., 
2001; Dix et al., 2002; Erol et al., 1994b; Ilghami et al., 2002; Lotem & Nau, 2000; Lotem et al., 
1999; Mukkamalla & Muñoz-Avila, 2002; Muñoz-Avila, Aha et al., 2000; Muñoz-Avila, Aha et 
al., 2001; Muñoz-Avila, Dix et al., 2000; Muñoz-Avila, Gupta et al., 2001; Nau et al., 2003; Nau 
et al., 2001; Tsuneto, 1999; Tsuneto et al., 1997; Xu & Munõz-Avila, 2003]. 
However, for many real-world applications, developing a collection of methods that completely 
models plan generation has been found to be unfeasible. There are several factors that limit the 
development of methods. In particular, domain experts find method representation, which 
includes variables, difficult to use. In addition, identifying and formulating suitable preconditions 
is also difficult. In order to overcome this limitation, [Muñoz-Avila, Aha et al., 2001] use a 
case-based HTN planning algorithm, in which cases are instances of methods. Learning 
hierarchical plans or HTNs is still rarely addressed by the machine learning community, although 
there are a few exceptions. Garland and colleagues [Garland et al., 2001] infer task models from 
annotated examples, i.e., through demonstration by a domain expert. [Ilghami et al., 2002] 
describe a planning system that learns the HTN methods incrementally under supervision of an 
expert. They present a general formal framework for learning HTN methods, and a supervised 
learning algorithm, named CaMeL, based on this formalism. van Lent and Laird [van Lent & 
Laird, 1999] used a learning-by-observation technique which involves extracting knowledge from 
observations of an expert performing a task and generalizes this knowledge into a hierarchy of 
rules. Xu and Muñoz [Xu & Munõz-Avila, 2003] use an algorithm that gathers and generalizes 
information on how domain experts solve HTN planning problems. 
Even though HTN planning is used more in practical applications, most studies in AI planning 
have been done in the action-based planning framework. However, HTN planning is provably 
more expressive than STRIPS-style planning [Erol, Hendler, & Nau, 1995]. There are a lot of 
differences between these two planning formalisms. The primary difference is in what they plan 
for, and how they plan for it. In STRIPS-style planning, the objective is to find a sequence of 
actions that will bring the world to a state that satisfies certain conditions or attainment goals. 
Planning proceeds by finding operators that have the desired effects, and by making the 
preconditions of those operators into sub-goals. In contrast, HTN planners search for plans that 
accomplish task networks, which can include things other than just attainment goals. Further, they 
plan via task decomposition and conflict resolution. 
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2.5.4 Creativity 
Creativity is a controversial, mysterious and somehow frightening subject matter. Very few dare 
to try to clearly explain the challenge of clarifying the creative phenomenon. Artists and scientists 
rarely know how their creative ideas come about. They usually ta1k about “flashes of insight”, 
“inspirational moments”, “sudden ideas that pop into their heads” and mention intuition and 
inspiration (like the Muses) as the unique explanation. Psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, 
etc. cannot tell us much more about it either. Although some progress has been achieved in the 
study of creativity, it still is a mystery, judging by the many contradictory and incomplete theories 
about it. Innumerable questions still do not have concrete, objective and consensual answers: 
What is creativity?, What is the nature of the creative process?, Is it fruit of inspiration or is it just 
like other ordinary processes?, Is it conscious or unconscious?, What are the properties that 
characterise a creative product?, How should creativity be evaluated?, etc. This is one of the 
reasons why so many people claim that there will never be a scientific theory of creativity. 
However, the course of creativity studies tells us that this is not so. In spite of these many 
unanswered questions, some progress has been made, judging by the considerable amount of 
theories, among which there are a few that generate consensus. 
In the literature, two main concepts are referred to as related to the act of creation: to bring into 
existence something original which did not exist before (the exnhilo definition); and to give an 
original form of existence to something that already exists. However, everybody seems to agree 
that no one can originate new things out of nothing. 
In spite of the diversity of opinions with respect to the nature of creativity, it is reasonable to 
consider that there are four main approaches to research as suggested by Mooney [Mooney, 1963] 
and Stein [Stein, 1969]. According to these authors, there are four different but interrelated 
approaches to creativity: the creative environment, i.e., the environment where the creation 
happens; the creative product, i.e., the product of creating; the creative process, i.e., the process of 
creating; and the creative person, i.e., the person who is creative. This idea of considering 
creativity as a four-part phenomenon has been generally accepted by the majority of the authors in 
the field (see for instance [Glover et al., 1989; Sternberg, 1988]). Nonetheless, the creative 
process and the creative product perspectives are the most addressed in the literature. When all of 
these approaches are considered, one is assuming that creativity is considered as an activity 
(process), as a product, as a feature of the personality and that happens in a place or context. 
These different four approaches are deeply connected and to some extent they complement each 
other. We will now focus on the creative product perspective, since this is the one which this 
thesis and particularly exploration of unknown environments is more related to. 
From the point of view of the product (one of the four main facets of creativity), surprise and 
related concepts such as unpredictability or unexpectedness have been pointed out as being 
relevant characteristics of a creative product, in addition to other commonly referred to features 
such as novelty, originality, interestingness and appropriateness (also defined as usefulness, 
aesthetic value, rightness, etc.) [Boden, 1992, 1995; Jackson & Messick, 1967; Koestler, 1964; 
Lubart, 1994; Macedo, 1998; MacKinnon, 1962; Moorman & Ram, 1994; Ritchie, 2001; 
Saunders & Gero, 2001]. Furthermore, Boden argued that there is a distinction between mere 
novelty and creativity [Boden, 1995]. In her opinion, that distinction resides in the fact that 
creative products are not only novel but also unpredictable, unexpected and therefore surprising. 
According to Boden, unpredictability is the essence of creativity: creative products amaze us, 
shock us and delight us mainly because they are unexpected or unpredictable. The nature of the 
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link between surprise and creativity is very strong. Surprise is usually considered as a property of 
a creative product, i.e., almost every creative product causes surprise, at least at the first time it is 
perceived. 
Schank and Cleary [Schank & Cleary, 1995], and Boden [Boden, 1992, 1994] distinguish two 
types of perspectives in the evaluation of a creative product: the individual and the society. They 
claim that, for example, in the case of an individual that discovers the Theory of Relativity today, 
without having heard about it previously, if the perspective is himself then he may be considered 
creative, but non creative if the perspective is the society. In this first case, the individual is 
p-creative, but not h-creative [Boden, 1992]. 
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Chapter 3 
The Exploration of Unknown Environments by Affective Agents 
xploration gathers information about the unknown. Exploration of unknown environments 
by artificial agents (usually mobile robots) has been an active research field in recent 
years. The exploration domains include planetary exploration (e.g., Mars or lunar 
exploration), the search for meteorites in Antarctica, volcano exploration, map-building of 
interiors, etc. The main advantage of using artificial agents in those domains instead of humans is 
that most of them are extreme environments making exploration a dangerous task for human 
agents. However, there is still much to be done, especially in dynamic environments such as those 
real environments mentioned above. Those real environments consist of objects. For example, 
office environments possess chairs, doors, garbage cans, etc., cities comprise different kinds of 
buildings (houses, offices, hospitals, churches, etc.), as well as other objects such as cars, etc. 
Many of these objects are non-stationary, that is, their locations may change over time. This 
observation has motivated research on a new generation of mapping algorithms, which represent 
environments as collections of objects. Moreover, the autonomy of agents still needs to be 
improved, as happens, for instance, in planetary exploration which is still too human dependent 
[Bresina et al., 1999; Washington et al., 1999]. The plans are determined by a human operator as 
well as the interesting points to visit and communicated to the robots. Besides, tele-operation is 
impractical at longer distances, and therefore some level of autonomous operation is necessary for 
planetary robots deployed beyond our moon. Several exploration techniques have been proposed 
and tested either in simulated and real, indoor and outdoor environments, using single or multiple 
agents. In human beings, exploration has been closely connected with motivation and emotion. 
This relationship between exploration and motivation has been defended for a long time in the 
realms of Psychology and Ethology. Therefore, a reasonable approach is to model artificial 
agent’s exploration on that of humans, i.e., in a human-like fashion by assigning artificial agents 
mentalistic qualities such as emotion and motivation, beliefs, intentions, and desires. In fact, there 
is one primary reason for taking the way humans explore the environment as a reference: the 
problem of modelling exploration in humans has already been successfully solved by millions of 
years of evolution. Yet, in general, a lot of barriers have been found to incorporating models of 
emotion in artificial agents. Research in AI has almost completely ignored this significant role of 
emotions in reasoning, and only recently was this issue taken seriously, mainly because of the 
recent advances in neuroscience, which have indicated that cognitive tasks of humans, and 
particularly planning and decision-making, are influenced by emotion [Adolphs et al., 1996; 
Bechara et al., 1997; Churchland, 1996; Damásio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996]. Since exploration is a 
decision-making process, these results further support the thesis which links exploration to 
emotion and motivation. 
In this chapter we describe an approach, based on affect, to the problem of exploring unknown 
environments by agents. We start by introducing AMAS, a multi-agent system based on the 
notion of affect and on ideas of the BDI model, that was used as a platform to develop the 
application for the exploration of unknown environments with affective agents. Primary relevance 
is given to the architecture of an affective agent. Although AMAS is presented from a generic 
perspective, illustrative examples are given for the particular case of the domain of the exploration 
E 
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of unknown environments throughout its description. Then, we present the exploration strategy. 
Finally, we illustrate this strategy with an example. 
3.1 A Multi-Agent System Composed of Affective Agents 
Throughout its history, software engineering has developed an increasingly powerful array of 
tools with which to tackle the complexity of software systems. The most significant 
improvements in software engineering have come about through the introduction of powerful 
abstractions with which to manage the inherent complexity of software such as object-oriented 
programming. However, object-orientation fails to provide an adequate set of concepts and 
mechanisms for modelling complex systems. For such systems, objects are insufficient means of 
abstraction. This explains the most recent addition to software engineering of the notion of the 
intelligent agent which, unlike an object, is a self-contained problem solving system capable of 
autonomous, reactive, pro-active, and social behaviour. Based on this abstraction tool of agent, 
agent-based computing (agent-oriented programming/agent-oriented software engineering/agent-
based systems) is a promising approach to developing a range of complex, usually distributed, 
software systems. Such complex software systems are appropriately developed as a collection of 
interacting, autonomous agents, i.e., as a multi-agent system. 
This section describes AMAS, a multi-agent system based on the notion of affect and the BDI 
model. The next subsection provides an overview of AMAS, paying especial attention to the 
specification of the multi-agent system. The subsequent section presents the kind of environment 
agents can inhabit. Finally, the architecture adopted for the agents of this agent-based tool is 
described. 
3.1.1 Overview of the Affect-based Multi-Agent System 
AMAS was developed to be used as a framework for building agent-based applications in general. 
However, AMAS is still only in a preliminary version. For now it is simply a prototype needing 
further improvements and experimental evaluation (see Section 6.2). The current version is 
suitable for applications in which the entities (agents) are distributed in a physical environment. 
This is the case of the domain of exploration of unknown environments, which is the only 
application developed with AMAS up to date. This application is described later in this chapter. 
Examples of other potential applications are air traffic control, and transportation logistics (UM 
Translog). To extend this platform to other kinds of applications, features such as the sensors have 
to be extended or adapted to the requirements of such applications. For now, we focus on the 
agent-based platform used to develop the application of exploration of unknown environments. 
As an agent-based system tool, AMAS requires the specification of the environment as well as 
of the agents that inhabit it. During this process it is supposed that developers describe the agents, 
namely their motivations, feelings, plans, goals, and actions, as well as the environment they 
inhabit, namely the objects and respective locations in it. The tools provided to specify the 
settings of the multi-agent system are still very rudimentary, lacking, for instance, a compiler. 
AMAS is prepared to deal with dynamic and uncertain environments. It is a homogeneous 
multi-agent system in the sense that all the agents are of the same type, sharing the same 
architecture, although converting it to a heterogeneous architecture seems to be a straightforward 
process. However, together with these agents, the environment can also be populated with objects. 
If we ultimately consider that these objects are a kind of inanimate agents, then in this case the 
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multi-agent system is heterogeneous. Agents possess mental attributes and they can autonomously 
make decisions, while objects do not. 
3.1.2 Environment 
As we mentioned previously, the current version of AMAS is particularly suitable for applications 
in which the entities (agents and objects) are distributed in a physical environment. Many 
common agent-based applications, such as air traffic control, air-combat modelling, traffic 
control, or even digital entertainment (games, cinema, etc.), possess features that suit this 
approach. We represent such environments as collections of physically distributed entities. In fact, 
real environments consist of entities. For example, office environments possess chairs, doors, 
garbage cans, etc., cities comprise different kinds of buildings (houses, offices, hospitals, 
churches, etc.), and other objects such as cars, etc., in air traffic control there are planes and 
airports, etc. Many of these entities are non-stationary, that is, their locations may change over 
time. This makes the environments they populate dynamic. 
In the particular case of exploration of unknown environments, any of such physical 
environments can be considered. Exploration is thus the process by which an agent that inhabits 
such environments can learn them by building models of the entities that populate it as well as 
their spatial distribution. At a minimum, such entity models would enable an agent (usually a 
robot) to track changes in the environment. For example, a cleaning robot entering an office at 
night might realize that a garbage can has moved from one location to another. It might do so 
without needing to learn a model of this garbage can from scratch, as would be necessary with 
common robot mapping techniques. Entity representations offer a second, important advantage, 
which is due to the fact that many of those environments possess large collections of entities of 
the same type. For example, most office chairs are instances of the same generic chair and 
therefore look alike, as do most doors, garbage cans, and so on. As these examples suggest, 
attributes of entities are shared by entire classes of entities, and understanding the nature of entity 
classes is of significant interest to mobile robotics. In particular, algorithms that learn properties 
of entity classes would be able to transfer learned parameters (e.g., appearance, motion 
parameters) from one entity to another in the same class. This would have a profound impact on 
the accuracy of entity models, and the speed at which such models can be acquired. If, for 
example, a cleaning robot enters a room it has never visited before, it might realize that a specific 
entity in the room possesses the same visual appearance of other entities seen in other rooms (e.g., 
chairs). The robot would then be able to acquire a map of this entity much faster. It would also 
enable the robot to predict properties of this newly seen entity, such as the fact that a chair is non-
stationary, without ever seeing this specific entity move. 
The simulation environment considered as a test bed to our approach to exploration comprises, 
therefore, a variety of entities located at specific positions. Figure 3-1 shows an illustrative sketch 
of an example of an environment where agents can act. In this case, the objects are confined to 
buildings. The structure of the buildings comprises the shape (triangular, rectangular, etc.) of the 
roof, facade, door and windows. The possible functions may be: house, church, hotel, hospital, 
etc. 
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Figure 3-1 – Illustrative sketch of an environment. 
3.1.3 Agent Architecture 
The architecture that we adopted for an agent (Figure 3-2) is based on the BDI approach [Bratman 
et al., 1988; A. Rao & Georgeff, 1995]. As in many other agent architectures, the architecture 
followed in our work includes the following modules: sensors, memory/beliefs (for entities, plans, 
and maps of the environment), basic desires (basic motivations/motives), goals, intentions, 
feelings, and reasoning. 
The key components that determine the agent’s behaviour are the kind of basic desires, 
feelings, goals and plans with which the agent is equipped. In our case of exploration, and 
according to the studies mentioned above, the agent is equipped in advance with the basic desires 
for minimal hunger, maximal information gain (reduce curiosity), and maximal surprise. Each one 
of these basic desire drives the agent to reduce or to maximize a particular feeling. The desire for 
minimal hunger, maximal information gain and maximal surprise directs the agent, respectively, 
to reduce the feeling of hunger, to reduce the feeling of curiosity (by maximizing information 
gain) and to maximize the feeling of surprise. It is important to note that the desire to reduce 
curiosity does not mean that the agent dislike curiosity. Instead, it means the agent desires 
selecting actions that maximize curiosity before performing them, because after executing them it 
is expected that they maximize information gain and therefore that they maximize the reduction of 
curiosity. The intensity of these feelings is, therefore, important to compute the degree of 
satisfaction of the basic desires. For the desires of minimal hunger and maximal surprise it is 
given by the expected intensities of the feelings of hunger and surprise, respectively, after 
performing an action, while for the desire of maximal information gain it is given by the intensity 
of the feeling of curiosity before performing the action (this is the expected information gain). 
The memory of agents is setup with goals and plans for visiting entities that populate the 
environment, regions of the environment and for going to places where the agent can recharge its 
battery. These are the goals and plans whose execution may lead to satisfy the basic desires with 
which the agent is equipped in advance for the purpose of exploration. 
The reasoning module is in the core of the architecture. It receives internal information (from 
memory) and environment information (through the sensors) and outputs an action that has been 
selected for execution. The process of action selection takes into account the states of the 
environment the agent would like to happen (desires), i.e., it selects an action that leads to those 
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states of the environment the agent prefers. This preference is implicitly represented in a 
mathematical function that evaluates states of the world in terms of the degree to which the basic 
desires are satisfied in them. Thus, this function obeys the MEU principle [S. Russell & Norvig, 
1995]. In this case, the utility is the satisfaction of the basic desires which is measurable by the 
intensity of the feelings. These intensities are computed by the feeling module, taking into account 
both the past experience (the information stored in memory) and the present environment 
description provided by the sensors. The following subsections describe in more detail the main 
modules of the architecture (the modules of feelings and basic desires are described in a unique 
section; this also happens with goals and intentions). 
 
 
Figure 3-2 – Architecture of an agent. 
3.1.3.1 Sensors 
The perceptual system of the agent comprises two simulated sensors: an optic sensor and an 
infrared/sonar sensor. The infrared/sonar sensor provides the distance of the entities and hence 
also the location of the entities. The optic sensor provides the visible part of the physical structure 
(visual description) of the entities. Entities out of the visual range are not visible by the agent. 
Thus, the optic sensor may provide incomplete information of the entities in the visual range. For 
the sake of simplicity, this is confined to features such as the shape or colour of the visible part of 
Memory for entities 
Generation and 
Ranking of Goals by 
EU 
 
Sensors
Memory for plans 
Memory 
Hunger 
Feelings 
Computation of 
current world state 
Generation and 
Ranking of Plans by 
EU 
Select and execute 
current goal task 
(intention) of the MEU 
plan 
Reasoning 
Minimal hunger 
Maximal information gain / 
minimal curiosity 
Maximal surprise 
Map
Intentions
Goals
Environm
ent
Surprise 
Curiosity 
Basic desires 
108                             Chapter 3. The Exploration of Unknown Environments by Affective Agents 
 
the structure (notice that the function of the entity is not accessible or can not be inferred from 
visual information unless the agent is at the same place of the entity) (see Figure 3-5 for an 
illustrative example of how this information is represented). As we will explain below, based on 
this partial information and on cases of entities stored in memory, the agent is able to estimate the 
complete entity, i.e., it generates assumptions or expectations for both the physical structure and 
the function of the entity. The estimated physical structure is represented by a three-dimensional 
matrix whose cells are set to values that express the probability of being occupied by the entity. 
The function is in fact a probabilistic distribution over the possible functions. 
3.1.3.2 Memory 
The memory of an agent stores information about the world. This information includes the 
configuration of the surrounding world, such as the position of the entities (objects and other 
animated agents) that inhabit it, the description of these entities themselves, descriptions of the 
sequences of actions (plans) executed by those entities and resulting from their interaction, and, in 
general, beliefs about the world. This information is stored in several memory components. Thus, 
there is a (grid-based) metric map [Thrun, 2002a] to spatially model the surrounding physical 
environment of the agent. Descriptions of entities (physical structure and function) and plans are 
stored both in the episodic memory and in the semantic memory [Tulving, 1972]. We will now 
describe in more detail each one of these distinct components. 
 The metric map 
In our approach, a grid-based metric map (occupancy grid) of the world is a three-dimensional 
grid in which each cell contains the information of the set of entities that may alternatively occupy 
the cell and the probability of this occupancy. This variant of occupancy grid is, for this reason, 
called entity map. Thus, each cell c=<x,y,z> of the metric map of an agent is set to a set of nc+1 
pairs zyx ,,φ ={< 1p , 1E >, < 2p , 2E >, ..., < cnp , cnE >, < 1+cnp ,0>}, where jE  is the identifier of the 
jth entity that may occupy the cell <x,y,z> of the metric map of the agent with probability jp  ∈ 
[0,1], and such that ∑+
=
=
1
1
1
cn
j
jp . Note that the pair < 1+cnp ,0> is included in order to express the 
probability of the cell being empty (for the sake of representation, an empty cell is actually 
occupied by an entity with identifier 0). Cells that are completely unknown, i.e., for which there 
are not yet any assumptions/expectations about their occupancy, are set to a set of two pairs 
zyx ,,φ ={<0.5,+∞>,<0.5,0>}. This expresses the idea that there is a total uncertainty about whether 
it is empty (denoted by the identifier 0) or occupied by some entity (denoted by the identifier +∞). 
The uniform distribution of these two states leads to a maximal entropy. Note also that each entity 
may occupy more than a single cell, i.e., there might be several adjacent cells with the same jE . 
Figure 3-3 presents an example of an entity metric map. Although metric maps are 
three-dimensional, for the sake of simplicity, it is represented here only in two dimensions. Only 
the cells <x,y,0> are represented, with x and y = 0, 1, …, 19. For the same reason the identifier of 
the entities in the cells is omitted. For instance, the cell <7,14,0> contains the following two pairs 
0,14,7φ ={<0.6,4>,<0.4,0>}, which means it might be occupied by entity 4 with a probability of 0.6, 
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or by no entity (denoted here by entity 0) with a probability of 0.4. Figure 3-4 presents the 
histogram of this cell. 
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Figure 3-3 – An example of a metric map. 
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Figure 3-4 – Example of the histogram of a cell. 
 Memory of entities 
The set of descriptions of entities perceived from the environment are stored in the episodic 
memory of entities (Figure 3-5). Each one of these descriptions is of the form <ID,PS,F>, where 
ID is a number that uniquely identifies the entity in the environment, PS is the physical structure, 
and F is the function of the entity [Goel, 1992]. The sensors may provide incomplete information 
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about an entity (for instance, only part of the physical structure may be seen or the function of the 
entity may be undetermined). In this case the missing information is filled in by making use of 
Bayes’ rule [Shafer & Pearl, 1990], i.e., the missing information is estimated by taking into 
account the available information and descriptions of other entities previously perceived and 
already stored in the episodic memory of entities. This means some of the descriptions of entities 
stored in memory are uncertain or not completely known (e.g., element 4 of Figure 3-5). 
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Figure 3-5 – Example of the episodic memory of entities2. 
The physical structure of an entity may be described analogically or propositionally [Eysenck 
& Keane, 1991; McNamara et al., 1992; Rumelhardt & Norman, 1985; Stillings et al., 1989]. The 
analogical representation reflects directly the real physical structure while the propositional 
representation is a higher level description (using propositions) of that real structure (see Figure 
3-5). 
                                                     
2 Although the matrix of the analogical description is three-dimensional, for the sake of simplicity, it is represented here 
as a two-dimensional matrix corresponding to the upper view of the entity. 
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The analogical description of the physical structure of an entity is a tuple <M,RG,AG,AO>, 
where: M is the physical structure itself of the entity, which is represented in a three-dimensional 
matrix (the entity reference system – a sub-matrix of the three-dimensional matrix of the 
environment – such that each cell is set to a value that expresses the probability of being occupied 
by the entity; RG represents the coordinates of the centre-of-mass of the entity in the 
three-dimensional entity reference system; AG represents the coordinates of the centre-of-mass of 
the entity in the three-dimensional environment reference system; and, AO represents the 
coordinates of the origin of the entity reference system (origin of the three-dimensional matrix of 
the entity) in the environment reference system. 
The propositional description of the physical structure of an entity relies on the representation 
through semantic features or attributes much like in semantic networks [Quillian, 1966] or 
schemas [Rumelhardt, 1980; Rumelhardt & Ortony, 1977; Schank & Abelson, 1977]. Entities are 
described by a set of attribute-value pairs that can be represented in a graph-based way [Macedo 
& Cardoso, 1998]. 
The function is simply a description of the role or category of the entity in the environment 
(e.g., house, car, plane, tree, etc.). Like the description of the physical structure, this may be 
probabilistic because of the incompleteness of perception. This means, this is a set F = 
{<functioni,probi>: i=1,2, …, n, where n is the number of possible functions and P(“function” = 
functioni) = probi}. 
Concrete entities (i.e., entities represented in the episodic memory) with similar features may be 
generalized or abstracted into a single one, an abstract entity, which is stored in the semantic 
memory for entities. Figure 3-6 shows a semantic memory obtained from the episodic memory of 
entities shown in Figure 3-5. 
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Figure 3-6 – Example of a semantic memory of entities. 
 Memory of plans 
Within our approach we may distinguish two main kinds of plans: concrete plans (stored in the 
episodic memory of plans), i.e., cases of plans, and abstract plans (stored in the semantic memory 
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of plans) (for more details about abstraction in case-based reasoning, see for instance [Bergmann 
& Wilke, 1996]). Concrete plans and abstract plans are interrelated since concrete plans are 
instances of abstract plans and these are built from concrete plans. Since the concept of abstract 
plan subsumes the concept of concrete plan, let us first describe the representation issues related 
with abstract plans and then present the main differences between concrete plans and abstract 
plans. 
We represent abstract plans as a hierarchy of tasks (a variant of HTNs – e.g., [Erol et al., 
1994b; Nau et al., 2001]) (see Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8). Formally, an abstract plan is a tuple AP 
= <T, L>, where T is the set of tasks and L is the set of links. More precisely, we represent an 
abstract plan by a hierarchical graph-structured representation comprising tasks (represented by 
the nodes) and links (represented by the edges). We adopted the adjacency matrix approach to 
represent these graphs [Macedo & Cardoso, 1998]. The links may be of a hierarchical (abstraction 
or decomposition), temporal, utility-ranking, or adaptational kind. This structure has the form of a 
planning tree [Lotem & Nau, 2000], i.e., it is a kind of AND/OR tree that expresses all the 
possible ways to decompose an initial task network. Like in regular HTNs, this hierarchical 
structure of a plan comprises primitive tasks or actions (non-decomposable tasks) and 
non-primitive tasks (decomposable or compound tasks). Primitive tasks correspond to the leaves 
of the tree and are directly executed by the agent, while compound tasks denote desired changes 
that involve several subtasks to accomplish them. For instance, the leaf node PTRANS of Figure 
3-7 is a primitive task, while visitEntity is a compound task. The decomposition of a compound 
task into a sequence of subtasks is represented by linking the compound task to each subtask by a 
hierarchical link of the type “decomposition” (denoted by dcmp). This corresponds to an AND 
structure. In addition, a hierarchical plan may also include especial tasks in order to express 
situations when a decomposable task has at least two alternative decompositions. Thus, these 
especial tasks are tasks whose subtasks are heads of those alternative decompositions. We called 
those especial decomposable tasks abstract tasks because they may be instantiated by one of their 
alternative subtasks. Thus, they are a kind of abstraction of their alternative instances. Notice that 
the subtasks of an abstract task may themselves be abstract tasks. This decomposition of abstract 
tasks into several alternative instances is expressed by linking the abstract task to each subtask by 
a hierarchical link of the type “abstract” (denoted by abst). This corresponds to an OR structure. 
The abstract plans of the exploration domain do not contain this kind of task because the 
compound tasks always have the same decomposition: visitEntity is always decomposed into 
moveTo and analyze. Thus, this is better illustrated in the logistic domain. In this domain, the root 
task transport of Figure 3-8 is an example of an abstract task. As we said, in addition to 
hierarchical links that express AND or OR decomposition (dcmp and abst), there are also 
temporal, utility-ranking, and adaptational links between tasks. Temporal links are just like in 
regular HTNs. We followed the temporal model introduced by [Allen, 1983]. Thus, links such as 
after, before, during, overlap, etc., may be found between tasks of an abstract plan. 
Utility-ranking links (denoted by more_useful) are used between subtasks of abstract tasks in 
order to express a relation of order with respect to their EU, i.e., the head tasks of the alternative 
decompositions of a given abstract task are ranked according to the EU of their decompositions. 
Adaptation links [Kolodner, 1993] are useful to generate an abstract plan from several cases of 
plans. They explain how tasks and their components are related in a plan and therefore they 
explain how to adapt portions of cases of plans when they are reused to construct an abstract plan. 
For instance, the link eslel (start location equal to end location) means that the start location of 
the agent when ATTEND takes place is equal to the end location of the agent after PTRANS is 
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executed. Notice that any primitive task corresponds to a primitive act [Schank, 1972; Schank & 
Abelson, 1977]. Hence, for instance, PTRANS corresponds to a physical transfer from one 
location to another. 
 
Figure 3-7 – Example of an exploration plan. 
 
transport
transport transport
inCityDel airDel inCityDel inCityDel
flyAirplaneloadAirplaneinCityDel inCityDel
doNothing driveTruck loadTruck driveTruck unloadTruck
. . .
.
.
.
. . .
after
more_useful
eelsl
 
Figure 3-8 - Example of an abstract plan from the logistic domain3. 
 
A task T is both conditional and probabilistic (e.g., [Blythe, 1999a; Haddawy & Doan, 1994; 
Younes, 2003]). This means each primitive task has a set of conditions C={c1, c2, ..., cm} and for 
each one of these mutually exclusive and exhaustive conditions, ci, there is a set of alternative 
effects εi={< ip1 , iE1 >, < ip2 , iE2 >, ..., < inip ,
i
niE >}, where 
i
jE  is the j
th effect triggered with 
                                                     
3 Primitive tasks are represented by thick ellipses while non-primitive tasks are represented by thin ellipses. Dashed 
arrows represent abst links, while thin arrows represent dcmp links. 
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probability ijp  ∈ [0,1] by condition ci (i.e., ijiij pcEP =)|( ), and such that ∑
=
=
in
j
i
jp
1
1. Figure 3-9 
presents the generic structure of a task. The probabilities of conditions are represented in that 
structure although we assume that conditions are independent of tasks, i.e., P(ci|T)=P(ci). The 
main reason for this is to emphasize that the EU of a task, in addition to the probability of effects, 
depends on the probability of conditions too. In addition to conditions and effects, a task has other 
information components. Formally, a task (primitive or not) may be defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1. A task is a tuple <PS, ID, TT, AID, DO, IO, ST, ET, SL, EL, PR, A, EP, EU, P>, 
where: 
• PS is the set of preconditions that should be satisfied so that the task can be executed; 
• ID is the task’s identifier, i.e., an integer that uniquely identifies the task in a plan; 
• TT is the task category (e.g., driveTruck, transport); 
• AID is the identifier of the agent that is responsible for the execution of the task4; 
• DO is the direct object of the task, i.e., the identifier of the entity that was subjected to 
the task directly (e.g., for a task of type “driveTruck”, the direct object is the object – 
its identifier – to be driven; for a task of type “transport”, the direct object is the entity 
that is transported – for instance, a package); 
• IO is the indirect object of the task, i.e., the answer to the question “To whom?” (e.g., 
for a task of type “give”, the indirect object is the entity that receives the entity (the 
direct object) that is given – for instance, the person who receives the money); 
• ST is the scheduled start time of the task; 
• ET is the scheduled end time of the task, 
• SL is the start location of the agent that is responsible for executing the task; 
• EL is the end location of the agent that is responsible for executiing the task; 
• PR is a Boolean value that is true when the task is primitive; 
• A is a Boolean value that is true when the task is abstract (for primitive tasks it is 
always false); 
• EP is the set of alternative probabilistic conditional effects of the task, i.e., EP = 
{<ci,εi>: 1=< i <=m}; 
• EU is the EU of the task; 
• P is the probability of the task (this has always the value 1 for every task except the 
heads of alternative decompositions of an abstract task as will be explained below). 
 
                                                     
4 Notice that our planning formalism is suitable for multi-agent planning, i.e., the structure of the plans allows them to 
be built so they may be executed by a team of agents. 
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Figure 3-10 shows examples of tasks from the domain of exploration of unknown 
environments. In the case of PTRANS, since we assume no errors in navigation (including no 
odometric errors), there is only one possible effect: the arrival to the destination. However, in the 
case of ATTEND, there are two conditions: the agent is at an empty cell or the agent is at a 
neighbouring cell of an entity. This uncertainty happens because in a dynamic environment the 
entities that populate it may change their position frequently. Hence, when the agent moves to an 
object it may fail to be closer to it because the destination entity might also have moved. In this 
case, the agent “ATTENDs” to a cell. The probability of this outcome is computed based on their 
frequency of occurrence. In the example presented in the figure this is 1% of the times. These and 
other kinds of uncertainty may be taken into account in the representation of tasks. Another 
example that better illustrates the potential of this formalism for representing probabilistic tasks is 
the task from the logistic domain presented in Figure 3-11. In this case, there are two conditions, 
wetRoad and dryRoad, and therefore two conditional effects. The wetRoad condition may give 
rise to two effects, while the dryRoad condition always leads to the same effect. 
Although non-primitive tasks are not directly executed by an agent, they are represented like 
primitive tasks. Therefore, some of the components are meaningful only for primitive tasks. 
However, others, such as the set of alternative probabilistic conditional effects, are essential for 
the ranking of the alternative decompositions of the abstract tasks in terms of the EU. That is why 
the set of conditional probabilistic effects and other meaningful properties are propagated upward 
through the hierarchy from the primitive tasks to the non-primitive tasks (this propagation will be 
explained below). 
Each effect (see Figure 3-10 and Figure 3-11) comprises a few components of different kinds 
such as temporal, emotional, etc. These components may be of two kinds: non-procedural and 
procedural. The non-procedural component refers to the data collected from previous occurrences 
of the effect (it contains the duration of the task, the emotions and respective intensities felt by the 
agent, the fuel consumed, etc., in previous executions of the task as stored in cases of plans). The 
procedural component refers to the process through which the temporal, emotional and other 
kinds of data may be computed (it contains descriptions or rules of how to compute the 
components). In the current version of AMAS only the procedural component is used. 
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Figure 3-9 - Schematic representation of a generic task in an abstract plan. 
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Figure 3-10 - Schematic representation of tasks in an abstract plan of the exploration 
domain. 
 
Formally, an effect may be defined as follows. 
Definition 2. An effect is a tuple <ID, EC, EU, P, NPC, PC>, where: 
• ID is the identifier of the effect, i.e., an integer value that uniquely identifies the effect 
in the list of effects of the task; 
• EC is the effect category to which it belongs (like tasks, effects are classified into 
categories); 
• EU is the utility value (EU value for the case of tasks in abstract plans) of the effect; 
• P is the probability value of the effect, i.e., the relative frequency of the effect (this 
gives us the number of times the effect occurred given that the task and the condition 
that triggers it occurred); 
• NPC is the non-procedural component; 
• PC is the procedural component. 
PS: agtAt(SL) 
ID: 1 
TT: PTRANS 
AID: 1 
DO: 1 
IO: ∅ 
ST: 0 
ET: ST + ∆Time 
SL: 0,0,1 
EL: 0,0,7 
PR: true 
A: false 
EU: EU1 
P: 1 
agtAt(SL) 1 
PS: agtAt(0,0,7) 
ID:1 
TT: ATTEND 
AID: 1 
DO: 8 
IO: ∅ 
ST: 10 
ET: 11 
SL: 0,0,7 
EL: 0,0,7 
PR: true 
A: false 
EU: 0.99xEU1+0.01xEU2 
P: 1 
ID: 1 
EC: ATTENDEffect 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATTEND(Ent8) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EU1: Surprise(Ent8)+Curiosity(Ent8)-
Hunger(cell<0,0,7>) 
0.99 
agtAtEnt 
ID: 2 
EC: ATTENDEffect 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATTEND(cell<0,0,7>) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EU2: -Hunger(cell<0,0,7>)+ Curiosity(cell<0,0,7>) 
agtAtCell 
0.01 
ID: 1 
EC: PTRANSEffect 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dist=EL-SL 
∆Fuel=StartFuel-(c x Dist) 
Fuel=StartFuel - ∆Fuel 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EU1: -Hunger=C-∆Fuel 
1 
1 
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Figure 3-11 - Schematic representation of a task in an abstract plan of the logistic domain. 
 
Cases of plans (i.e., concrete plans) share most of the features of abstract plans because they are 
also represented hierarchically. The major differences are: unlike abstract plans, cases of plans do 
not have OR structures and consequently do not have abstract tasks; the primitive tasks have a 
probability of 1.0 (otherwise they will not belong to the case) and can only have a conditional 
effect since the conditions are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Notice that, although a 
non-primitive task of a case of a plan may exhibit an effect, this is not relevant, since in the real 
world only the primitive tasks are executed. However, the way a non-primitive task was 
decomposed is of primary importance for the generation of abstract plans, as will be explained in 
the following section. In the domain of exploration, cases of plans are structurally identical to 
abstract plans, since, as mentioned above, the compound tasks are always decomposed in the 
same manner. However in other domains, such as in the logistic domain, this might not happen. 
wetRoad 
0.18 
PS:truckAt(SL) 
ID: 1 
TT: driveTruck 
AID: 1 
DO: truck1 
IO: ∅ 
ST: 0 
ET: 20 
SL: 0,0,1 
EL: 0,0,7 
PR: true 
A: false 
EU: 0.7 
P: 1.0 
0.82 
dryRoad 
NPC: 
∆time=20; 
∆fuel=-10; 
truckAt(EL) 
aver_vel=90 
happiness=0.5;surprise=0 
------------------------------------- 
Dist=EL-SL 
∆time=vel x Dist 
∆Fuel=StartFuel-(c x Dist) 
Fuel=StartFuel - ∆Fuel 
truckAt(EL) 
0.75 
NPC: 
∆time=30; 
∆fuel=-20; 
truckAt(Other Location) 
aver_vel=60 
anger=0.7 
------------------------------------- 
Dist=Other Location-SL 
∆time=vel x Dist 
∆Fuel=StartFuel-(c x Dist) 
Fuel=StartFuel - ∆Fuel 
truckAt(Other Location) 
0.25 
NPC: 
∆time=15; 
∆fuel=-7; 
truckAt(EL) 
aver_vel=90 
happiness=0.8 
------------------------------------- 
Dist=EL-SL 
∆time=vel x Dist 
∆Fuel=StartFuel-(c x Dist) 
Fuel=StartFuel - ∆Fuel 
truckAt(EL) 
1.0 
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Figure 3-12 shows an example of two cases of plans from the logistic domain, which are instances 
of the abstract plan presented in Figure 3-8. Figure 3-13 represents the schematic representation of 
a primitive task of a concrete plan, while Figure 3-14 and Figure 3-15 describe examples of 
primitive tasks from the domains of exploration and logistic, respectively. 
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Figure 3-12 - Example of a case-base with two concrete plans of the logistic domain. 
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Figure 3-13 - Schematic representation of a generic primitive task in a concrete plan. 
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Figure 3-14 - Schematic representation of a primitive task in a concrete plan of the 
exploration domain. 
 
 
Figure 3-15 - Schematic representation of a primitive task in a concrete plan of the logistic 
domain. 
 
wetRoad 
PS:truckAt(SL) 
ID: 1 
TT: driveTruck 
AID: 1 
DO: truck1 
IO: ∅ 
ST: 0 
ET: 20 
SL: 0,0,1 
EL: 0,0,7 
PR: true 
A: false 
EU: 0.7 
P: 1.0 
NPC: 
∆time=20; 
∆fuel=-10; 
truckAt(EL) 
aver_vel=90 
happiness=0.5;surprise=0 
------------------------------------- 
Dist=EL-SL 
∆time=vel x Dist 
∆Fuel=StartFuel-(c x Dist) 
Fuel=StartFuel - ∆Fuel 
truckAt(EL) 
PS: agtAt(SL) 
ID: 1 
TT: PTRANS 
AID: 1 
DO: 1 
IO: ∅ 
ST: 0 
ET: ST + ∆Time 
SL: 0,0,1 
EL: 0,0,7 
PR: true 
A: false 
EU: EU1 
P: 1 
ID: 1 
EC: PTRANSEffect 
--------------------------------------------- 
Dist=EL-SL 
∆Time=vel x Dist 
∆Fuel=StartFuel-(c x Dist) 
Fuel=StartFuel - ∆Fuel 
--------------------------------------------- 
EU1: -Hunger= C-∆Fuel 
agtAt(SL) 1 
PS: agtAt(0,0,7) 
ID:1 
TT: ATTEND 
AID: 1 
DO: 8 
IC: ∅ 
ST: 10 
ET: 11 
SL: 0,0,7 
EL: 0,0,7 
P: true 
A: false 
EU: EU2 
P: 1 
1 agtAt(SL) 
ID: 1 
EC: ATTENDEffect 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATTEND(Ent8) 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
EU2: Surprise(Ent8)+Curiosity(Ent8)-
Hunger(cell<0,0,7>) 
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3.1.3.3 Basic Desires and Feelings 
Following the pluralist view of motivation [Havercamp & Reiss, 2003; McDougall, 1908; Reiss, 
2000; Schwartz, 1992; B. Weiner, 1980], the module of basic desires (basic motivations/motives) 
contains a set of basic desires that drive the behaviour of the agent. Taking into account the 
studies about the motivations of exploratory behaviour described in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we 
considered the following basic desires: the desires for minimal hunger, maximal information gain 
(reduce curiosity), and maximal surprise. The desire for minimal hunger and for maximal 
information gain (reduce curiosity) are among the sixteen basic desires proposed by Reiss [Reiss, 
2000]. These basic desires are represented in a mathematical function that evaluates states of the 
environment in terms of the positive and negative relevance for the basic desires. This function 
obeys the MEU principle [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995] (see Section 3.1.3.5 - Generation and 
Management of the Agent’s Goals). This Utility Function is a combination of the Utility 
Functions of each desire. It represents, in our case, the aversion against hunger and the like of 
surprise and information gain. To satisfy the basic desires of minimal hunger, maximal 
information gain and maximal surprise, in the case of exploration, the agent desires to visit 
previously unvisited entities, regions of the environment and places where it can recharge its 
battery (e.g., visitEntity(y), visitLoc(x), rechargeBattery()) (see Section 3.1.3.5 - Generation and 
Management of the Agent’s Goals). These goals are automatically generated by the agent by 
adapting past goals to new situations giving rise to new goals which are then ranked according to 
its preference (utility) and then taken as intentions once a plan is generated for them. The reason 
for trying to achieve a goal might be because that achievement corresponds to a state of the 
environment that makes it satisfy one or several basic desires. 
Each one of these basic desire drives the agent to reduce or to maximize a particular feeling. 
The desire for minimal hunger, maximal information gain and maximal surprise directs the agent, 
respectively, to reduce the feeling of hunger, to reduce the feeling of curiosity (by maximizing 
information gain) and to maximize the feeling of surprise. It is important to note that the desire to 
reduce curiosity does not mean that the agent dislike curiosity. Instead, it means the agent desires 
selecting actions that maximize curiosity before performing them, because after executing them it 
is expected that they maximize information gain and therefore that they maximize the reduction of 
curiosity. The intensity of these feelings is, therefore, important to compute the degree of 
satisfaction of the basic desires. For the desires of minimal hunger and maximal surprise it is 
given by the expected intensities of the feelings of hunger and surprise, respectively, after 
performing an action, while for the desire of maximal information gain it is given by the intensity 
of the feeling of curiosity before performing the action (this is the expected information gain). 
The intensity of these feelings is the output of the module of feelings based on the information 
about a state of the environment. Following Clore [Clore, 1992], we include in this module 
affective, cognitive, and bodily feelings. The latter two categories are merged to form the category 
of non-affective feelings. This means that this module is much broader than a module of emotion 
that could be considered.  Feelings are of primary relevance to influence the behaviour of an 
agent, because computing their intensity the agent measures the degree to which the basic desires 
are fulfilled. In this thesis, this module is confined to the feelings that are related with some 
variables that are directly involved in exploratory behaviour (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4): surprise 
(elicited by unexpectedness), curiosity (elicited by novelty and uncertainty), and hunger (reflects 
the need for an energy source). The next subsections describe in detail the models adopted for 
these feelings. 
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 Surprise 
Our model of surprise is mainly based on Ortony and Partridge’s proposals [Ortony & Partridge, 
1987] and on Meyer, Reisenzein, and Schützwohl’s model [Meyer et al., 1997; Reisenzein, 2000a, 
2000b, 2001]. We will now give an overview of these models and then explain our computational 
model by comparing it with these two models. 
 Background Models 
Although Ortony and Partridge agree with Meyer, Reisenzein, and Schützwohl (and also with 
other authors) that surprise is caused by events that are commonsensically called unexpected, they 
proposed that unexpectedness covers two cases. First, surprise results when prior expectations 
regarding an event are disconfirmed, i.e., surprise sometimes results from expectation failure. 
Second, however, surprise can also be caused by events for which expectations were never 
computed. That is, according to Ortony and Partridge, there are situations in which one is 
surprised although one had no explicit expectations (either conscious or unconscious) regarding 
the surprising event. Ortony and Partridge also proposed that surprisingness is an important 
variable in artificial intelligence systems, particularly in attention and learning. 
In more detail, Ortony and Partridge’s model of surprise assumes a system (or agent) with an 
episodic and semantic propositional memory whose elements may be immutable (propositions 
that are believed to be always true) or typical (propositions that are believed to be usually, but not 
always true).The system receives an input proposition which activates some elements of that 
memory. 
Furthermore they distinguish between practically deducible propositions and practically 
non-deducible propositions. Practically deducible propositions comprise the propositions that are 
explicitly represented in memory, as well as those that can be inferred from them by a few simple 
deductions. Hence, practically deducible propositions are that subset of formally deducible 
propositions that do not require many complex inferences. Furthermore, practically deducible 
propositions may be actively or passively deduced in a particular context. In the former case, their 
content corresponds to actively expected or predicted events; in the latter case, to passively 
expected (assumed) events. 
Based on these assumptions, Ortony and Partridge propose that surprise results when the 
system encounters a conflict or inconsistency between an input proposition and pre-existing 
representations or representations computed “after the fact”. More precisely, surprise results in 
three situations (Table 3-1 presents the correspondent range of values): (i) active expectation 
failure: here, surprise results from a conflict or inconsistency between the input proposition and 
an active prediction or expectation; (ii) passive expectation failure (or assumption failure): here, 
surprise results from a conflict or inconsistency between the input proposition and what the agent 
implicitly knows or believes (passive expectations or assumptions); and (iii) unanticipated 
incongruities or deviations from norms: here, surprise results from a conflict or inconsistency 
between the input proposition (which in this case is a practically non-deducible proposition) and 
what, after the fact, may be judged to be normal or usual (cf. [Kahneman & Miller, 1986]), that is, 
between the input proposition and practically deducible propositions (immutable or typical) that 
are suggested by the unexpected fact. Note that, in this case, prior to the unexpected event there 
are no explicit expectations (passive or active) with which the input proposition could conflict. 
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Table 3-1 - Three different sources of surprise and corresponding value ranges (adapted 
from [Ortony & Partridge, 1987]). 
Related Cognition Confronted proposition 
Active Passive 
Immutable [1]; SA=1; Prediction [2]; SP=1; Assumption 
Typical [3]; 0< SA<1; Prediction [4]; SP<SA; Assumption 
Immutable [5]; ∅ [6]; SP=1; none 
Typical [7]; ∅ [8]; 0< SP<1; none 
 
In their cognitive-psycho-evolutionary model, Meyer, Reisenzein, and Schützwohl also assume 
that surprise (considered by them as an emotion) is elicited by the appraisal of unexpectedness. 
More precisely, it is proposed that surprise-eliciting events give rise to the following series of 
mental processes: (i) the appraisal of a cognized event as exceeding some threshold value of 
unexpectedness (schema-discrepancy) – according to Reisenzein [Reisenzein, 2001], this is 
achieved by a specialized comparator mechanism, the unexpectedness function, that computes the 
degree of discrepancy between “new” and “old” beliefs or schemas; (ii) interruption of ongoing 
information processing and reallocation of processing resources to the investigation of the 
unexpected event; (iii) analysis/evaluation of that event; and (iv) possibly, immediate reactions to 
that event and/or updating or revision of the “old” schemas or beliefs. 
 Computational Model of Surprise 
The computational model of surprise incorporated in an agent [Macedo & Cardoso, 2001a; 
Macedo et al., 2004] is an adaptation (although with some simplifications) of the surprise model 
proposed by Meyer and colleagues [Meyer et al., 1997] in which the above-mentioned four 
mental processes elicited by surprising events are present. The suggestions by Ortony and 
Partridge [Ortony & Partridge, 1987] are mainly concerned with the first of these steps, and are 
compatible with the Meyer and colleagues’ model. Accordingly, in our model, we drew on the 
assumptions of Ortony and Partridge for the implementation of the appraisal of unexpectedness 
and the computation of the intensity of surprise, as well as for the selection of knowledge 
structures. 
In our surprise model, as described in Sections 3.1.3.2, knowledge is both semantic and 
episodic in nature, as in Ortony and Partridge’s model. In this respect, the knowledge structure of 
our model also matches the schema-theoretic framework of the Meyer and colleagues’ model that 
also assumes both episodic and semantic knowledge. In our model, an input proposition (or new 
belief) is therefore always compared with episodic/semantic representations of objects or events 
(or their properties) (for instance an object with squared windows, rectangular door, etc.). Besides 
this, as described in Section 3.1.3.2 - Memory of entities, the agent has in its episodic memory 
explicit representations of similar objects. This knowledge base comprising explicit 
representations of objects constitutes the explicit knowledge. Following Ortony and Partridge, we 
also distinguish between deducible and non-deducible knowledge (see Figure 3-16). Both 
categories constitute the formally deduced knowledge. Thus, using simple inference rules it is 
possible to produce an amount of knowledge, called inferred knowledge, that is not explicitly 
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represented. Together with explicitly represented knowledge, it forms the category of deducible 
knowledge. Non-deducible knowledge corresponds to that knowledge that is not explicitly 
represented and that involves complex inference rules to deduce it, probably because it is not 
motivated or not easily explained from the current state of the world. Following Ortony and 
Partridge, we also distinguish between deducible and non-deducible, active and passive, 
immutable and typical propositions as well as between different possible sources of surprise (see 
Table 3-1). The immutability of a proposition can be extracted from the absolute frequency values 
associated with the cases stored in episodic memory. For instance, in the example shown in Figure 
3-5, the proposition “houses have pentagonal facades” is immutable (since all the houses in 
memory have squared facades), whereas “houses have squared doors” is a typical proposition 
with a probability (immutability) value of 0.50 (as implied by Ortony and Partridge’s model, in 
our model immutability is a continuous variable). 
 
 
Figure 3-16 - Categories of knowledge. 
In exploration of unknown environments, the usual activity of an agent consists of moving 
through the environment hoping to find interesting things (objects or events) that deserve to be 
investigated. We assume that this exploratory behaviour is ultimately in the service of other (e.g., 
hedonic) motives. When one or more objects/events are perceived, as described in more detail 
below (Section 3.1.3.5 - Computation of Current World State), the agent computes expectations 
for the missing information (e.g., “it is a house with 67% probability”, “it is a hotel with 45% 
probability”, etc.; note that the function of a building becomes available to the agent only when its 
position and that of the building are the same). In this case, the agent has performed active 
predictions or active expectations. In addition, it might already have knowledge or beliefs about 
the rest of the information (e.g., “doors are immutably squared”, “windows are typically 
squared”). This means that the agent has performed passive assumptions or passive expectations. 
Both passive and active expectations are therefore within the category of deducible knowledge. 
We call expectation set to the set comprising passive and active expectations. 
The new knowledge (input knowledge/input proposition) provided by the new state of the 
world may be of two kinds from the perspective of the agent: (a) practically deducible knowledge, 
i.e., the new knowledge (the state of the world or portion of it) is easily inferred, explainable or 
motivated by the previous state of the world and from the agent’s knowledge base, or (b) 
Explicit 
Knowledge 
Inferred 
Knowledge 
Non-Deducible 
Knowledge 
Inference
Deducible Knowledge 
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non-deducible knowledge, i.e., the new knowledge is hardly inferred, unexplainable or not 
motivated by the previous state of the world and from the agent’s knowledge base. In the former 
case, (a), another two major situations may happen: (a1) there is a conflict between that new 
knowledge and the practically deduced knowledge of the agent (active and passive expectations), 
or (a2) there is no conflict at all. In the former case, (a1), the degree of the conflict is assessed and 
the respective reaction is performed such as the elicitation of surprise [Macedo & Cardoso, 2001a; 
Macedo et al., 2004]. In situation (b), there is no conflict between the input knowledge and 
expectations because there are no expectations at all. Notice that the input knowledge of situation 
(b) describes a state of the world or part of it that is non-deducible to the agent and therefore it is 
impossible for the agent to have expectations for it. However, after the fact (after that 
unpredictable or practically non-deducible state of the world) it is possible to evaluate its 
deviation from the norm or the usual. Thus, in contrary to situation (a1), the conflict or 
inconsistency happens after the fact and is related to practically deducible knowledge that it 
suggests. The different surprise-eliciting situations distinguished by Ortony and Partridge are thus 
dealt with in our model in the following way. As said above, when an agent perceives an object, it 
first computes expectations (deducible, active expectations) for missing information (e.g., “it is a 
hotel with 45% probability”). If, after having visited that object, the agent detects that the object is 
different from what was expected (e.g., if it is a post office), the agent is surprised because its 
active expectations conflict with the input proposition (note that, in our model, belief conflicts 
may be partial as well as total). This is thus an example of the first source of surprise 
distinguished by Ortony and Partridge. In contrast, when an agent perceives an aspect or part of 
an object with particular properties (e.g., a building with a window of a circular shape) that were 
not actively predicted, it may still be able to infer that it expected something (e.g., a 
rectangular-shaped window with, 45% probability, a square-shaped window with 67%, etc.). This 
is an example of a deducible, passive expectation: although the expectation was not present before 
the agent perceived the object, it was inferred after the object had been perceived. This case is 
therefore an example of the second source of surprise distinguished by Ortony and Partridge, 
where an input proposition conflicts with an agent’s passive expectations. Finally, when an agent 
perceives an object with a completely new part (e.g., a building with no facade), it has neither an 
active nor a passive expectation available. The reason is that, because there are no objects of this 
kind (e.g., buildings with no facade) stored in the agent’s memory, the agent cannot predict that 
such objects might be encountered. The perception of an object with a completely new part is thus 
an example of a non-deducible proposition. This is an example of the third source of surprise 
distinguished by Ortony and Partridge: there is a conflict between the input proposition (e.g., “the 
house has no facade”) and what after the fact is judged to be normal or usual (e.g., “buildings 
have a facade”). 
On the basis of the available information (e.g., the visible structure of an object) and the 
computed expectations (e.g., predictions for the function of an object), the agent then determines 
the computation of the degree of conflict and the computation of the intensity of surprise that may 
be caused by the object/event (these computations, which correspond to the “appraisal of 
unexpectedness” in the Meyer and colleagues’ model, are described in more detail below). 
Subsequently, the object/event with the maximum estimated surprise is selected to be visited and 
investigated5. This corresponds to the “interruption of ongoing activity” and the “reallocation of 
                                                     
5 We are assuming here a decision-making process completely dependent on surprise. However, as we will describe 
later, this process may also take into account other variables. 
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processing resources” assumed in the Meyer and colleagues’ model. The previously estimated 
value of surprise may subsequently be updated on the basis of the additional information acquired 
about the object/event. The object/event is then stored in memory and the absolute frequencies of 
the affected objects/events in memory are updated. This is a simplification of the fourth step of 
the Meyer and colleagues’ model (for alternative approaches to belief revision, see, for instance, 
[Gärdenfors, 1988]). 
We now address the question of how the intensity of surprise should be computed in the model. 
In humans, this problem has already been successfully solved by evolution; therefore, a 
reasonable approach is to model the agent’s surprise function according to that of humans. 
Experimental evidence from human participants summarized in [Reisenzein, 2000b] suggests that 
the intensity of felt surprise increases monotonically, and is closely correlated with the degree of 
unexpectedness (see [Macedo & Cardoso, 2001a] for more details). This means that 
unexpectedness is the proximate cognitive appraisal cause of the surprise experience. On the basis 
of this evidence, we propose that the surprise “felt” by an agent elicited by an event X is 
proportional to the degree of unexpectedness of X (which in the model is based on the frequencies 
of events present in the memory of the agent). According to probability theory, the degree of 
expecting an event X to occur is its subjective probability P(X). Accordingly, the improbability of 
X, denoted by 1-P(X), defines the degree of not expecting X, or in short its unexpectedness. The 
intensity of surprise elicited by X should therefore be an (at least weakly) monotonically 
increasing function of 1-P(X) [Macedo & Cardoso, 2001a]. However, an additional empirical and 
theoretical study [Macedo et al., 2004] (see Section 4.1.2) conducted in the domains of political 
elections and sport games with several surprise functions suggests that the surprise felt by an 
agent elicited by an event Eg, g ∈ {1, 2, …, m}, among a set of m mutually exclusive events 
E={E1, E2, …, Em} is given by: 
 
))()(1(log)()( 2 ghgg EPEPENESSUNEXPECTEDESURPRISE −+==  (1) 
 
In this formula, Eh, h ∈ {1, 2, …, m}, is the event with the highest probability of the set E. It 
implies that, within each set of mutually exclusive events, there is always at least one (Eh) whose 
occurrence is entirely unsurprising, namely the event with the maximum probability in the set 
(P(Eh)). For the other events X in the set, the surprise intensity caused by their occurrence is the 
logarithm of the difference between P(Eh) and their probability P(Eg) plus 1. This difference can 
be interpreted as the amount by which P(Eg) has to be increased for Eg to become unsurprising. 
For instance, in the election example with three candidates A, B, and C, where P(A) = P(B )= 
P(C) = 0.333, this formula correctly predicts that one would not be surprised if either A, B or C is 
elected. By contrast, if P(A) = 0.55, P(B) = 0.40 and P(C) = 0.05, this equation predicts that the 
surprise caused by B is 0.20 and for C is 0.58, whereas for A it is 0. It also implies that maximum 
surprise, that is, SURPRISE(Eg) = 1, occurs only if P(Eh) = 1 and hence, by implication, P(Eg) = 
0. (In the Ortony and Partridge model, this corresponds to situations [1], [2], [5] and [6], where 
the disconfirmed event Eh is immutable, i.e., its probability is 1). Therefore, this formula seems to 
correctly describe surprise in the election example. Confirming this impression, this formula also 
acknowledges the intuition that if there are only two alternative events Eg and Eh (= not Eg), it 
predicts that Eg should be unsurprising for P(Eg) ≥ 0.5, for in this case Eg is also the event with the 
highest probability in the set. By contrast, for P(Eg) < 0.5, it predicts that Eg should be surprising 
126                             Chapter 3. The Exploration of Unknown Environments by Affective Agents 
 
and increasingly so the more P(Eg) approaches 0, with maximum possible surprise 
(SURPRISE(Eg) = 1) being experienced for P(Eg) = 0. In addition, however, it also captures the 
nonlinearity of the surprise function suggested by the experiments with humans reported below 
(Section 4.1.2.2). Figure 3-17 illustrates these properties by plotting surprise as function of the 
difference between P(Eh) and P(Eg). 
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Figure 3-17 – Surprise as a function of the difference between P(Eh) and P(Eg). 
The above equation just gives the surprise of an event after its occurrence. However, it is 
possible to compute beforehand the surprise the agent expects to feel from a scenario S whose 
outcome is one event of the set of mutually exclusive events E={E1, E2, …, Em}. This is given by 
the following equation that resembles the equation of EU as well as the equation of entropy, 
where the logarithmic factor plays the role of utility and surprisal6, respectively: 
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6 Notice that the notion of surprisal that belongs to information theory differs from our notion of surprise because the 
former does not capture human surprise correctly (see Section 4.1.2) 
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The computation of the intensity of surprise elicited by an object relies on considering the 
object as consisting of pieces (as described in Section 3.1.3.2): the cells of the analogical 
description, the propositions of the propositional description, and the function [Macedo & 
Cardoso, 2005b; Macedo et al., 2006]. 
With respect to the analogical description of the physical structure of an object, it comprises a 
matrix (actually a sub-matrix of the matrix representing the metric map) in which each cell 
i=<xi,yi,zi> contains the information about the probability of being occupied by the object. In 
addition, it also contains information about the occupancy probability of other entities. Thus, each 
cell is set to a set of two pairs 
iii zyx ,,
φ ={< ip , E >, < ip−1 ,0>}, where E  is the identifier of the 
entity that may occupy the ith cell <xi,yi,zi> of the that matrix with probability ip  ∈ [0,1]. 
The propositional description comprises propositions. Each proposition is an attribute value-
pair. In the case of uncertainty there are multiple possible values for the same attribute, each one 
with a probability of occurrence (e.g., the shape of the window of a building may be rectangular, 
square, etc.). This means the zth piece of the propositional description is set to a set 
Az={< zp1 , zV1 >, < zp2 , zV2 >, ..., < zrzp ,
z
rzV >}, where 
z
jV  is j
th value of the zth piece of propositional 
description with probability zjp  ∈ [0,1]. 
With respect to the function, it is also a probability distribution, i.e., it is set to a set F = {<pk, 
fk>: k=1,2, …, n, where n is the number of possible functions and P(“function” = fk) = pk}. 
Surprise is computed based on all those pieces of an object. Each piece of an object is 
considered as a scenario. For some of those scenarios there is already an outcome event and for 
others there is not, but rather a set of possible events associated with a probability of occurrence. 
This means for the former scenarios, the probability distribution contains a single pair <event, 
probability> – the certain event, while for the latter scenarios, the probability distribution contains 
multiple pairs. In this case, these pairs constitute the active expectations of the agent which may 
conflict with the information further acquired for these uncertain scenarios. Although, the 
probability distribution of the scenarios with no uncertainty contains a single pair, it is possible to 
compute the probability distribution as if there was no certainty by computing the probability for 
the already known events as well as for the other events that could have happened. The pairs of 
such probability distributions correspond to passive expectations as they are computed only after 
the outcome of a scenario is known. Whether the scenario contains uncertainty or not, the 
probabilities of the probability distributions are computed in three ways, depending on the 
category of knowledge to which the piece of information belongs: (a) for the scenarios 
corresponding to pieces of the propositional description, Bayes’ equation is used, taking as 
evidence the rest of the pieces of the propositional description that are already known; (b) for the 
scenario corresponding to the function of the object, Bayes’ equation is used, taking as evidence 
the pieces of information of the propositional description that are already known; (c) for the 
scenarios corresponding to the cells of the analogical description, a probabilistic analogical 
description is used, which is obtained based on the probability distribution for the function of the 
object (see Section 3.1.3.5 - Computation of Current World State). 
The intensity of surprise results from the contribution of both the pieces with no uncertainty 
and the pieces with uncertainty. To compute the surprise for the pieces with no uncertainty, the 
probabilities of the event with the highest probability of the set and of the event that really 
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occurred are retrieved from the probability distributions and used in Equation 1. Then all the 
surprises computed for all the pieces of the object that are known are added up: 
 
∑
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For the uncertain pieces of an object (XU) the process is similar except that all the probabilities 
are taken from the probability distributions and not only those of the event with the highest 
probability of the set and of the event that really occurred. Equation 2 is used to compute the 
expected surprise values of all the uncertain pieces and then they are added up: 
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The surprise values of the uncertain and certain parts are then added up7 in order to obtain the 
surprise of the object X formed by a certain part XC and an uncertain part XU: 
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Unlike the surprise of an event, the surprise of an object is not normalized. This seems to be 
correct because its overall surprise value depends on the number of pieces which it can be split 
into. Objects with many pieces are more complex than objects with a few pieces, and therefore 
they are potentially more surprising.  
 Curiosity/Interest 
We define curiosity/interest (following McDougall [McDougall, 1908], Berlyne [Berlyne, 1950] 
and Shand [Shand, 1914]) as the desire to know or learn an object that arouses interest by being 
novel or uncertain, which means that novel and uncertain objects, i.e., objects with at least some 
parts that are not yet known, stimulate actions intended to acquire knowledge about those objects. 
While novelty means new information, uncertainty means that new information will probably be 
acquired. Information is a decrease in uncertainty which, according to information theory, is 
measured by entropy [Shannon, 1948]. An object may comprise a known part (XC) and an 
uncertain part (XU). Thus, if we accept the above definition, the curiosity/interest induced in an 
                                                     
7 A better choice would be to consider every combination of events in an object and then compute the expected surprise 
of those combinations taking into account the surprise value of those combinations and their probability of 
occurrence. 
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agent by an object X depends both on the novelty or difference of X relative to the set of objects 
present in the memory of the agent denoted by AgtMem, and on the entropy of the object: 
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An important property of this equation is that given two objects with equal uncertainty, the one 
whose known parts are newer is the one that elicits more curiosity. 
Just as in surprise, the computation of the curiosity elicited by an object is based on considering 
the object as consisting of pieces (the cells of the analogical description, the propositions of the 
propositional description, and the function). Curiosity is thus computed based on all those pieces 
of an object. As mentioned above each piece of an object is considered as a scenario. For some of 
those scenarios there is already an outcome event and for others there is not, but rather a set of 
possible events associated with a probability of occurrence. For the former scenarios the 
probability distribution contains a single pair <event, probability> – the certain event, while for 
the latter scenarios the probability distribution contains multiple pairs. The computation of these 
probability distributions was already described in the previous section. Like surprise, curiosity 
results from the curiosity elicited by the certain parts and the uncertain parts of the object. The 
pieces of the object that contain no uncertainty, i.e., which are already known, are used to 
compute the novelty of the object, while the uncertainty pieces8 are used to compute the entropy 
of the object. 
Let us consider first the certain pieces. In order to compute its novelty, the object is compared 
with every object in memory. This comparison may involve the comparison of the propositional 
and analogical descriptions, and the functions. Notice that only the certain pieces are taken into 
account. Since the propositional description is represented in a graph-based way, the measure of 
difference relies heavily on error correcting code theory [Hamming, 1950]: the function computes 
the distance between two objects represented by graphs, counting the minimal number of changes 
(insertions and deletions of nodes and edges) required to transform one graph into another (e.g., 
[Messmer & Bunke, 1998]). A similar procedure is applied to compute the difference between the 
analogical descriptions: the analogical descriptions of two objects are superimposed and then the 
cells that do not match are counted. The difference between two objects concerning the function is 
either 1 or 0, depending on whether they match or do not match. To compute the difference of a 
given object relative to a set of objects, we apply the above procedure to each pair of objects 
formed by the given object and an object from the set of objects. The minimum of those 
differences is the difference of the given object relative to the given set of objects. 
The entropy is computed based on all parts of an object that contain uncertainty. This includes 
the analogical and propositional descriptions of the physical structure, and the function. 
With respect to the analogical description of the physical structure of an object, as described 
above (Section 3.1.3.2), it comprises a matrix (actually a sub-matrix of a matrix representing the 
metric map) in which each cell i=<xi,yi,zi> contains the information about the probability of being 
                                                     
8 These could be all the pieces because the certain pieces have a null contribution to the overall entropy of the object. 
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occupied by the object. Thus, each cell is set to a set of two pairs 
iii zyx ,,
φ ={< ip , E >, < ip−1 ,0>}, 
where E  is the identifier of the entity that may occupy the ith cell <xi,yi,zi> of the that matrix with 
probability ip  ∈ [0,1]. Hence, as stated by information theory [Shannon, 1948], the entropy of 
each cell is computed as follows: 
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The entropy of the analogical description XA of an object X (more precisely, it is of its uncertain 
part XU) is then given by the sum of the entropy of all its m cells. 
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The propositional description XP comprises propositions. Each proposition is an attribute 
value-pair. Since in case of uncertainty there are multiple possible values for the same attribute, 
each one with a probability of occurrence (e.g., the shape of the window of a building may be 
rectangular, square, etc.). This means the zth piece of the propositional description is set to a set 
Az={< zp1 , zV1 >, < zp2 , zV2 >, ..., < zrzp ,
z
rzV >}, where 
z
jV  is j
th value of the zth piece of propositional 
description with probability zjp  ∈ [0,1]. Using the same equation provided by information theory, 
the entropy of a piece z of the propositional description is given by: 
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The entropy of the propositional description XP of an object X is then given by adding up the 
entropy of all its l cells. 
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With respect to the function, it is also a probability distribution, i.e., it is set to a set F = {<pk, 
fk>: k=1,2, …, n, where n is the number of possible functions and P(“function” = fk) = pk}. 
Likewise, the entropy of the function XF of an object X is then: 
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The entropy of an object X may be computed by adding up the entropies of its propositional and 
analogical description plus the entropy of its function: 
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Computed by the above equation, curiosity is not normalized. This seems to be correct because 
objects with many novel and uncertain pieces potentially provide more information than objects 
with a few pieces, and therefore they elicit more curiosity. 
 Hunger 
Hunger is defined as the need for a source of energy. Given the capacity C of the storage of that 
source (C=1, i.e., C=100%), and L the amount of energy left (0 ≤ L ≤ C), the hunger elicited in an 
agent is computed as follows: 
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The function hunger is already normalized, since C=1 and 0 ≤ L ≤ C, which implies that 0 ≤ C-
L ≤ 1. 
3.1.3.4 Goals and Intentions  
Desires are states of the environment the agent would like to happen, i.e., they correspond to those 
states of the environment the agent prefers. This preference is implicitly represented in a 
mathematical function that evaluates states of the environment in terms of the degree of 
satisfaction of the basic desires which, as noted before, drive the agent to reduce or to maximize 
feelings. This function obeys the MEU principle [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995]. The agent always 
prefers those states that maximize or reduce certain feelings. Goals may be understood as 
something that an agent wants or has to do. These might be automatically generated by the agent 
(see Section 3.1.3.5 - Generation and Management of the Agent’s Goals). The reason for trying to 
achieve a goal might be because that achievement corresponds to a state of the environment that 
makes it satisfy the basic desires. Thus, goals may be thought of as a subset of the agent’s desires 
[Huhns & Singh, 1998]. 
To satisfy the basic desires of minimal hunger, maximal information gain and maximal 
surprise, the agent desires to visit previously unvisited entities, regions of the environment and 
places where it can recharge its battery. This means that, in the particular case of exploration, 
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agents may possess three kinds of goals: visitEntity(X), visitLoc(Y), and rechargeBattery. This 
happens because the memory of the agents is seeded with plans to achieve these goal tasks. Notice 
that if plans for other goal tasks are given to the memory of the agents, then they are able to deal 
with those other goals. However, for our exploration strategy those visitEntity(X), visitLoc(Y), 
and rechargeBattery suffice. The first is concerned with the goal of visiting an entity of the 
environment, the second refers to the goal of visiting a location where there is no entity, and 
finally the third concerns the goal of going to the place where there is a source of energy to 
recharge batteries. These goals are automatically generated by the agent by adapting past goals to 
new situations giving rise to new goals which are then ranked according to its preference (utility) 
and then taken as intentions once a plan is generated for them. 
3.1.3.5 Reasoning 
The reasoning module receives information from the internal/external world and outputs an action 
that has been selected for execution. This is actually a sequential decision-making process, as 
opposed to single decision-making, in that not only a single decision is made but rather a 
sequence of decisions, i.e., the computation of a sequence of decisions involves several single 
decision-making processes, bearing in mind that each one belongs to a sequence. We will now 
explain this process in detail. 
Figure 3-18 presents the algorithm for the reasoning cycle of the agent, including the 
management of goals, planning, and execution. The main principle of decision-making is kept: the 
agent receives percepts and generates an action. The first of the steps is concerned with getting 
percepts. The second is the computation of the current world state. This is performed by 
generating expectations or assumptions, based on the knowledge stored in memory, for the gaps 
of the environment information provided by the sensors. Since the agent knows its position 
precisely, there is no need for generating assumption/expectations for its current position. The 
agent has a queue of goal tasks (goals) ranked by their priority (i.e., EU). The first of the ranking 
is the goal/intention that is under achievement. Once one goal is achieved, it is removed from the 
queue and the way it was achieved could be learned for future reuse by simply storing its plan in 
memory as a case. However, for instance, external events or objects may give rise to new goals. 
This is the next step of the reasoning/decision-making process: the generation of new goals, 
computation of their EU and insertion in the queue of goals according to their priority (i.e., their 
EU). Though, if the queue was empty before this step and no new goals are generated in this step, 
the queue remains empty. In this case there is nothing to reason or decide about and consequently 
no action is returned. However, the most likely situation is that the queue is not empty either 
before or after the step of generating new goals. If the first goal of the queue is still the same, then 
proceed with its execution. However, the addition of new goals may have caused changes in the 
ranking of the goals in the queue because a new goal may be more expected useful than some old 
goals. Thus, the first goal may now be different from the previous first goal. In this case the old 
first goal is said to be suspended. Thus, a plan is required for this new first goal in queue, which 
will be from now on or until its achievement the current goal. That plan could be built or retrieved 
from memory (if there is one – remember that this current goal may be previously suspended or 
even previously achieved in the past). Anyway, the plan is executed and the next primitive task 
(action) is returned. 
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Reasoning (Task currentGoalTask) 
 1 - Get percepts; 
 2 - Compute the current world state: generate assumptions/expectations for missing information; 
 4 - Generate new goal tasks, compute their EU, and insert them in the queue of goals/goal tasks according to their        EU; 
 5. – Generate or get a plan for each goal task; 
 6. – Compute again the EU of the goal tasks (intentions) now based on the EU of the tasks of the plan, and rank them again; 
 7 - If the queue of goals/goal tasks is not empty 
  7.1 - currentGoalTask ← Get the first goal task; 
  7.2 - Execute the plan; 
Figure 3-18 – Algorithm for Sequential Decision-Making. 
 
We will now describe in more detail the steps of the reasoning cycle of the agent, namely 
computation of current world state, generation and management of goals and plans, planning itself 
(including the representation, plan generation, and plan execution and re-planning) (which in our 
case is within the category of Decision-Theoretic, Case-based HTN planning), and learning. 
 Computation of Current World State 
The process of making the right decision depends heavily on a good model of the environment 
that surrounds agents. Unfortunately, the real world is not crystal clear to agents. Agents almost 
never have access to the whole environment, mainly because of the incompleteness and 
incorrectness of their perceptual and understanding components. In fact, it is too much work to 
obtain all the information from a complex and dynamic world, and it is quite likely that the 
accessible information suffers distortions. Nevertheless, since the success of agents depends 
heavily on the completeness of the information of the state of the world, they have to pursue 
alternatives to construct good models of the world even (and especially) when this is uncertain. 
According to psychologists, cognitive scientists, and ethologists [Kline, 1999; Piaget, 1952], 
humans and, in general, animals attempt to overcome this limitation through the generation of 
assumptions or expectations9 to fill in gaps in the present observational information. Note, 
however, that not all those expectations are made explicit. However, the reasoning of the agent 
may be improved if its model of the world also contains a good model of the future worlds. In this 
case, the process cannot be confined to filling in gaps in the information provided by perception 
because there is no information at all of those worlds. In order to overcome this limitation, agents 
also exhibit the ability to make predictions about future states of the world, taking into account the 
present world and inference processes. When the missing information, either of the present state 
of the world or of the future states of the world, becomes known to the agent, there may be an 
inconsistency or conflict between it and the assumptions or expectations that the agent has (this 
issue was described above in Section 3.1.3.3 - Surprise). As defended by Reisenzein [Reisenzein, 
2000b], Gärdenfors [Gärdenfors, 1994], Ortony and Partridge [Ortony & Partridge, 1987], etc., 
the result of this inconsistency gives rise to surprise. It also gives rise to the process of updating 
beliefs, called belief revision (e.g., [Gärdenfors, 1992]). 
                                                     
9 Although some authors use the terms assumption and expectation as synonyms, there are authors that make a 
distinction between them defending the notion that an expectation has to do with future world states while 
assumptions are related to the current world state. 
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Let us now describe how those assumptions/expectations are generated [Macedo & Cardoso, 
2003]. As we said before, it is very difficult for an agent to get all the information about the 
surrounding environment. One reason is that the perceptual information is incomplete. However, 
taking as evidence the available information, it is possible to generate expectations/assumptions 
for the missing information using a Bayesian approach [Shafer & Pearl, 1990]. Information may 
be missing in the three components of the description of an entity: analogical description, 
propositional description, and the function. Probability distributions are computed for pieces of 
the entity descriptions in three manners, depending on the component to which the piece of 
information belongs: (a) for pieces of the propositional description, Bayes’ equation is used, 
taking as evidence the rest of the pieces of the propositional description that are already known; 
(b) for the function of the entity, Bayes’ equation is used, taking as evidence the pieces of 
information of the propositional description that are already known; (c) for the cells of the 
analogical description, a probabilistic analogical description is obtained, based on the probability 
distribution for the function of the entity as well as on the analogical descriptions of the entities of 
the same class stored in memory. Hence, in this process of generating assumptions/expectations 
for the current world state, Bayes’ equation, represented as follows, plays a primary role: 
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where E1, E2, …, Em are pieces of evidence, i.e., the available information, and Hi, i=1,2,…,n, 
are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive hypotheses/possibilities (retrieved from past 
cases of entities) for a specific piece of the missing information. Each conditional probability 
P(E|H) is given by the number of times E and H appeared together in the cases of entities stored 
in memory divided by the number of times H appeared in those case of entities (when E and H 
have never appeared together they are independent events and therefore P(E|H)= P(E)). 
When an entity is perceived, the sensors provide for instance the shape and colour of it, which 
permits construction of the propositional description (or part of it) of that entity. This 
propositional description of the physical structure of the entities such as their shape (rectangular, 
squared, etc.), shape of their constituent parts (in case there are any), colour, etc., constitute the 
evidence. Based on this evidence, hypotheses are generated based on past cases of entities not 
only for pieces of the propositional descriptions of the physical structure whose information is 
missing, but also for the function or category of the entity. The result is a probability distribution 
for each one of those pieces. This means the zth piece of the propositional description is set to a set 
Az={< zp1 , zV1 >, < zp2 , zV2 >, ..., < zrzp ,
z
rzV >}, where 
z
jV  is j
th hypothesis/value of the zth piece of 
propositional description with probability zjp  ∈ [0,1]. E.g., if the shape of the window of a 
building may be rectangular, square, and pentagonal, this information is represented by, for 
instance, Az={<0.2,rectangular>, <0.35,square>, <0.45,pentagonal>}. With respect to the 
function, it is set to a set F = {<pk, fk>: k=1,2, …, n, where n is the number of possible functions 
and P(“function” = fk) = pk}. E.g., {<0.66,house>, <0.34,church>}. 
Based on the probability distribution for the function of the entity, the analogical description of 
the entity may now be estimated, taking into account the analogical descriptions of the entities 
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with similar function stored in memory. This means that we are considering the reference class as 
comprising the entities with the same function. Notice that this resulting analogical description is 
probabilistic. Thus, for instance, considering the semantic memory presented in Figure 3-6 and 
the probability distribution for the function of an entity {<0.66,house>, <0.34,church>}, the 
resulting analogical description is similar to that of entity 4 of the episodic memory depicted in 
Figure 3-5. This is computed as follows. For all function X: (i) take the analogical description of 
each possible entity with function X and multiply the occupancy value of each cell by 
P(Function=X); (ii) superimpose the analogical descriptions obtained in the previous step, adding 
up the occupancy values of the superimposed cells. Let us illustrate this process with an example. 
Suppose we want to compute the description of an entity whose propositional description, i.e., the 
evidence, is that it is a building with triangular door, squared facade, triangular roof, rectangular 
windows, etc. So the missing information here is the function or type of the building and the 
analogical description. Considering the memory of entities, episodic and semantic, represented 
respectively in Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6, we verify that there are only two hypotheses for the 
function: house and church. The probability distribution for the function of the entity is 
{<0.66,house>, <0.34,church>}. We will not go into the details of computing these probabilities 
since they are simply the result of applying Bayes’ equation. The analogical description of the 
entity may now be estimated, taking into account the analogical descriptions of an abstract house 
and an abstract church multiplying all the cells of each one by the probability of being a house 
and a church, respectively, yielding two analogical descriptions, which are then superimposed and 
their correspondent cells are added in order to get the probabilistic analogical description of the 
current entity (Figure 3-19). 
 
 
Figure 3-19 – Illustration of the computation of the probabilistic analogical description of an 
entity. 
 Generation and Management of the Agent’s Goals 
To satisfy the basic desires of minimal hunger, maximal information gain and maximal surprise, 
the agent desires to visit previously unvisited entities, regions of the environment and places 
where it can recharge its battery. The visits of entities, regions and places of the battery are 
therefore taken as goals. The agent selects goals (and the actions or sequences of actions that 
accomplish them) that lead to those states of the world that are more relevant to satisfy the basic 
desires. For instance, an agent establishes the goal of visiting an object that seems interesting 
(novel, surprising) beforehand, because visiting it will probably satisfy the basic desire of 
acquiring information. The algorithm for the generation and ranking of goals is as follows (see 
Figure 3-20). First, the set of different goal tasks present in the memory of plans are retrieved and, 
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for each kind, a set of new goals (newGoals) is generated using the function adaptGoal(). This 
function takes as input a goal task retrieved from a plan in the memory of plans, the memory and 
the perception of the agent, and generates similar goals resulting from the adaptation of the past 
goal to situations of the present state of the world. In the present version of this multi-agent tool, 
the adaptation strategies used are mainly substitutions [Kolodner, 1993]. Thus, for instance, 
suppose the goal task visitEntity(e7) is present in the memory of the agent. Suppose also that the 
agent has just perceived three entities present in the environment, e1, e2 and e3. The entity to 
which visitEntity is applied (e7) may be substituted by e1, e2 or e3, resulting three new goals: 
visitEntity(e1), visitEntity(e2), visitEntity(e3). Then, the EU of each goal task is computed. As 
mentioned above, a task T is both conditional and probabilistic (e.g., [Blythe, 1999a]). This means 
each task has a set of alternative probabilistic conditional effects {<ci,εi>: 1=< i <=m}, i.e., for 
each one of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive conditions, ci, there is a set of alternative 
effects εi={< ip1 , iE1 >, < ip2 , iE2 >, ..., < inip ,
i
niE >}, where 
i
jE  is the j
th effect triggered with 
probability ijp  ∈ [0,1] by condition ci (i.e., ijiij pcEP =)|( ), and such that ∑
=
=
in
j
i
jp
1
1. Thus, the 
execution of a goal task under a given condition may be seen according to Utility Theory as a 
lottery [S. Russell & Norvig, 1995]: 
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, where ip  is the probability of the condition ci, ijp  is the probability of the j
th effect, ijE , of 
condition ci. 
The EU of T may be then computed as follows: 
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The computation of )( kjEEU  is performed estimating the degree of satisfaction of the basic 
desires when the effect kjE  of the task T takes place [Castelfranchi et al., 1996; Reisenzein, 1996]. 
As mentioned before, we confined the set of basic desires to those that are more related with 
exploratory behaviour in humans [Berlyne, 1950], i.e., to minimal hunger, maximal information 
gain and maximal surprise. The degree of fulfil of the desire of maximal surprise is given by the 
expected intensity of the feeling surprise after executing the action, while the degree of fulfil of 
the desire of minimal hunger decreases as the expected intensity of the feeling of hunger after the 
execution of the action increases. The degree of fulfil of maximal information gain is given by the 
intensity of the feeling of curiosity computed before executing the action. The level of curiosity 
caused by an object before visiting it is a measure (estimation) of the information gained if the 
agent visits it. From this point of view, curiosity is a kind of anticipated information gain. So the 
agent wants to visit objects that maximize curiosity before visiting them and therefore that are 
expected to maximize information gain after visiting them. Obviously, after visiting them the 
level of curiosity decreases as information gain increases. In the formula, there is therefore a 
difference between the utility of curiosity and the utility of surprise or hunger: the utility of 
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curiosity is indeed the anticipated information gain, while the utility of surprise and hunger is 
itself the anticipated surprise and hunger, respectively. After visiting an object, the level of 
curiosity of this object is null, while surprise and hunger may not. Thus, the intensities of surprise, 
curiosity and hunger felt by the agent when the effect takes place are estimated based on the 
procedural component of the effect, i.e., on the information available in the effect about the 
changes produced in the world. Another choice that is not in the scope of this thesis is performing 
these computations based on the non-procedural component (somatic markers [Damásio, 1994]), 
i.e., on the intensities of feelings felt in past occurrences of the effect of the task. 
The generic function )( kjEEU  is used to compute the EU of the effect kjE  as follows: 
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where αi is the weight of basic desire di, with i ∈ ℵ. 
For the particular application of exploration of unknown environments, this function is as 
follows: 
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, where, α3 = 1 and αi (i≠3) may be defined as follows: 
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, where D is the amount of energy necessary to go from the end location of goal task T to the 
closest place where energy could be recharged, and C is the maximum amount of energy that 
could be stored by the agent. The functions )( kjESurprise , )(
k
jECuriosity , and )(
k
jEHunger  are 
replaced by the functions of surprise, curiosity, and hunger defined above (Section 3.1.3.3) and 
applied to the resulting state of the world when the effect kjE  takes place. Which parts of the state 
of the world they are applied to is determined in the definition of each action. For instance for the 
case of task ATTEND they are applied to the entity or the cell visited. In the first case, it is 
restricted to surprise and curiosity, while in the second case only the function hunger is used. The 
definition of the task PTRANS determines that surprise and curiosity are not applied to a path. 
However, this could be addressed in a future version of the system since certain paths elicit more 
surprise and curiosity than others. In contrast, hunger depends directly on the distance of the path. 
This dependence of the parameters αi (i≠3) on the hunger of the agent partially models the 
results of Berlyne’s experiments (e.g., [Berlyne, 1950]) that have shown that in the absence of (or 
despite) known drives, humans tend to explore and investigate their environment as well as seek 
stimulation. In fact, surprise and curiosity are taken into account to compute the EU of a task only 
when there is enough energy to go from the end location of goal task T to the closest place where 
an energy source could be found. Otherwise, only hunger is taken into account for the EU of tasks 
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and further ranking. This means that in this situation (when hunger is above a specific threshold), 
the goal of rechargeBattery has the highest EU=0 (which is actually because the expected hunger 
is 0 after executing it). In the other situations (hunger below a specific threshold), hunger plays 
the role of a negative reward decreasing the utility of a task by the percentage of energy needed 
after the task is completed. Thus, the further the distance to the location after the execution of a 
task, the more energy is required and the less utility of that task. 
 
Algorithm generateRankGoals(newRankedGoals) 
Output: newRankedGoals – the set of ranked goals 
newGoals ← ∅ 
setPastGoals ← {x: x is a goal task belonging to some plan in memory} 
for each goal in setPastGoals do 
 adaptationGoal←adaptGoal(goal,agtMemory,agtPercepts) 
 newGoals ← newGoals ∪ adaptationGoals  
end for each 
for each T  in newGoals do ∑ ××=
jk
k
j
k
j
k EEUppTEU
,
)()(  
insert(T,,newRankedGoals) 
end for each 
return newRankedGoals 
end 
Figure 3-20 – Algorithm for the generation and ranking of goals. 
 Decision-Theoretic, Case-Based, HTN Planning 
As we said before, the decision-making process may involve the construction of a plan for each 
goal and then the execution of it. This is the competence of the planner, called ProCHiP, a planner 
that combines case-based reasoning with the techniques of decision-theoretic planning and HTN 
planning in order to deal with uncertain, dynamic large-scale real-world domains [Macedo & 
Cardoso, 2004a, 2004b]. We describe first how a plan is constructed and finally how it is executed 
and revised (replanned). The description is illustrated with examples taken from the logistics 
domain [Andrews et al., 1995]. This domain was designed especially to fulfil the clear need for 
planning benchmarks with matching complexity to evaluate features and capabilities of planning 
systems. This domain seems to be more appropriate to illustrate the capabilities of ProCHiP than 
the domain of exploration of unknown environments. In fact, as described above, this domain 
contains far simpler plans. 
 Plan Generation 
Since the planner is used by an agent that is part of a multi-agent environment, the agent should 
have the information of the initial state of the environment in memory in order to solve a planning 
problem. This comprises a three-dimensional metric map of the environment in which inanimate 
and other animate agents are spatially represented. Figure 3-21 presents an example of such an 
initial state of the environment. It comprises: one truck (truck1) located at coordinates (11,0,0); 
three packages, pk1, pk2 and pk3, located at, respectively, (10,3,0), (4,3,0), and (8,0,0); and one 
plane located at the airport with coordinates (2,1,0). 
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Figure 3-21 – Illustrative example of the sketch of the metric map of an initial state of the 
environment in the logistics domain. 
A problem is an initial and incomplete HTN, i.e., a set of goal tasks. Planning is a process by 
which that initial HTN is completed, resulting in an abstract plan ready to be executed and 
incorporating alternative courses of action, i.e., it includes re-planning procedures. Broadly 
speaking, this involves the following steps (the respective algorithms are presented in later 
figures): first, the structure of the abstract plan (HTN) is built based on cases of past plans (this is 
closely related to the regular HTN planning procedure); then the conditional effects, probabilities 
as well as the EU are computed for the primitive tasks of this abstract plan, based on the primitive 
tasks of cases of past plans; finally, these properties (conditional effects and respective 
probabilities, and EU) are propagated upward in the HTN, from the primitive tasks to the main 
task of the HTN. Figure 3-22 presents this algorithm. 
 
Algorithm construct-Abstract-Plan(abstPlan) 
Input: abstPlan – an initial abstract plan defining the planning problem 
Output: abstPlan – the abstract plan resulting from completing the structure and propagating properties of the input abstPlan 
 
 abstPlan ← build-Structure(abstPlan) 
 primTasks ← get-PrimTasks(abstPlan) 
 primTasksAllPlanCases← get-PrimTasks-All-Plan-Cases() 
 comput-PrimTasks-PROPs(primTasks,primTasksAllPlanCases) 
 abstPlan←propagat-Props-upward(primTasks,abstPlan) 
 return abstPlan 
end 
Figure 3-22 – Algorithm for the construction of an abstract plan. 
 
Let us now describe in detail how the structure of the abstract plan is built (see the algorithm of 
Figure 3-25). As we said, a problem is an initial and incomplete HTN, i.e., a set of goal tasks. 
Much like regular HTN planning, building the structure of the abstract plan (algorithm of Figure 
3-25) is a process by which the initial HTN is completed by recursively decomposing its 
compound tasks. Unlike regular HTN planning, within our approach the domain theory (methods 
and operators in regular HTN planning) is confined to a finite set of actions/operators. Thus, there 
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are no explicit methods to describe how to decompose a task into a set of subtasks. Actually, 
methods are implicitly present in cases of past plans (see [Muñoz-Avila, Aha et al., 2001] for a 
similar approach). This is particularly useful in domains where there is no theory available. 
Therefore, the process of decomposing a task into subtasks is case-based and is performed as 
follows. Given a task, the possible alternative decompositions (task and its subtasks, as well as the 
links between them) are retrieved from cases of past plans. Two situations might occur. If there 
are more than one alternative decomposition, the given task is set as abstract and the set of 
decompositions are added to the HTN, linking each head task to the abstract task through a 
hierarchical link of type abst. Thus, these head tasks are now the subtasks of the abstract task (see 
Figure 3-23 for an illustration of this process). The result is a decomposition with an OR structure. 
On the other hand, if only one decomposition is retrieved, its subtasks are added as subtasks of the 
given task, linked by a hierarchical link of type dcmp (see Figure 3-24 for an illustration of this 
process). This corresponds to an AND structure. Whether a single decomposition or multiple 
decompositions are retrieved, the addition of it/them comprises an adaptation process [Kolodner, 
1993], i.e., the retrieved decomposition(s) is/are changed if necessary so that it/they is/are 
consistent with the rest of the HTN. Each adaptation link triggers a process. Thus, for instance, 
the adaptation link ea (equal AID) in Figure 3-23 indicates that the tasks transport and inCityDel 
have the same component AID, i.e., they are executed by the same agent. This means that the AID 
component of those tasks retrieved from past plans is changed so that it refers to the agent whose 
identifier is referred to by the AID of transport belonging to the current abstract plan. 
 
 
Retrieved decompositions for
task transport::
Current abstract plan
(incomplete):
transport
transport
inCityDel airDel inCityDel
transport
inCityDel
Abstract plan (incomplete)
after the abstrat
decomposition:
transport
transport
inCityDel airDe inCityDel
transport
inCityDel
. . .
.
.
.
ea
ea
ea
 
Figure 3-23 – Illustrative example of the decomposition of an abstract task, i.e., OR-
decomposition of an abstract task. 
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Retrieved decompositions
for task airDel:
Current abstract plan
(incomplete):
Abstract plan (incomplete)
after the abstrat
decomposition:
transport
transport
inCityDel airDel inCityDel
transport
inCityDel
airDel
flyAirplaneloadAirplane
transport
transport
inCityDel airDel inCityDel
transport
inCityDel
flyAirplaneloadAirplane()
 
Figure 3-24 - Illustrative example of the decomposition of a compound task, i.e., AND-
decomposition of a regular compound task. 
 
Within our approach, a task belonging to an HTN has a probability value associated to it. This 
value expresses the probability of being executed given that its ancestor is executed. Thus, this 
probability is actually a conditional probability. Obviously, the probability of a task belonging to 
a case of a past plan is always 1 because it was executed (otherwise it would not belong to the 
case). The probability of the tasks belonging to an abstract plan is computed during the process of 
building the HTN as follows. Given the ith subtask, STi, of a task T both belonging to an abstract 
plan, the probability of STi being executed, given that T is executed, is given by the conditional 
probability formula 
)(
)(
)/(
TP
TSTP
TSTP ii
∩
= . Since within our approach there is no probabilistic 
model available, these probabilities have to be computed from data, i.e., from past occurrences of 
the tasks in past plan cases, in the following manner. According to the frequency definition of 
probability, in r repetitions of an experiment, the value P(X) is given by the number of times X 
occurred in the possible r times. This value is given by Sr(X)/r, where Sr(X) denotes the absolute 
frequency of X (i.e., the number of times X occurred in the r repetitions of the experiment). As r 
increases, Sr(X)/r converges to P(X). In the context of HTN planning, the experiment should be 
interpreted as the decomposition of a task into subtasks. According to frequency interpretation of 
probability, this is estimated by: 
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∩
=
∩
=  (when r is big), which 
expresses the number of times STi and T occurred together in the total amount of times T 
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occurred, or in the context of HTN planning, this expresses the number of times STi was a subtask 
of T in the total amount of times that T was the task decomposed in past HTN plans in r 
decompositions. When STi is not a head of an alternative decomposition in the new plan (i.e., 
when T is not an abstract task), it means that T was always decomposed in the same way in past 
plans, i.e., into the same subtasks, which means STi occurred always when T occurred, otherwise 
STi would not be a subtask of T. Thus, in this situation, the numerator and denominator of the 
above equation are equal and therefore P(STi/T)=1.0. However, when STi is a head of an 
alternative decomposition, it means there were more than one way to decompose T in past plans, 
the decomposition headed by STi being one of them. Thus, counting the number of times the 
decomposition headed by STi was taken to decompose T, i.e., the number of times STi instantiated 
T, )( TSTS ir ∩ , in all past plans and dividing this number by the number of times T was 
decomposed, i.e., )(TSr , yields the value for P(STi/T) for this situation. 
The process of building the HTN ends when there are no more compound tasks to decompose, 
i.e., when the leaves of the tree are primitive tasks, or when there are no available decompositions 
in the case-base for at least one compound task. 
After the abstract HTN is built, the conditional effects (and respective probabilities) and the EU 
are computed for the primitive tasks based on the past occurrences of those primitive tasks (notice 
that the probability of the tasks has already been computed during the process of building the 
HTN as described above). Remember that tasks (either primitive or not) have a list of possible 
effects, each one associated with a probability value (see Figure 3-13). Thus, this is once more a 
case-based process that is carried out as follows (algorithm of Figure 3-26). First, all the 
conditional effects of all the tasks of the same kind and belonging to cases of plans, for each 
primitive task of the abstract plan, are collected and subjected to a generalization procedure, such 
that conditional effects with the same condition are merged or generalized into a single one. 
Additionally, the EU of each primitive task is computed according to the EU definition of 
Decision-Theory, i.e., as a sum of the products of the utility of an outcome/effect by their 
probability. 
After the primitive tasks have the effects and respective probabilities, the probability and EU 
computed, based on cases of past plans, these properties are propagated bottom-up (from lower 
levels to upper levels, from primitive to non-primitive tasks), from the subtasks to the task of a 
decomposition (situation (i)) and from the subtasks (heads of alternative decompositions) to the 
abstract task of an abstract decomposition (situation (ii)). Preconditions are also propagated 
similarly, although they were not computed for the primitive tasks because they are previously 
defined for them and do not change. Notice, however, that the goal of this propagation is twofold: 
to complete the non-primitive tasks so that they can be ranked according to their EU when they 
are heads of alternative decompositions, and to know the overall EU of the abstract plan which is 
given by the EU of the main task of the plan. Figure 3-27 presents the algorithm for this process. 
PROPAGATE-PROPERTIES-UPWARD makes use of PROPAGATE-PROPERTIES-DCMP 
or PROPAGATE-PROPERTIES-ABST depending on whether the situation is the propagation of 
properties within a decomposition or within an abstract decomposition. These functions rely 
heavily on the notions of inter-action abstraction described in [Haddawy & Doan, 1994]. 
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Algorithm BUILD-STRUCTURE(abstPlan,CB) 
Input: abstPlan – an initial abstract plan defining the planning problem 
CB: the case-base of plans 
Output: abstPlan – the abstract plan resulting from completing the structure of the input abstPlan 
 
 goalTasks ← getLeafTasks(AbstPlan) 
 taskQueue ← goalTasks 
 while taskQueue ≠ ∅ 
  task ← popFrontTask(taskQueue) 
  listAlternDcmps ← getListAlternDcmps(task, CB) 
  if size(listAlternDcmps) > 1 
   task type ← “abstract” 
   for each decomposition in listAlternDcmps do 
    headTask ← getHeadTask(decomposition) 
    )(
)()/(
taskS
taskheadTaskStaskheadTaskP
r
r ∩←
 
    adapt(headTask, task, “abst”) 
    insert headTask in AbstPlan; link it to task by “abst” link 
    subtasksDcmp ← getSubTasks(decomposition) 
    for each subtask (with adaptationLinks from headTask) in subtasksDcmp do 
     adapt(subtask, headTask, adaptionLinks) 
     for each othertask with adaptationLinks to subtask do 
      adapt(subtask, othertask, adaptionLinks) 
     end for each 
     if notPrimitive(subtask) then 
      insertTask(subtask, taskQueue) 
      
0.1
)(
)()/( =∩←
headTaskS
headTasksubtaskSheadTasksubtaskP
r
r
 
     insertTask(subtask, AbstPlanStructure) 
    end for each 
    copy all links from decomposition to AbstPlan 
   end for each 
  else 
   subtasksDcmp ← getSubTasks(decomposition) 
   for each subtask (with adaptationLinks from subTask) in subtasksDcmp do 
    adapt(subtask, task, adaptionLinks) 
    for each othertask with adaptationLinks to subtask do 
     adapt(subtask, othertask, adaptionLinks) 
    end for each 
    if notPrimitive(subtask) then insertTask(subtask, taskQueue) 
    
0.1
)(
)()/( =∩←
taskS
tasksubtaskStasksubtaskP
r
r
 
    insertTask(subtask, AbstPlan) 
   end for each 
   copy all links from decomposition to abstPlan 
  endif 
 endwhile 
 return abstPlan 
end 
Figure 3-25 – Algorithm for constructing the structure of an HTN. 
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Algorithm COMPUT-PRIMTASKS-PROPS(primTasks, primTasksAllPlanCases) 
Input: primTasks – set of primitive tasks of the abstract plan 
 PrimTasksAllPlanCases - set of primitive tasks of all plan cases 
Output: primTasks – set of primitive tasks of the abstract plan with effects, probabilities and EU computed 
 
 for each primTask in primTasks do 
  taskList ← {i: i ∈ primTasks and i  is of the same type of primTask} 
  condEffectList ← ∅ 
  for each task in taskList do 
   condEffectListTask ← U
m
i
ii Ec
1
,
=
>< , m is the number of conditional effects Ei of task 
   condEffectList ← condEffectList ∪ condEffectListTask 
  end for each 
  genCondEffectList ← GENERALIZE-COND-EFFECT-LIST(condEffectList ) 
  set the conditional effects of primTask with genCondEffectList 
  EU(primTask)← )()(),(),( i
i
iii
i
ii EEUcPEcEUEcP ×=><×>< ∑∑   
 end for each 
 return primTasks 
end 
Figure 3-26 – Algorithm for computing the conditional effects (and respective probabilities) 
and the EU of primitive tasks. 
 
Algorithm PROPAGATE-PROPERTIES-UPWARD(primTasks, mainTask, abstPlan) 
Input: primTasks – a list of primitive tasks with properties (effects, respective probabilities and EU) already computed 
 mainTask – the upper most task of the hierarchy until which the properties should be propagated 
 abstPlan – the abstract plan with non-primitive tasks still without properties (effects, respective probabilities and EU) 
Output: abstPlan – the abstract plan resulting from the upward propagation of properties (effects, respective probabilities and EU), i.e., 
from the primitive tasks to all the non-primitive tasks 
 
 if primitive(mainTask) 
  nothing to do 
 else 
  subTasks ← getSubTasks(mainTask) 
  for each subTask in subTasks do 
   PROPAGATE-PROPERTIES-UPWARD(primTasks, subTask, abstPlan) 
  end for each 
  if abstract(mainTask) then 
   PROPAGATE-PROPERTIES-ABST(subTasks, mainTask, mainTask1) 
   replace mainTask by mainTask1 in abstPlan 
  else 
   PROPAGATE-PROPERTIES-DCMP(subTasks, mainTask, mainTask1) 
   replace mainTask by mainTask1 in abstPlan 
  endif 
 endif 
end 
Figure 3-27 – Recursive algorithm for propagating properties upward, from primitive tasks 
to all non-primitive tasks. 
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In situation (ii), when all the subtasks (heads of alternative decompositions) of an abstract task 
have the effects and respective probabilities, the probability and EU computed, a link of the kind 
more_useful is established between them so that they are ranked according to their EU. The main 
reason of this ranking is to establish a preference between them for the instantiation of the abstract 
task. Thus, the most EU alternative decomposition instantiates the abstract task. When there is an 
execution failure of one of the primitive actions that is hierarchically dependent on this 
decomposition, the next most EU alternative decomposition instantiates the abstract task. 
 Plan Execution an Re-planning 
Finding the optimal plan in ProCHiP consists simply of traversing the abstract plan, selecting the 
most EU subtask of an abstract task. Given a previously constructed abstract plan, its execution is 
a continuous process that involves the following two steps: selection of an action, and execution 
of the selected action.  
 Learning 
As described in the previous section, executing a plan corresponds to an instantiation of an 
abstract plan. After a plan is executed, the instantiation that was actually executed is stored in 
memory for future reuse. In addition, the abstract plan is also stored in memory. This way, it 
might be useful in the future since it might avoid the unnecessary process of generating it again. 
3.2 Affect-based Exploration of Unknown Environments 
Throughout the description of the multi-agent system, we presented and illustrated most of the 
aspects of the application developed for the domain of exploration of unknown environments, 
especially those concerned with the architecture of agents such as: how the agents represent the 
environment, the entities that populate the environment, the motivational and emotional makeup, 
goals, plans, how these goals and plans are generated, how the agents generate 
assumptions/expectations for the current world state, and in general how the agents make 
decisions. We called this application A-EUNE (Affect-based Exploration of UNknown 
Environments). The description of how the explorer agents make decisions and behaves, i.e., how 
the exploratory behaviour comes up, is still missing. This will be addressed in the present and the 
following section. 
The goal of exploration is twofold: (i) acquisition of maps of the environment – metric maps – 
to be stored in memory and where the cells occupied by the entities that populate that 
environment are represented; (ii) construction of models of those entities. Each agent is 
continuously performing the reasoning algorithm. Thus, each agent at a given time senses the 
environment to look for entities and compute the current world state (location, structure and 
function of those entities) based on the sensorial information and on the generation of 
expectations for the missing information. Then, a goal of kind visitEntity is generated for each 
unvisited entity (including those within the visual range and also those out of this range that were 
previously perceived but not yet visited). In addition, a goal of the kind visitLoc is generated for 
all the frontier cells [Yamauchi, 1998]. Then, these goals are then inserted in the ranked list of 
goals which might already contain previous goals generated in the past but not yet accomplished. 
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This list of goals is ranked according to the EU of the goals, which is computed, based on the 
intensities of feelings predicted as explained above. 
3.3 A Running Session 
We ran an agent in a simulated environment populated with several buildings (their functions 
were for instance, house, church, hotel, etc.; for the sake of simplicity, their descriptions were 
related with the shapes of their structure: rectangular, square, etc.). Figure 3-28 presents the 
simulated environment and the path taken by the agent to explore it. The agent started at location 
0, with an empty memory of entities, but with a single case of a past plan for visiting entities. At 
this location its visual field included objects E1 and E2, located respectively at locations 1 and 2. 
Then the agent generated goals for visiting them by adapting the goal visitEntity of the previous 
plan stored in memory. The resulting goals are: visitEntity(E1) and visitEntity(E2). E1 and E2 are 
entirely new for the agent (remember that the agent started with an empty memory of entities). 
Therefore, the surprise and curiosity that they may elicit when visited is maximum. However, E1 
is closer, so the hunger that may be felt when the agent is at location 1 is lower than in location 2. 
Hence, the agent ranks the goals as follows: visitEntity(E1) followed by visitEntity(E2). A plan is 
generated for the first goal. After its execution, the agent is at location 1 with a complete 
description of E1 stored in memory as a case (case 1 of the episodic memory of Figure 3-5) and 
an incomplete description of E2 (because it has not been visited yet and therefore it is not 
completely known – at least the function is still undetermined). In addition, the goal 
visitEntity(E1) is deleted from the queue of goals. At location 1, the agent perceives E2 and E3 
(E1 is also perceived, but it has just been visited). The agent generates the goal visitEntity(E3) for 
visiting E3. Notice that visitEntity(E2) is still in the queue of goals. E3 is similar to the previously 
visited E1 and therefore it feels now a low curiosity and it predicts feeling a low intensity of 
surprise when visiting it. Besides, hunger is expected to be higher in location 3 than in 2 (the 
place for recharging the battery is location 0). So, the goals are ranked as follows: visitEntity(E2) 
followed by visitEntity(E3). Once again, a plan is generated for visitEntity(E2) and then executed. 
The result is the completion of the description of E2 (case 2 of the episodic memory of Figure 
3-5). At location 2, the agent perceives E4, in addition to E3. E4 is similar to both E1 and E2. 
However, its EU is lower than that of E3 mainly because the agent expects a higher hunger in 
location 4 than in 3. Thus, E3 is visited. At this time, the agent has the episodic memory of Figure 
3-5. An interesting behaviour is observed later when the agent has to select between visiting E11 
and E12, which are exactly equal to E1 and E2, respectively, and at similar distances (E11 is 
slightly closer to location 0). Therefore, it might be expected that the agent would visit E11. 
However, this time the agent ranks the goals as follows: visitEntity(E12) and visitEntity(E11). 
This is because the agent has now more cases describing entities similar to E11 than to E12. 
Therefore, E12 is expected to elicit more surprise than E11, and hence the EU of visiting E12 is 
higher than that of visiting E11. 
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Figure 3-28 – A running session. 
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Chapter 4 
Experimental Evaluation 
xperimental evaluation of works on the exploration of unknown environments usually 
comprises two components: simulation tests and field tests. Simulation tests involve 
building softbots and then using them in a simulated environment to test theories and 
algorithms. Field tests require building real world robots and running them in real world 
environments. As we mentioned in Section 1.3, we decided to confine the experimental evaluation 
to the simulation approach. The main reason that lead us to make this decision is that the 
hypothesis we are testing in our thesis does not necessarily require field tests, although, just as 
any other claims related with real world application, field tests would provide a more complete 
evaluation of our thesis. Besides, any field test of our approach would require a larger project 
involving modules of pattern recognition, etc. This would necessarily involve people from other 
research fields. We do not reject this kind of evaluation. On the contrary, we would like to do it in 
the future. Conversely, simulation tests almost only offer us advantages: we can see the results of 
our approach much more quickly using softbots in simulated environments than robots in real 
environments; the research is almost independent from the constraints of time and expenses that 
are usually associated with using real robots; and, we could focus more specifically on the precise 
aspect of the problem which we were interested in. Hence, in conclusion, and considering that 
there would not be relevant advantages of field tests for our purposes but almost only 
disadvantages, and that simulation tests provide us various advantages, we decided to perform 
only simulation tests. To do that, we had to guarantee that the majority of the disadvantages of 
simulation tests were avoided, given that, to build softbots as models of real robots, we had to 
abstract the essential features of the robots being modelled, i.e., we had to make some 
simplifications especially in the modelling of sensors. This was accomplished by ensuring that the 
variables that influence the results in the real world are captured by the computer model, and that 
the simplifications that we made do not discard part of those variables. For instance, we made the 
assumption that the agents know their localization precisely, for example by using GPS, because 
this is not relevant to test the influence of emotion and motivations on exploration. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that exploration of unknown environments populated with 
entities can be robustly and efficiently performed by affective agents. If we want to confirm this 
hypothesis, there are a few experimental procedures we should do. 
First, we should define how exploration is evaluated. Following the research performed by 
others working on the problem of exploring unknown environments, there are two common 
dimensions for evaluating it: efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency may be measured by the 
amount of knowledge acquired from the environment per unit of time. An agent that is able to 
acquire more knowledge in a time t1 is more efficient than another agent that acquires the same 
knowledge in a time t2>t1, which means that, from another point of view, for the same time t3, 
the former agent is able to acquire more knowledge than the latter. On the other hand, 
effectiveness is related to acquiring the information of a finite environment correctly and 
completely. An effective explorer is able to explore the entire environment. An effective agent is 
more efficient than another if it explores the entire environment before the other. In our approach, 
knowledge is measured in three complementary but related dimensions: the amount of the 
E 
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occupancy map acquired, the number and the diversity of models of entities acquired. These three 
dimensions are profoundly related since, for the same environment, the more models of entities 
acquired, the higher the probability of having acquired more information about the occupancy 
map. Remember that the analogical description of the entities is used to build the occupancy map. 
Another important aspect to take into account in the evaluation of exploration is that it is a two 
step process, involving the selection of viewpoints so that the sensory measurements contain new 
and useful information, and the interpretation of the findings of the sensors so as to make accurate 
deductions about the state of the environment. The first step prepares the second. It is of primary 
importance for the efficiency and effectiveness of an exploration strategy. Selecting the 
viewpoints that provide maximum information at a low cost (energy or time) enables an efficient 
exploration task. On the other hand those viewpoints should be selected so that all the information 
of the environment is acquired. The map building step is more concerned with effectiveness, 
although it also influences efficiency. In fact, although it might involve more or less time to 
interpret the information provided by the sensors, this seems to have much less weight on 
efficiency, in comparison to the time taken to travel from place to place. On the contrary, the 
effectiveness of the exploration depends on the accuracy of the interpretation of the information 
provided by the sensors. Wrong interpretations may lead to inaccurate maps which means a partial 
failure in exploration. So, an evaluation of any exploration should take into account these distinct 
steps. 
Second, in order to know whether affective agents can perform exploration efficiently and 
effectively, we should not be confined to running an affective agent and measure its performance. 
Instead, we should compare its performance with ordinary agents (i.e., non affective agents). 
Furthermore, we should go further and study what variables influence its behaviour, i.e., which 
affective components make it perform better. We should therefore compare different exploration 
strategies. In our case, we should compare the strategies resulting from the combination of 
surprise, curiosity and hunger. 
Third, to be valid, this comparison should rely on good models of curiosity, surprise and 
hunger. We should therefore ensure that their computational models are faithful to those of 
humans. This means that the computational models of surprise, curiosity and hunger should be 
valid models by accurately capturing the features of human models. 
Finally, if we want to test the robustness of affective agents when performing exploration, we 
should test them with different amplitudes of the visual field in several environments of different 
complexities. 
We performed three experiments to address these issues. 
Experiment I addresses the third issue. However, we decided not to evaluate the computational 
model of curiosity nor that of hunger because they truly reflect the psychological theories which 
assign them a simple linearity. Actually, curiosity is usually equated with novelty and uncertainty, 
and hunger with the physiological need of an energy source. Novelty is peacefully computed by 
difference and uncertainty by entropy. The problem is with the complexity of the surprise model 
which seems to be non linear, according to some psychological theories. Therefore we tested the 
validity of the computational model of surprise. 
Experiment II is the main experiment of the thesis that confirms the hypothesis. It addresses the 
first, the second and the last issue. The first issue is addressed concerning only to the efficiency of 
the exploration strategy. It tests whether affective agents can perform better or as better as 
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ordinary agents. Moreover, it addresses the issue of determining which strategy is better and 
therefore it tests the influence of surprise, curiosity and hunger on the exploratory behaviour of 
the affective agent (second issue). This experiment also tests the robustness of the affect-based 
approach by assessing this influence in several environments (third issue). Besides considering the 
parameter of the exploration strategy and environment complexity, we also take into account the 
amplitude of the visual field of the agent. 
Experiment III addresses the first issue related with exploration effectiveness. While 
Experiment II is more concerned with the step related with the selection of viewpoints, i.e., with 
the exploration strategy, Experiment III addresses the evaluation of the map-building process 
which relies on the generation of assumptions. Therefore, we assess its main advantage, which is 
the possibility of building maps by exploiting the knowledge acquired in previous exploration 
phases in the same or in other environments rather than by actually exploring the environment. 
This process depends on the contents of the memory, namely on the memory of entities. We test 
this influence as well as that of the environment complexity. However, it was not our intention to 
study the influence of affect on this exploration stage, but mainly to reach conclusions about its 
accuracy. The goal was to know whether the model for generating expectations can estimate 
accurately the entities of the environment based on incomplete information of them. This is 
important because the selection of viewpoints relies on these estimated entities. If they are too 
different from real entities, the computation of estimated feelings might be wrong and therefore 
the results of Experiment II may be invalid. 
Not all aspects of the affective agents were tested. This is the case of the planner. This variable 
of the system was kept constant, i.e., the same planner was used in all the exploration sessions. 
However, it is obvious that the performance of exploration depends on the planner efficiency and 
effectiveness whose extensive evaluation is beyond the scope of this thesis. Besides, since the 
planner is constant, i.e., it is always the same planner, the corresponding variable that represents 
the planner is constant and hence does not interfere with the exploration task. The only 
involvement of the planner is in the ranking of goals which is affected by the component for 
autonomous generation and ranking of goals. According to the algorithm in Figure 3-18, a plan 
for a given goal could even not be generated if there is already one in memory. So, if we have to 
test the planner we should do it concerning the adaptation of plans. Anyway, a preliminary 
evaluation of this planner may be found in [Macedo & Cardoso, 2004a, 2004b]. Another part of 
the reasoning module that is constant is the module for autonomous generation and ranking of 
goals [Macedo & Cardoso, 2004d]. 
In conclusion, besides evaluating the computational model of surprise [Macedo & Cardoso, 
2001a; Macedo et al., 2004], we also evaluate the following relationships between the variables of 
our approach (Figure 4-1): the role of surprise, curiosity and hunger (the strategy) on the 
performance of the exploration of environments populated with entities [Macedo & Cardoso, 
2004c]; the role of environment complexity and amplitude of the visual field on the performance 
of the exploration of environments populated with entities; the sensitivity of the strategy to the 
environment complexity and visual field, and vice-versa, i.e., whether the influence of the strategy 
on time/energy required for exploring an environment depends on or is controlled or “gated” by 
the environment complexity and by the visual field, and vice-versa; the role of the size and to 
some extent of the diversity of the memory of entities on map-building by exploitation [Macedo 
& Cardoso, 2004e, 2005a]; and, the role of the environment complexity on map-building by 
exploitation. Any exploration task depends on the environment where it is performed. Therefore, 
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in order to reach conclusions about the influence of any variable of the system on the performance 
of exploration, the experiments are repeated in various environments with a different complexity 
or diversity. The study of these aspects is performed in single agent exploration. The next sections 
are devoted to all these assessments. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 – Causal model of the relationships among variables. 
4.1 Experiment I – Computational Model of Surprise 
This section describes the experiments carried out concerning the computational model of 
surprise. 
Experiment I-A is about our early model of surprise [Macedo & Cardoso, 2001a]. In this 
model, we proposed that the surprise “felt” by an agent elicited by an event X is proportional to 
the degree of unexpectedness of X (which in the model is based on the frequencies of events 
present in the memory of the agent). According to probability theory, the degree of expecting an 
event X to occur is its subjective probability P(X). Accordingly, the improbability of X, denoted 
by 1-P(X), defines the degree of not expecting X, or in short its unexpectedness. The intensity of 
surprise elicited by X should therefore be an (at least weakly) monotonically increasing function 
of 1-P(X). 
This early model of surprise exhibited several limitations, namely that a few situations of 
surprise were not explained correctly, such as that the occurrence of the highest expected event of 
a set of events seems to elicit no surprise. In order to reach a more complete computational model 
of surprise, we then performed a theoretical and an empirical study in which we consider other 
alternative ways of computing the intensity of surprise [Macedo et al., 2004]. These studies are 
described in Experiment I-B which suggests the actual computational model of surprise described 
in Section 3.1.3.3 - Computational Model of Surprise. Both experiments, as well as the 
computational model, result from the close collaboration between us and Rainer Reisenzein, one 
of the psychology researchers of the University of Greifswald, in Germany, who has been 
working on the subject of surprise [Meyer et al., 1997; Reisenzein, 1996, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 
2001, 2006; Reisenzein et al., 2006; Stiensmeier-Pelster et al., 1995]. 
Memory of entities 
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Exploration efficiency 
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4.1.1 Experiment I-A 
With respect to the early computational model of surprise, we performed two experiments, 
denoted A1 and A2, to test the following issues: (i) whether the intensity values generated by the 
artificial agent match those of humans under similar circumstances; (ii) the role of the amount of 
previous knowledge on the surprise intensity; (iii) whether the surprise intensity values generated 
by the artificial agent fall within the range of the surprise intensity values proposed in Ortony and 
Partridge’s model. 
4.1.1.1 Materials and Methods 
In both experiments, the participants (an artificial agent, called S-EUNE, whose emotional 
makeup was confined to surprise, and 60 humans with a mean age of 20.5 years) were presented 
with 40 quiz-like items. Experiment A1 was performed in an abstract domain with hedonically 
neutral events (see [Stiensmeier-Pelster et al., 1995], for a similar experiment with humans). Each 
“quiz item” consisted of several sequences of symbols. Some of the “quiz items” contained a 
single sequence in which one symbol was missing. Experiment A2 was performed in the domain 
of buildings. In this case, each “quiz item” consisted of the presentation of a building, and some 
items did not include information about its function (see [Reisenzein, 2000a], for a conceptually 
similar experiment with humans). In those cases where a symbol of the sequence (Experiment A1) 
or information about the function of the building (Experiment A2) was missing, the participants 
had to state their expectations for the missing symbol or the missing function. Subsequently, the 
“solution” (the missing information) of the “quiz item” was presented and the participants were 
asked to rate the intensity of surprise felt concerning the “solution”, as well as for the whole 
sequence/building. For “quiz items” ending with complete sequences or complete buildings, the 
participants had to rate the intensity of surprise felt about a specified element of the sequence or a 
specified piece of the building. Subsequently, they also indicated their passive expectations for 
that element/piece. The “quiz items” used in both experiments were selected on the basis of a 
previous questionnaire. They were equally distributed among the three sources of surprise 
described in Section 3.1.3.3 - Surprise, as well as among different intensities of surprise ranging 
from low to high. 
4.1.1.2 Results and Discussion 
Figure 4-2 presents the results of Experiment A1. It can be seen that the intensity of surprise 
computed for an element of a sequence by the agent (labelled S-EUNE-Piece) is close (average 
difference = 0.065, i.e., 6.5%) to the corresponding average intensity given by the human judges 
(Humans Average-Piece). Even better results (average difference = 0.022) were obtained for the 
surprise values computed for the whole sequence (S-EUNE-Whole and Humans Average-Whole). 
Figure 4-2 also shows that the standard deviations of the surprise intensities given by the 60 
humans (S.D.-Humans-Piece, S.D.-Humans-Whole) were less than 0.23 (for an element) and 0.18 
(for the whole sequence). 
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Figure 4-2 - Results of Experiment A1. 
 
Figure 4-3 presents the results of Experiment A2. In this experiment, S-EUNE answered the 
“quiz items” several times, each time with a different episodic memory. For the sake of 
simplicity, we reported only the results of three sessions, denoted by S-EUNE-I, IV and V (with I, 
IV and V denoting an increasingly large memory). It can be seen that the surprise values of the 
agent are not as close to the human judgments as in the previous domain. For instance, the 
average differences for S-EUNE-V were 0.47 (for a piece of a building) and 0.05 (for the whole 
building). This most probably happened because, in contrast to the previous, hedonically neutral 
domain, in the domain of buildings the knowledge of humans and of the agent is different. 
However, the results suggest that the larger the episodic memory, and the closer its probability 
distribution corresponds to the real world, the closer are the surprise values given by the agent and 
by the humans. For instance, S-EUNE-V (S-EUNE-V-Piece and S-EUNE-V-Whole) showed the 
best correspondence to the human ratings. This experiment also confirms to some extent the 
dependence of surprise on the contents and developmental stage of memory, suggested by studies 
that compared the surprise reactions of adults with those of children [Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 
1999]. 
Both experiments also confirmed that the values of surprise fall in the ranges predicted by 
Ortony and Partridge, with the exception that, in the case of the source of surprise corresponding 
to cell “[8]” of Table 3-1 (Section 3.1.3.3 - Background Models), the values are always 1, and, in 
the case of cell [4], SP=SA. 
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Figure 4-3 - Results of Experiment A2. 
4.1.2 Experiment I-B 
This experiment was preceded by a theoretical study of surprise functions. This theoretical study 
lead us to a list of surprise functions or surprise models that were then subjected to an 
experimental test using a nonlinear regression method [Motulsky & Cristopoulos, 2003]. This 
kind of experimental approach is especially appropriate to fit data to a model that defines a 
dependent variable as a function of an independent variable. Moreover, when there are several 
possible models as in this particular case of surprise models, nonlinear regression makes it 
possible to discriminate between those different models and hence to know which one fits the data 
better. The next section presents the theoretical study and the subsequent section the empirical test 
based on nonlinear regression. 
4.1.2.1 Theoretical Study of Surprise Functions 
We now address theoretically the question of how the intensity of surprise should be computed in 
the model. In humans, this problem has already been successfully solved by evolution; therefore, 
a reasonable approach is to model the agent's surprise function according to that of humans. 
Experimental evidence from human participants summarized in [Reisenzein, 2000b] suggests that 
the intensity of the surprise felt increases monotonically, and is closely correlated with, the degree 
of unexpectedness. On the basis of this evidence, we propose that the surprise “felt” by an agent 
elicited by an object/event X is proportional to the degree of unexpectedness of X (which in the 
model is based on the frequencies of objects/events present in the memory of the agent). 
According to probability theory, the degree of expecting an event X to occur is its subjective 
probability P(X). Accordingly, the improbability of X, denoted by 1-P(X), defines the degree of 
not expecting X, or in short, its unexpectedness. The intensity of surprise elicited by X should 
therefore be an (at least weakly) monotonically increasing function of 1-P(X). As a first approach, 
this function (S1) could simply be taken to be the identity function, that is, the intensity of 
surprise could simply be equated with the degree of unexpectedness: 
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However, on second thoughts, S1 does not seem to faithfully capture the relation between 
unexpectedness and surprise. For example, consider a political election with three candidates A, B 
and C, where the probability of being elected is P(A) = P(B) = P(C) = 0.333. In this case, one 
would not be surprised if either A, B or C is elected. Therefore, in this situation at least, S1 fails. 
To arrive at a more adequate surprise function, consider the case where there are only two 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternative events, X and Y (i.e., not X). Here, intuition 
suggests that X is not surprising as long as P(X) ≥ 0.5, whereas X is surprising for P(X) < 0.5, and 
increasingly more so the more P(X) approaches 0. This intuition is captured by the following 
surprise function: 
 
⎩⎨
⎧
≥⇐
<⇐−
=
5.0)(0
5.0)()(1
),(2
XP
XPXP
XAgtS
 
(21) 
 
To deal with sets of more than two mutually exclusive events, S2 could be generalized as 
follows (where n denotes the number of events in the set): 
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However, it may be more adequate to set the upper limit of surprise not to 1, but to 
n
1 : 
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Yet another possible surprise function, suggested by further reflection on the above election 
example, is the following: 
 
)()(),(5 XPYPXAgtS −=  (24) 
 
In this formula, Y is the event with the highest probability of a set of mutually exclusive events. 
S5 implies that, within each set of mutually exclusive events, there is always one (Y) whose 
occurrence is entirely unsurprising, namely the event with the maximum probability in the set 
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(P(Y)). For the other events X in the set, the surprise intensity caused by their occurrence is the 
difference between P(Y) and their probability P(X). This difference can be interpreted as the 
amount by which P(X) has to be increased for X to become unsurprising. For instance, in the 
election example considered earlier, where P(A) = P(B )= P(C) = 0.333, S5 correctly predicts that 
one would not be surprised if either A, B or C is elected. By contrast, if P(A) = 0.55, P(B) = 0.40 
and P(C) = 0.05, S5 predicts that the surprise caused by B is 0.15 and for C is 0.50, whereas for A 
it is 0. S5 also implies that maximum surprise, that is, S(X) = 1, occurs only if P(Y) = 1 and 
hence, by implication, P(X) = 0 (in the Ortony and Partridge model, this corresponds to situations 
“[1]”, “[2]”, “[5]” and “[6]”, where the disconfirmed event Y is immutable, i.e., its probability is 
1). Therefore, S5 seems to correctly describe surprise in the election example. Confirming this 
impression, S5 also acknowledges the intuition behind S2: if there are only two alternative events 
X and Y (= not X), S5 predicts, like S2, that X should be unsurprising for P(X) ≥ 0.5, for in this 
case X is also the event with the highest probability in the set. In contrast, for P(X) < 0.5, S5 
predicts that X should be surprising and increasingly so the more P(X) approaches 0, with 
maximum possible surprise (S(X) = 1) being experienced for P(X) = 0. 
Yet another possible surprise function (S6) is suggested by Information Theory [Shannon, 
1948]: 
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According to S6, surprise about X is 0 when P(X) = 1 and increases monotonically with 
decreasing P(X). In these respects, then, S6 is similar to S1. However, in contrast to S1, S6 is a 
nonlinear function of P(X), and it is not normalized. For instance, for P(X) = 0.3, S6(X) = 1.7 
(bits), for P(X) = 0.01, S6(X) = 6.6, and for P(X) = 0.001, S6(X) = 9.9. In fact, there is no upper 
limit of S(X): for P(X)=0, S6(X) = +∝. To overcome this problem, we propose the following 
normalized function S7 (stipulating the upper limit to be 10): 
 
10
)(
1log
),(7
2 XPXAgtS =
 
(26) 
 
Finally, yet another surprise function (S8), a nonlinear modification of S5, is suggested by the 
results of the experiment, reported below, performed with humans in the domain of elections and 
sports games: 
 
))()(1(log),(8 2 XPYPXAgtS −+=  (27) 
 
This function retains the essential features of S5: when X is the most expected event (X = Y), 
then S8(X) = 0; when X is different from Y, S8(X) > 0 and increases monotonically with the 
difference between P(Y) and P(X); and S8(X) is maximal (= 1) if P(Y) = 1 and P(X) = 0. In 
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addition, however, S8 also captures the nonlinearity of the surprise function suggested by the 
experiments with humans reported below. 
4.1.2.2 Empirical Study of Surprise Functions 
To test the validity of the proposed surprise functions, we conducted an experiment that involved 
two steps. In step 1, we collected ratings of probability and surprise intensity from humans in two 
domains, political elections and sports games. In step 2, artificial agents that implemented the 
different surprise functions were provided with the probability judgments obtained from the 
humans and, on this basis, computed surprise intensity values. These predicted surprise values 
were then compared with the actual surprise ratings provided by the human participants. 
Step 1 was conducted with ten participants (mean age 29 years). They were presented with 20 
brief scenarios, 10 of which described political elections with 2-4 candidates (see Figure 4-4), 
whereas the other 10 scenarios described sports games with 2-4 teams or players (see [Reisenzein, 
2000a] for a conceptually similar experiment using knowledge questions). Political elections and 
sports games were chosen because we thought that these domains are familiar to most people and 
that the participants would have no problems to state their probabilities and their surprise about 
outcomes. In addition, in contrast to the domain of buildings used in a previous study reported in 
[Macedo & Cardoso, 2001a], elections and sport games allow for an easier matching of the 
knowledge of artificial agents with that of humans. Part of the scenarios did not include 
information about the actual outcome of the election or game, whereas the remaining scenarios 
included this information. For scenarios without outcome information, the participants were asked 
to first state their expectations for all possible outcomes and to rate their probability on a 1-100 
scale. Subsequently, they were informed about the outcome of the election or game and their 
surprise about the outcome was rated, first on a qualitative intensity scale, and then again on a 
quantitative intensity scale within the chosen qualitative level. By contrast, for the scenarios that 
included outcome information, participants first rated the intensity of surprise about the outcome 
and subsequently their (passive) expectations regarding the outcome. An example of a scenario is 
shown in Figure 4-4. 
 
 
Figure 4-4 - Example of a test item. 
 
In step 2 of the study, the probability ratings obtained from each participant in step 1 were 
delivered to eight artificial agents, each of which implemented one of the eight surprise functions 
Given the following prognosis for the election of candidate A, 
B and C for a political position: 
 
Victory of A=45%; Victory of B=45%; Victory of C=10% 
 
a) What are your personal expectations regarding the victory 
of candidates A, B and C? 
b) Assume that candidate A won the election and rate the 
intensity of surprise that you would feel. 
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S1-S8 described earlier. Using these functions, the agents computed surprise intensity values from 
the probabilities. These predicted surprise values were then compared with the surprise ratings of 
the humans obtained in step 1. 
The data obtained in the first step of the experiment suggested two qualitative conclusions. 
First, the occurrence of the most expected event of the set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
events did not elicit surprise in humans. For example, when the expectations for the election of 
three political candidates A, B and C were P(A) = 0.55, P(B) = 0.40, and P(C) = 0.05, the 
participants felt no surprise about the election of candidate A. This was also true when two or 
more candidates had equal maximal probabilities. For example, when P(A) = 0.40, P(B) = 0.40 
and P(C) = 0.20, participants were not surprised when either A or B was elected. Second, beyond 
the point of zero surprise, the surprise function appeared to be nonlinear. For example, relatively 
high surprise was indicated when candidate C won the elections in both of the above situations, 
although it was still higher for P(C) = 0.05 than for P(C) = 0.20. 
To compare the surprise values generated by the artificial agents and the surprise ratings 
provided by the human judges, the following fit indices were used: the root mean squared 
difference, the mean absolute difference, and the Pearson correlation. The results of these 
comparisons are shown in Table 4-1, separately for the 10 participants (H1, …, H10) and for six 
of the eight artificial agents (A1,…,A8) (the surprise functions S6 and S7 were not included 
because they have a different range to the human ratings and therefore computation of the 
absolute and squared differences is not meaningful). It can be seen from Table 4-1 that, regardless 
of which fit index is used, agent A8 (which implemented surprise function S8) was the one with 
the best fit to the human ratings: it had on average, the lowest root mean squared differences (Ms= 
0.10), the lowest absolute differences (Md= 0.06), and the highest correlation to these ratings 
(Mr= 0.98). A8 was closely followed by A5 (Ms = 0.21; Md = 0.08; Mr = 0.97), whereas agents 
A1 and A2 had the comparatively worst fit values (for instance, A1 had Ms = 0.35; Md = 0.26; Mr 
= 0.81). The main reason for the bad performance of A1 was apparently that it failed in the case 
of the occurrence of the most expected event of the set: A1 still predicts a positive surprise value 
(1-P(X)) for this case, whereas humans do not feel surprised by the occurrence of this event. 
However, in other situations, A1 performed well. 
In conclusion, the empirical study of the surprise functions suggests 
))()(1(log)(8 2 XPYPXS −+=  as the most appropriate surprise function for the domains of 
political elections and sport games, although S5 (the linear counterpart of S8) is a very close 
contender. However, before more definitive conclusions can be drawn, additional tests need to be 
performed in other domains, as well as with yet other possible surprise functions (e.g., [Shackle, 
1969]). 
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Table 4-1 - Statistical comparison of the surprise values computed by the artificial agents 
and those provided by the humans (s = root mean squared difference, d = mean absolute 
difference, and r = Pearson correlation). 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 M 
s 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.35 
d 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 
A1 
r 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.81 
s 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31 
d 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
A2 
r 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.81 
s 0.22 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.30 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.22 
d 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 
A3 
r 0.95 0.85 0.89 0.94 0.81 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.91 
s 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.44 
d 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.28 
A4 
r 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.90 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.92 
s 0.22 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.21 
d 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 
A5 
r 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 
s 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.10 
d 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 
A8 
r 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.07 0.07 0.97 0.98 
 
4.2 Experiment II – The role of surprise, curiosity and hunger on exploration 
performance 
This experiment tests the role of surprise, curiosity and hunger on the performance of the 
exhaustive exploration of environments populated with entities. In fact, this study corresponds to 
the study of the influence of those feelings on the exploration strategy of affective agents. The 
seven strategies that result from the combinations of the three abovementioned feelings are 
compared with each other and also with a strategy that relies on undirected (random) exploration 
as well as with another that is based on a classical exploration strategy used by other authors that 
takes the distance to traverse and the amount of information expected to be acquired into account 
[Stachniss & Burgard, 2003]. This strategy was adapted so that it can be applied to environments 
populated with entities. The experiment involves running the agent in various environments of 
different complexities. 
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As we mentioned above, the performance of exploring unknown environments populated with 
entities may be measured in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency may be measured in 
terms of the amount of knowledge acquired in a period of time. This amount of knowledge may 
be measured by the number of entities visited (i.e., the number or percentage of entity models 
acquired) and/or by the number or percentage of different entities acquired (i.e., the number or 
percentage of different entity models acquired) (notice that two distinct entities may be totally 
equal except for the identifier). Another way to measure the amount of knowledge obtained could 
be based on the amount (for instance, number or percentage of known cells) of the occupancy 
map acquired or, from a different perspective, the inconsistency between the map built and the 
real map. In conclusion, we opted to report here these three different ways of measuring the 
amount of knowledge acquired which are: the amount (number or percentage of known cells) of 
the occupancy map acquired, the number of entities visited (i.e., the number or percentage of 
entity models acquired), the number or percentage of different entities acquired (i.e., the number 
or percentage of different entity models acquired). Since the simplifications that we made in our 
simulations ensure that the agents acquire the map with no errors when they explore the 
environment exhaustively, i.e., the occupancy map and the real map are fully consistent after 
exploring the whole environment whatever the strategy considered, the difference relies solely on 
the time elapsed and energy consumed to perform such exploration task. So, in this case of the full 
exploration of an environment, performance may be measured by computing the time elapsed and 
the energy required to complete the exploration of the environment, i.e., to acquire all the 
knowledge of the environment. In order to simplify the experiment we consider that the agent 
consumes a unit of energy per unit of time, which enables us to merge these two variables into a 
single one: exploration performance (more specifically: exploration efficiency). Furthermore, the 
agent consumes a unit of energy per cell traversed. Considering that we have three different ways 
of measuring the amount of knowledge acquired, performance may be measured by computing 
the time elapsed and the energy required to acquire completely the occupancy map (time elapsed 
and the energy required to get information about all the cells of an environment), the time elapsed 
and the energy required to visit all the entities (time elapsed and the energy required to acquire all 
entity models of an environment), and the time elapsed and the energy required to visit all 
different entities (time elapsed and the energy required to acquire all different entity models of an 
environment). These are the dependent variables (or response variables) of the experiment. This 
is, therefore, a multivariate study.  
One of those strategies used by the agent, strategy 9, is based on the distance to be travelled by 
the agent and the expected information gain which is defined by the entropy [Stachniss & 
Burgard, 2003]. This is the classical strategy used by other authors. Eight of these strategies result 
from considering the combinations of the parameters of Equation 18. The possible combinations 
of these parameters and the correspondent strategies are presented in Table 4-2. With strategy 1, 
the agent performs undirected exploration (random) [Thrun, 1992a]. With strategy 2, the agent 
performs directed exploration based solely on hunger. With strategy 3 it performs directed 
exploration based solely on curiosity. With strategy 4, the agent performs directed exploration 
based on curiosity/interest and hunger. With strategy 5, the agent performs directed exploration 
based only on surprise. With strategy 6, it performs directed exploration based on surprise and 
hunger. With strategy 7, it performs directed exploration based on surprise and curiosity. With 
strategy 8, it performs directed exploration based on surprise, curiosity, and hunger. 
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Table 4-2 - Combinations of the parameters of Equation 18 and the correspondent 
strategies. 
Strategy α1 - Surprise α2 - Curiosity α3 - Hunger
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1 
3 0 1 0 
4 0 1 1 
5 1 0 0 
6 1 0 1 
7 1 1 0 
8 1 1 1 
 
The simulated environments in which the agent was run were of three different categories of 
complexity (low, medium, and high). The complexity of an environment is defined by a few 
features such as: the diversity of entities it contains, the number of entities with similar structure 
and/or function. Environments within the low complexity category contain only three different 
entities and only two kinds of functions, which means that of those three different objects, two 
share the function and differ only with respect to the structure. The environments of medium 
complexity include an average of seven different entities and an average of four different 
functions. The environments of high complexity include no completely similar entities, although a 
few of these entities have a common structure or function, and an average of five functions. All 
the environments are of the same size and all of them contain the same number of entities 
(twelve). The twelve possible locations for entities are also kept in all the environments. These 
features (environment size, locations of the entities, and number of entities) are constant in order 
to avoid introducing more variability in the variable “environment complexity” because it might 
obscure the influence of the exploration strategy on exploration performance. Actually, changing 
any of these features results in an obvious change of the time and energy required to explore 
completely an environment. For more details about the environments see Appendix A. 
The experiment procedure consists simply in running an agent in twelve simulated 
environments, each time with a different strategy for exploration, starting from the same location. 
Each run of the agent in each environment with each strategy is performed twice times, one with a 
low visual range and another with a large visual range. Considering that an exploration 
problem/task10 is defined by the pair environment-visual range, this corresponds to running an 
agent with a specific strategy in 24 exploration problems. At the end of each running session we 
collected information about the time and energy required to accomplish the exploration task, i.e., 
the time and energy required to acquire the information of all the cells, of all the entities, and of 
all different entities. As mentioned above, these are the dependent variables (the response 
variables), while the strategy is an independent variable (also called factor or treatment). Although 
other approaches might be taken, we consider that the exploration problems are the experimental 
units (participants or subjects). Since each exploration problem is executed under every strategy, 
                                                     
10 From now on we will use the term exploration problem as synonym of exploration task. 
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i.e., each participant gets each of the treatments or conditions of the independent variable(s) or 
levels of the factor(s), this is a repeated measures experimental design (also called within subjects 
experimental design). Repeated measures designs allow us to obtain a lot of information from a 
relatively small number of subjects by gathering several pieces of data from each subject [P. 
Cohen, 1995; D. Cox & Reid, 2000; Dowdy et al., 2004; Mason et al., 2003; Montgomery, 2001; 
Murphy & Myors, 2004; I. Weiner, 2003]. All other things being equal, there is less random 
variability in a set of repeated measures than in a set of independent measures, each obtained from 
a different subject. Furthermore, repeated measures designs allow us to take advantage of the fact 
that the mean of several correlated observations is a more reliable piece of information about a 
subject than a single observation, which is all we would have in a between-subjects experimental 
design. Finally, repeated measures designs allow for the identification and removal of sources of 
variance in scores that are treated as error in a between-subject design. In particular, repeated 
measures designs allow for estimation and removal of systematic subject effects that cannot be 
estimated or controlled in typical between-subject designs. A consequence of this is that the 
power to detect the effects of within-subjects experimental factors (in our case confined to the 
strategy) is increased compared with testing in a between-subjects design. It is worth of notice 
that, as mentioned before, there are variables in this experiment that may exert some influence on 
the response variables, but for purposes of this experiment these are not of interest and are held at 
a specific level such as: location of the entities (for the purpose of this experiment we decided to 
perform all experimental runs holding the location of the entities constant), number of entities in 
the environment (twelve), number of other agents in the environment (0), battery level (1000 
units), the planner, etc. 
Considering this experiment information, we might conceive at least three different 
experimental designs depending on the factors considered. 
The main factor of our experiment is the strategy. There are nine levels for this factor, each one 
corresponding to one of the different strategies whose means we want to compare. The 
exploration problem may be another factor, although we may not consider its effects. In this case, 
we have a one factor with repeated measures experimental design (described in Section 4.2.1). In 
order to statistically analyse the observed data produced by those runs of the agent using different 
exploration strategies in different environments, we make use of the one way analysis of variance 
with repeated measures. 
However, we may want to know the effects of the problem in addition to the effects of the 
strategy as well as the effects of their interaction on the exploration performance of the agent. In 
this case, we have a two factor factorial experimental design with repeated measures. This two 
way repeated measure design may in turn be split into the following two slightly different designs 
depending on whether or not the blocking experimental principle is applied to the exploration 
problem factor. This principle may be applied in order to reduce the variance caused by the use of 
environments with different complexities or by the different visual ranges considered. In this case 
these variables may be considered as nuisance factors. This yields the following slightly different 
two factor factorial repeated measures designs: repeated measures design with the problem as a 
factor (the one-line-per-level setup - without blocking), repeated measures design with blocking 
(the environment complexity or the visual range might be used to group the subjects – exploration 
problems) (described in Section 4.2.2). 
The strategy is undoubtedly a fixed factor. However, in order to generalize the results to all the 
exploration problems we might choose them randomly from a population of exploration problems. 
164  Chapter 4. Experimental Evaluation 
 
In this case we have a two factor factorial experimental design with a random and a fixed factor 
which may be seen as a three factor factorial experimental design (described in Section 4.2.3). 
We might also consider a three factor factorial experimental design in which the strategy, the 
environment and the visual range would be the factors. However, since this would be an 
unreplicated factorial experiment, i.e., there would be a single observation per cell (condition), we 
would have to use the technique of not considering one of those variables so that the data can be 
statistically analysed [Montgomery, 2001]. Therefore, this procedure would transform the three 
way design into the two way design. 
The next subsections are devoted to the different experimental designs considered and the 
respective statistical analysis. For the first of those experimental designs, we begin with the 
calculation of a number of summary statistics such as the mean, median, standard deviation, etc., 
and by creating informative graphical displays of the data such as histograms, box plots, and 
stem-and-leaf plots. The aim at this stage is to describe the general distributional properties of the 
data, to identify any unusual observations (outliers) or any unusual patterns of observations that 
may cause problems for later analyses (inference analyses) to be carried out on the data. 
Following the initial exploration of the data, statistical tests are applied to answer specific 
questions or to test particular hypotheses about the data. 
4.2.1 One Way Repeated Measures Design 
This experimental design considers the strategy as the within subject factor. Each treatment 
corresponds to one of the nine levels of the factor. The layout of this experiment is shown in 
Table 4-3. Each di,j denotes the observation made with subject/problem i under condition/strategy 
j. 
Table 4-3 – Experiment design. 
Strategies  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 d1,1 d1,2 d1,3 d1,4 d1,5 d1,6 d1,7 d1,8 d1,9 
2 d2,1 d2,2 d2,3 d2,4 d2,5 d2,6 d2,7 d2,8 d2,9 
…          
23 d23,1 d23,2 d23,3 d23,4 d23,5 d23,6 d23,7 d23,8 d23,9 S
ub
je
ct
s 
(P
ro
bl
em
s)
 
24 d24,1 d24,2 d24,3 d24,4 d24,5 d24,6 d24,7 d24,8 d24,9 
 
This design allows us to test the null hypothesis about the equality of the strategy factor effects: 
H0: α1 = α2 =…= α9 = 0 (there is no strategy effect) 
H1: at least one αi ≠ 0, i=1,…,9 
 
In other words, this factorial design allows us to answer the following question: what is the 
effect of the strategy? 
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We begin the analysis of the data by examining relevant summary statistics, and a variety of 
graphical displays. 
The descriptive statistics (presented in detail in Appendix B) shows, for example, that the 
median of time/energy to explore the environment and all the entities is shorter for the strategy 
based on hunger. Ignoring this strategy, we see that the median is shorter for the strategy based on 
surprise and hunger followed closely by the classical strategy and then by the strategy based on 
the combination of surprise, curiosity and hunger, and the strategy based on the combination of 
curiosity and hunger. Strategies based on surprise or curiosity, either alone or combined have 
higher medians. A similar conclusion is reached when either the mean or the 5% trimmed mean is 
used as the measure of location. The “spread” of the exploration performances as measured by the 
interquartile range (IQR) appears to vary with strategy. Other measures of spread, such as the 
standard deviation and the range of the sample, confirm this. Finally, we find that the skewness 
shape index indicates some degree of negative or positive skewness for a few strategies. We also 
find that the kurtosis shape index indicates distributions that are more pointed or more flattened 
than a normal distribution for a few strategies. 
The box plots are shown in Figure 4-5, Figure 4-6, and Figure 4-7 (an alternative to the box plot 
for displaying sample distributions is the histogram, which are provided in Appendix B together 
with the quantile-quantile probability plots (Q-Q plot)). These box plots are useful in an informal 
assessment of both the homogeneity and normality assumptions of ANOVA. Here, the heights of 
the boxes, which measure the inter-quartile ranges, appear to vary across strategy. Consequently, 
the homogeneity of variance assumption seems to fail. And the distribution within the strategies 
appears be nonsymmetric, suggesting that the normality assumption is also unacceptable (a better 
way of assessing the normality assumption is presented later). 
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Figure 4-5 – Box plot for the time/energy required to explore the environment completely. 
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Figure 4-6 - Box plot for the time/energy required to explore all the entities of the 
environment. 
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Figure 4-7 – Box plot for the time/energy required to explore all different entities of the 
environment. 
Chapter 4. Experimental Evaluation  167 
 
The evidence from both the summary statistics for the observations in each strategy and the box 
plot is that the distributions of the exploration performances in the underlying population are 
nonsymmetric and that their variances vary between the strategies. 
We can now move on to formally assess the effect of the strategy on exploration performance. 
The results from both the ANOVA and MANOVA approaches to analyzing repeating measures 
were obtained with SPSS 13.0 and are shown in Table 4-4 and Table 4-6. 
The significance tests are divided into two types, Multivariate Tests and Averaged Tests (which 
are also commonly termed Univariate). The Multivariate Tests in the SPSS printout give four 
significance tests, each with probability values, labelled Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Trace, Hotelling’s 
Trace, and Roy’s Largest Root. Generally, they are more conservative and give larger probability 
values than the Averaged or Univariate Tests, although occasionally this will not be the case. 
The one-way ANOVA table is shown in Table 4-4. The “Error(strat)” line in this univariate 
summary table is the error term (which, for one-factor within-subjects designs, Keppel [Keppel, 
1991] referred to as the A × S term and many other texts refer to as the “treatment by subject” 
term), and the line with the factor name (in this case, “strat”) offers the sum of squares, degrees of 
freedom, mean square, and significance level for the test of the within-subjects factor, “strategy” 
(encoded as “strat”). The required F-test is shown under the rows labelled “Sphericity Assumed”. 
Here we find a significant effect of “strat” on the three exploration performance measures: 
F(8,184) = 58.77, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore the environment completely (encoded 
as “teenv”); F(8,184) = 5.767, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore all the entities (encoded as 
“teent”); and F(8,184) = 33.747, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore all different entities 
(encoded as “teent”). Specifically, “strat” accounts for 71.9% of the variance in the time/energy to 
explore the environment completely, 20% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all the 
entities, and 59.5% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all different entities. 
The univariate approach to analysis of variance for within-subjects factors is known to result in 
positively biased F tests, which means statistical significance may be found too often. The 
positive bias is primarily due to violations of the Univariate Test’s assumption of homogeneity of 
the variances of differences among pairs of treatment measures (i.e., between pairs of levels of the 
within-subjects factor). This assumption is also referred to as the sphericity assumption. Thus, we 
test whether evidence of violation of the sphericity assumption is present using the Mauchly 
sphericity test. As shown in Table 4-5, this test is statistically significant (X2(35) = 258.701, p < 
0.001 for the time/energy to explore the environment completely – “teenv” -, X2(35) = 776.493, p 
< 0.001 for the time/energy to explore all the entities – “teent” -, and and X2(35) =212.507, p < 
0.001 for the time/energy to explore all different entities – “teent”), which suggests that the 
sphericity assumption had been violated. The Multivariate Tests do not make this sphericity 
assumption and so are immune from the positive biasing effect when it is violated. However, as a 
result, they are somewhat more conservative than the Univariate Test, as noted earlier, resulting in 
tests with reduced power [Huynh & Feldt, 1976]. Anyway, we will provide them later. An 
alternative to using the Multivariate Tests is the use of a correction in the degrees of freedom, 
permitting a choice of a larger critical F value, which, if properly selected, avoids the positive bias 
problem. 
Table 4-4 presents three estimates of the correction factors (the Greenhouse-Geisser due to 
[Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959], the Huynh-Feldt [Huynh & Feldt, 1976] and the Lower Bounds). 
Giving that the ordinary univariate F test leads to statistical significance, we should now turn to 
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one of these more conservative (likely too conservative) tests. Following the procedure suggested 
for instance by [Keppel, 1991; J. Myers, 1979], we turn to the Lower Bound test. The within 
subject effect that tested significant under the assumption of sphericity remain significant with 
this test (see Table 4-4 under the rows “Lower-bound”): F(1.00, 23.00) = 58.77, p < 0.001 for the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely, F(1.00, 23.00) = 5.767, p = 0.025 for the 
time/energy to explore all the entities, and F(1.00, 23.00) = 33.747, p < 0.001 for the time/energy 
to explore all different entities. Giving this statistical significance, we need not to use the other 
two conservative tests. Anyway, the within subject effect that tested significant under the 
assumption of sphericity and with the Lower Bound test remain highly significant even after these 
corrections: using Huynh-Feldt correction factor, F(1.647, 37.874) = 58.77, p < 0.001 for the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely, F(1.013, 23.291) = 5.767, p = 0.024 for the 
time/energy to explore all the entities, and F(2.409, 55.406) = 33.747, p < 0.001 for the 
time/energy to explore all different entities; using Greenhouse-Geisser correction factor, F(1.555, 
35.759) = 58.77, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore the environment, F(1.011, 23.256) = 
5.767, p = 0.024 for the time/energy to explore all the entities, and F(2.174, 49.996) = 33.747, p < 
0.001 for the time/energy to explore all different entities. 
The Multivariate Tests are shown in Table 4-6. As noted earlier, these give four commonly 
used significance tests labelled Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Trace, Hotelling’s Trace, and Roy’s Largest 
Root. The results for testing the main effect of “strat” are identical to those obtained from the 
univariate ANOVA model: the four tests of significance for the strategy effect given by the 
Multivariate Tests, Pillai’s Trace (value = 0.944; F(24.00, 552.00)=10.565, p < 0.001), Wilks’ 
Lambda (value = 0.218; F(24.00, 528.457) = 15.219, p < 0.001), Hotelling’s Trace (value = 
2.847; F(24.00, 542.00) = 21.429, p < 0.001), and Roy’s Largest Root (value = 2.556; 
F(8.00,184.00) = 58.787, p < 0.001), indicate that the strategy has a significant effect. The Partial 
Eta Squared values for strategy show that it explains quite a lot of variation in exploration 
performance. 
All the analyses reported above have established that the exploration performance is affected by 
the strategy. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis. The F test tell us only if all the group means 
are roughly equal or if there are some significant differences among them. In the latter case, it 
does not tell us which groups are different from which other groups. Therefore, we now undertake 
further tests to determine which particular group means differ. Since we have no prior hypotheses 
about the group differences and we are simply exploring the data to ascertain which group 
differences are driving the significance of the overall F test, we conducted post hoc comparisons. 
The resulting multiple comparison output for the strategy factor is shown in Table 4-7, Table 4-8, 
and Table 4-9. For each comparison type and pair of groups (strategies), the Pairwise 
Comparisons table provides an estimate of the difference in means and the p-value from a 
statistical test of zero group difference (in parentheses). Additional information, such as the 
standard error of that estimator and a confidence interval for the mean difference, is provided by 
the original table presented in Appendix B. 
The profile plots (Figure 4-8, Figure 4-9, and Figure 4-10) show the model-estimated means for 
the nine strategies. Together with the multiple comparison output, the plots provide us the 
following results. As it can be seen strategy 1 (random) is significantly (p < 0.001) the worst 
strategy considering the three exploration performance measures (time/energy to explore the 
environment completely, time/energy to explore all the entities, and the time/energy to explore all 
different entities). On the contrary, strategy 2 (hunger-based) is significantly (p < 0.001) the best 
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strategy considering the three exploration performance measures. However, as we will note later, 
this strategy depends heavily on the position of the entities in the environment (this factor was 
kept constant in our experiment). 
 
Table 4-4 - Univariate ANOVA tables for testing the main effects of the within-subject 
factor (strategy) on the exploration performance. 
Univariate Tests  
Source Measure  Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 252678.317 8 31584.790 58.770 0.000 0.719 470.159 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 252678.317 1.555 162521.447 58.770 0.000 0.719 91.372 1.000
Huynh-Feldt 252678.317 1.647 153446.105 58.770 0.000 0.719 96.776 1.000
teenv 
Lower-bound 252678.317 1.000 252678.317 58.770 0.000 0.719 58.770 1.000
Sphericity 
Assumed 950894.351 8 118861.794 5.767 0.000 0.200 46.138 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 950894.351 1.011 940422.587 5.767 0.024 0.200 5.831 0.637
Huynh-Feldt 950894.351 1.013 939006.521 5.767 0.024 0.200 5.840 0.637
teent 
Lower-bound 950894.351 1.000 950894.351 5.767 0.025 0.200 5.767 0.633
Sphericity 
Assumed 282320.236 8 35290.029 33.747 0.000 0.595 269.977 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 282320.236 2.174 129878.039 33.747 0.000 0.595 73.357 1.000
Huynh-Feldt 282320.236 2.409 117195.996 33.747 0.000 0.595 81.295 1.000
strat 
tedent 
Lower-bound 282320.236 1.000 282320.236 33.747 0.000 0.595 33.747 1.000
Sphericity 
Assumed 98887.417 184 537.432      
Greenhouse-
Geisser 98887.417 35.759 2765.387      
Huynh-Feldt 98887.417 37.874 2610.965      
teenv 
Lower-bound 98887.417 23.000 4299.453      
Sphericity 
Assumed 3792198.038 184 20609.772      
Greenhouse-
Geisser 3792198.038 23.256 163062.448      
Huynh-Feldt 3792198.038 23.291 162816.912      
teent 
Lower-bound 3792198.038 23.000 164878.176      
Sphericity 
Assumed 192412.496 184 1045.720      
Greenhouse-
Geisser 192412.496 49.996 3848.568      
Huynh-Feldt 192412.496 55.406 3472.771      
Error(strat) 
tedent 
Lower-bound 192412.496 23.000 8365.761      
a  Computed using alpha = 0.05 
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Table 4-5 - Mauchly’s test for testing the sphericity assumption and correction factors. 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity(b)  
Epsilon(a) 
Within Subjects 
Effect Measure
Mauchly's 
W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
teenv .000 258.701 35 .000 .194 .206 .125
teent .000 776.493 35 .000 .126 .127 .125strat 
tedent .000 212.507 35 .000 .272 .301 .125
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
a  May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in 
the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b  Design: Intercept  
Within Subjects Design: strat 
 
Table 4-6 - Multivariate ANOVA output for testing the main effect of the within-subject 
factor on exploration performance. 
Multivariate(c.d)  
Within 
Subjects Effect  Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Pillai's Trace .944 10.565 24.000 552.000 .000 .315 253.549 1.000
Wilks' 
Lambda .218 15.219 24.000 528.457 .000 .398 349.796 1.000
Hotelling's 
Trace 2.847 21.429 24.000 542.000 .000 .487 514.285 1.000
strat 
Roy's Largest 
Root 2.556 58.787(b) 8.000 184.000 .000 .719 470.300 1.000
a  Computed using alpha = 0.05 
b The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a Lower Bound on the significance level. 
c Design: Intercept  
   Within Subjects Design: strat 
d Tests are based on averaged variables. 
 
Consider first the time/energy to explore the environment completely. Excluding strategy 2, 
strategy 6 (based on surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, followed closely by 
strategy 9 (classical strategy). However, this difference is no significant at the 0.05 level (p = 
0.098) but it is at the 0.1 level. All the other strategies are significantly worse than strategy 6. The 
next strategies in the ranking are strategies 4 (curiosity and hunger) and 8 (surprise, curiosity and 
hunger), whose difference is not significant. The difference between strategy 6 and these two 
strategies is significant: p = 0.006 for strategy 4 and p = 0.014 for strategy 8. However, these are 
not significantly different from strategy 9. There is no significant difference between strategies 3 
(curiosity), 5 (surprise) and 7 (curiosity and surprise). This means that those strategies that take 
hunger, either alone or combined with surprise and/or curiosity, into account are significantly 
better than those strategies that take only surprise and/or curiosity into account. 
Considering the time/energy to explore all the entities, excluding strategy 2, strategy 6 (surprise 
and hunger) generated the highest performance, followed closely by strategy 9 (classical strategy). 
However, this difference is not significant at the 0.05 level but it is at the 0.08 level. All the other 
strategies are significantly worse than strategy 6. The next strategies in the ranking are strategies 8 
(surprise, curiosity and hunger) and 4 (curiosity and hunger), whose difference is not significant. 
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The difference between strategy 6 and these two strategies is significant: p < 0.001. However, 
these are not significantly different from strategy 9. There is no significant difference between 
strategies 5 (surprise), 4 (curiosity and hunger), 7 (curiosity and surprise), and 8 (surprise, 
curiosity and hunger). 
Consider now the time/energy to explore all different entities. Excluding strategy 2 (hunger), 
strategy 6 (surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, followed closely by strategy 8 
(surprise, curiosity and hunger), 3 (curiosity), 4 (curiosity and hunger), and 7 (curiosity and 
surprise). However, this difference is no significant. The next strategies in the ranking are 
strategies 9 (classical) and 5 (surprise), whose difference is not significant. The difference 
between strategy 6 and these two strategies is not significant: p = 0.267 for strategy 9. 
 
Table 4-7 – Pairwise comparisons of the strategy for “teenv”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
131.210 
(0.000) 
83.125 
(0.000) 
98.822 
(0.000) 
89.268 
(0.000) 
108.202 
(0.000) 
85.218 
(0.000) 
99.545 
(0.000) 
103.176 
(0.000) 
2 
131.210 
(0.000) 
 
-48.085 
(0.000) 
-32.389 
(0.000) 
-41.943 
(0.000) 
-23.009 
(0.000) 
-45.993 
(0.000) 
-31.666 
(0.000) 
-28.035 
(0.000) 
3 
-83.125 
(0.000) 
48.085 
(0.000) 
 
15.697 
(0.000) 
6.143 
(0.142) 
25.077 
(0.000) 
2.093 
(0.328) 
16.420 
(0.000) 
20.051 
(0.000) 
4 
-98.822 
(0.000) 
32.389 
(0.000) 
-15.697 
(0.000) 
 
-9.554 
(0.049) 
9.380 
 (0.006) 
-13.604 
(0.000) 
0.723 
(0.359) 
4.354 
(0.339) 
5 
-89.268 
(0.000) 
41.943 
(0.000) 
-6.143 
(0.142) 
9.554 
(0.049) 
 
18.934 
(0.000) 
-4.050 
(0.331) 
10.277 
(0.038) 
13.908 
(0.001) 
6 
-108.202 
(0.000) 
23.009 
(0.000) 
-25.077 
(0.000) 
-9.380 
 (0.006) 
-18.934 
(0.000) 
 
-22.984 
(0.000) 
-8.657 
(0.014) 
-5.026 
(0.098) 
7 
-85.218 
(0.000) 
45.993 
(0.000) 
-2.093 
(0.328) 
13.604 
(0.000) 
4.050 
(0.331) 
22.984 
(0.000) 
 
14.327 
(0.000) 
17.958 
(0.000) 
8 
-99.545 
0.000) 
31.666 
(0.000) 
-16.420 
(0.000) 
-0.723 
(0.359) 
-10.277 
(0.038) 
8.657 
(0.014) 
-14.327 
(0.000) 
 
3.631 
 (0.443) 
9 
-103.176 
(0.000) 
28.035 
(0.000) 
-20.051 
(0.000) 
-4.354 
(0.339) 
-13.908 
(0.001) 
5.026 
(0.098) 
-17.958 
(0.000) 
-3.631 
(0.443) 
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Table 4-8 - Pairwise comparisons of the strategy for “teent”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
240.391 
(0.011) 
189.918 
(0.041) 
202.544 
(0.031) 
199.051 
(0.031) 
214.638 
(0.023) 
191.736 
(0.039) 
203.186 
(0.030) 
208.824 
(0.027) 
2 
-240.391 
(0.011) 
 
-50.474 
(0.000) 
-37.847 
(0.000) 
-41.340 
(0.000) 
-25.754 
(0.000) 
-48.655 
(0.000) 
-37.205 
(0.000) 
-31.568 
(0.000) 
3 
-189.918 
(0.041) 
50.474 
(0.000) 
 
12.627 
(0.000) 
9.133 
(0.016) 
24.720 
(0.000) 
1.819 
(0.328) 
13.268 
(0.000) 
18.906 
(0.000) 
4 
-202.544 
(0.031) 
37.847 
(0.000) 
-12.627 
(0.000) 
 
-3.493 
(0.400) 
12.093 
(0.000) 
-10.808 
(0.000) 
0.642 
(0.162) 
6.280 
(0.135) 
5 
-199.051 
(0.031) 
41.340 
(0.000) 
-9.133 
(0.016) 
3.493 
(0.400) 
 
15.587 
(0.000) 
-7.315 
(0.057) 
4.135 
(0.324) 
9.773 
(0.018) 
6 
-214.638 
(0.023) 
25.754 
(0.000) 
-24.720 
(0.000) 
-12.093 
(0.000) 
-15.587 
(0.000) 
 
-22.901 
(0.000) 
-11.452 
(0.000) 
-5.814 
(0.078) 
7 
-191.736 
(0.039) 
48.655 
(0.000) 
-1.819 
(0.328) 
10.808 
(0.000) 
7.315 
(0.057) 
22.901 
(0.000) 
 
11.450 
(0.000) 
17.088 
(0.000) 
8 
-203.186 
(0.030) 
37.205 
(0.000) 
-13.268 
(0.000) 
-0.642 
(0.162) 
-4.135 
(0.324) 
11.452 
(0.000) 
-11.450 
(0.000) 
 
5.638 
(0.181) 
9 
-208.824 
(0.027) 
31.568 
(0.000) 
-18.906 
(0.000) 
-6.280 
(0.135) 
-9.773 
(0.018) 
5.814 
(0.078) 
-17.088 
(0.000) 
-5.638 
(0.181) 
 
 
Table 4-9 - Pairwise comparisons of the strategy for “tedent”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
126.188 
(0.000) 
112.863 
(0.000) 
112.275 
(0.000) 
108.203 
(0.000) 
114.595 
(0.000) 
113.5333 
(0.000) 
113.953 
(0.000) 
110.999 
(0.000) 
2 
-126.188 
(0.000) 
 
-13.324 
(0.114) 
-13.912 
(0.106) 
-17.985 
(0.058) 
-11.593 
(0.068) 
-12.655 
(0.135) 
-12.235 
(0.146) 
-15.189 
(0.038) 
3 
-112.863 
(0.000) 
13.324 
(0.114) 
 
-0.588 
(0.920) 
-4.661 
(0.358) 
1.731 
(0.802) 
0.669 
(0.884) 
1.090 
(0.857) 
-1865 
(0.790) 
4 
-112.275 
(0.000) 
13.912 
(0.106) 
0.588 
(0.920) 
 
-4.073 
(0.383) 
2.319 
(0.660) 
1.257 
(0.760) 
1.678 
(0.141) 
-1.277 
(0.834) 
5 
-108.203 
(0.000) 
17.985 
(0.058) 
4.661 
(0.358) 
4.073 
(0.383) 
 
6.392 
(0.220) 
5.330 
(0.308) 
5.750 
(0.216) 
2.796 
(0.591) 
6 
-114.595 
(0.000) 
11.593 
(0.068) 
-1.731 
(0.802) 
-2.319 
(0.660) 
-6.392 
(0.220) 
 
-1.062 
(0.872) 
-0.642 
(0.901) 
-3.596 
(0.262) 
7 
-113.5333 
(0.000) 
12.655 
(0.135) 
-0.669 
(0.884) 
-1.257 
(0.760) 
-5.330 
(0.308) 
1.062 
(0.872) 
 
0.420 
(0.918) 
-2.534 
(0.717) 
8 
-113.953 
(0.000) 
12.235 
(0.146) 
-1.090 
(0.857) 
-1.678 
(0.141) 
-5.750 
(0.216) 
0.642 
(0.901) 
-0.420 
(0.918) 
 
-2.954 
(0.629) 
9 
-110.999 
(0.000) 
15.189 
(0.038) 
1865 
(0.790) 
1.277 
(0.834) 
-2.796 
(0.591) 
3.596 
(0.262) 
2.534 
(0.717) 
2.954 
(0.629) 
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Figure 4-8 - Profile plots of the strategy for “teenv”. 
 
Figure 4-9 - Profile plots of the strategy for “teent”. 
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Figure 4-10 – Profile plots of the strategy for “tedent”. 
4.2.2 Two Way Repeated Measures Design 
This experimental design considers the strategy as the within subject factor. Each treatment 
corresponds to one of the nine levels of the factor. In addition, we consider the problem as another 
factor. This is a between subject factor. In this case, we have a two factor factorial experimental 
design with repeated measures. The blocking experimental principle is applied to the exploration 
problem factor in order to reduce the variance caused by the use of environments with different 
complexities and by the different visual ranges considered. This yields the following two slightly 
different two factor factorial repeated measures designs: repeated measures design with three 
blocks of problems (the environment complexity is the variable used to group the subjects – 
exploration problems - into three groups: low, medium, and high complexity environments) and 
repeated measures design with two blocks of problems (the visual range is used to group the 
subjects – exploration problems – into two groups: short and large amplitudes of the visual range). 
The next subsections describe these two different two factor factorial repeated measures designs. 
4.2.2.1 Problems grouped by different environment complexity 
The layout of this experiment is shown in Table 4-10. Each di,j denotes the observation made 
with subject/problem i under condition/strategy j. 
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Table 4-10 – Experiment design. 
Strategies  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
low 
1 
2 
3 
d1,1 
d2,1 
d3,1 
d1,2 
d2,2 
d3,2
d1,3 
d2,3 
d3,3
d1,4 
d2,4 
d3,4
d1,5 
d2,5 
d3,5
d1,6 
d2,6 
d3,6
d1,7 
d2,7 
d3,7
d1,8 
d2,8 
d3,8 
d1,9 
d2,9 
d3,9 
medium 
4 
5 
6 
d4,1 
d5,1 
d6,1 
d4,2 
d5,2 
d6,2
d4,3 
d5,3 
d6,3
d4,4 
d5,4 
d6,4
d4,5 
d5,5 
d6,5
d4,6 
d5,6 
d6,6
d4,7 
d5,7 
d6,7
d4,8 
d5,8 
d6,8 
d4,9 
d5,9 
d6,9 
Su
bj
ec
ts
  g
ro
up
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t c
om
pl
ex
ity
 
high 
7 
8 
9 
d7,1 
d8,1 
d9,1 
d7,2 
d8,2 
d9,2
d7,3 
d8,3 
d9,3
d7,4 
d8,4 
d9,4
d7,5 
d8,5 
d9,5
d7,6 
d8,6 
d9,6
d7,7 
d8,7 
d9,7
d7,8 
d8,8 
d9,8 
d7,9 
d8,9 
d9,9 
 
This design allows us to test the null hypothesis about the equality of the strategy factor effects: 
H0: α1 = α2 =…= α9 = 0 (there is no strategy effect) 
H1: at least one αi ≠ 0, i = 1,…,9 
Also, this design allows us to test the null hypothesis about the equality of the problem category 
(environment complexity) factor effects: 
H0: β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 (there is no category effect) 
H1: at least one βj ≠ 0, j = 1,2,3 
Finally, it also allows us to determine whether strategy and problem category interact: 
H0: (αβ)ij = 0 , for all i,j (there is no interaction effect) 
H1: at least one (αβ)ij ≠ 0 
 
In other words, this factorial design allows us to answer the following three questions: (a) what 
is the effect of the strategy?; (b) what is the effect of the environment complexity (problem 
category)?; and (c) do these two variables interact (i.e., does the effect of the strategy depend on 
the environment complexity category)? 
We can now move on to formally assess the effect of the strategy, the effect of the environment 
complexity, and their interaction on exploration performance. The results from both the ANOVA 
and MANOVA approaches to analyzing repeating measures were obtained with SPSS 13.0 and 
are shown in Table 4-11, Table 4-12, and Table 4-14. 
Once again, the significance tests are divided into two types, Multivariate Tests and Averaged 
Tests (Univariate). 
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The one-way ANOVA table for testing our single between-subject factor “environment 
complexity” (“envComp”) is shown in Table 4-11. We do not find a significant main effect of the 
environment complexity factor both on the time/energy to explore the environment completely 
(encoded as “teenv”) (F(2, 15) = 0.197, p = 0.823), and on the time/energy to explore all the 
entities (“teent”) (F(2, 15) = 2.207, p = 0.144). Specifically, the environment complexity group 
accounts for 2.6% of the variance in the time/energy to explore the environment completely and 
for 22.7% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all the entities; averaged over the nine 
strategies, exploration times for the complete environment and all the entities do not differ 
between the three environment complexity groups. However, we find a significant main effect of 
the environment complexity factor on the time/energy to explore all different entities (encoded as 
“tedent”) (F(2, 15) = 157.875, p < 0.001). Specifically, the environment complexity group 
accounts for 95.5% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all different entities. 
Table 4-11 - ANOVA table for testing the main effect of the between-subject factor 
environment complexity (variable “envComp”) on exploration performance (variables 
“teenv”, “teent”, and “tedent”). 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects  
Transformed Variable: Average  
Source Measure Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
teenv 3607668.081 1 3607668.081 1004.601 0.000 0.985 1004.601 1.000
teent 2688996.451 1 2688996.451 6564.152 0.000 0.998 6564.152 1.000Intercept 
tedent 1729663.603 1 1729663.603 3115.725 0.000 0.995 3115.725 1.000
teenv 1414.218 2 707.109 0.197 0.823 0.026 0.394 0.075
teent 1808.504 2 904.252 2.207 0.144 0.227 4.415 0.380envComp 
tedent 175285.467 2 87642.734 157.875 0.000 0.955 315.750 1.000
teenv 53867.189 15 3591.146      
teent 6144.731 15 409.649      Error 
tedent 8327.101 15 555.140      
a  Computed using alpha = 0.05 
 
The within-subjects parts are included in the “Tests of Within-Subjects Effects” table under the 
rows labelled “Sphericity Assumed” (Table 4-12). Variability in the exploration times can be due 
to a main effect of the strategy (variable “strat”) or an interaction between the strategy and the 
between-subject factor group. As a result, F-tests are constructed that compare variability due to 
these sources against within-subjects error variability in this model. We find a main effect of the 
strategy on the three exploration performance measures: F(8, 120) = 41.403, p < 0.001 for the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely, F(8, 120) = 36.376, p < 0.001 for the 
time/energy to explore all the entities, and F(8, 120) = 25.050, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to 
explore all different entities. Specifically, the strategy accounts for 73.4% of the variance in the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely, 70.8% of the variance in the time/energy to 
explore all the entities, and for 62.5% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all different 
entities. We find evidence for the two-way interaction involving “envComp” and “strat” on the 
time/energy to explore all different entities (F(16, 120) = 1.738, p = 0.048), but no evidence for 
the two-way interaction involving “envComp” and “strat” on the other two exploration 
performance measures (F(16, 120) = 0.276, p = 0.997 for the time/energy to explore the 
environment completely, and F(16, 120) = 0.160, p = 1.00 for the time/energy to explore all the 
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entities). Specifically, “envComp” and “strat” accounts for 18.8% of the variance in the 
time/energy to explore all different entities. 
We test whether evidence of violation of the sphericity assumption is present using the 
Mauchly Sphericity Test. As shown in Table 4-13, this test is statistically significant (X2(35) = 
174.578, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore the environment completely – “teenv” -, X2(35) 
= 242.371, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore all the entities – “teent” -, and X2(35) = 
202.068, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore all different entities – “tedent”), which suggests 
that the sphericity assumption had been violated. As in the previous experimental design, we have 
two ways to deal with this violation: the use of the Multivariate Tests and the use of a correction 
in the degrees of freedom. Table 4-12 presents the three estimates of the correction factors 
(Greenhouse-Geisser, Huynh-Feld, and the Lower Bounds). Giving that the ordinary univariate F 
test leads to statistical significance of the strategy on the three exploration performance measures, 
we should now turn to one of these more conservative tests. We turn to the Lower Bound test. The 
within subject effect that tested significant under the assumption of sphericity remain significant 
with this test (see Table 4-12 under the rows “Lower-bound”, for the three exploration 
performance measures): F(1.00, 15.00) = 41.403, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore the 
environment completely, F(1.00, 15.00) = 36.376, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore all the 
entities, and F(1.00, 15.00) = 25.050, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore all different 
entities. Giving this statistical significance, we need not to use the other two conservative tests. 
Anyway, the within subject effect that tested significant under the assumption of sphericity and 
with the Lower Bound test remain highly significant even after these corrections. For instance, for 
the time/energy to explore the environment completely: using Huynh-Feldt correction factor, 
F(1.665, 24.974) = 41.403, p < 0.001; using Greenhouse-Geisser correction factor, F(1.372, 
20.575) = 41.403, p < 0.001. 
Giving that the ordinary univariate F test leads to statistical significance of the interaction effect 
“strat” × “envComp” on “tedent”, we should now turn to one of the more conservative tests. We 
turn to the Lower Bound test. The interaction effect involving the within subject effect that tested 
significant under the assumption of sphericity does not remain significant with the Lower Bound 
test (see Table 4-12 under the rows “Lower-bound”, for the measure time/energy to explore all 
different entities of the environment, under the row “strat * envComp”): F(2.00, 15.00) = 1.738, p 
= 0.21. The two tests contradict each other, that is, the uncorrected (positively biased) test yields 
statistical significance and the conservative (negatively biased) test does not. Therefore, the more 
specific epsilon correction in the degrees of freedom is made, substituting either the 
Greenhouse-Geisser or Huynh-Feldt epsilon estimate in place of the Lower Bound epsilon. The 
use of one of these estimates, besides being likely to yield higher degrees of freedom than the 
Lower Bound, should yield degrees of freedom for the unbiased F distribution, the distribution 
that is more likely to represent the true degrees of freedom created by the extent of the violation 
of the assumption. The new degrees of freedom obtained with one of the estimates should then be 
used to select a new critical F value, with which a final statistical decision is made. The 
interaction effect “strat” and “envComp” that tested significant under the assumption of sphericity 
and no significant under the Lower Bound test remain no significant after these corrections: using 
Huynh-Feldt correction factor, F(3.634, 27.258) = 1.738, p = 0.175; using Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction factor, F(2.953, 22.146) = 1.738, p < 0.189. Therefore we conclude that there is no 
effect of “strat” × “envComp” on “tedent”. 
 
178  Chapter 4. Experimental Evaluation 
 
 
Table 4-12 - Univariate ANOVA tables for testing the main effects of and interactions 
involving the within-subject factor (strategy) on exploration performance. 
Univariate Tests  
Source Measure  
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 204960.674 8 25620.084 41.403 0.000 0.734 331.224 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 204960.674 1.372 149422.828 41.403 0.000 0.734 56.792 1.000
Huynh-Feldt 204960.674 1.665 123104.192 41.403 0.000 0.734 68.933 1.000
teenv 
Lower-bound 204960.674 1.000 204960.674 41.403 0.000 0.734 41.403 1.000
Sphericity 
Assumed 292815.084 8 36601.885 36.376 0.000 0.708 291.006 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 292815.084 1.199 244168.048 36.376 0.000 0.708 43.623 1.000
Huynh-Feldt 292815.084 1.419 206321.923 36.376 0.000 0.708 51.625 1.000
teent 
Lower-bound 292815.084 1.000 292815.084 36.376 0.000 0.708 36.376 1.000
Sphericity 
Assumed 208948.522 8 26118.565 25.050 0.000 0.625 200.398 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 208948.522 1.476 141526.940 25.050 0.000 0.625 36.983 1.000
Huynh-Feldt 208948.522 1.817 114984.459 25.050 0.000 0.625 45.520 1.000
strat 
tedent 
Lower-bound 208948.522 1.000 208948.522 25.050 0.000 0.625 25.050 0.997
Sphericity 
Assumed 2734.845 16 170.928 0.276 0.997 0.036 4.420 0.173
Greenhouse-
Geisser 2734.845 2.743 996.894 0.276 0.825 0.036 0.758 0.093
Huynh-Feldt 2734.845 3.330 821.306 0.276 0.861 0.036 0.920 0.097
teenv 
Lower-bound 2734.845 2.000 1367.423 0.276 0.762 0.036 0.552 0.086
Sphericity 
Assumed 2569.744 16 160.609 0.160 1.000 0.021 2.554 0.113
Greenhouse-
Geisser 2569.744 2.398 1071.409 0.160 0.887 0.021 0.383 0.072
Huynh-Feldt 2569.744 2.838 905.340 0.160 0.914 0.021 0.453 0.074
teent 
Lower-bound 2569.744 2.000 1284.872 0.160 0.854 .021 0.319 0.070
Sphericity 
Assumed 28988.137 16 1811.759 1.738 0.048 0.188 27.802 0.913
Greenhouse-
Geisser 28988.137 2.953 9817.256 1.738 0.189 0.188 5.131 0.387
Huynh-Feldt 28988.137 3.634 7976.092 1.738 0.175 0.188 6.315 0.440
strat * 
envComp 
tedent 
Lower-bound 28988.137 2.000 14494.068 1.738 0.210 0.188 3.475 0.307
a  Computed using alpha = 0.05 
(continues in the next page) 
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Table 4-12 (cont.) - Univariate ANOVA tables for testing the main effects of and 
interactions involving the within-subject factor (strategy) on exploration performance. 
Univariate Tests  
Source Measure  
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 74255.799 120 618.798      
Greenhouse-
Geisser 74255.799 20.575 3608.989      
Huynh-Feldt 74255.799 24.974 2973.318      
teenv 
Lower-bound 74255.799 15.000 4950.387      
Sphericity 
Assumed 120746.016 120 1006.217      
Greenhouse-
Geisser 120746.016 17.989 6712.386      
Huynh-Feldt 120746.016 21.288 5671.964      
teent 
Lower-bound 120746.016 15.000 8049.734      
Sphericity 
Assumed 125120.181 120 1042.668      
Greenhouse-
Geisser 125120.181 22.146 5649.837      
Huynh-Feldt 125120.181 27.258 4590.246      
Error(strat) 
tedent 
Lower-bound 125120.181 15.000 8341.345      
a  Computed using alpha = 0.05 
 
Table 4-13 - Mauchly’s test for testing the sphericity assumption and correction factors. 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity(b)  
Epsilon(a) 
Within Subjects 
Effect Measure 
Mauchly's 
W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
teenv 0.000 174.578 35 0.000 0.171 0.208 0.125
teent 0.000 242.371 35 0.000 0.150 0.177 0.125strat 
tedent 0.000 202.068 35 0.000 0.185 0.227 0.125
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
a  May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in 
the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b  Design: Intercept+envComp  
Within Subjects Design: strat 
 
The Multivariate Tests are shown in Table 4-14. As noted earlier, these give four commonly 
used significance tests labelled Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Trace, Hotelling’s Trace, and Roy’s Largest 
Root. The results for testing the main effect of “strat” and the interaction “strat” × “envComp” are 
identical to those obtained from the univariate ANOVA model: the four tests of significance for 
the strategy effect given by the Multivariate Tests, Pillai’s Trace (value = 1.151, F(24.00, 360.00) 
= 9.331, p < 0.001), Wilks’ Lambda (value = 0.162, F(24.00, 342.837) = 12.453, p < 0.001), 
Hotelling’s Trace (value = 3.397, F(24.00,350.00) = 16.511, p < 0.001), and Roy’s Largest Root 
(value = 2.856, F(8.00, 120.00) = 42.847, p < 0.001), indicate that the strategy has a significant 
effect. The large Partial Eta Squared values for the strategy show that it explains quite a lot of 
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variation in exploration performance. There is also evidence for an interaction between factors 
“strat” and “envComp”: Pillai’s Trace (value = 0.575, F(48.00, 360.00) = 1.777, p = 0.002), 
Wilks’ Lambda (value = 0.474, F(48.00, 351.755) = 2.094, p < 0.001), Hotelling’s Trace (value = 
1.011, F(48.00, 350.00) = 2.457, p < 0.001), and Roy’s Largest Root (value = 0.902, F(16.00, 
120.00) = 6.765, p < 0.001). Thus, the MANOVA approach alters the conclusions drawn about 
the within-subject interaction effect. 
Table 4-14 - Multivariate ANOVA output for testing the main effect and interactions 
involving the within-subject factor on the exploration performance. 
Multivariate(c.d)  
Within 
Subjects Effect  Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Pillai's Trace 1.151 9.331 24.000 360.000 0.000 0.384 223.955 1.000
Wilks' 
Lambda 0.162 12.453 24.000 342.837 0.000 0.454 285.634 1.000
Hotelling's 
Trace 3.397 16.511 24.000 350.000 0.000 0.531 396.260 1.000
strat 
Roy's Largest 
Root 2.856 42.847(b) 8.000 120.000 0.000 0.741 342.776 1.000
Pillai's Trace 0.575 1.777 48.000 360.000 0.002 0.192 85.298 1.000
Wilks' 
Lambda 0.474 2.094 48.000 351.755 0.000 0.221 99.534 1.000
Hotelling's 
Trace 1.011 2.457 48.000 350.000 0.000 0.252 117.956 1.000
strat * 
envComp 
Roy's Largest 
Root 0.902 6.765(b) 16.000 120.000 0.000 0.474 108.232 1.000
a  Computed using alpha = 0.05 
b  Exact statistic 
c  The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a Lower Bound on the significance level 
d  Design: Intercept+envComp  
    Within Subjects Design: strat 
e  Tests are based on averaged variables. 
 
All the analyses reported above have established that the there is evidence indicating that the 
three exploration performance measures are affected by the strategy. The univariate ANOVA 
model tests, particularly the more conservative tests, indicate no evidence for the interaction 
between “strat” and “envComp”, but the MANOVA approach alters these conclusions by 
indicating a significant interaction “strat” × “envComp”. We do not find a significant main effect 
of the environment complexity factor both on the time/energy to explore the environment 
completely and on the time/energy to explore all the entities, but we find a significant main effect 
of the environment complexity factor on the time/energy to explore all different entities. Giving 
these results: we reject the null hypothesis that states there is no effect of the strategy; we reject 
the null hypothesis about the equality of the environment complexity factor effects with respect to 
the time/energy to explore all different entities, but we accept the null hypothesis about the 
equality of the environment complexity factor effects with respect to the other two exploration 
performance measures; we reject the null hypothesis that states there is no interaction between the 
strategy and the environment complexity. We now undertake further tests to determine which 
particular strategies differ. As in the previous experimental design, we conducted post hoc 
comparisons. The resulting multiple comparison output for the strategy factor is shown in Table 
4-15, Table 4-16, and Table 4-17. Each cell contains: the mean difference between the strategy of 
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the row and the strategy of the column; and, the respective p-value (enclosed in parentheses). The 
mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. Additional information, such as the standard error 
of that estimator and a confidence interval for the mean difference, is provided by the original 
table presented in Appendix B. 
The profile plots (Figure 4-11, Figure 4-12, Figure 4-13, Figure 4-14, Figure 4-15, Figure 4-16, 
Figure 4-17, Figure 4-18, Figure 4-19, Figure 4-20, Figure 4-21, and Figure 4-22) show the 
model-estimated means for the nine strategies. Together with the multiple comparison output, the 
plots provide us similar results to those reached with the one-way repeated measures experimental 
design with respect to the strategy. The profile plots also indicate that there is no clear significant 
interaction “strat” × “envComp” (it seems to happen only for a group of strategies), as well as that 
there is a significant effect of “envComp” only on the time/energy to explore all different entities 
(this is also confirmed by the pairwise comparisons of “envComp” presented in Table 4-18). 
 
Table 4-15 – Pairwise comparisons of the strategy for “teenv”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
135.687 
(0.000) 
89.863 
(0.000) 
104.117 
(0.000) 
92.614 
(0.000) 
112.496 
(0.000) 
92.653 
(0.000) 
105.081 
(0.000) 
109.066 
(0.000) 
2 
-135.687 
(0.000) 
 
-45.824 
(0.000) 
-31.571 
(0.000) 
-43.073 
(0.000) 
-23.191 
(0.000) 
-43.034 
(0.000) 
-30.607 
(0.000) 
-26.622 
(0.000) 
3 
-89.863 
(0.000) 
45.824 
(0.000) 
 
14.254 
(0.001) 
2.751 
(0.479) 
22.633 
(0.000) 
2.791 
(0.333) 
15.218 
(0.001) 
4.949 
(0.236) 
4 
-104.117 
(0.000) 
31.571 
(0.000) 
-14.254 
(0.001) 
 
-11.503 
(0.028) 
8.379 
(0.012) 
-11.463 
(0.002) 
.964 
(0.368) 
4.949 
(0.236) 
5 
-92.614 
(0.000) 
43.073 
(0.000) 
-2.751 
(0.479) 
11.503 
(0.028) 
 
19.882 
(0.001) 
.039 
(0.993) 
12.467 
(0.024) 
16.452 
(0.001) 
6 
-112.496 
(0.000) 
23.191 
(0.000) 
-22.633 
(0.000) 
-8.379 
(0.012) 
-19.882 
(0.001) 
 
-19.843 
(0.000) 
-7.416 
(0.038) 
-3.431 
(0.297) 
7 
-92.653 
(0.000) 
43.034 
(0.000) 
-2.791 
(0.333) 
11.463 
(0.002) 
-0.039 
(0.993) 
19.843 
(0.000) 
 
12.427 
(0.002) 
16.412 
(0.001) 
8 
-105.081 
(0.000) 
30.607 
(0.000) 
-15.218 
(0.001) 
-0.964 
(0.368) 
-12.467 
(0.024) 
7.416 
(0.038) 
-12.427 
(0.002) 
 
3.985 
(0.390) 
9 
-109.066 
(0.000) 
26.622 
(0.000) 
-19.203 
(0.000) 
-4.949 
(0.236) 
-16.452 
(0.001) 
3.431 
(0.297) 
-16.412 
(0.001) 
-3.985 
(0.390) 
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Table 4-16 - Pairwise comparisons of the strategy for “teent”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
161.536 
(0.000) 
112.800 
(0.000) 
124.541 
(0.000) 
119.495 
(0.000) 
135.408 
(0.000) 
115.225 
(0.000) 
125.396 
(0.000) 
130.720 
(0.000) 
2 
-161.536 
(0.000) 
 
-48.736 
(0.000) 
-36.995 
(0.000) 
-42.041 
(0.000) 
-26.128 
(0.000) 
-46.311 
(0.000) 
-36.139 
(0.000) 
-30.816 
(0.000) 
3 
-112.800 
(0.000) 
48.736 
(0.000) 
 
11.741 
(0.002) 
6.695 
(0.076) 
22.608 
(0.000) 
2.425 
(0.333) 
12.596 
(0.001) 
17.920 
(0.001) 
4 
-124.541 
(0.000) 
36.995 
(0.000) 
-11.741 
(0.002) 
 
-5.046 
(0.258) 
10.867 
(0.001) 
-9.316 
(0.004) 
0.856 
(0.135) 
6.179 
(0.155) 
5 
-119.495 
(0.000) 
42.041 
(0.000) 
-6.695 
(0.076) 
5.046 
(0.258) 
 
15.913 
(0.004) 
-4.270 
(0.314) 
5.901 
(0.204) 
11.225 
(0.013) 
6 
-135.408 
(0.000) 
26.128 
(0.000) 
-22.608 
(0.000) 
-10.867 
(0.001) 
-15.913 
(0.004) 
 
-20.183 
(0.000) 
-10.012 
(0.002) 
-4.688 
(0.238) 
7 
-115.225 
(0.000) 
46.311 
(0.000) 
-2.425 
(0.333) 
9.316 
(0.004) 
4.270 
(0.314) 
20.183 
(0.000) 
 
10.171 
(0.003) 
15.495 
(0.002) 
8 
-125.396 
(0.000) 
36.139 
(0.000) 
-12.596 
(0.001) 
-0.856 
(0.135) 
-5.901 
(0.204) 
10.012 
(0.002) 
-10.171 
(0.003) 
 
5.324 
(0.232) 
9 
-130.720 
(0.000) 
30.816 
(0.000) 
-17.920 
(0.001) 
-6.179 
(0.155) 
-11.225 
(0.013) 
4.688 
(0.238) 
-15.495 
(0.002) 
-5.324 
(0.232) 
 
 
Table 4-17 - Pairwise comparisons of the strategy for “tedent”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
122.977 
(0.000) 
106.692 
(0.000) 
113.864 
(0.000) 
109.712 
(0.000) 
114.603 
(0.000) 
112.462 
(0.000) 
116.101 
(0.000) 
111.306 
(0.000) 
2 
-122.977 
(0.000) 
 
-16.285 
(0.003) 
-9.112 
(0.057) 
-13.264 
(0.015) 
-8.373 
(0.088) 
-10.515 
(0.048) 
-6.876 
(0.143) 
-11.671 
(0.061) 
3 
-106.692 
(0.000) 
16.285 
(0.003) 
 
7.173 
(0.117) 
3.021 
(0.547) 
7.912 
(0.295) 
5.770 
(0.084) 
9.409 
(0.055) 
4.614 
(0.536) 
4 
-113.864 
(0.000) 
9.112 
(0.057) 
-7.173 
(0.117) 
 
-4.152 
(0.417) 
0.739 
(0.900) 
-1.403 
(0.709) 
2.237 
(0.110) 
-2.559 
(0.710) 
5 
-109.712 
(0.000) 
13.264 
(0.015) 
-3.021 
(0.547) 
4.152 
(0.417) 
 
4.891 
(0.347) 
2.749 
(0.638) 
6.389 
(0.215) 
1.593 
(0.743) 
6 
-114.603 
(0.000) 
8.373 
(0.088) 
-7.912 
(0.295) 
-0.739 
(0.900) 
-4.891 
(0.347) 
 
-2.142 
(0.783) 
1.498 
(0.800) 
-3.298 
(0.265) 
7 
-112.462 
(0.000) 
10.515 
(0.048) 
-5.770 
(0.084) 
1.403 
(0.709) 
-2.749 
(0.638) 
2.142 
(0.783) 
 
3.639 
(0.378) 
-1.156 
(0.888) 
8 
-116.101 
(0.000) 
6.876 
(0.143) 
-9.409 
(0.055) 
-2.237 
(0.110) 
-6.389 
(0.215) 
-1.498 
(0.800) 
-3.639 
(0.378) 
 
-4.796 
(0.505) 
9 
-111.306 
(0.000) 
11.671 
(0.061) 
-4.614 
(0.536) 
2.559 
(0.710) 
-1.593 
(0.743) 
3.298 
(0.265) 
1.156 
(0.888) 
4.796 
(0.505) 
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Table 4-18 – Pairwise comparisons of the environment complexity. 
Pairwise Comparisons  
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference(a) Measure (I) Environment Complexity 
(J) Environment 
Complexity 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig.(a)
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Medium -1.556 11.533 0.894 -26.138 23.025
Low 
High -6.899 11.533 0.559 -31.481 17.682
Low 1.556 11.533 0.894 -23.025 26.138
Medium 
High -5.343 11.533 0.650 -29.924 19.239
Low 6.899 11.533 0.559 -17.682 31.481
teenv 
High 
Medium 5.343 11.533 0.650 -19.239 29.924
Medium -2.017 3.895 0.612 -10.319 6.285
Low 
High -7.878 3.895 0.061 -16.180 0.425
Low 2.017 3.895 0.612 -6.285 10.319
Medium 
High -5.861 3.895 0.153 -14.163 2.442
Low 7.878 3.895 0.061 -0.425 16.180
teent 
High 
Medium 5.861 3.895 0.153 -2.442 14.163
Medium -61.452(*) 4.534 0.000 -71.117 -51.788
Low 
High -75.856(*) 4.534 0.000 -85.521 -66.192
Low 61.452(*) 4.534 0.000 51.788 71.117
Medium 
High -14.404(*) 4.534 0.006 -24.069 -4.739
Low 75.856(*) 4.534 0.000 66.192 85.521
tedent 
High 
Medium 14.404(*) 4.534 0.006 4.739 24.069
Based on estimated marginal means 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
a Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments). 
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Figure 4-11 - Profile plots of ”envComp” × “strat” for “teenv”. 
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Figure 4-12 - Profile plots of “strat”×”envComp” for “teenv”. 
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Figure 4-13 - Profile plots of ”envComp” for “teenv”. 
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Figure 4-14 - Profile plots of “strat” for “teenv”. 
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Figure 4-15 - Profile plots of ”envComp”× “strat” for “teent”. 
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Figure 4-16 - Profile plots of “strat”×”envComp” for “teent”. 
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Figure 4-17 - Profile plots of ”envComp” for “teent”. 
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Figure 4-18 - Profile plots of “strat” for “teent”. 
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Figure 4-19 - Profile plots of ”envComp” × “strat” for “tedent”. 
987654321
strat
250,00
200,00
150,00
100,00
50,00
0,00
Es
tim
at
ed
 M
ar
gi
na
l M
ea
ns
High
Medium
Low
Environment
Complexity
Estimated Marginal Means of tedent
 
Figure 4-20 - Profile plots of “strat”×”envComp” for “tedent”. 
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Figure 4-21 - Profile plots of “envComp” for “tedent”. 
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Figure 4-22 – Profile plots of “strat” for “tedent”. 
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4.2.2.2 Problems grouped by different visual range 
The layout of this experiment is shown in Table 4-19. 
Table 4-19 - Experiment design. 
Strategies  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
short
1 
2 
… 
12 
d1,1 
d2,1 
… 
d12,1 
d1,2 
d2,2 
… 
d12,2
d1,3 
d2,3 
… 
d12,3
d1,4 
d2,4 
… 
d12,4
d1,5 
d2,5 
… 
d12,5
d1,6 
d2,6 
… 
d12,6
d1,7 
d2,7 
… 
d12,7
d1,8 
d2,8 
… 
d12,8 
d1,9 
d2,9 
… 
d12,9 
Su
bj
ec
ts
 g
ro
up
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
am
pl
itu
de
 o
f t
he
 v
is
ua
l f
ie
ld
) 
large 
13 
14 
… 
24 
d13,1 
d14,1 
… 
d24,1 
d13,2 
d14,2 
… 
d24,2
d13,3 
d14,3 
… 
d24,3
d13,4 
d14,4 
… 
d24,4
d13,5 
d14,5 
… 
d24,5
d13,6 
d14,6 
… 
d24,6
d13,7 
d14,7 
… 
d24,7
d13,8 
d14,8 
… 
d24,8 
d13,9 
d14,9 
… 
d24,9 
 
This design allows us to test the null hypothesis about the equality of the strategy factor effects: 
H0: α1 = α2 =…= α9 = 0 (there is no strategy effect) 
H1: at least one αi ≠ 0, i=1,…,9 
Also, this design allows us to test the null hypothesis about the equality of the problem category 
(visual range) factor effects: 
H0: β1 = β2 = 0 (there is no problem category effect) 
H1: at least one βj ≠ 0, j=1,2 
Finally, it also allows us to determine whether the strategy and the problem category (visual 
field) interact: 
H0: (αβ)ij = 0 , for all i,j (there is no interaction effect) 
H1: at least one (αβ)ij ≠ 0 
 
This factorial design allows us to answer the following three questions: (a) what is the effect of 
the strategy, (b) what is the effect of the visual range (problem category), and (c) do these two 
variables interact (i.e., does the effect of the strategy depend on the visual range category)? 
We can now move on to formally assess the effect of the strategy, the effect of the visual range, 
and their interaction on exploration performance. The results from both the ANOVA and 
MANOVA approaches to analyzing repeating measures were obtained with SPSS 13.0 and are 
shown in Table 4-20, Table 4-21, and Table 4-23. 
Once again, the significance tests are divided into two types, Multivariate Tests and Averaged 
Tests. 
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The one-way ANOVA table for testing our single between-subject factor “amplitude of the 
visual field” (variable “visField”), is shown in Table 4-20. We find a significant main effect of 
“visField” factor on the time/energy to explore the environment completely (“teenv”) (F(1, 22) = 
119.534, p < 0.001), but no effect both on the time/energy to explore all the entities (“teent”) (F(1, 
22) = 0.577, p = 0.445) and on the time/energy to explore all different entities (“tedent”) (F(1, 22) 
= 0.080, p = 0.781). Specifically, the visual field accounts for 84.5% of the variance in the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely, for 2.6% of the variance in the time/energy to 
explore all the entities, and for 0.4% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all different 
entities; averaged over the nine strategies, time/energy to explore all the entities and all different 
entities does not differ between the two visual ranges. 
Table 4-20 - ANOVA table for testing the main effect of the between-subject factor 
“amplitude of the visual field” (variable “visField”) on exploration performance (variables 
“teenv”, “teent”, and “tedent”). 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects  
Transformed Variable: Average  
Source Measure Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
teenv 4829711.339 1 4829711.339 8081.078 0.000 0.997 8081.078 1.000
teent 4127188.402 1 4127188.402 232.800 0.000 0.914 232.800 1.000Intercept 
tedent 2426823.362 1 2426823.362 273.672 0.000 0.926 273.672 1.000
teenv 71440.137 1 71440.137 119.534 0.000 0.845 119.534 1.000
teent 10235.517 1 10235.517 0.577 0.455 0.026 0.577 0.112visField 
tedent 705.540 1 705.540 0.080 0.781 0.004 0.080 0.058
teenv 13148.449 22 597.657      
teent 390025.786 22 17728.445      Error 
tedent 195087.693 22 8867.622      
a  Computed using alpha = 0.05 
 
The within-subjects parts are included in the “Tests of Within-Subjects Effects” table under the 
rows labelled “Sphericity Assumed” (Table 4-21). Variability in the exploration times can be due 
to a main effect of strategy (“strat”) or an interaction between “strat” and the between-subject 
factor visual range (“visField”). As a result, F-tests are constructed that compare variability due to 
these sources against within-subjects error variability in this model. We find a main effect of the 
strategy on the three exploration performance measures: the time/energy to explore the 
environment completely (F(8, 176) = 147.260, p < 0.001), the time/energy to explore all the 
entities (F(8, 176) = 6.414, p < 0.001), and the time/energy to explore all different entities (F(8, 
176) = 78.408, p < 0.001). Specifically, the strategy accounts for 87% of the variance in the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely, for 22.6% of the variance in the time/energy 
to explore all the entities, and for 78.1% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all different 
entities. We also find evidence for the two-way interaction involving “visField” and “strat” also 
on the three exploration performance measures: the time/energy to explore the environment 
completely (F(8, 176) = 35.631, p < 0.001), the time/energy to explore all the entities (F(8, 176) = 
3.579, p = 0.001), and the time/energy to explore all different entities (F(8, 176) = 31.438, p < 
0.001). The interaction accounts for 61.8% of the variance in the time/energy to explore the 
environment completely, for 14.0% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all the entities, 
and for 58.8% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all different entities. 
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Table 4-21 - Univariate ANOVA tables for testing the main effects of and interactions 
involving the within-subject factor (strategy) on the exploration performance. 
Univariate Tests  
Source Measure  Type III Sum of Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 252678.317 8 31584.790 147.260 0.000 0.870 1178.079 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 252678.317 3.361 75174.791 147.260 0.000 0.870 494.971 1.000
Huynh-Feldt 252678.317 4.221 59866.204 147.260 0.000 0.870 621.542 1.000
teenv 
Lower-bound 252678.317 1.000 252678.317 147.260 0.000 0.870 147.260 1.000
Sphericity 
Assumed 950894.351 8 118861.794 6.414 0.000 0.226 51.311 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 950894.351 1.011 940558.219 6.414 0.019 0.226 6.484 0.681
Huynh-Feldt 950894.351 1.061 896449.901 6.414 0.017 0.226 6.803 0.696
teent 
Lower-bound 950894.351 1.000 950894.351 6.414 0.019 0.226 6.414 0.678
Sphericity 
Assumed 282320.236 8 35290.029 78.408 0.000 0.781 627.264 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 282320.236 3.919 72032.823 78.408 0.000 0.781 307.307 1.000
Huynh-Feldt 282320.236 5.092 55445.638 78.408 0.000 0.781 399.241 1.000
strat 
tedent 
Lower-bound 282320.236 1.000 282320.236 78.408 0.000 0.781 78.408 1.000
Sphericity 
Assumed 61138.346 8 7642.293 35.631 0.000 0.618 285.049 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 61138.346 3.361 18189.382 35.631 0.000 0.618 119.764 1.000
Huynh-Feldt 61138.346 4.221 14485.298 35.631 0.000 0.618 150.389 1.000
teenv 
Lower-bound 61138.346 1.000 61138.346 35.631 0.000 0.618 35.631 1.000
Sphericity 
Assumed 530599.793 8 66324.974 3.579 0.001 0.140 28.632 0.981
Greenhouse-
Geisser 530599.793 1.011 524832.224 3.579 0.071 0.140 3.618 0.443
Huynh-Feldt 530599.793 1.061 500219.748 3.579 0.069 0.140 3.796 0.454
teent 
Lower-bound 530599.793 1.000 530599.793 3.579 0.072 0.140 3.579 0.440
Sphericity 
Assumed 113198.059 8 14149.757 31.438 0.000 0.588 251.505 1.000
Greenhouse-
Geisser 113198.059 3.919 28882.010 31.438 0.000 0.588 123.217 1.000
Huynh-Feldt 113198.059 5.092 22231.274 31.438 0.000 0.588 160.078 1.000
strat * 
visField 
tedent 
Lower-bound 113198.059 1.000 113198.059 31.438 0.000 0.588 31.438 1.000
(continues in the next page) 
Chapter 4. Experimental Evaluation  193 
 
Table 4-21 (cont.) - Univariate ANOVA tables for testing the main effects of and 
interactions involving the within-subject factor (strategy) on the exploration performance. 
Univariate Tests  
Source Measure  Type III Sum of Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 37749.071 176 214.483      
Greenhouse-
Geisser 37749.071 73.947 510.491      
Huynh-Feldt 37749.071 92.856 406.534      
teenv 
Lower-bound 37749.071 22.000 1715.867      
Sphericity 
Assumed 3261598.245 176 18531.808      
Greenhouse-
Geisser 3261598.245 22.242 146642.954      
Huynh-Feldt 3261598.245 23.336 139766.001      
teent 
Lower-bound 3261598.245 22.000 148254.466      
Sphericity 
Assumed 79214.437 176 450.082      
Greenhouse-
Geisser 79214.437 86.225 918.692      
Huynh-Feldt 79214.437 112.020 707.143      
Error(strat) 
tedent 
Lower-bound 79214.437 22.000 3600.656      
a  Computed using alpha = 0.05 
 
We test whether evidence of violation of the sphericity assumption is present using the 
Mauchly sphericity test. As shown in Table 4-22, this test is statistically significant (X2(35) = 
129.221, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore the environment – “teenv” -, X2(35) = 736.677, 
p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore all the entities – “teent” -, and X2(35) = 117.726, p < 
0.001 for the time/energy to explore all different entities – “tedent”), which suggests that the 
sphericity assumption had been violated. As in previous experimental design, we have two 
alternatives to deal with this violation: the use of the Multivariate Tests and the use of a correction 
in the degrees of freedom. Table 4-21 presents the three estimates of the correction factors 
(Greenhouse-Geisser, Huynh-Feldt, and the Lower Bounds). 
Giving that the ordinary univariate F test leads to statistical significance, we should now turn to 
one of these more conservative tests. We turn to the Lower Bound test. The within subject main 
effects on the three exploration performance measures and the interaction effect on both the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely and the time/energy to explore all different 
entities that tested significant under the assumption of sphericity remain significant with this test 
(see Table 4-21 under the rows “Lower-bound”): F(1.00, 22.00) = 147.260, p < 0.001 for the main 
effect of “strat” on the time/energy to explore the environment completely; F(1.00, 22.00) = 
6.414, p = 0.019 for the main effect of “strat” on the time/energy to explore all the entities; 
F(1.00, 22.00) = 78.408, p < 0.001 for the main effect of “strat” on the time/energy to explore all 
different entities; F(1.00, 22.00) = 35.631, p < 0.001 for the interaction effect “strat” × “visField” 
on the time/energy to explore the environment completely; F(1.00, 22.00) = 31.438, p < 0.001 for 
the interaction effect “strat” × “visField” on the time/energy to explore all different entities. 
Giving this statistical significance, we need not to use the other two conservative tests. Anyway, 
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the within subject effects that tested significant under the assumption of sphericity and with the 
Lower Bound test remain highly significant even after these corrections (see Table 4-21). 
However, the interaction effect, “strat” × “visField”, on “teent” that tested significant under the 
assumption of sphericity does not remain significant with the Lower Bound test (see Table 4-21 
under the rows “Lower-bound”, for the measure “teent” (F(1.00, 22.00) = 3.579, p = 0.072). The 
two tests contradict each other, that is, the uncorrected (positively biased) test yields statistical 
significance and the conservative (negatively biased) test does not. Therefore, the more specific 
epsilon correction in the degrees of freedom is made, substituting either the Greenhouse-Geisser 
or Huynh-Feldt epsilon estimate in place of the Lower Bound epsilon. The within subject effect, 
that tested significant under the assumption of sphericity and no significant under the Lower 
Bound test, remains no significant after these corrections: using Huynh-Feldt correction factor, 
F(1.061, 23.336) = 3.579, p = 0.069; using Greenhouse-Geisser correction factor, F(1.011, 
22.242) = 3.579, p = 0.071. Therefore we conclude that there is no significant interaction effect 
“strat” × “visField” on “teent” at the 0.05 level but there is such effect at the 0.071 level. 
Table 4-22 - Mauchly’s test for testing the sphericity assumption and correction factors. 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity(b)  
Epsilon(a) 
Within Subjects 
Effect Measure
Mauchly's 
W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
teenv 0.001 129.221 35 0.000 0.420 0.528 0.125
teent 0.000 736.677 35 0.000 0.126 0.133 0.125Strat 
tedent 0.002 117.726 35 0.000 0.490 0.636 0.125
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
a  May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in 
the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b  Design: Intercept+visField  
Within Subjects Design: strat 
 
The Multivariate Tests for testing the main effect of “strat” and the interaction “strat” × 
“visField” are shown in Table 4-23. As noted earlier, these give four commonly used significance 
tests labelled “Pillai’s Trace”, “Wilks’ Trace”, “Hotelling’s Trace”, and “Roy’s Largest Root”. 
The four tests of significance for the strategy effect given by the Multivariate Tests, Pillai’s Trace 
(value = 1.140, F(24.00, 528.00) = 13.493, p < 0.001), Wilks’ Lambda (value = 0.085, F(24.00, 
505.254) = 28.205, p < 0.001), Hotelling’s Trace (value = 8.117, F(24.00, 518.00) = 58.396, p < 
0.001), and Roy’s Largest Root (value = 7.776, F(8.00, 176.00) = 171.077, p < 0.001), indicate 
that the strategy has a significant effect. The large Partial Eta Squared values for the strategy show 
that it explains quite a lot of variation in exploration performance. There is also evidence for an 
interaction between “strat” and “visField”: Pillai’s Trace (value = 0.780, F(24.00, 528.00) = 
7.729, p < 0.001), Wilks’ Lambda (value = 0.277, F(24.00, 505.254) = 11.712, p < 0.001), 
Hotelling’s Trace (value = 2.402, F(24.00, 518.00) = 17.279, p < 0.001), and Roy’s Largest Root 
(value = 2.313, F(8.00, 176.00) = 50.897, p < 0.001). Thus, the MANOVA approach alters the 
conclusions drawn about the within-subject interaction effect, specifically with respect to the 
interaction involving “teent”. 
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Table 4-23 - Multivariate ANOVA output for testing the main effect and interactions 
involving the within-subject factor (strategy) on the exploration performance. 
Multivariate(c.d)  
Within 
Subjects 
Effect 
 Value F Hypothesis df 
Error 
df Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Pillai's Trace 1.140 13.493 24.000 528.000 .000 .380 323.827 1.000
Wilks' 
Lambda .085 28.205 24.000 505.254 .000 .560 643.982 1.000
Hotelling's 
Trace 8.117 58.396 24.000 518.000 .000 .730 1401.508 1.000
strat 
Roy's Largest 
Root 7.776 171.077(b) 8.000 176.000 .000 .886 1368.613 1.000
Pillai's Trace .780 7.729 24.000 528.000 .000 .260 185.485 1.000
Wilks' 
Lambda .277 11.712 24.000 505.254 .000 .348 269.616 1.000
Hotelling's 
Trace 2.402 17.279 24.000 518.000 .000 .445 414.704 1.000
strat * 
visField 
Roy's Largest 
Root 2.313 50.897(b) 8.000 176.000 .000 .698 407.176 1.000
a  Computed using alpha = 0.05 
b  The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a Lower Bound on the significance level. 
c  Design: Intercept+visField  
    Within Subjects Design: strat 
d  Tests are based on averaged variables. 
 
All the analyses reported above have established that there is evidence indicating that the 
time/energy to explore the environment is affected by the strategy and by the amplitude of the 
visual field. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis. We now undertake further tests to determine 
which particular strategies differ (since there are only two levels for the visual range, we already 
know that these two levels differ). As in the previous experimental design, we conducted post hoc 
comparisons. The resulting multiple comparison output for the strategy factor is shown in Table 
4-24, Table 4-25, and Table 4-26. In addition, there is evidence of an interaction between “strat” 
and “visField”. We need to interpret this interaction. A line chart of estimated means is useful for 
this purpose (Figure 4-23, Figure 4-24, Figure 4-25, Figure 4-26, Figure 4-27, Figure 4-28, Figure 
4-29, Figure 4-30, Figure 4-31, Figure 4-32, Figure 4-33, and Figure 4-34). 
All the analyses reported above have established that the there is evidence indicating that the 
three exploration performance measures are affected by the strategy. The univariate ANOVA 
model tests, particularly the more conservative tests, indicate no evidence for the interaction 
between “strat” and “visField” on “teent”, but the MANOVA approach alters these conclusions 
by indicating a significant interaction “strat” × “visField”. We do not find a significant main 
effect of the visual field factor both on the time/energy to explore all the entities of the 
environment and on the time/energy to explore all different entities, but we find a significant main 
effect of the visual field factor on the time/energy to explore the environment completely. Giving 
these results: we reject the null hypothesis that states there is no effect of the strategy; we reject 
the null hypothesis about the equality of the visual field factor effects with respect to the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely, but we accept the null hypothesis about the 
equality of the visual field factor effects with respect to the other two exploration performance 
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measures; we reject the null hypothesis that states there is no interaction between the strategy and 
the visual field. 
The profile plots (Figure 4-23, Figure 4-24, Figure 4-25, Figure 4-26, Figure 4-27, Figure 4-28, 
Figure 4-29, Figure 4-30, Figure 4-31, Figure 4-32, Figure 4-33, and Figure 4-34) show the 
model-estimated means for the nine strategies. Together with the multiple comparison output, the 
plots provide us similar results to those reached with the one-way repeated measures experimental 
design with respect to the strategy. The profile plots also indicate that there is significant 
interaction “strat” × “visField”, as well as that there is significant effect of “visField” on “teenv” 
(this is also confirmed by the pairwise comparisons of “visField” presented in Table 4-27). 
 
Table 4-24 – Pairwise comparisons of the strategy for “teenv”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
131.210 
(0.000) 
83.125 
(0.000) 
98.822 
(0.000) 
89.268 
(0.000) 
108.202 
(0.000) 
85.218 
(0.000) 
99.545 
(0.000) 
103.176 
(0.000) 
2 
-131.210 
(0.000) 
 
-48.085 
(0.000) 
-32.389 
(0.000) 
-41.943 
(0.000) 
-23.009 
(0.000) 
-45.993 
(0.000) 
-31.666 
(0.000) 
-28.035 
(0.000) 
3 
-83.125 
(0.000) 
48.085 
(0.000) 
 
15.697 
(0.000) 
6.143 
(0.128) 
25.077 
(0.000) 
2.093 
(0.328) 
16.420 
(0.000) 
20.051 
(0.000) 
4 
-98.822 
(0.000) 
32.389 
(0.000) 
-15.697 
(0.000) 
 
-9.554 
(0.041) 
9.380 
(0.005) 
-13.604 
(0.000) 
0.723 
(0.360) 
4.354 
(0.341) 
5 
-89.268 
(0.000) 
41.943 
(0.000) 
-6.143 
(0.128) 
9.554 
(0.041) 
 
18.934 
(0.000) 
-4.050 
(0.290) 
10.277 
(0.030) 
13.908 
(0.001) 
6 
-108.202 
(0.000) 
23.009 
(0.000) 
-25.077 
(0.000) 
-9.380 
(0.005) 
-18.934 
(0.000) 
 
-22.984 
(0.000) 
-8.657 
(0.013) 
-5.026 
(0.105) 
7 
-85.218 
(0.000) 
45.993 
(0.000) 
-2.093 
(0.328) 
13.604 
(0.000) 
4.050 
(0.290) 
22.984 
(0.000) 
 
14.327 
(0.000) 
17.958 
(0.000) 
8 
-99.545 
(0.000) 
31.666 
(0.000) 
-16.420 
(0.000) 
-0.723 
(0.360) 
-10.277 
(0.030) 
8.657 
(0.013) 
-14.327 
(0.000) 
 
3.631 
(0.443) 
9 
-103.176 
(0.000) 
28.035 
(0.000) 
-20.051 
(0.000) 
-4.354 
(0.341) 
-13.908 
(0.001) 
5.026 
(0.105) 
-17.958 
(0.000) 
-3.631 
(0.443) 
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Table 4-25 - Pairwise comparisons of the strategy for “teent”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
240.391 
(0.008) 
189.918 
(0.032) 
202.544 
(0.024) 
199.051 
(0.024) 
214.638 
(0.018) 
191.736 
(0.030) 
203.186 
(0.023) 
208.824 
(0.021) 
2 
-240.391 
(0.008) 
 
-50.474 
(0.000) 
-37.847 
(0.000) 
-41.340 
(0.000) 
-25.754 
(0.000) 
-48.655 
(0.000) 
-37.205 
(0.000) 
-31.568 
(0.000) 
3 
-189.918 
(0.032) 
50.474 
(0.000) 
 
12.627 
(0.000) 
9.133 
(0.016) 
24.720 
(0.000) 
1.819 
(0.328) 
13.268 
(0.000) 
18.906 
(0.000) 
4 
-202.544 
(0.024) 
37.847 
(0.000) 
-12.627 
(0.000) 
 
-3.493 
(0.409) 
12.093 
(0.000) 
-10.808 
(0.000) 
0.642 
(0.153) 
6.280 
(0.142) 
5 
-199.051 
(0.024) 
41.340 
(0.000) 
-9.133 
(0.016) 
3.493 
(0.409) 
 
15.587 
(0.001) 
-7.315 
(0.051) 
4.135 
(0.332) 
9.773 
(0.020) 
6 
-214.638 
(0.018) 
25.754 
(0.000) 
-24.720 
(0.000) 
-12.093 
(0.000) 
-15.587 
(0.001) 
 
-22.901 
(0.000) 
-11.452 
(0.000) 
-5.814 
(0.084) 
7 
-191.736 
(0.030) 
48.655 
(0.000) 
-1.819 
(0.328) 
10.808 
(0.000) 
7.315 
(0.051) 
22.901 
(0.000) 
 
11.450 
(0.000) 
17.088 
(0.000) 
8 
-203.186 
(0.023) 
37.205 
(0.000) 
-13.268 
(0.000) 
-0.642 
(0.153) 
-4.135 
(0.332) 
11.452 
(0.000) 
-11.450 
(0.000) 
 
5.638 
(0.187) 
9 
-208.824 
(0.021) 
31.568 
(0.000) 
-18.906 
(0.000) 
-6.280 
(0.142) 
-9.773 
(0.020) 
5.814 
(0.084) 
-17.088 
(0.000) 
-5.638 
(0.187) 
 
 
Table 4-26 - Pairwise comparisons of the strategy for “tedent”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
126.188 
(0.000) 
112.863 
(0.000) 
112.275 
(0.000) 
108.203 
(0.000) 
114.595 
(0.000) 
113.533 
(0.000) 
113.953 
(0.000) 
110.999 
(0.000) 
2 
-126.188 
(0.000) 
 
-13.324 
(0.152) 
-13.912 
(0.094) 
-17.985 
(0.060) 
-11.593 
(0.074) 
-12.655 
(0.140) 
-12.235 
(0.132) 
-15.189 
(0.042) 
3 
-112.863 
(0.000) 
13.324 
(0.152) 
 
-0.588 
(0.916) 
-4.661 
(0.359) 
1.731 
(0.806) 
0.669 
(0.886) 
1.678 
(0.149) 
-1.277 
(0.823) 
4 
-112.275 
(0.000) 
13.912 
(0.094) 
0.588 
(0.916) 
 
-4.073 
(0.379) 
2.319 
(0.624) 
1.257 
(0.743) 
1.678 
(0.149) 
-1.277 
(0.823) 
5 
-108.203 
(0.000) 
17.985 
(0.060) 
4.661 
(0.359) 
4.073 
(0.379) 
 
6.392 
(0.213) 
5.330 
(0.316) 
5.750 
(0.214) 
2.796 
(0.587) 
6 
-114.595 
(0.000) 
11.593 
(0.074) 
-1.731 
(0.806) 
-2.319 
(0.624) 
-6.392 
(0.213) 
 
-1.062 
(0.874) 
-0.642 
(0.890) 
-3.596 
(0.272) 
7 
-113.533 
(0.000) 
12.655 
(0.140) 
-0.669 
(0.886) 
-1.257 
(0.743) 
-5.330 
(0.316) 
1.062 
(0.874) 
 
0.420 
(0.913) 
-2.534 
(0.721) 
8 
-113.953 
(0.000) 
12.235 
(0.132) 
-1.090 
(0.852) 
-1.678 
(0.149) 
-5.750 
(0.214) 
0.642 
(0.890) 
-0.420 
(0.913) 
 
-2.954 
(0.610) 
9 
-110.999 
(0.000) 
15.189 
(0.042) 
1.865 
(0.795) 
1.277 
(0.823) 
-2.796 
(0.587) 
3.596 
(0.272) 
2.534 
(0.721) 
2.954 
(0.610) 
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Table 4-27 – Pairwise comparisons of “visField”. 
Pairwise Comparisons  
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference(a) Measure (I) Visual Field 
(J) Visual 
Field 
Mean Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error Sig.(a)
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low Large 36.373(*) 3.327 .000 29.473 43.272
teenv 
Large Low -36.373(*) 3.327 .000 -43.272 -29.473
Low Large 13.768 18.119 .455 -23.809 51.344
teent 
Large Low -13.768 18.119 .455 -51.344 23.809
Low Large 3.615 12.815 .781 -22.961 30.191
tedent 
Large Low -3.615 12.815 .781 -30.191 22.961
Based on estimated marginal means 
*  The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
a  Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments). 
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Figure 4-23 - Profile plots of ”visField” × “strat” for “teenv”. 
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Figure 4-24 - Profile plots of “strat”×”visField” for “teenv”. 
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Figure 4-25 - Profile plots of “visField” for “teenv”. 
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Figure 4-26 – Profile plots of “strat” for “teenv”. 
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Figure 4-27 - Profile plots of ”visField” × “strat” for “teent”. 
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Figure 4-28 - Profile plots of “strat”×”visField” for “teent”. 
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Figure 4-29 - Profile plots of “visField” for “teent”. 
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Figure 4-30 – Profile plots of “strat” for “teent”. 
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Figure 4-31 - Profile plots of ”visField” × “strat” for “tedent”. 
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Figure 4-32 - Profile plots of “strat”×”visField” for “tedent”. 
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Figure 4-33 - Profile plots of “visField” for “tedent”. 
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Figure 4-34 – Profile plots of “strat” for “tedent”. 
4.2.3 Three Way repeated measures design with the problem as a random factor 
This experimental design is similar to that of Section 4.2.2.1. Thus, it considers also the strategy 
as the within subject factor. Each treatment corresponds to one of the nine levels of the factor. In 
addition, we consider the problem as another factor. This is a between subject factor. In this case, 
we have a two factor factorial experimental design with repeated measures. The blocking 
experimental principle is applied to the exploration problem factor in order to reduce the variance 
caused by the use of environments with different complexities. This yields the following two 
factor factorial repeated measures design: repeated measures design with three blocks of problems 
(the environment complexity is the variable used to group the problems into three groups: low, 
medium, and high complexity environments). However, in contrary to the previous experimental 
design, we consider the problem as a random factor which is nested in the environment 
complexity factor. This is considered as a random factor because the problems included are 
regarded as merely representatives of a virtually infinite class of problems to which we wish to 
generalize. We chose them randomly from a population of exploration problems. Keppel [Keppel, 
1991] suggested that this design may be alternatively conceived as a three-factor design, with the 
factors being the strategy, the environment complexity, and the problem. The latter is to be 
regarded as a random factor, the former two as fixed. 
The layout of this experiment is shown in Table 4-28.  
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Table 4-28 – Experiment design. 
Strategies  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
low 
1 
2 
3 
d1,1 
d2,1 
d3,1 
d1,2 
d2,2 
d3,2
d1,3 
d2,3 
d3,3
d1,4 
d2,4 
d3,4
d1,5 
d2,5 
d3,5
d1,6 
d2,6 
d3,6
d1,7 
d2,7 
d3,7
d1,8 
d2,8 
d3,8 
d1,9 
d2,9 
d3,9 
medium 
4 
5 
6 
d4,1 
d5,1 
d6,1 
d4,2 
d5,2 
d6,2
d4,3 
d5,3 
d6,3
d4,4 
d5,4 
d6,4
d4,5 
d5,5 
d6,5
d4,6 
d5,6 
d6,6
d4,7 
d5,7 
d6,7
d4,8 
d5,8 
d6,8 
d4,9 
d5,9 
d6,9 
Su
bj
ec
ts
  g
ro
up
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t c
om
pl
ex
ity
 
high 
7 
8 
9 
d7,1 
d8,1 
d9,1 
d7,2 
d8,2 
d9,2
d7,3 
d8,3 
d9,3
d7,4 
d8,4 
d9,4
d7,5 
d8,5 
d9,5
d7,6 
d8,6 
d9,6
d7,7 
d8,7 
d9,7
d7,8 
d8,8 
d9,8 
d7,9 
d8,9 
d9,9 
 
This design allows us to test the null hypothesis about the equality of the strategy factor effects: 
H0: α1 = α2 =…= α9 = 0 (there is no strategy effect) 
H1: at least one αi ≠ 0, i=1,…,9 
Also, this design allows us to test the null hypothesis about the equality of the problem category 
(environment complexity) factor effects: 
H0: β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 (there is no problem category effect) 
H1: at least one βj ≠ 0, j=1,2,3 
Finally, it also allows us to determine whether the strategy and the problem category interact: 
H0: (αβ)ij = 0 , for all i,j (there is no interaction effect) 
H1: at least one (αβ)ij ≠ 0 
 
In other words, and just like the previous experimental design described in Section 4.2.2.1, this 
factorial design allows us to answer the following three questions: (a) what is the effect of the 
strategy?; (b) what is the effect of the environment complexity (problem category)?; and (c) do 
these two variables interact (i.e., does the effect of the strategy depend on the environment 
complexity category)? Here, there is, however, an important aspect to stress: these questions are 
answered with respect to all the exploration problems. 
The formal analysis lead us to reach similar conclusions to those of the experimental design of 
Section 4.2.2.1 (see Table 4-29, Table 4-30, Table 4-31, Table 4-32, and Table 4-33). However, in 
this design these conclusions assume more importance because they are generalized to all the 
exploration problems. 
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Table 4-29 - Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects  
Dependent Variable: Time/Energy required to explore the environment completely  
Source  Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Hypothesis 3607668.081 1 3607668.081 1004.601 0.000 0.985 1004.601 1.000
Intercept 
Error 53867.189 15 3591.146(b)      
Hypothesis 204960.674 8 25620.084 41.403 0.000 0.734 331.224 1.000
strat 
Error 74255.799 120 618.798(c)      
Hypothesis 1414.218 2 707.109 0.197 0.823 0.026 0.394 0.075
envComp 
Error 53867.189 15 3591.146(b)      
Hypothesis 2734.845 16 170.928 0.276 0.997 0.036 4.420 0.173strat * 
envComp Error 74255.799 120 618.798(c)      
Hypothesis 53867.189 15 3591.146 5.803 0.000 0.420 87.051 1.000envComp * 
problem Error 74255.799 120 618.798(c)      
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects  
Dependent Variable: Time/Energy required to explore all the entities of the environment  
Source  Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Hypothesis 2688996.451 1 2688996.451 6564.152 0.000 0.998 6564.152 1.000
Intercept 
Error 6144.731 15 409.649(b)      
Hypothesis 292815.084 8 36601.885 36.376 0.000 0.708 291.006 1.000
strat 
Error 120746.016 120 1006.217(c)      
Hypothesis 1808.504 2 904.252 2.207 0.144 0.227 4.415 0.380
envComp 
Error 6144.731 15 409.649(b)      
Hypothesis 2569.744 16 160.609 0.160 1.000 0.021 2.554 0.113strat * 
envComp Error 120746.016 120 1006.217(c)      
Hypothesis 6144.731 15 409.649 0.407 0.975 0.048 6.107 0.245envComp * 
problem Error 120746.016 120 1006.217(c)      
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects  
Dependent Variable: Time/Energy required to explore all different entities of the environment  
Source  Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Hypothesis 1729663.603 1 1729663.603 3115.725 0.000 0.995 3115.725 1.000
Intercept 
Error 8327.101 15 555.140(b)      
Hypothesis 208948.522 8 26118.565 25.050 0.000 0.625 200.398 1.000
strat 
Error 125120.181 120 1042.668(c)      
Hypothesis 175285.467 2 87642.734 157.875 0.000 0.955 315.750 1.000
envComp 
Error 8327.101 15 555.140(b)      
Hypothesis 28988.137 16 1811.759 1.738 0.048 0.188 27.802 0.913strat * 
envComp Error 125120.181 120 1042.668(c)      
Hypothesis 8327.101 15 555.140 0.532 0.918 0.062 7.986 0.325envComp * 
problem Error 125120.181 120 1042.668(c)      
a  Computed using alpha = 0.05 
b   MS(envComp * Problem) 
c   MS(Error) 
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Table 4-30 - Pairwise Comparisons of the strategy for “teenv”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
135.687 
(0.000) 
89.863 
(0.000) 
104.117 
(0.000) 
92.614 
(0.000) 
112.496 
(0.000) 
92.653 
(0.000) 
105.081 
(0.000) 
109.066 
(0.000) 
2 
-135.687 
(0.000) 
 
-45.824 
(0.000) 
-31.571 
(0.000) 
-43.073 
(0.000) 
-23.191 
(0.006) 
-43.034 
(0.000) 
-30.607 
(0.000) 
-26.622 
(0.002) 
3 
-89.863 
(0.000) 
45.824 
(0.000) 
 
14.254 
(0.088) 
2.751 
(0.741) 
22.633 
(0.007) 
2.791 
(0.737) 
15.218 
(0.069) 
19.203 
(0.022) 
4 
-104.117 
(0.000) 
31.571 
(0.000) 
-14.254 
(0.088) 
 
-11.503 
(0.168) 
8.379 
(0.314) 
-11.463 
(0.169) 
0.964 
(0.908) 
4.949 
(0.552) 
5 
-92.614 
(0.000) 
43.073 
(0.000) 
-2.751 
(0.741) 
11.503 
(0.168) 
 
19.882 
(0.018) 
0.039 
(0.996) 
12.467 
(0.135) 
16.452 
(0.050) 
6 
-112.496 
(0.000) 
23.191 
(0.006) 
-22.633 
(0.007) 
-8.379 
(0.314) 
-19.882 
(0.018) 
 
-19.843 
(0.018) 
-7.416 
(0.373) 
-3.431 
(0.680) 
7 
-92.653 
(0.000) 
43.034 
(0.000) 
-2.791 
(0.737) 
11.463 
(0.169) 
-0.039 
(0.996) 
19.843 
(0.018) 
 
12.427 
(0.137) 
16.412 
(0.050) 
8 
-105.081 
(0.000) 
30.607 
(0.000) 
-15.218 
(0.069) 
-0.964 
(0.908) 
-12.467 
(0.135) 
7.416 
(0.373) 
-12.427 
(0.137) 
 
3.985 
(0.632) 
9 
-109.066 
(0.000) 
26.622 
(0.002) 
-19.203 
(0.022) 
-4.949 
(0.552) 
-16.452 
(0.050) 
3.431 
(0.680) 
-16.412 
(0.050) 
-3.985 
(0.632) 
 
 
Table 4-31 - Pairwise Comparisons of the strategy for “teent”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
161.536 
(0.000) 
112.800 
(0.000) 
124.541 
(0.000) 
119.495 
(0.000) 
135.408 
(0.000) 
115.225 
(0.000) 
125.396 
(0.000) 
130.720 
(0.000) 
2 
-161.536 
(0.000) 
 
-48.736 
(0.000) 
-36.995 
(0.001) 
-42.041 
(0.000) 
-26.128 
(0.015) 
-46.311 
(0.000) 
-36.139 
(0.001) 
-30.816 
(0.004) 
3 
-112.800 
(0.000) 
48.736 
(0.000) 
 
11.741 
(0.269) 
6.695 
(0.528) 
22.608 
(0.035) 
2.425 
(0.819) 
12.596 
(0.236) 
17.920 
(0.093) 
4 
-124.541 
(0.000) 
36.995 
(0.001) 
-11.741 
(0.269) 
 
-5.046 
(0.634) 
10.867 
(0.306) 
-9.316 
(0.380) 
0.856 
(0.936) 
11.225 
(0.291) 
5 
-119.495 
(0.000) 
42.041 
(0.000) 
-6.695 
(0.528) 
5.046 
(0.634) 
 
15.913 
(0.135) 
-4.270 
(0.687) 
5.901 
(0.578) 
11.225 
(0.291) 
6 
-135.408 
(0.000) 
26.128 
(0.015) 
-22.608 
(0.035) 
-10.867 
(0.306) 
-15.913 
(0.135) 
 
-20.183 
(0.059) 
-10.012 
(0.346) 
-4.688 
(0.658) 
7 
-115.225 
(0.000) 
46.311 
(0.000) 
-2.425 
(0.819) 
9.316 
(0.380) 
4.270 
(0.687) 
20.183 
(0.059) 
 
10.171 
(0.338) 
15.495 
(0.145) 
8 
-125.396 
(0.000) 
36.139 
(0.001) 
-12.596 
(0.236) 
-0.856 
(0.936) 
-5.901 
(0.578) 
10.012 
(0.346) 
-10.171 
(0.338) 
 
5.324 
(0.616) 
9 
-130.720 
(0.000) 
30.816 
(0.004) 
-17.920 
(0.093) 
-6.179 
(0.560) 
-11.225 
(0.291) 
4.688 
(0.658) 
-15.495 
(0.145) 
-5.324 
(0.616) 
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Table 4-32 - Pairwise Comparisons of the strategy for “tedent”. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  
122.977 
(0.000) 
106.692 
(0.000) 
113.864 
(0.000) 
109.712 
(0.000) 
114.603 
(0.000) 
112.462 
(0.000) 
116.101 
(0.000) 
111.306 
(0.000) 
2 
-122.977 
(0.000) 
 
-16.285 
(0.133) 
-9.112 
(0.399) 
-13.264 
(0.220) 
-8.373 
(0.438) 
-10.515 
(0.331) 
-6.876 
(0.524) 
-11.671 
(0.280) 
3 
-106.692 
(0.000) 
16.285 
(0.133) 
 
7.173 
(0.506) 
3.021 
(0.779) 
7.912 
(0.464) 
5.770 
(0.593) 
9.409 
(0.384) 
4.614 
(0.669) 
4 
-113.864 
(0.000) 
9.112 
(0.399) 
-7.173 
(0.506) 
 
-4.152 
(0.700) 
0.739 
(0.945) 
-1.403 
(0.897) 
2.237 
(0.836) 
-2.559 
(0.812) 
5 
-109.712 
(0.000) 
13.264 
(0.220) 
-3.021 
(0.779) 
4.152 
(0.700) 
 
4.891 
(0.650) 
2.749 
(0.7999) 
6.389 
(0.554) 
1.593 
(0.883) 
6 
-114.603 
(0.000) 
8.373 
(0.438) 
-7.912 
(0.464) 
-0.739 
(0.945) 
-4.891 
(0.650) 
 
-2.142 
(0.843) 
1.498 
(0.890) 
-3.298 
(0.760) 
7 
-112.462 
(0.000) 
10.515 
(0.331) 
-5.770 
(0.593) 
1.403 
(0.897) 
-2.749 
(0.7999) 
2.142 
(0.843) 
 
3.639 
(0.736) 
-1.156 
(0.915) 
8 
-116.101 
(0.000) 
6.876 
(0.524) 
-9.409 
(0.384) 
-2.237 
(0.836) 
-6.389 
(0.554) 
-1.498 
(0.890) 
-3.639 
(0.736) 
 
-4.796 
(0.657) 
9 
-111.306 
(0.000) 
11.671 
(0.280) 
-4.614 
(0.669) 
2.559 
(0.812) 
-1.593 
(0.883) 
3.298 
(0.760) 
1.156 
(0.915) 
4.796 
(0.657) 
 
 
There is however an additional statistical information that can be obtained with this design 
which is the identification of homogeneous subsets (see Table 4-34, Table 4-35, and Table 4-36). 
Once we have determined that differences exist among the means, post hoc range tests and 
pairwise multiple comparisons can determine which means differ. Range tests identify 
homogeneous subsets of means that are not different from each other. Pairwise multiple 
comparisons test the difference between each pair of means, and yield a matrix where asterisks 
indicate significantly different group means at an alpha level of 0.05. 
We can identify three homogenous subsets of means with the Tukey HSD test for the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely (Table 4-34). Group1 comprises the strategies 
based on: hunger; and, surprise and hunger (“surprise+hunger”). Group 2 comprises all the 
strategies except the one based on hunger and the random strategy. Group 3 comprises the random 
strategy. With Scheffe test Group 2 and 3 are identical. However, Group 1 comprises the classical 
strategy as well as the strategies based on: hunger; surprise and hunger (“surprise+hunger”); 
surprise, curiosity and hunger (“surprise+curiosity+hunger”); and curiosity and hunger 
(“curiosity+hunger”). 
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Table 4-33 - Pairwise Comparisons for the environment complexity. 
Pairwise Comparisons  
Dependent Variable: Time/Energy required to explore the environment completely  
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference(a) (I) Environment 
Complexity 
(J) Environment 
Complexity 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig.(a)
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Medium -1.556(b.c) 4.787 0.746 -11.035 7.922
Low 
High -6.899(b.c) 4.787 0.152 -16.378 2.579
Low 1.556(b.c) 4.787 0.746 -7.922 11.035
Medium 
High -5.343(b.c) 4.787 0.267 -14.821 4.136
Low 6.899(b.c) 4.787 0.152 -2.579 16.378
High 
Medium 5.343(b.c) 4.787 0.267 -4.136 14.821
 
Pairwise Comparisons  
Dependent Variable: Time/Energy required to explore all the entities of the environment  
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference(a) (I) Environment 
Complexity 
(J) Environment 
Complexity 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig.(a)
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Medium -2.017(b.c) 6.105 0.742 -14.104 10.070
Low 
High -7.878(b.c) 6.105 0.199 -19.964 4.209
Low 2.017(b.c) 6.105 0.742 -10.070 14.104
Medium 
High -5.861(b.c) 6.105 0.339 -17.948 6.226
Low 7.878(b.c) 6.105 0.199 -4.209 19.964
High 
Medium 5.861(b.c) 6.105 0.339 -6.226 17.948
 
Pairwise Comparisons  
Dependent Variable: Time/Energy required to explore all different entities of the environment  
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference(a) (I) Environment 
Complexity 
(J) Environment 
Complexity 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig.(a)
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Medium -61.452(*.b.c) 6.214 0.000 -73.756 -49.149
Low 
High -75.856(*.b.c) 6.214 0.000 -88.160 -63.553
Low 61.452(*.b.c) 6.214 0.000 49.149 73.756
Medium 
High -14.404(*.b.c) 6.214 0.022 -26.708 -2.100
Low 75.856(*.b.c) 6.214 0.000 63.553 88.160
High 
Medium 14.404(*.b.c) 6.214 0.022 2.100 26.708
Based on estimated marginal means 
a  Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments). 
b  An estimate of the modified population marginal mean (I). 
c  An estimate of the modified population marginal mean (J). 
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Table 4-34 – Homogeneous subsets for “teenv”. 
Time/Energy required to explore the environment completely  
Subset  
 Strategy N 1 2 3 
Hunger Strategy 18 107.0511   
Surprise+Hunger Strategy 18 130.2422 130.2422  
Classical Strategy 18  133.6728  
Surprise+Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18  137.6578  
Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18  138.6217  
Surprise+Curiosity Strategy 18  150.0850  
Surprise Strategy 18  150.1244  
Curiosity Strategy 18  152.8756  
Random Strategy 18   242.7383 
Tukey HSD(a.b) 
Sig.  0.127 0.149 1.000 
Hunger Strategy 18 107.0511   
Surprise+Hunger Strategy 18 130.2422 130.2422  
Classical Strategy 18 133.6728 133.6728  
Surprise+Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18 137.6578 137.6578  
Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18 138.6217 138.6217  
Surprise+Curiosity Strategy 18  150.0850  
Surprise Strategy 18  150.1244  
Curiosity Strategy 18  152.8756  
Random Strategy 18   242.7383 
Scheffe(a.b) 
Sig.  0.081 0.493 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 618.798. 
a  Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 18.000. 
b  Alpha = 0.05. 
 
We can identify three homogenous subsets of means with the Tukey HSD test for the 
time/energy to explore all the entities of the environment (Table 4-35). Group1 comprises the 
classical strategy as well as the strategies based on: hunger; and, surprise and hunger 
(“surprise+hunger”). Group 2 comprises all the strategies except the one based on hunger and the 
random strategy. Group 3 comprises the random strategy. With Scheffe test Group 2 and 3 are 
identical. However, Group 1 comprises all the strategies except the random strategy and those 
based on: surprise and curiosity (“surprise+curiosity”); and curiosity. 
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Table 4-35 - Homogeneous subsets for “teent”. 
Time/Energy required to explore all the entities of the environment  
Subset  
 Strategy N 1 2 3 
Hunger Strategy 18 81.2028   
Surprise+Hunger Strategy 18 107.3306 107.3306  
Classical Strategy 18 112.0183 112.0183  
Surprise+Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18  117.3422  
Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18  118.1978  
Surprise Strategy 18  123.2433  
Surprise+Curiosity Strategy 18  127.5133  
Curiosity Strategy 18  129.9383  
Random Strategy 18   242.7383 
Tukey HSD(a.b) 
Sig.  0.096 0.453 1.000 
Hunger Strategy 18 81.2028   
Surprise+Hunger Strategy 18 107.3306 107.3306  
Classical Strategy 18 112.0183 112.0183  
Surprise+Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18 117.3422 117.3422  
Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18 118.1978 118.1978  
Surprise Strategy 18 123.2433 123.2433  
Surprise+Curiosity Strategy 18  127.5133  
Curiosity Strategy 18  129.9383  
Random Strategy 18   242.7383 
Scheffe(a.b) 
Sig.  0.055 0.800 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1006.217. 
a  Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 18.000. 
b  Alpha = 0.05. 
 
We can identify two homogenous subsets of means both with the Tukey HSD and the Scheffe 
tests for the time/energy to explore all different entities of the environment (Table 4-36). Group1 
comprises the all the strategies except the random strategy which is the single strategy that forms 
Group2. 
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Table 4-36 - Homogeneous subsets for “tedent”. 
Time/Energy required to explore all different entities of the environment  
Subset  
 Strategy N 1 2 
Hunger Strategy 18 81.2100  
Surprise+Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18 88.0856  
Surprise+Hunger Strategy 18 89.5833  
Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18 90.3222  
Surprise+Curiosity Strategy 18 91.7250  
Classical Strategy 18 92.8811  
Surprise Strategy 18 94.4744  
Curiosity Strategy 18 97.4950  
Random Strategy 18  204.1867 
Tukey HSD(a.b) 
Sig.  0.847 1.000 
Hunger Strategy 18 81.2100  
Surprise+Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18 88.0856  
Surprise+Hunger Strategy 18 89.5833  
Curiosity+Hunger Strategy 18 90.3222  
Surprise+Curiosity Strategy 18 91.7250  
Classical Strategy 18 92.8811  
Surprise Strategy 18 94.4744  
Curiosity Strategy 18 97.4950  
Random Strategy 18  204.1867 
Scheffe(a.b) 
Sig.  0.969 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1042.668. 
a  Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 18.000. 
b  Alpha = 0.05. 
 
4.2.4 Summary of Results 
We begin with the summary of the results reached with the one way repeated measures 
experimental design. With the univariate approach, we find a significant effect of “strat” on the 
three exploration performance measures: F(8,184) = 58.77, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to 
explore the environment completely (encoded as “teenv”); F(8,184) = 5.77, p < 0.001 for the 
time/energy to explore all the entities (encoded as “teent”); and F(8,184) = 33.747, p < 0.001 for 
the time/energy to explore all different entities (encoded as “teent”). Specifically, “strat” accounts 
for 71.9% of the variance in the time/energy to explore the environment completely, 20% of the 
variance in the time/energy to explore all the entities, and 59.5% of the variance in the 
time/energy to explore all different entities. 
The within subject effect, “strat”, that tested significant under the assumption of sphericity 
remains significant with the tests based on correction factors (Lower Bound): F(1.00, 23.00) = 
58.77, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore the environment completely, F(1.00, 23.00) = 
5.767, p = 0.025 for the time/energy to explore all the entities, and F(1.00, 23.00) = 33.747, p < 
0.001 for the time/energy to explore all different entities. 
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The Multivariate Test results for testing the main effect of “strat” are identical to those obtained 
from the univariate ANOVA model: the four tests of significance for the strategy effect given by 
the Multivariate Tests, Pillai’s Trace (value = 0.944; F(24.00, 552.00)=10.565, p < 0.001), Wilks’ 
Lambda (value = 0.218; F(24.00, 528.457) = 15.219, p < 0.001), Hotelling’s Trace (value = 
2.847; F(24.00, 542.00) = 21.429, p < 0.001), and Roy’s Largest Root (value = 2.556; 
F(8.00,184.00) = 58.787, p < 0.001), indicate that the strategy has a significant effect. 
All the analyses reported above have established that the exploration performance is affected by 
the strategy. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis. The F test tell us only if all the group means 
are roughly equal or if there are some significant differences among them. In the latter case, it 
does not tell us which groups are different from which other groups. Therefore, we undertake 
further tests to determine which particular group means differ. Since we has no prior hypotheses 
about the group differences and we are simply exploring the data to ascertain which group 
differences are driving the significance of the overall F test, we conducted post hoc comparisons. 
Together with the multiple comparison output, the plots provide us the following results. 
Strategy 1 (random) is significantly (p < 0.001) the worst strategy considering the three 
exploration performance measures (time/energy to explore the environment completely, 
time/energy to explore all the entities and the time/energy to explore all different entities). On the 
contrary, strategy 2 (hunger-based) is significantly (p < 0.001) the best strategy considering the 
three exploration performance measures. However, this strategy depends heavily on the position 
of the entities in the environment (this factor was kept constant in our experiment). 
Consider first the time/energy to explore the environment completely. Excluding strategy 2, 
strategy 6 (based on surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, followed closely by 
strategy 9 (classical strategy). However, this difference is no significant at the 0.05 level (p = 
0.098) but it is at the 0.1 level. All the other strategies are significantly worse than strategy 6. The 
next strategies in the ranking are strategies 4 (curiosity and hunger) and 8 (surprise, curiosity, and 
hunger), whose difference is not significant. The difference between strategy 6 and these two 
strategies is significant: p = 0.006 for strategy 4 and p = 0.014 for strategy 8. However, these are 
not significantly different from strategy 9. There is no significant difference between strategies 3 
(curiosity), 5 (surprise), and 7 (curiosity and surprise). This means that those strategies that take 
hunger, either alone or combined with surprise and/or curiosity, into account are significantly 
better than those strategies that take only surprise and/or curiosity into account. 
Considering the time/energy to explore all the entities, and, excluding strategy 2, strategy 6 
(surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, followed closely by strategy 9 (classical 
strategy). However, this difference is not significant at the 0.05 level but it is at the 0.08 level. All 
the other strategies are significantly worse than strategy 6. The next strategies in the ranking are 
strategies 8 (surprise, curiosity and hunger) and 4 (curiosity and hunger), whose difference is not 
significant. The difference between strategy 6 and these two strategies is significant: p < 0.001. 
However, these are not significantly different from strategy 9. There is no significant difference 
between strategies 5 (surprise), 4 (curiosity and hunger), 7 (curiosity and surprise), and 8 
(surprise, curiosity and hunger). 
Consider now the time/energy to explore all different entities. Excluding strategy 2 (hunger), 
strategy 6 (surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, followed closely by strategy 8 
(surprise and curiosity), 3 (curiosity), 4 (curiosity and hunger), and 7 (curiosity and surprise). 
However, this difference is no significant. The next strategies in the ranking are strategies 9 
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(classical) and 5 (surprise), whose difference is not significant. The difference between strategy 6 
and these two strategies is not significant: p = 0.267 for strategy 9. 
Table 4-37 shows the summary of the results reached with the one way repeated measures 
experimental design. 
 
Table 4-37 - Summary of the results reached with the one way repeated measures 
experimental design. 
 Univariate Conservative Multivariate 
 strat strat strat 
teenv <0.001 <0.001 
teent <0.001 =0.025 
tedent <0.001 <0.001 
<0.001 
 
We now summarize the results achieved with the two way repeated measures design. We begin 
with the variant of grouping problems by different environment complexity. 
The one-way ANOVA table for testing our single between-subject factor “environment 
complexity” does not lead us to finding a significant main effect of the environment complexity 
factor both on the time/energy to explore the environment completely (encoded as “teenv”) (F(2, 
15) = 0.197, p = 0.823), and on the time/energy to explore all the entities (“teent”) (F(2, 15) = 
2.207, p = 0.144). Specifically, the environment complexity group accounts for 2.6% of the 
variance in the time/energy to explore the environment completely and for 22.7% of the variance 
in the time/energy to explore all the entities; averaged over the nine strategies, exploration times 
for the complete environment and all the entities do not differ between the three environment 
complexity groups. However, we find a significant main effect of the environment complexity 
factor on the time/energy to explore all different entities (encoded as “tedent”) (F(2, 15) = 
157.875, p < 0.001). Specifically, the environment complexity group accounts for 95.5% of the 
variance in the time/energy to explore all different entities. 
With the within-subject tests, we find a main effect of the strategy on the three exploration 
performance measures: F(8, 120) = 41.403, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore the 
environment completely, F(8, 120) = 36.376, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore all the 
entities, and F(8, 120) = 25.050, p < 0.001 for the time/energy to explore all different entities. 
Specifically, the strategy accounts for 73.4% of the variance in the time/energy to explore the 
environment completely, 70.8% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all the entities, and 
for 62.5% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all different entities. We find evidence for 
the two-way interaction involving “envComp” and “strat” on the time/energy to explore all 
different entities (F(16, 120) = 1.738, p = 0.048), but no evidence for the two-way interaction 
involving “envComp” and “strat” on the other two exploration performance measures (F(16, 120) 
= 0.276, p = 0.997 for the time/energy to explore the environment completely, and F(16, 120) = 
0.160, p = 1.00 for the time/energy to explore all the entities). Specifically, “envComp” and 
“strat” accounts for 18.8% of the variance in the time/energy to explore all different entities. 
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The within subject effect that tested significant under the assumption of sphericity remain 
significant with the test based on correction factors (Lower Bound): F(1.00, 15.00) = 41.403, p < 
0.001 for the time/energy to explore the environment completely, F(1.00, 15.00) = 36.376, p < 
0.001 for the time/energy to explore all the entities, and F(1.00, 15.00) = 25.050, p < 0.001 for the 
time/energy to explore all different entities. Giving this statistical significance, we need not to use 
the other two conservative tests. 
The interaction effect involving the within subject effect, “strat” × “envComp” on “tedent”, that 
tested significant under the assumption of sphericity does not remain significant with the Lower 
Bound Test: F(2.00, 15.00) = 1.738, p = 0.21. The two tests contradict each other, that is, the 
uncorrected (positively biased) test yields statistical significance and the conservative (negatively 
biased) test does not. Therefore, the more specific epsilon correction in the degrees of freedom is 
made, substituting either the Greenhouse-Geisser or Huynh-Feldt epsilon estimate in place of the 
Lower Bound epsilon. The interaction effect “strat” and “envComp” that tested significant under 
the assumption of sphericity and no significant under the Lower Bound test remain no significant 
after these corrections: using Huynh-Feldt correction factor, F(3.634, 27.258) = 1.738, p = 0.175; 
using Greenhouse-Geisser correction factor, F(2.953, 22.146) = 1.738, p < 0.189. Therefore we 
conclude that there is no effect of “strat” × “envComp” on “tedent”. 
The Multivariate Test results for testing the main effect of “strat” and the interaction “strat” × 
“envComp” are identical to those obtained from the univariate ANOVA model: the four tests of 
significance for the strategy effect given by the Multivariate Tests, Pillai’s Trace (value = 1.151, 
F(24.00, 360.00) = 9.331, p < 0.001), Wilks’ Lambda (value = 0.162, F(24.00, 342.837) = 12.453, 
p < 0.001), Hotelling’s Trace (value = 3.397, F(24.00, 350.00) = 16.511, p < 0.001), and Roy’s 
Largest Root (value = 2.856, F(8.00, 120.00) = 42.847, p < 0.001), indicate that the strategy has a 
significant effect. The large Partial Eta Squared values for the strategy show that it explains quite 
a lot of variation in exploration performance. There is also evidence for an interaction between 
factors “strat” and “envComp”: Pillai’s Trace (value = 0.575, F(48.00, 360.00) = 1.777, p = 
0.002), Wilks’ Lambda (value = 0.474, F(48.00, 351.755) = 2.094, p < 0.001), Hotelling’s Trace 
(value = 1.011, F(48.00, 350.00) = 2.457, p < 0.001), and Roy’s Largest Root (value = 0.902, 
F(16.00, 120.00) = 6.765, p < 0.001). Thus, the MANOVA approach alters the conclusions drawn 
about the within-subject interaction effect. 
All these analyses establish that the there is evidence indicating that the three exploration 
performance measures are affected by the strategy. The univariate ANOVA model tests, 
particularly the more conservative tests, indicate no evidence for the interaction between “strat” 
and “envComp”, but the MANOVA approach alters these conclusions by indicating a significant 
interaction “strat” × “envComp”. We do not find a significant main effect of the environment 
complexity factor both on the time/energy to explore the environment completely and on the 
time/energy to explore all the entities, but we find a significant main effect of the environment 
complexity factor on the time/energy to explore all different entities. Giving these results: we 
reject the null hypothesis that states there is no effect of the strategy; we reject the null hypothesis 
about the equality of the environment complexity factor effects with respect to the time/energy to 
explore all different entities, but we accept the null hypothesis about the equality of the 
environment complexity factor effects with respect to the other two exploration performance 
measures; we reject the null hypothesis that states there is no interaction between the strategy and 
the environment complexity. 
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Together with the multiple comparison output, the plots provide us similar results to those 
reached with the one-way repeated measures experimental design with respect to the strategy. The 
profile plots also indicate that there is no clear significant interaction “strat” × “envComp” (it 
seems to happen only for a group of strategies), as well as that there is a significant effect of 
“envComp” only on the time/energy to explore all different entities (this is also confirmed by the 
pairwise comparisons of “envComp”). 
Table 4-38 shows the summary of the results reached with the two way repeated measures 
design, variant of grouping problems by different environment complexities. 
 
Table 4-38 - Summary of the results reached with the two way repeated measures design, 
variant of grouping problems by different environment complexities. 
 Univariate Conservative Multivariate 
 strat envComp strat × envComp strat envComp strat × envComp strat strat × envComp 
teenv <0.001 0.823 0.997 <0.001 - - 
teent <0.001 0.144 1.00 <0.001 - - 
tedent <0.001 <0.001 0.048 <0.001 - 
0.21 
0.175 
0.181 
<0.001 <0.001 
 
We now summarize the results achieved with the two way repeated measures design, variant of 
grouping problems by different amplitudes of the visual field. 
The one-way ANOVA table for testing our single between-subject factor “visField” lead us to 
finding its significant main effect on the time/energy to explore the environment completely 
(“teenv”) (F(1, 22) = 119.534, p < 0.001), but no effect both on the time/energy to explore all the 
entities (“teent”) (F(1, 22) = 0.577, p = 0.445) and on the time/energy to explore all different 
entities (“tedent”) (F(1, 22) = 0.080, p = 0.781). Specifically, the visual field accounts for 84.5% 
of the variance in the time/energy to explore the environment completely, for 2.6% of the variance 
in the time/energy to explore all the entities, and for 0.4% of the variance in the time/energy to 
explore all different entities; averaged over the nine strategies, time/energy to explore all the 
entities and all different entities does not differ between the two visual ranges. 
We find a main effect of the strategy on the three exploration performance measures: the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely (F(8, 176) = 147.260, p < 0.001), the 
time/energy to explore all the entities (F(8, 176) = 6.414, p < 0.001), and the time/energy to 
explore all different entities (F(8, 176) = 78.408, p < 0.001). Specifically, the strategy accounts 
for 87% of the variance in the time/energy to explore the environment completely, for 22.6% of 
the variance in the time/energy to explore all the entities, and for 78.1% of the variance in the 
time/energy to explore all different entities. We also find evidence for the two-way interaction 
involving “visField” and “strat” also on the three exploration performance measures: the 
time/energy to explore the environment completely (F(8, 176) = 35.631, p < 0.001), the 
time/energy to explore all the entities (F(8, 176) = 3.579, p = 0.001), and the time/energy to 
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explore all different entities (F(8, 176) = 31.438, p < 0.001). The interaction accounts for 61.8% 
of the variance in the time/energy to explore the environment completely, for 14.0% of the 
variance in the time/energy to explore all the entities, and for 58.8% of the variance in the 
time/energy to explore all different entities. 
The within subject main effects on the three exploration performance measures and the 
interaction effect on both the time/energy to explore the environment completely and the 
time/energy to explore all different entities that tested significant under the assumption of 
sphericity remain significant with the Lower Bound test: F(1.00, 22.00) = 147.260, p < 0.001 for 
the main effect of “strat” on the time/energy to explore the environment completely; F(1.00, 
22.00) = 6.414, p = 0.019 for the main effect of “strat” on the time/energy to explore all the 
entities; F(1.00, 22.00) = 78.408, p < 0.001 for the main effect of “strat” on the time/energy to 
explore all different entities; F(1.00, 22.00) = 35.631, p < 0.001 for the interaction effect “strat” × 
“visField” on the time/energy to explore the environment completely; F(1.00, 22.00) = 31.438, p 
< 0.001 for the interaction effect “strat” × “visField” on the time/energy to explore all different 
entities. Giving this statistical significance, we need not to use the other two conservative tests. 
However, the interaction effect, “strat” × “visField”, on “teent” that tested significant under the 
assumption of sphericity does not remain significant with the Lower Bound test (F(1.00, 22.00) = 
3.579, p = 0.072). The two tests contradict each other, that is, the uncorrected (positively biased) 
test yields statistical significance and the conservative (negatively biased) test does not. 
Therefore, the more specific epsilon correction in the degrees of freedom is made, substituting 
either the Greenhouse-Geisser or Huynh-Feldt epsilon estimate in place of the Lower Bound 
epsilon. The within subject effect, that tested significant under the assumption of sphericity and 
no significant under the Lower Bound test, remains no significant after these corrections: using 
Huynh-Feldt correction factor, F(1.061, 23.336) = 3.579, p = 0.069; using Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction factor, F(1.011, 22.242) = 3.579, p = 0.071. Therefore we conclude that there is no 
significant interaction effect “strat” × “visField” on “teent” at the 0.05 level but there is such 
effect at the 0.071 level. 
The four tests of significance for the strategy effect given by the Multivariate Tests, Pillai’s 
Trace (value = 1.140, F(24.00, 528.00) = 13.493, p < 0.001), Wilks’ Lambda (value = 0.085, 
F(24.00, 505.254) = 28.205, p < 0.001), Hotelling’s Trace (value = 8.117, F(24.00, 518.00) = 
58.396, p < 0.001), and Roy’s Largest Root (value = 7.776, F(8.00, 176.00) = 171.077, p < 
0.001), indicate that the strategy has a significant effect. The large Partial Eta Squared values for 
the strategy show that it explains quite a lot of variation in exploration performance. There is also 
evidence for an interaction between “strat” and “visField”: Pillai’s Trace (value = 0.780, F(24.00, 
528.00) = 7.729, p < 0.001), Wilks’ Lambda (value = 0.277, F(24.00, 505.254) = 11.712, p < 
0.001), Hotelling’s Trace (value = 2.402, F(24.00, 518.00) = 17.279, p < 0.001), and Roy’s 
Largest Root (value = 2.313, F(8.00, 176.00) = 50.897, p < 0.001). Thus, the MANOVA approach 
alters the conclusions drawn about the within-subject interaction effect, specifically with respect 
to the interaction involving “teent”. 
These analyses have established that the there is evidence indicating that the three exploration 
performance measures are affected by the strategy. The univariate ANOVA model tests, 
particularly the more conservative tests, indicate no evidence for the interaction between “strat” 
and “visField” on “teent”, but the MANOVA approach alters these conclusions by indicating a 
significant interaction “strat” × “visField”. We do not find a significant main effect of the visual 
field factor both on the time/energy to explore all the entities of the environment and on the 
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time/energy to explore all different entities, but we find a significant main effect of the visual field 
factor on the time/energy to explore the environment completely. Giving these results: we reject 
the null hypothesis that states there is no effect of the strategy; we reject the null hypothesis about 
the equality of the visual field factor effects with respect to the time/energy to explore the 
environment completely, but we accept the null hypothesis about the equality of the visual field 
factor effects with respect to the other two exploration performance measures; we reject the null 
hypothesis that states there is no interaction between the strategy and the visual field. 
Together with the multiple comparison output, the plots provide us similar results to those 
reached with the one-way repeated measures experimental design with respect to the strategy. The 
profile plots also indicate that there is significant interaction “strat” × “visField”, as well as that 
there is significant effect of “visField” on “teenv” (this is also confirmed by the pairwise 
comparisons of “visField”). 
Table 4-39 shows the summary of the results reached with the two way repeated measures 
design, variant of grouping problems by different visual ranges. 
 
Table 4-39 - Summary of the results reached with the two way repeated measures design, 
variant of grouping problems by different visual ranges. 
 Univariate Conservative Multivariate 
 strat visField strat × visField strat visField strat × visField strat strat × visField 
teenv <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 - <0.001 
teent <0.001 0.781 <0.001 0.019 - 
0.072 
0.071 
0.071 
tedent <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 - <0.001 
<0.001 <0.001 
 
The formal analysis of the three way repeated measures experimental design lead us to reach 
similar conclusions to those reached with the two way repeated measures experimental design. 
However, in this design these conclusions assume more importance because they are generalized 
to all the exploration problems. 
In addition, we can identify three homogenous subsets of means with the Tukey HSD test for 
the time/energy to explore the environment completely. Group1 comprises the strategies based on: 
hunger; and, surprise and hunger (“surprise+hunger”). Group 2 comprises all the strategies except 
the one based on hunger and the random strategy. Group 3 comprises the random strategy. With 
Scheffe test Group 2 and 3 are identical. However, Group 1 comprises the classical strategy as 
well as the strategies based on: hunger; surprise and hunger (“surprise+hunger”); surprise, 
curiosity and hunger (“surprise+curiosity+hunger”); and curiosity and hunger 
(“curiosity+hunger”). We can identify three homogenous subsets of means with the Tukey HSD 
test for the time/energy to explore all the entities of the environment. Group1 comprises the 
classical strategy as well as the strategies based on: hunger; and, surprise and hunger 
(“surprise+hunger”). Group 2 comprises all the strategies except the one based on hunger and the 
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random strategy. Group 3 comprises the random strategy. With Scheffe test Group 2 and 3 are 
identical. However, Group 1 comprises all the strategies except the random strategy and those 
based on: surprise and curiosity (“surprise+curiosity”); and curiosity. We can identify two 
homogenous subsets of means both with the Tukey HSD and the Scheffe tests for the time/energy 
to explore all different entities of the environment. Group1 comprises the all the strategies except 
the random strategy which is the single strategy that forms Group2. 
Table 4-40 shows the summary of the results reached with the three way repeated measures 
experimental design. 
 
Table 4-40 - Summary of the results reached with the three way repeated measures 
experimental design. 
 Univariate 
 strat envComp strat x envComp 
teenv <0.001 0.823 0.997 
teent <0.001 0.144 1 
tedent <0.001 <0.001 0.048 
 
 
Concluding, all the analyses reported above have established that there is evidence indicating a 
significant main effect of the strategy on the three exploration performance measures. 
We find no evidence for a main effect of the factor “environment complexity” on the 
time/energy required to explore the environment completely and all the entities. However, we find 
a significant main effect of the environment complexity on the time/energy required to explore all 
different entities. We find no evidence for an interaction between the strategy and the 
environment complexity factors on the time/energy required to explore the environment 
completely and all the entities. However, there is some doubt about the interaction between the 
strategy and the environment complexity factors on the time/energy required to explore all 
different entities: it tested significant under the assumption of sphericity and no significant under 
the Lower Bound test, and it remains no significant after the corrections (Huynh-Feldt and 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction factors). Therefore we might conclude that there is no interaction 
effect “strategy” × “environment complexity” on the time/energy required to explore all different 
entities of the environment at the 0.05 level. However, these conclusions are altered by the 
Multivariate Tests which indicate a significant interaction effect “strategy” × “environment 
complexity” on the time/energy required to explore all different entities of the environment. The 
three way design also indicates that there is a significant interaction effect. 
We find a significant main effect of the amplitude of the visual field factor on the time/energy 
required to explore the environment completely and all different entities, but no effect on the 
time/energy to explore all the entities. We find also that there is evidence of a two way interaction 
effect between the strategy and the amplitude of the visual field on the time/energy required to 
explore the environment completely. There is however some doubt about the interaction effect, 
“strategy” × “amplitude of the visual field”, on the time/energy required to explore all the entities 
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of the environment: it tested significant under the assumption of sphericity and no significant 
under the Lower Bound test, and it remains no significant after the corrections (Huynh-Feldt and 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction factors). Therefore we might conclude that there is no interaction 
effect “strategy” × “amplitude of the visual field” on the time/energy required to explore all the 
entities of the environment at the 0.05 level but there is such effect at the 0.071 level. However, 
these conclusions are altered by the Multivariate Tests which indicate a significant interaction 
effect “strategy” × “amplitude of the visual field” on the time/energy required to explore all the 
entities of the environment. The influence of the strategy is to some extent controlled by the 
amplitude of the visual field. 
With respect to the time/energy to explore the environment completely, excluding strategy 2, 
strategy 6 (based on surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, followed closely by 
strategy 9 (classical strategy). However, this difference is no significant at the 0.05 level (p = 
0.098) but it is at the 0.1 level. All the other strategies are significantly worse than strategy 6. The 
next strategies in the ranking are strategies 4 (curiosity and hunger) and 8 (surprise, curiosity and 
hunger), whose difference is not significant. The difference between strategy 6 and these two 
strategies is significant: p = 0.006 for strategy 4 and p = 0.014 for strategy 8. However, these are 
not significantly different from strategy 9. There is no significant difference between strategies 3 
(curiosity), 5 (surprise) and 7 (curiosity and surprise). This means that those strategies that take 
hunger, either alone or combined with surprise and/or curiosity, into account are significantly 
better than those strategies that take only surprise and/or curiosity into account. Whatever the 
values of “envComp” or “visField”, this ranking is more or less maintained. Note, however, that 
with environments of higher complexity or with a low visual field, the performances are usually 
worse. 
Concerning the time/energy required to explore all the entities of the environment, excluding 
strategy 2, strategy 6 (surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, followed closely 
by strategy 9 (classical strategy). However, this difference is not significant at the 0.05 level but it 
is at the 0.08 level. All the other strategies are significantly worse than strategy 6. The next 
strategies in the ranking are strategies 8 (surprise, curiosity and hunger) and 4 (curiosity and 
hunger), whose difference is not significant. The difference between strategy 6 and these two 
strategies is significant: p < 0.001. However, these are not significantly different from strategy 9. 
There is no significant difference between strategies 5 (surprise), 4 (curiosity and hunger), 7 
(curiosity and surprise), and 8 (surprise, curiosity and hunger). As with “teenv”, we should note, 
however, that with environments of higher complexity or with a high visual field, the 
performances are usually worse, but this ranking is in general kept. 
Finally, concerning the time/energy required to explore all different entities of the environment, 
excluding strategy 2 (hunger), strategy 6 (surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, 
followed closely by strategy 8 (surprise, curiosity and hunger), 3 (curiosity), 4 (curiosity and 
hunger), and 7 (curiosity and surprise). However, this difference is no significant. The next 
strategies in the ranking are strategies 9 (classical) and 5 (surprise), whose difference is not 
significant. The difference between strategy 6 and these two strategies is not significant: p = 0.267 
for strategy 9. On the contrary to the previous performance measures (“teenv” and “teent”), the 
ranking of the strategies varies with the category of “envComp” or “visField”. For instance, 
strategies 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 outperform significantly the other strategies when “envComp” is low. 
Another curious result is that strategies 4 and 8 are the best strategies when “visField” is low and 
the worst when “visField” is large. Note that, as with “teent”, and in contrary to “teenv”, best 
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results are achieved with a low “visField”, and that, as with “teent” and “teenv”, best results are 
achieved with a low “envComp”. 
4.2.5 Discussion 
As mentioned above this experiment shows that the strategy that takes hunger into account 
requires less time and energy to explore the whole of the environment. This happens because an 
agent that uses this strategy computes beforehand the expected hunger it may feel at the 
destination locations (either closer to an entity or at a frontier cell). The agent then selects the 
destination location that minimizes hunger. By doing this, it selects those destination locations 
that are closer to it and, by navigating through the environment with this principle in mind, it 
avoids traversing long distances, as happens with other strategies, and therefore explores the 
entire environment efficiently. However, this strategy is deterministic given that the location of 
the entities is constant. It does not take into account the characteristics of the places to visit. 
The strategy that takes curiosity into account leads the agent to select entities or frontier cells 
that are expected to maximize novelty and entropy for visits. These are the entities or frontier cells 
that are expected to provide most information. However, these entities or frontier cells are 
frequently not the closest ones and therefore the agent sometimes traverses long distances to 
obtain what it expects to be the highest information gain. By exploring the environment with this 
strategy, the agent wastes much time taking routes that are sometimes erratic and therefore it does 
not outperform the other strategies. 
The strategy that takes surprise into account makes the agent move to entities that are expected 
to elicit surprise by containing something unexpected. This strategy is related with the one that 
takes curiosity into account because entities whose parts that are not already known are new and 
with higher entropy and are therefore eligible to elicit surprise. However, there are a few 
differences. For instance, if the function of an entity has high entropy with ten or twenty equally 
probable functions, the curiosity is high but surprise is 0. So, in order to have a positive value for 
the expected surprise there must be entropy but also that the events are not equally probable. 
Moreover, when there is a low entropy (e.g., when there are several possible functions for an 
entity and one of them has a high probability) the curiosity is low but the expected surprise is 
high. So, the strategy that takes surprise into account motivates the agent to move to entities that 
are expected to provide unexpected information rather than solely new information. On the other 
hand the known parts of the entities (the parts with no entropy) elicit surprise and curiosity if they 
contain new information (new information is unexpected). In this point curiosity and surprise are 
quite similar. Another major difference between the surprise-based strategy and the 
curiosity-based strategy is that while frontier cells may have a positive expected curiosity, we 
assume that they do not elicit surprise. So, although when the agent makes use of the 
surprise-based strategy it behaves differently from when it makes use of the curiosity-based 
strategy, the performance is quite similar and its, to some extent erratic, exploration paths indicate 
that it traverses unnecessarily long distances which has negative effects on its efficiency. 
However, when surprise or curiosity, jointly or independently, are taken into account together 
with hunger, the erratic paths are replaced by ordered exploration paths and hence to a significant 
increase in efficiency. In fact, the motivation to visit entities or frontier cells that are expected to 
elicit curiosity and/or surprise but that are far away from the location of the agent is restrained by 
the hunger that is expected to be felt at those destination locations. When curiosity and surprise 
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are taken into account together with hunger, the result is a strategy that nicely favours entities or 
frontier cells that are not too far away and that are expected to elicit a considerable intensity of 
curiosity and surprise. The performance of this strategy usually does not outperform the other two 
closer strategies that take curiosity and hunger, and surprise and hunger, into account, 
respectively. This happens because the restraining role of hunger, i.e., the weight of hunger, is 
reduced in that strategy (it is one of three feelings while in the other two strategies it is one of two 
feelings). 
The difference between the strategy based on curiosity and hunger and that based on surprise 
and hunger may be explained by the fact that the intensities of surprise are lower than the 
intensities of curiosity. Therefore, the restrained effect of hunger is higher in the former than in 
the latter strategy. This also explains why the classical strategy usually outperforms the strategies 
based on curiosity and hunger and on curiosity, surprise and hunger. All of them take into account 
the distance, but values for the entropy computed by the classical strategy are lower than the 
curiosty values, because curiosity also takes into account the novelty in addition to entropy. 
Giving this, we can logically understand the results above which indicate that the strategy has a 
significant effect on exploration performance. 
We may understand better the significant effect of the amplitude of the visual field on “teenv”, 
“teent” and “tedent” if we take a look at the exploration paths (see Appendix C). When the 
“visField” is large enough so that the agent can access the whole environment, the agent does not 
have to visit frontier cells, but instead solely entities. Once it finishes visiting all the entities, it 
knows the whole environment because its sensors captured already all the information of the 
whole environment. Therefore, the “teenv” is lower when the “visField” is large. This is 
responsible for the significant effect of the amplitude of the visual field on “teenv”. When the 
agent has a large visual field, it can see not only the entities that are closer but also those entities 
that are far. Then, and especially when hunger is not taken into account, sometimes it selects for 
visiting entities that are far which has a negative effect on the “teent” and “tedent”. 
When the environment is of higher complexity, there are more different entities. These are 
usually dispersed and therefore the agent has to follow erratic paths to visit all the entities. This 
explains the higher “teenv”, “teent” and “tedent” when “envComp” is high. However, concerning 
“tedent”, there is an additional effect: since higher complexity environments have more different 
entities than lower complexity environments it is obvious that an agent usually takes more time to 
visit all different entities in the former environments than in the latter. 
4.3 Experiment III –Map-building by exploiting the knowledge in memory 
We conducted an experiment to assess the influence of the size of memory and of the 
environment complexity on map-building by exploitation. Furthermore, this experiment enables 
us to study the trade-off between map-building by exploitation and map-building by exploration. 
A good approach to evaluate a map-building approach is by comparing the map built with the 
ideal map, i.e., with the map that should have been built. In the case of simulation, these two maps 
are known which facilitates this evaluation process. So, with this end, we let an agent explore 
various environments with different degrees of complexity. This process was repeated various 
times (twelve), each time with a larger memory. The key issue of this experiment is that the agent 
had such a minimum time limit to explore the environment that it could not leave the starting 
location, i.e., the agent only had time to sense the world and generate expectations about it. 
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4.3.1 Materials and Method 
In order to study the influence of the memory and environment complexity on map-building we 
design a factorial experiment, i.e., an agent was run with various memories of different sizes in 
various environments of different complexities. The environments were a subset of those used in 
Experiment II (described in Section 4.2). The memories ranged from zero to twelve cases in the 
episodic memory. All of these cases were built from entities, selected among the twelve entities 
that populate the environment. These memories were built by letting the agent explore a similar 
environment previously. For instance the memory of size 1 was built letting the agent explore a 
single entity, while memory of size 2 was built by letting the agent explore up to two entities, and 
so on. Since they depend on the environment considered, the description of these memories used 
in this experiment is presented in Appendix A. 
Hence, the procedure of this experiment consists simply of running the agent in nine 
environments that fall into three categories of complexity each time with a different memory, 
starting from the same location. The time limit defined for exploration was minimum so that the 
agent can only sense the environment once and generate expectations from the start location. So, 
there is no time to move to any entity. Therefore, the agent had to build the map of the 
environment by generating assumptions/expectations for the unvisited entities. The visual range 
of the agent was set so that the entire environment can be sensed from the start location. We 
collected the value of the map inconsistency between the built map and the entire real map. This 
map inconsistency constitutes the dependent variable, while the memory size and the environment 
complexity are the independent variables. 
4.3.2 Results 
Figure 4-35 presents the results of this experiment. As can be seen, as the memory size increases 
there is a tendency for the map inconsistency to decrease on average, and converge to a certain 
map inconsistency value. The higher the complexity of the environment, the higher this value of 
map inconsistency is. 
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Figure 4-35 - Results of experiment III. 
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4.3.3 Discussion 
The results reported above show that the higher the complexity of the environment, the higher the 
map inconsistency. Higher complexity means higher diversity, and therefore it is harder for the 
agent to predict the reality accurately. There is much more uncertainty in such environments in 
that there is more diversity of entities than in low complexity environments. As the complexity 
increases the probability of finding any two similar entities decreases. In low complexity 
environments, this is, therefore, an easier task. 
The results also show the influence of the memory size on map inconsistency. On average, the 
higher the memory size, the lower the map inconsistency. This happens because the higher the 
memory size the higher the knowledge about the entities present in the environment. This means 
that the probability distribution of the entities present in the memory approaches that of the 
environment as the memory size increases, and therefore the expectations generated are closer to 
reality. However, this is not linear, because sometimes the addition of a case may make the two 
probability distributions diverge slightly. However, the tendency is to converge. This is quite 
analogous to the theory of big numbers. Notice that with memories of size 4 or 5 the map 
inconsistency is almost optimal. In fact, the addition of seven or eight episodes to those memories 
results in an insignificant improvement in map inconsistency. 
Considering these results we may infer the advantages and disadvantages of map-building by 
exploiting the knowledge acquired in previous training explorations. The main advantage of this 
map learning process is that it requires less time and less energy than that of involving a complete 
exploration of the environment. In fact, the agent does not have to explore all the regions of the 
environment, such as the invisible side of the entities, since it is able to predict that inaccessible 
information. The disadvantage of this approach is that the learned maps may be more inconsistent 
than those learned from an exhaustive exploration of the environment. However, this 
inconsistency can be decreased by incorporating a memory with a probability distribution that 
approaches that of the environment. 
This experiment raises another research question concerning Experiment II: whether the results 
won’t be better for the affective strategies if the agent starts with a wealthy memory of entities 
previously acquired by training in similar environments. 
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Chapter 5 
Related Work 
ur work draws upon several areas as described in Chapter 2. It integrates multiple aspects 
from agents and multi-agent systems, emotion and motivation, exploration of unknown 
environments, knowledge representation, probabilistic planning, HTN planning, and 
creativity. Thereby, various studies from these areas need to be compared with our work so that 
we can assess its position and importance to these areas. In this chapter we make that comparison. 
Our goal is not to survey the most representative work done in those areas (this was to some 
extent included in Chapter 2) but rather to simply make a comparison to those representative 
studies by stressing the main differences and similarities. This comparison is organized according 
to each one of the referred areas. 
5.1 Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 
In our approach, agents have their own world model, their goals that they try to achieve, and they 
use plans to achieve them. In this sense the architecture of our agents is of a deliberative kind. 
Many other works adopt this architecture for agents, especially those within the traditional field of 
AI. 
Our agents are assigned mentalistic qualities such as beliefs, desires, intentions, emotion and 
motivation, in addition to autonomy, social ability, reactivity and proactiveness. Considering 
Wooldridge and Jennings’ distinction between a weak and strong notion of agency [Wooldridge 
& Jennings, 1995b], we are among many others who put forward the latter notion. Other closely 
related works are, for instance, [Bates, 1994; Shoham, 1993; Wright, 1997] (others that assign 
emotion and motivation to agents are described in the next section). 
Relying on this strong notion of agency, we would like to mention, in particular, the forerunner 
BDI-based multi-agent tool PRS [Georgeff & Ingrand, 1989; Georgeff & Lansky, 1987; K. 
Myers, 1997] and all the latter BDI-based multi-agent tool, which in a way or another are based 
on PRS, such as JACK [Busetta et al., 1999; Howden et al., 2001], dMARS [d’Inverno et al., 
1997], AgentSpeak [Bordini et al., 2002; Bordini & Moreira, 2004; A. Rao, 1996], JADEX 
[Pokahr et al., 2005], SPARK [Morley & Myers, 2004], and 3APL [Dastani et al., 2003]. For 
instance, JACK intelligent agents are autonomous software components that have explicit goals to 
achieve or events to handle (desires). To describe how they should go about achieving these 
desires, these agents are programmed with a set of plans. Each plan describes how to achieve a 
goal under varying circumstances. Set to work, the agent pursues its given desires, adopting the 
appropriate plans (intentions) according to its current set of data (beliefs) about the state of the 
world. This combination of desires and beliefs initiating context-sensitive intentional behaviour is 
part of what characterizes a BDI agent. AMAS also relies on the BDI model. Therefore, it shares 
many characteristics of the above mentioned tools. However, we do not incorporate this model so 
closely. There are also beliefs, desires and intentions. Desires (or goals) are generated from 
previous goals of the plans presented in memory. These goals are evaluated and ranked in terms 
of how they contribute to satisfy the basic desires [Reiss, 2000; Schwartz, 1992] which are 
represented in an EU function. The goal that maximizes this function is taken as an intention and 
O 
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the plan generated for it is executed. Other closely related multi-agent languages and tools that 
also assign mentalistic qualities to agents include the forerunners AGENT0 [Shoham, 1993] and 
PLACA [Thomas, 1993]. 
5.2 Emotion and Motivation 
Our work has similarities to that of Breazel and Scassellati [Breazeal, 1999; Breazeal & 
Scassellati, 1999] in that Kismet exhibits the proto-social response of exploration by searching for 
desired visual stimuli. Exploratory responses allow the “caregiver” to attribute curiosity, interest, 
and desires to the robot. Kismet possesses an attention system that enables it to select perceptual 
stimuli. As in our approach, the motivational system of Kismet includes emotions and drives, 
although, contrarily to our model, emotions are modelled along three dimensions, valence, arousal 
and stance, while we consider solely valence and arousal. 
Cañamero [Cañamero, 1997] has also developed a synthetic environment, the Gridland, 
inhabited by entities. However, unlike us, she considers three different types of entities: living 
beings, food and water sources, and inanimate objects. Like our agents, living beings are endowed 
with motivations and emotions. While we rely on a cognitive approach for modelling emotions, 
Cañamero uses physiological parameters. In addition to these physiological variables that define 
their body state, creatures also possess physical attributes such as hardness, brightness, amount of 
organic matter, etc., and a collection of agents, among which some of them model emotions. This 
latter property of creatures means that they are seen as a society of agents [Minsky, 1985]. This is 
definitely a different approach from ours. But, as in our approach, the behaviour of the creatures is 
controlled by motivation in that their behaviour is selected in order to satisfy some drive. 
The Cathexis computational model of emotion and its further emotion-based decision-making 
extension [Velásquez, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999] are particularly close to our approach in that the 
decisions of what to do next are influenced by drives and emotions. Behaviours are activated 
mainly to satisfy drives. In addition, positive and negative emotional memories are created when 
the agent interacts with people. This corresponds to some extent to somatic markers associated to 
particular situations that influence the selection of future behaviours so that negative outcomes are 
avoided. Besides this similarity with our approach, Velásquez included drives such as curiosity 
and also two other drives closely related to hunger, namely fatigue and “BatteryRegulation”. He 
also included surprise in the emotional system and related it to variables such as novelty, 
anticipatory expectancy, and other issues that have been considered essential components of a 
general attention system, including orienting to sensory stimuli, executive functions such as the 
detection of target events, and maintenance of a general “alert” state. Typical behavioural 
responses controlled by this system include look-around, orient-to-[stimulus], and 
look-at-[stimulus]. In addition, the detection of sudden, unexpected stimuli might also mediate 
more reflex-like responses such as an acoustic startle reflex. However, Velásquez’s model is 
much richer than ours in terms of the number of drives and emotions considered, although this can 
be explained by the different goals of both works. 
One of the most closely related systems is the Affective Reasoner of Elliot [Elliott, 1992], a 
platform for modelling the interactions between multiple agents operating in an environment. This 
is also one of the goals of our platform. In addition, the Affective Reasoner and AMAS also share 
the feature of reasoning about the emotions and emotion induced actions. However, the Affective 
Reasoner is much broader with respect to the emotional component. It includes the twenty-two 
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emotion types of the OCC model plus two additional emotions: love and hate. Although our 
platform predicts the inclusion of all these emotions, in the current version, the feeling makeup of 
agents is confined to surprise, curiosity/interest, and hunger. 
The Oz project [Bates, 1992, 1994; Bates et al., 1992; Loyall & Bates, 1991; Reilly, 1996; 
Reilly & Bates, 1992] and especially the Tok architecture also shares a few features with our 
work. Although with a different purpose, both works are about simulated environments populated 
with agents which exhibit some capabilities, especially an emotional makeup. However, like the 
Affective Reasoner, Em, the subsystem of Tok that handles emotion, is based on the OCC model 
and therefore is far more general than the AMAS counterpart module of feelings. The Hap, and 
particularly, the handling of goals is also similar to the AMAS counterpart module of goals. Hap 
supports multiple active goals and multiple plans for each goal. The architecture automatically 
chooses which goal to pursue and how to pursue it by examining the most current perceived state 
of the world and the internal state of the agent. In particular, high-level goals are expanded to 
primitive acts incrementally at execution-time by choosing appropriate plans and their component 
sub-goals. 
Our work has also similarities with those studies about building agents with personality which 
is closely related to the concept of believable agents. For instance, in [Oliveira & Sarmento, 2002] 
an agent is endowed with an emotion-based mechanism that strongly influences its own 
decision-making process. There is a particular set of emotional parameters, which comprise the 
“Sensibility Factors of Emotional Valence Functions”, the “Decay Rate of Emotional 
Accumulator” and the “Memory Threshold Levels”. Each combination of those parameters gives 
rise to a specific personality. This is similar to our approach in which we also consider parameters 
(in our case these are the basic desires: minimal hunger, maximal surprise, and maximal 
information gain) whose combination also defines a specific personality for an agent. Oliveira and 
Sarmento also consider the emotional mechanism of curiosity which is responsible for the 
exploratory behaviour of their agents. Dias and Paiva [Dias & Paiva, 2005] used a different 
approach to define the personality of agents based on the OCC model which shares some 
parameters of Oliveira and Sarmento’s approach. An agent personality is defined by: a set of 
goals; a set of emotional reaction rules; the character’s action tendencies; emotional thresholds 
and decay rates for each of the 22 emotion types defined in the OCC model. 
Like Pereira and colleagues [Pereira et al., 2006b; Pereira et al., 2005] we are also pursing the 
goal of incorporating emotion into the BDI architecture. Pereira and colleagues’ approach to 
extend the classic BDI architecture relies on the addition of three new components: the “Sensing 
and Perception Manager”, the “Effective Capabilities and Effective Resources revision function“ 
and the “Emotional State Manager” (which may be based on the model proposed in [Oliveira & 
Sarmento, 2003]). In our architecture, we also have a similar sensing and perception module. We 
could also make a correspondence between our feelings module and the Emotional State Manager 
in that both comprise a set of emotions which are linked to the tasks the agent has to perform. 
However, our model differs in that we consider feelings, comprising affective and non-affective 
feelings, including for instance the feeling of hunger which is not an emotion. Besides, we don’t 
consider a decay rate which is undoubtedly a realistic property that should be taken into account. 
The Capability module corresponds somehow to ours memory component of plans. We can also 
consider that the battery level of our agents corresponds to the Resources module. However, the 
work of Pereira and colleagues is formal [Pereira et al., 2006a] while ours is informal. Besides 
these differences and similarities, it is worth of noticing that there is a module in our architecture 
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that is not considered in the classic BDI architecture (at least directly). This is the module of basic 
desires. Note that we consider the existence of desires (goals) which are different from basic 
desires. 
The ultimate goal of Gratch [Gratch, 1999] is to use an understanding of emotional appraisal to 
guide planning in useful ways. The plan-based view that Gratch proposes allows appraisals to 
influence plan construction as well as immediate action selection. For example, a planner could be 
guided to focus its planning effort on goals that elicit the strongest appraisals. One can alter the 
balance between plan generation and plan execution by being more or less eager to execute steps 
in a plan before completely reasoning through their consequences. We also associated emotion to 
planning in similar ways, enabling the planner agent to select courses of action that provide higher 
utility in the sense of maximizing and/or reducing feelings for the agent. Among other differences 
between both approaches we stress that Gratch draws upon classical planning while we do not. 
With respect to the cognitive appraisal of emotions, it is worth noticing that our model differs 
from the OCC model in that this does not include surprise. However, our model of surprise is 
consistent with Roseman’s [Roseman, 1991; Roseman et al., 1996; Roseman et al., 1990] model 
of emotion and Meyer, Reisenzein, and Schützwohl’s [Meyer et al., 1997] model of surprise by 
considering the appraisal of unexpectedness as the proximate cause of surprise. It is also 
compatible with Ortony and Patridge’s [Ortony & Partridge, 1987] ideas about surprisingness. 
There other computational models of surprise such as [Baldi, 2004; Castelfranchi & Lorini, 2003; 
Itti & Baldi, 2004; Lorini & Castelfranchi, 2004, 2006; Peters, 1998]. Lorini and Castelfranchi 
define two main kinds of surprise in the context of the BDI model: mismatch-based surprise and 
astonishment. They also consider the existence of explicit and implicit expectations. Contrary to 
us, they propose a formal logic of beliefs and probabilities (similar to [Halpern, 2003]) in order to 
integrate a formal model of surprise and a formal model of belief change. These models are 
closely related with those about belief revision (e.g., [Gärdenfors, 1988]). Balsi and Itti [Baldi, 
2004; Itti & Baldi, 2004] claim that surprise is function of the distance between prior probabilities 
and posterior probabilities obtained after conditioning on a set of perceived data. Peters’ 
computational model of surprise [Peters, 1998] is implemented in a computer vision system and 
focuses on the detection of unexpected movements. 
5.3 Exploration of Unknown Environments 
The dependence of the parameters αi (i≠3) on the hunger of the agent in Equation 18 partially 
models the results of Berlyne’s experiments (e.g., [Berlyne, 1950]) that have shown that, in the 
absence of (or despite) known drives, humans tend to explore and investigate their environment as 
well as seek stimulation. Actually, surprise and curiosity are taken into account to compute the 
EU of a task only when there is enough energy to go from the end location of goal task T to the 
closest place where an energy source could be found. Otherwise, only hunger is taken into 
account for the EU of tasks and further ranking. This means that in this situation (when hunger is 
above a specific threshold), only the goal of rechargeBattery has an EU > 0. In the other 
situations (hunger below a specific threshold), hunger plays the role of a negative reward 
decreasing the utility of a task by the percentage of energy needed after the task is completed. 
Thus, the further the distance to the location after the execution of a task, the more energy 
required and therefore the less utility of that task. This is related with piecemeal exploration and 
therefore with the exploration approaches described in [Albers & Henzinger, 1997, 2000; Albers 
et al., 2002; Awerbuch et al., 1999; Betke et al., 1995], although we assume that the location for 
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recharging energy could be anywhere and not only the starting position. Besides, the agent does 
not have to return every time to the recharging place but rather only when the agent is forced to 
stop with no energy to continue the exploration of the environment if it performs the next task that 
it is committed to accomplish. 
In our approach we consider environments as collections of non-stationary objects. This is an 
assumption that also underlies the work of Anguelov and colleagues [Anguelov et al., 2002; 
Biswas et al., 2002]. In fact, like Anguelov and colleagues’ work we also learn high level shape 
representations (templates in their terminology, semantic entities in ours) from several 
occurrences of the same type of object represented by an occupancy grid map. However, unlike 
them, we go beyond the occupancy grid/analogical representation of objects since object 
representations include the function of objects in our approach. Another difference to their work is 
that in our approach the physical component is represented both in a propositional and in an 
analogical way. 
Our approach is close to the work of Taylor and Kriegman [Taylor & Kriegman, 1993, 1998] in 
that the agents are assumed to be equipped with a visual recognition system able to recognize 
features of the obstacles or entities that populate the environment. In our approach these features 
are the shapes of objects, or of their constituent parts, or even their colour. 
Like Burgard et al. [Burgard et al., 2000; Burgard et al., 2002] we also take into account the 
cost and the utility of visiting a specific frontier cell. However, in addition to frontier cells, our 
agents may also have as target points cells in the neighbourhood of entities. This is actually one of 
main differences to their work resulting from our consideration of environments as collections of 
objects. Another chief difference is that our approach is confined to simulation while theirs 
comprises both simulations and real environments with real robots. Concerning the basis of 
exploration, we also use similar metric maps. 
Our work is particularly related with those of Sim and Dudek [Sim, 1998, 2004; Sim & Dudek, 
1998, 1999], Arbel and Ferrie [Arbel, 2000; Arbel & Ferrie, 1999], Whaite and Ferrie [Whaite, 
1998; Whaite & Ferrie, 1994, 1995], Stachniss and Burgard [Stachniss & Burgard, 2003], and 
MacKay [MacKay, 1992a, 1992b], in that the selection of the actions is based on the 
maximization of the expected reduction in entropy. In fact, by considering the model of 
curiosity/interest as capturing the variable of uncertainty in addition to novelty, our agents are 
directed to move to entities or places of the environment where there is more uncertainty. This 
way, the agents are directed to maximize information gain, since wherever there is more 
uncertainty an agent can expect to get more information. 
One of the experiments performed to study the influence of curiosity/interest, surprise and 
hunger, either individually or combined, leads us to results which are similar to those achieved by 
Stachniss and Burgard [Stachniss & Burgard, 2003] in that the combination of curiosity and 
hunger enables the agent to visit more entities and acquire more entity models. Their strategy, that 
combines the maximization of the reduction of the entropy (the curiosity/interest counterpart of 
their approach) and takes into account the travel distance (the hunger counterpart of their 
approach), achieved in a similar way the best results (measured in terms of the number of 
measurements and travel distance). 
Like Yamauchi [Yamauchi, 1997, 1998; Yamauchi et al., 1998] we also consider exploring 
frontier cells. By making the agents take into account the paths that elicit less hunger, we are to 
some extent choosing to visit those frontier cells that are closer to the agent. However, our agents’ 
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exploration behaviour is not confined to frontier cells, but also includes the entities that populate 
the environment. Therefore the targets of exploration actions are, in addition to frontier cells, 
entities, and the location for recharging energy. 
In conclusion, most of the exploration strategies rely, in some way, on information gain. Either 
by selecting the frontier cells [Yamauchi, 1997] which have higher expected visible range, or the 
positions where a new sensor reading would better resolve the underlying obstacle, or the 
locations with maximal entropy, etc., the maximization of knowledge gain is a consensual 
method. However, some approaches consider also the cost of travelling to the target positions. 
Our approach considers both. However, we follow a human-like approach in that both the 
variables of information gain, namely novelty, uncertainty, unexpectedness and surprisingness, 
and energy cost are incorporated in the motivational system of the agents. Instead of maximizing 
directly knowledge gain and minimizing cost, our approach relies on maximizing surprise, 
maximizing the reduction of curiosity, and minimizing hunger. In this sense, our approach seems 
to be broader. Besides, in contrast to most of the approaches (the exceptions are [Anguelov et al., 
2002; Biswas et al., 2002; Thrun, 1993]) our exploration task is not confined to terrain mapping 
but also and mainly to acquiring models of the entities that populate the environment. This stems 
from another chief difference to most of the approaches: we consider the environment as a 
collection of entities. This perspective of environments seems to be suitable to respond to the 
challenge of three-dimensional dynamic environments by keeping track of the changes of the 
positions of entities. In contrast to most of the approaches (the exceptions are [Hähnel et al., 2001; 
Hähnel et al., 2002; Hähnel, Schulz et al., 2003; Hähnel, Triebel et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2001; 
Thrun et al., 2000; Thrun et al., 2005]), we deal with three-dimensional environments. In fact, 
maps in our approach are three-dimensional maps. These are represented by a slightly different 
occupancy grid in which, in contrast to other approaches, each cell <x,y,z> is set to a set of pairs 
that indicate the entities that may occupy that cell and respective probability. 
5.4 Knowledge Representation 
Knowledge representation in our approach follows works such as those of Cohen [G. Cohen, 
1989] and Schank [Schank, 1982, 1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977] in that information about the 
world is stored in several memory components such as the memory for entities (description of 
these entities), the memory for plans (descriptions of the sequences of actions – plans – executed 
by those entities and resulting from their interaction), and the metric map (configuration of the 
surrounding world such as the position of the entities – objects and other animated agents – that 
inhabit it). The first and second components exist in two forms: episodic and semantic. In this 
manner, knowledge representation is similar to the work of Tulving [Tulving, 1972]. Our 
approach also captures features of Schank’s dynamic memory theory by distinguishing particular 
situations or experiences of particular events from generalized events, as well as the idea of 
obtaining these generalized events from abstracting the common features or losing the details of 
those situations that have been experienced numerous times. Besides, our knowledge 
representation approach for entities draws upon the taxonomies of Rumelhardt and Norman 
[Rumelhardt & Norman, 1985], Stillings and colleagues [Stillings et al., 1989], Eysenck and 
Keane [Eysenck & Keane, 1991], and McNamara [McNamara, 1994] in that it involves 
propositional and analogical facets. The physical structure of the entities is represented directly, in 
addition to a graph-based representation of their high level description, in a way that resembles 
schemata [Rumelhardt, 1980; Rumelhardt & Norman, 1985; Rumelhardt & Ortony, 1977] and 
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similar representation formalisms (frames [Minsky, 1975], and scripts [Schank & Abelson, 1977] 
– further elaborated into MOPs [Schank, 1982]). By considering these two facets for the 
representation of entities, our work is related to Kosslyn’s theory [Kosslyn, 1980, 1985]. In fact, 
Kosslyn considered two fundamental kinds of representations of image information: surface and 
deep representation. The former corresponds to the visual image itself, while the latter refers to 
some sort of propositional representation from which the image can be generated. The difference 
is that in our approach the analogical representation is not generated from the propositional 
counterpart, although that could be possible. 
In our approach, one of the main purposes of the knowledge stored in memory is to provide 
assumptions and expectations to fill in gaps in the present observational information and to 
predict future world states. This is also one of the functions of MOPs [Schank, 1982] and 
schemata [Rumelhardt & Ortony, 1977]. In fact, MOPs serve to organize our experiences that 
have been gathered from different episodes into sensible units organized around essential 
similarities and their main purpose is to provide expectations that enable the prediction of future 
events on the basis of previously encountered structurally similar events. On the other hand, 
according to Rumelhardt and Ortony [Rumelhardt & Ortony, 1977], schemata are used to account 
for our ability to make inferences in complex situations, to make default assumptions about 
unmentioned aspects of situations, and to generate predictions about what is likely to occur in the 
future. Defending the notion that expectations are defeasible beliefs that are necessary to everyday 
reasoning, Gärdenfors [Gärdenfors, 1994] argues, with respect to their cognitive origins, that they 
may be much like summaries of previous experiences. 
The propositional description of entities, either episodic or semantic, is represented in a 
graph-based way. This kind of graph-structured representation is a suitable approach to dealing 
with the problem of complex case representation since they provide a more flexible and higher 
expressive power than attribute-value representations. Other works that use this kind of 
representation for cases or episodes may be found in [Gebhardt et al., 1997; Watson & Perera, 
1997]. 
5.5 Planning 
Our work is closely related to HTN planning. This methodology has been extensively used in 
planning systems such as UMCP [Erol et al., 1994b], SHOP and SHOP2 [Nau et al., 2003]. 
Unlike these planners, our planner, ProCHiP, does not use methods as part of the domain theory 
for task decomposition, but instead uses methods that are implicitly included in cases that describe 
previous planning problem solving experiences. SiN [Muñoz-Avila, Aha et al., 2001] also uses a 
case-based HTN planning algorithm, in which cases are instances of methods. 
Learning hierarchical plans or HTNs is still rarely addressed by the machine learning 
community, although there are a few exceptions. Garland and colleagues [Garland et al., 2001] 
infer task models from annotated examples, i.e., through demonstration by a domain expert. van 
Lent and Laird [van Lent & Laird, 1999] used a learning-by-observation technique which 
involves extracting knowledge from observations of an expert performing a task and generalizes 
this knowledge to a hierarchy of rules. Xu and Muñoz [Xu & Munõz-Avila, 2003] use an 
algorithm that gathers and generalizes information on how domain experts solve HTN planning 
problems.  
232  Chapter 5. Related Work 
 
Among decision-theoretic planners, DRIPS [Haddawy & Doan, 1994] is probably the most 
closely related to ProCHiP. In fact, DRIPS shares a similar representation approach for abstract 
plans (an abstraction/decomposition hierarchy) and for actions. Besides, it also returns the optimal 
plan according to a given utility function. However, in contrast to DRIPS, in ProCHiP the variant 
of an HTN that represents abstract plans is automatically built from cases and not given as input 
for the planning problem. Besides, it includes temporal, utility ranking and adaptation links, in 
addition to decomposition links. Another major difference is that, in ProCHiP, the EU of tasks 
and of alternative plans is computed when the abstract plan is built, while in DRIPS this occurs 
when the optimal plan is searched. In ProCHiP, there is the possibility of computing the EU of 
tasks based on the non-procedural component of their effects, which avoids some additional 
computations at the cost of being less accurate. Moreover, finding the optimal plan in ProCHiP 
consists simply in traversing the HTN with backtracking (or re-planning) points located at the 
subtasks of an abstract task. In ProCHiP the propagation of properties upward in the hierarchy is 
similar to the approach taken in DRIPS for abstracting actions [Haddawy & Doan, 1994]. A 
propagation of properties in the planning tree, bottom-up and left-to-right, is also used in 
GraphHTN [Lotem & Nau, 2000] in order to improve the search algorithm. 
5.6 Creative Evaluation 
We consider the perspective that exploration of environments populated with objects may involve 
a kind of creative evaluation of those objects in that those that elicit more surprise, that are novel, 
and original are those that amaze us, shock us and delight us and therefore are those that are more 
interesting, catch our attention and probably incite visits to them in order to get to know them 
better. In this sense, we may find some work in the literature that is related with ours concerning 
the aspect of creative evaluation. Among them we may consider the works of Tang and Gero 
[Tang & Gero, 2002] and, particularly, Saunders and Gero [Saunders & Gero, 2001]. 
Tang and Gero [Tang & Gero, 2002] propose a cognitive method to measure potential 
creativity in designing. Its connection to our work is in the assessment of novelty and 
unpredictability which are also considered by us regarding the evaluation of objects. However, 
they also consider value. 
Of particular interest to our work is that of Saunders and Gero who developed a computational 
model consisting of agents that can assess the interestingness of artworks by seeking novelty in 
them. Each agent is equipped with an evolutionary art system that enables it to generate genetic 
artworks. The agent then assesses each artwork generated in terms of novelty and in order to 
obtain the degree of its interestingness. Those interesting artworks generated (from the point of 
view of the generator) may be exposed to other agents for peer review. The agents exhibit a form 
of curious behaviour in that they select those artworks that incite learning them. Saunders and 
Gero consider that interesting artworks are not those that are too similar nor too different to an 
agent’s previous experiences, but rather those that fall between this interval. This means that they 
use a subjective measure of interestingness which relies on a measure of novelty or 
unexpectedness, whose computation is based on the previous experience of agents. We also 
consider this subjective aspect of interest/curiosity. However, unlike Saunders and Gero, we 
consider that interesting objects are those that are novel and contain uncertainty regardless of 
whether they are too similar or too different. By considering uncertainty and novelty we endow 
the agents with the ability to look for objects that may enrich their memory after studying them. In 
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contrast to their approach in which they equate unexpectedness to novelty, we consider 
unexpectedness as part of the model of surprise. 

 235 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
n this thesis, we study the problem of the exploration of unknown environments populated 
with entities by affective autonomous agents. The goal of these agents is twofold: (i) the 
acquisition of maps of the environment – metric maps – to be stored in memory, where the 
cells occupied by the entities that populate that environment are represented; (ii) the construction 
of models of those entities. We examine this problem through simulations because of the various 
advantages this approach offers, mainly efficiency, more control and easy focus of the research. 
Besides, the simulation approach can be used because the simplifications that we made do not 
influence the value of the results. To this end, we have developed a framework to build 
multi-agent systems comprising affective agents and then, based on this platform, we developed 
an application for the exploration of unknown environments (although it might have other 
potential applications). This application is a simulated multi-agent environment in which, in 
addition to inanimate agents (objects), there are explorer agents interacting in a simple way, 
whose goal is to explore the environment, while mapping, analyzing, studying and evaluating it. 
Our approach to building artificial agents is that of assigning agents mentalistic qualities such 
as feelings, basic desires, memory/beliefs, desires/goals, intentions. Therefore, we are close to the 
view of agents as acting and thinking like humans. The inclusion of affect in the agent 
architecture is supported by the psychological and neuroscience research over the past decades 
which suggests that emotions and, in general, motivations play a critical role in decision-making, 
action and reasoning, by influencing a variety of cognitive processes (e.g., attention, perception, 
planning, etc.). Therefore, by relying on an affective component plus ideas from the BDI 
architecture, the architecture of an agent reflects this primacy of affect, beliefs, desires and 
intentions, including the following modules: sensors, memory/beliefs (for entities, plans, and 
maps of the environment), desires/goals, intentions, basic desires (basic motivations/motives), 
feelings, and reasoning. 
The key components that determine the exhibition of the exploratory behaviour in an agent are 
the kind of basic desires, feelings, goals and plans with which the agent is equipped. According to 
solid, psychological experimental evidence, exploratory behaviour has for a long time been 
expressed by the idea that organisms respond to novelty and change in the environment they 
inhabit, in the absence of known drives (thirst, hunger, etc.), and if novelty and change are not 
present in the environment, organisms tend to seek them. In addition, other variables such as 
surprisingness, uncertainty, or conflict have also been claimed to determine exploratory 
behaviour. Curiosity/interest is the psychological construct that is elicited by novelty, change, and 
uncertainty, while surprise is another psychological construct that is elicited by novelty, change, 
and conflict. This explains why the agent is equipped in advance with the basic desires for 
minimal hunger, maximal information gain (reduce curiosity), and maximal surprise. Each one of 
these basic desires drives the agent to reduce or to maximize a particular feeling. The desire for 
minimal hunger, maximal information gain and maximal surprise directs the agent, respectively, 
to reduce the feeling of hunger, to reduce the feeling of curiosity (by maximizing information 
gain) and to maximize the feeling of surprise. It is important to note that the desire to reduce 
curiosity does not mean that the agent dislike curiosity. Instead, it means the agent desires 
I 
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selecting actions that maximize curiosity before performing them, because after executing them it 
is expected that they maximize information gain and therefore that they maximize the reduction of 
curiosity. The intensity of these feelings is, therefore, important to compute the degree of 
satisfaction of the basic desires. For the basic desires of minimal hunger and maximal surprise it is 
given by the expected intensities of the feelings of hunger and surprise, respectively, after 
performing an action, while for the desire of maximal information gain it is given by the intensity 
of the feeling of curiosity before performing the action (this is the expected information gain). 
The memory of agents is setup with goals and decision-theoretic, HTN plans for visiting 
entities that populate the environment, regions of the environment, and for going to places where 
the agent can recharge its battery. These are the goals and plans whose execution may lead to 
satisfy the basic desires with which the agent is equipped in advance for the purpose of 
exploration. In addition to a memory for plans, the agents also possess a memory for entities 
which comprises both analogical and propositional knowledge representations. The analogical 
representations of entities are also included in the map of the environment. 
The reasoning cycle of an agent may be briefly described as follows. Each agent, at a given 
time, senses the environment to look for entities and compute the current world state (location, 
structure and function of those entities) based on the sensorial information and on the generation 
of expectations or assumptions for the gaps in the environment information provided by the 
sensors. The result is a set of cases of entities, each one describing an entity that was perceived. 
Then, the episodic memory and metric map are updated based on these episodic entities. To 
satisfy the basic desires of minimal hunger, maximal information gain and maximal surprise, the 
agent desires to visit previously unvisited entities, regions of the environment, and places where it 
can recharge its battery. Therefore, new goals of the kind visitEntity are generated for each 
unvisited entity within the visual range based on the goal tasks of past plans. In addition, a goal of 
the kind visitLoc is generated for some frontier cells, and another goal of the kind rechargeBattery 
is generated for recharging battery. These goals are automatically generated by the agent by 
adapting past goals to new situations giving rise to new goals which are then ranked according to 
its preference, i.e., its EU. The EU function is a mathematical function that evaluates states of the 
environment in terms of the positive and negative relevance for the basic desires. This function 
obeys the MEU principle. It is a combination of the Utility Functions of each basic desire. It 
represents, in our case, the aversion against hunger and the like of surprise and information gain. 
The positive or negative relevance for the basic desires (the degree of satisfaction of the basic 
desires) is given by the intensity of the feelings that are reduced or maximized. As said above, for 
the basic desires of minimal hunger and maximal surprise it is given by the expected intensities of 
the feelings of hunger and surprise, respectively, after achieving a goal, while for the desire of 
maximal information gain it is given by the intensity of the feeling of curiosity before achieving 
the goal. According to this EU, the set of these goals of the agent are ranked, and a HTN plan is 
generated for each one of them so that they can be achieved. The first one, i.e., the one with 
highest EU is taken as an intention. 
In order to test the approach followed in this thesis to the exploration of unknown environments 
by affective agents, we experimentally investigated the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables of the system. The independent variables correspond to various aspects of 
affective agents such as emotions, motivations, memory size and diversity, etc., as well as to 
features of the environment such as the size and diversity of the environment. Dependent 
variables describe features of the problem of exploring unknown environments, such as efficiency 
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and effectiveness (map quality). As a research project, this process was conducted starting by an 
exploratory data analysis which has led to a causal model involving the variables of the system 
and subsequently by confirmatory experiments in order to verify the hypothesis generated in the 
exploratory experiment [P. Cohen, 1995]. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that exploration of unknown environments populated with 
entities can be robustly and efficiently performed by affective agents. In order to confirm this 
hypothesis, we did a few experimental procedures. 
First, we defined how exploration is evaluated. Following the research performed by others 
working on the problem of exploring unknown environments, there are two common dimensions 
for evaluating it: efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency may be measured by the amount of 
knowledge acquired from the environment per unit of time. An agent that is able to acquire more 
knowledge in a time t1 is more efficient than another agent that acquires the same knowledge in a 
time t2>t1, which means that, from another point of view, for the same time t3, the former agent 
is able to acquire more knowledge than the latter. On the other hand, effectiveness is related to 
acquiring the information of a finite environment correctly and completely. An effective explorer 
is able to explore the entire environment. An effective agent is more efficient than another if it 
explores the entire environment before the other. In our approach, knowledge is measured in three 
complementary but related dimensions: the amount of the occupancy map acquired, the number 
and the diversity of models of entities acquired. These three dimensions are profoundly related 
since, for the same environment, the more models of entities acquired, the higher the probability 
of having acquired more information about the occupancy map. Remember that the analogical 
description of the entities is used to build the occupancy map. Another important aspect to take 
into account in the evaluation of exploration is that it is a two step process, involving the selection 
of viewpoints so that the sensory measurements contain new and useful information, and the 
interpretation of the findings of the sensors so as to make accurate deductions about the state of 
the environment. The first step prepares the second. It is of primary importance for the efficiency 
and effectiveness of an exploration strategy. Selecting the viewpoints that provide maximum 
information at a low cost (energy or time) enables an efficient exploration task. On the other hand 
those viewpoints should be selected so that all the information of the environment is acquired. 
The map building step is more concerned with effectiveness, although it also influences 
efficiency. In fact, although it might involve more or less time to interpret the information 
provided by the sensors, this seems to have much less weight on efficiency, in comparison to the 
time taken to travel from place to place. On the contrary, the effectiveness of the exploration 
depends on the accuracy of the interpretation of the information provided by the sensors. Wrong 
interpretations may lead to inaccurate maps which means a partial failure in exploration. So, an 
evaluation of any exploration should take into account these distinct steps. 
Second, in order to know whether affective agents can perform exploration efficiently and 
effectively, we didn’t confine to running an affective agent and measure its performance. Instead, 
we compared its performance with ordinary agents (i.e., non affective agents). Furthermore, we 
went further and studied what variables influence its behaviour, i.e., which affective components 
make it perform better. To this end, we compared different exploration strategies. In our case, we 
compared the strategies resulting from the combination of surprise, curiosity and hunger. 
Third, to be valid, this comparison should rely on good models of curiosity, surprise and 
hunger. We therefore ensured that their computational models are faithful to those of humans. 
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This means that the computational models of surprise, curiosity and hunger should be valid 
models by accurately capturing the features of human models. 
Finally, in order to test the robustness of affective agents when performing exploration, we 
tested them with different amplitudes of the visual field in several environments of different 
complexities. 
We performed three experiments to address these issues. 
Experiment I addresses the third issue. However, we decided not to evaluate the computational 
model of curiosity nor that of hunger because they truly reflect the psychological theories which 
assign them a simple linearity. Actually, curiosity is usually equated with novelty and uncertainty, 
and hunger with the physiological need of an energy source. Novelty is peacefully computed by 
difference and uncertainty by entropy. The problem is with the complexity of the surprise model 
which seems to be non linear, according to some psychological theories. Therefore we tested the 
validity of the computational model of surprise. 
Experiment II is the main experiment of the thesis that confirms the hypothesis. It addresses the 
first, the second and the last issue. The first issue is addressed concerning only to the efficiency of 
the exploration strategy. It tests whether affective agents can perform better or as better as 
ordinary agents. Moreover, it addresses the issue of determining which strategy is better and 
therefore it tests the influence of surprise, curiosity and hunger on the exploratory behaviour of 
the affective agent (second issue). This experiment also tests the robustness of the affect-based 
approach by assessing this influence in several environments (third issue). Besides considering the 
parameter of the exploration strategy and environment complexity, we also take into account the 
amplitude of the visual field of the agent. 
Experiment III addresses the first issue related with exploration effectiveness. While 
Experiment II is more concerned with the step related with the selection of viewpoints, i.e., with 
the exploration strategy, Experiment III addresses the evaluation of the map-building process 
which relies on the generation of assumptions. Therefore, we assess its main advantage, which is 
the possibility of building maps by exploiting the knowledge acquired in previous exploration 
phases in the same or in other environments rather than by actually exploring the environment. 
This process depends on the contents of the memory, namely on the memory of entities. We 
tested this influence as well as that of the environment complexity. However, it was not our 
intention to study the influence of affect on this exploration stage, but mainly to reach conclusions 
about its accuracy. The goal was to know whether the model for generating expectations can 
estimate accurately the entities of the environment based on incomplete information of them. This 
is important because the selection of viewpoints relies on these estimated entities. If they are too 
different from real entities, the computation of estimated feelings might be wrong and therefore 
the results of Experiment II may be invalid. 
In summary, besides evaluating the computational model of surprise [Macedo & Cardoso, 
2001a; Macedo et al., 2004], we also evaluated the following relationships between the variables 
of our approach (Figure 4-1): the role of surprise, curiosity and hunger (the strategy) on the 
performance of the exploration of environments populated with entities [Macedo & Cardoso, 
2004c]; the role of environment complexity and amplitude of the visual field on the performance 
of the exploration of environments populated with entities; the sensitivity of the strategy to the 
environment complexity and visual field, and vice-versa, i.e., whether the influence of the strategy 
on time/energy required for exploring an environment depends on or is controlled or “gated” by 
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the environment complexity and by the visual field, and vice versa; the role of the size and to 
some extent of the diversity of the memory of entities on map-building by exploitation [Macedo 
& Cardoso, 2004e, 2005a]; and, the role of the environment complexity on map-building by 
exploitation. Any exploration task depends on the environment where it is performed. Therefore, 
in order to reach conclusions about the influence of any variable of the system on the performance 
of exploration, the experiments were repeated in various environments with a different complexity 
or diversity. The study of these aspects was performed in single agent exploration. The next 
paragraphs are devoted to the results of all these assessments. 
Our early model of surprise [Macedo & Cardoso, 2001a] proposed that the surprise “felt” by an 
agent elicited by an event X is proportional to the degree of unexpectedness of X (which in the 
model is based on the frequencies of events present in the memory of the agent). According to 
probability theory, the degree of expecting an event X to occur is its subjective probability P(X). 
Accordingly, the improbability of X, denoted by 1-P(X), defines the degree of not expecting X, or 
in short its unexpectedness. The intensity of surprise elicited by X should therefore be an (at least 
weakly) monotonically increasing function of 1-P(X). In two experiments (experiments A1 and 
A2 of Experiment I-A), in which we tested whether the intensity values of surprise generated by 
an artificial agent with this computational model of surprise match those of humans under similar 
circumstances, when answering a quiz in an abstract domain with hedonically neutral events (with 
sequences of symbols) and in the domain of buildings, we found a strong evidence about the 
appropriateness of this model. Concerning the abstract domain with hedonically neutral events, 
the intensity of surprise computed for an element of a sequence by the agent is close (average 
difference = 0.065, i.e., 6.5%) to the corresponding average intensity given by the human judges. 
Even better results (average difference = 0.022, i.e., 2.2%) were obtained for the surprise values 
computed for the whole sequence. However, concerning the domain of buildings, the surprise 
values of the agent are not as close to the human judgments as in the hedonically neutral domain. 
For instance, the average differences were at least 0.47 (for a piece of a building) and 0.05 (for the 
whole building). 
This early model of surprise exhibited several limitations, namely that a few situations of 
surprise were not explained correctly, such as that the occurrence of the highest expected event of 
a set of events seems to elicit no surprise. In order to reach a more complete computational model 
of surprise, we then performed a theoretical and an empirical study, in Experiment I-B, in which 
we consider other alternative ways of computing the intensity of surprise [Macedo et al., 2004]. 
These studies performed in the domains of political elections and sport games suggest 
))()(1(log)(8 2 XPYPXS −+=  as the most appropriate surprise function, at least for the domains of 
political elections and sport games. 
The summary of the results of Experiment II are presented in the following paragraphs. 
All the analyses have established that there is evidence indicating a significant main effect of 
the strategy on the three exploration performance measures. 
We find no evidence for a main effect of the factor “environment complexity” on the 
time/energy required to explore the environment completely and all the entities. However, we find 
a significant main effect of the environment complexity on the time/energy required to explore all 
different entities. We find no evidence for an interaction between the strategy and the 
environment complexity factors on the time/energy required to explore the environment 
completely and all the entities. However, there is some doubt about the interaction between the 
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strategy and the environment complexity factors on the time/energy required to explore all 
different entities: it tested significant under the assumption of sphericity and no significant under 
the Lower Bound test, and it remains no significant after the corrections (Huynh-Feldt and 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction factors). Therefore we might conclude that there is no interaction 
effect “strategy” × “environment complexity” on the time/energy required to explore all different 
entities of the environment at the 0.05 level. However, these conclusions are altered by the 
Multivariate Tests which indicate a significant interaction effect “strategy” × “environment 
complexity” on the time/energy required to explore all different entities of the environment. The 
three way design also indicates that there is a significant interaction effect. 
We find a significant main effect of the amplitude of the visual field factor on the time/energy 
required to explore the environment completely and all different entities, but no effect on the 
time/energy to explore all the entities. We find also that there is evidence of a two way interaction 
effect between the strategy and the amplitude of the visual field on the time/energy required to 
explore the environment completely. There is however some doubt about the interaction effect, 
“strategy” × “amplitude of the visual field”, on the time/energy required to explore all the entities 
of the environment: it tested significant under the assumption of sphericity and no significant 
under the Lower Bound test, and it remains no significant after the corrections (Huynh-Feldt and 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction factors). Therefore we might conclude that there is no interaction 
effect “strategy” × “amplitude of the visual field” on the time/energy required to explore all the 
entities of the environment at the 0.05 level but there is such effect at the 0.071 level. However, 
these conclusions are altered by the Multivariate Tests which indicate a significant interaction 
effect “strategy” × “amplitude of the visual field” on the time/energy required to explore all the 
entities of the environment. The influence of the strategy is to some extent controlled by the 
amplitude of the visual field. 
With respect to the time/energy to explore the environment completely, excluding strategy 2, 
strategy 6 (based on surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, followed closely by 
strategy 9 (classical strategy). However, this difference is no significant at the 0.05 level (p = 
0.098) but it is at the 0.1 level. All the other strategies are significantly worse than strategy 6. The 
next strategies in the ranking are strategies 4 (curiosity and hunger) and 8 (surprise, curiosity and 
hunger), whose difference is not significant. The difference between strategy 6 and these two 
strategies is significant: p = 0.006 for strategy 4 and p = 0.014 for strategy 8. However, these are 
not significantly different from strategy 9. There is no significant difference between strategies 3 
(curiosity), 5 (surprise) and 7 (curiosity and surprise). This means that those strategies that take 
hunger, either alone or combined with surprise and/or curiosity, into account are significantly 
better than those strategies that take only surprise and/or curiosity into account. Whatever the 
values of “envComp” or “visField”, this ranking is more or less maintained. Note, however, that 
with environments of higher complexity or with a low visual field, the performances are usually 
worse. 
Concerning the time/energy required to explore all the entities of the environment, excluding 
strategy 2, strategy 6 (surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, followed closely 
by strategy 9 (classical strategy). However, this difference is not significant at the 0.05 level but it 
is at the 0.08 level. All the other strategies are significantly worse than strategy 6. The next 
strategies in the ranking are strategies 8 (surprise, curiosity and hunger) and 4 (curiosity and 
hunger), whose difference is not significant. The difference between strategy 6 and these two 
strategies is significant: p < 0.001. However, these are not significantly different from strategy 9. 
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There is no significant difference between strategies 5 (surprise), 4 (curiosity and hunger), 7 
(curiosity and surprise), and 8 (surprise, curiosity and hunger). As with “teenv”, we should note, 
however, that with environments of higher complexity or with a high visual field, the 
performances are usually worse, but this ranking is in general kept. 
Finally, concerning the time/energy required to explore all different entities of the environment, 
excluding strategy 2 (hunger), strategy 6 (surprise and hunger) generated the highest performance, 
followed closely by strategy 8 (surprise, curiosity and hunger), 3 (curiosity), 4 (curiosity and 
hunger), and 7 (curiosity and surprise). However, this difference is no significant. The next 
strategies in the ranking are strategies 9 (classical) and 5 (surprise), whose difference is not 
significant. The difference between strategy 6 and these two strategies is not significant: p = 0.267 
for strategy 9. On the contrary to the previous performance measures (“teenv” and “teent”), the 
ranking of the strategies varies with the category of “envComp” or “visField”. For instance, 
strategies 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 outperform significantly the other strategies when “envComp” is low. 
Another curious result is that strategies 4 and 8 are the best strategies when “visField” is low and 
the worst when “visField” is large. Note that, as with “teent”, and in contrary to “teenv”, best 
results are achieved with a low “visField”, and that, as with “teent” and “teenv”, best results are 
achieved with a low “envComp”. 
As mentioned above this experiment shows that the strategy that takes hunger into account 
requires less time and energy to explore the whole of the environment. This happens because an 
agent that uses this strategy computes beforehand the expected hunger it may feel at the 
destination locations (either closer to an entity or at a frontier cell). The agent then selects the 
destination location that minimizes hunger. By doing this, it selects those destination locations 
that are closer to it and by navigating through the environment with this principle in mind it 
avoids traversing long distances, as happens with other strategies, and therefore explores the 
entire environment efficiently. However, this strategy is deterministic given that the location of 
the entities is constant. It does not take into account the characteristics of the places to visit. 
The strategy that takes curiosity into account leads the agent to select entities or frontier cells 
that are expected to maximize novelty and entropy for visits. These are the entities or frontier cells 
that are expected to provide most information. However, these entities or frontier cells are 
frequently not the closest ones and therefore the agent sometimes traverses long distances to 
obtain what it expects to be the highest information gain. By exploring the environment with this 
strategy, the agent wastes much time taking routes that are sometimes erratic and therefore it does 
not outperform the other strategies. 
The strategy that takes surprise into account makes the agent move to entities that are expected 
to elicit surprise by containing something unexpected. This strategy is related with the one that 
takes curiosity into account because entities whose parts that are not already known are new and 
with higher entropy and are therefore eligible to elicit surprise. However, there are a few 
differences. For instance, if the function of an entity has high entropy with ten or twenty equally 
probable functions, the curiosity is high but surprise is 0. So, in order to have a positive value for 
the expected surprise there must be entropy but also that the events are not equally probable. 
Moreover, when there is a low entropy (e.g., when there are several possible functions for an 
entity and one of them has a high probability) the curiosity is low but the expected surprise is 
high. So, the strategy that takes surprise into account motivates the agent to move to entities that 
are expected to provide unexpected information rather than solely new information. On the other 
hand the known parts of the entities (the parts with no entropy) elicit surprise and curiosity if they 
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contain new information (new information is unexpected). In this point curiosity and surprise are 
quite similar. Another major difference between the surprise-based strategy and the curiosity-
based strategy is that while frontier cells may have a positive expected curiosity, we assume that 
they do not elicit surprise. So, although when the agent makes use of the surprise-based strategy it 
behaves differently from when it makes use of the curiosity-based strategy, the performance is 
quite similar and its, to some extent erratic, exploration paths indicate that it traverses 
unnecessarily long distances which has negative effects on its efficiency. 
However, when surprise or curiosity, jointly or independently, are taken into account together 
with hunger, the erratic paths are replaced by ordered exploration paths and hence to a significant 
increase in efficiency. In fact, the motivation to visit entities or frontier cells that are expected to 
elicit curiosity and/or surprise but that are far away from the location of the agent is restrained by 
the hunger that is expected to be felt at those destination locations. When curiosity and surprise 
are taken into account together with hunger, the result is a strategy that nicely favours entities or 
frontier cells that are not too far away and that are expected to elicit a considerable intensity of 
curiosity and surprise. The performance of this strategy usually does not outperform the other two 
closer strategies that take curiosity and hunger, and surprise and hunger, into account, 
respectively. This happens because the restraining role of hunger, i.e., the weight of hunger, is 
reduced in that strategy (it is one of three feelings while in the other two strategies it is one of two 
feelings). 
The difference between the strategy based on curiosity and hunger and that based on surprise 
and hunger may be explained by the fact that the intensities of surprise are lower than the 
intensities of curiosity. Therefore, the restrained effect of hunger is higher in the former than in 
the latter strategy. This also explains why the classical strategy usually outperforms the strategies 
based on curiosity and hunger and on curiosity, surprise and hunger. All of them take into account 
the distance, but the values for the entropy computed by the classical strategy are lower than the 
curiosty values, because curiosity also takes into account the novelty in addition to entropy. 
Giving this, we can logically understand the results above which indicate that the strategy has a 
significant effect on exploration performance. 
We may understand better the significant effect of the amplitude of the visual field on “teenv”, 
“teent” and “tedent” if we take a look at the exploration paths (see Appendix C). When the 
“visField” is large enough so that the agent can access the whole environment, the agent does not 
have to visit frontier cells, but instead solely entities. Once it finishes visiting all the entities, it 
knows the whole environment because its sensors captured already all the information of the 
whole environment. Therefore, the “teenv” is lower when the “visField” is large. This is 
responsible for the significant effect of the amplitude of the visual field on “teenv”. When the 
agent has a large visual field, it can see not only the entities that are closer but also those entities 
that are far. Then, and especially when hunger is not taken into account, sometimes it selects for 
visiting entities that are far which has a negative effect on the “teent” and “tedent”. 
When the environment is of higher complexity, there are more different entities. These are 
usually dispersed and therefore the agent has to follow erratic paths to visit all the entities. This 
explains the higher “teenv”, “teent” and “tedent” when “envComp” is high. However, concerning 
“tedent”, there is an additional effect: since higher complexity environments have more different 
entities than lower complexity environments it is obvious that an agent usually takes more time to 
visit all different entities in the former environments than in the latter. 
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Finally, in Experiment III, we concluded that as the memory size increases there is a tendency 
for the map inconsistency to decrease on average, and converge to a certain map inconsistency 
value. The results show that the higher the complexity of the environment, the higher the map 
inconsistency. Higher complexity means higher diversity, and therefore it is harder for the agent 
to predict the reality accurately. There is much more uncertainty in such environments in that 
there is more diversity of entities than in low complexity environments. As the complexity 
increases the probability of finding any two similar entities decreases. In low complexity 
environments, this is, therefore, an easier task. 
The results of Experiment III also show the influence of the memory size on map inconsistency. 
On average, the higher the memory size, the lower the map inconsistency. This happens because 
the higher the memory size, the higher the knowledge about the entities present in the 
environment. This means that the probability distribution of the entities present in the memory 
approaches that of the environment as the memory size increases, and therefore the expectations 
generated are closer to reality. However, this is not linear, because sometimes the addition of a 
case may make the two probability distributions diverge slightly. However, the tendency is to 
converge. This is quite analogous to the theory of big numbers. Notice that with memories of size 
4 or 5 the map inconsistency is almost optimal. In fact, the addition of 7 or 8 episodes to those 
memories results in an insignificant improvement in map inconsistency. 
Considering these results, we may infer the advantages and disadvantages of map-building by 
exploiting the knowledge acquired in previous training explorations. The main advantage of this 
map learning process is that it requires less time and less energy than that of involving a complete 
exploration of the environment. In fact, the agent does not have to explore all the regions of the 
environment, such as the invisible side of the entities, since it is able to predict that inaccessible 
information. The disadvantage of this approach is that the learned maps may be more inconsistent 
than those learned from an exhaustive exploration of the environment. However, this 
inconsistency can be decreased by incorporating a memory with a probability distribution that 
approaches that of the environment. 
This experiment raises another research question concerning Experiment II: whether the results 
won’t be better for the affective strategies if the agent starts with a wealthy memory of entities 
previously acquired by training in similar environments. 
 
The next section details the main contributions of this thesis, while the subsequent section 
presents the limitations and questions left unanswered by this thesis, and outlines future directions 
for research so that those unanswered questions may be addressed and those limitations may be 
overcome. 
6.1 Contributions 
The main contributions of this thesis are: 
• Affect-directed exploration. Most of exploration strategies proposed in the literature rely 
on information gain and a few of them also consider the cost of acquiring knowledge. Our 
exploration strategy also takes into account these features but in a human-like fashion, 
i.e., we consider that the variables that lead an agent to acquire maximal knowledge at 
minimal cost reside in affect, i.e., in emotion and motivation. Surprise, curiosity/interest, 
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and hunger are the constructs that drive the behaviour of the agents. In other words, 
instead of directly maximizing knowledge gain and minimizing cost, our approach relies 
on making the agent to move to places in which it expects feeling minimal hunger, 
maximal surprise and maximize information gain (maximizes the reduction of the feeling 
of curiosity). In this sense, our approach seems to be broader than most of the approaches 
presented in the related literature so far. 
• Three-dimensional entity maps. Maps cannot be neglected in any approach to exploration 
of unknown environments. They constitute the way the environment is represented as it is 
continuously explored. Grid-based metric maps (occupancy grids) are extensively used to 
deal with this problem. We propose a variant of this kind of map called entity maps. 
These are represented by a slightly different occupancy grid in which each cell <x,y,z> is 
associated to a set of pairs that indicate the entities that may occupy that cell and the 
respective probability. This kind of map results from the features that characterize our 
exploration task, namely that it is not confined to terrain mapping but also and mainly to 
acquiring models of the entities that populate the environment. This stems from another 
chief difference to most approaches to exploration: we consider the environment as a 
collection of entities. This view of environments seems to be suitable to respond to the 
challenge of three-dimensional dynamic environments by keeping track of the changes of 
the positions of entities. In contrast to most of the approaches, we deal with 
three-dimensional environments. In fact, maps in our approach are three-dimensional 
maps. Three-dimensional maps are useful for a range of applications. For example, 
architects and building managers may use three-dimensional models for design and utility 
studies using virtual reality technology. Emergency crews, such as fire fighters, could 
utilize three-dimensional models for planning how to best operate at a hazardous site. 
Three-dimensional models are also useful for robots operating in urban environments. 
Finally, accurate three-dimensional models could be a great supplement to the video game 
industry, especially if the model complexity is low enough for real-time virtual reality 
rendering. 
• Computational model of surprise. We propose a computational model of surprise that 
relies on psychological models of surprise which maintain that surprise is elicited by 
unexpectedness. The model captures this idea and incorporates it in the computation of 
the intensity of surprise. Another feature, for example, is that the most expected event in a 
set of them does not cause surprise. 
• Computational model of curiosity/interest. In contrast to surprise, there are already a few 
computational models to account for curiosity/interest. We propose our own, based on the 
idea that novelty and uncertainty elicit curiosity/interest. 
• Incorporation of feelings into a BDI-like architecture. By proposing a BDI-like 
architecture with additional mentalistic qualities such as feelings and basic desires, we 
achieved the goal of extending the classic BDI architecture. 
• An approach for defining agent’s personality. The EU function is a mathematical function 
that evaluates states of the environment in terms of the positive and negative relevance for 
the basic desires. It is a combination of the Utility Functions of the basic desires. 
According to the pluralist view of motivation [Havercamp & Reiss, 2003; McDougall, 
1908; Reiss, 2000; Schwartz, 1992; B. Weiner, 1980], these define the personality of 
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humans. It represents, in our case, the aversion against hunger and the like of surprise and 
information gain. The contribution of these Utility Functions to the EU function can be 
weighed, which means we can configure the personality of the agents by giving, for 
instance, more weight to curiosity than to hunger, etc. 
• A model for the generation of expectations. Unfortunately, the real world is not crystal 
clear to agents. Agents almost never have access to the whole environment, mainly 
because of the incompleteness and incorrectness of their perceptual and understanding 
components. In fact, it is too much work to obtain all the information from a complex and 
dynamic world, and it is quite likely that the accessible information suffers distortions. 
Nevertheless, since the success of agents depends heavily on the completeness of the 
information of the state of the world, they have to pursue alternatives in order to construct 
good models of the world, even (and specially) when this is uncertain. We propose a 
Bayesian model for the generation of assumptions or expectations to fill in gaps in the 
present observational information. Our model is motivated by studies that are provided 
from various areas, such as psychology, cognitive science, and ethology, which suggest 
that humans and, in general, animals attempt to overcome this limitation through the 
generation of assumptions or expectations. 
• A three-dimensional map-building process based on the generation of expectations. Most 
previous map-building approaches are applied to two-dimensional environments. As has 
already been described, three-dimensional maps are useful for a range of applications. In 
all of those application domains, there is a need for methods that can generate 
three-dimensional models at a low cost, and with minimum human intervention. We 
propose a straightforward probabilistic map-building technique for three-dimensional 
maps. This relies on the trade-off between exploitation and exploration. The exploitation 
relies on the model for the generation of expectations which enables the agent to make 
use of previously acquired knowledge about entities to generate assumptions/expectations 
for the entities that are visible, but not yet explored and therefore with missing 
information. 
• A multi-agent tool. Intelligent agents are a new paradigm for developing software 
applications. This new paradigm of programming, also called agent-oriented 
programming (agent-based computing is another common term), seems to be appropriate 
to deal with certain kinds of domains, offering a variety of benefits in comparison to other 
programming paradigms such as object-oriented programming. A considerable number of 
languages or tools have been proposed so that agent-based applications can be designed 
and built easily. We introduce AMAS, a multi-agent system based on the notion of affect 
and also on ideas of the BDI model, that was used as a platform to develop the application 
for the exploration of unknown environments by affective agents. AMAS was developed 
to be used as a framework for building agent-based applications in general. Yet, AMAS is 
still in a preliminary version. For now it is simply a prototype needing further 
improvements and experimental evaluation. The current version is suitable for 
applications in which the entities (agents) are distributed in a physical environment. This 
is the case of the domain of the exploration of unknown environments which is the only 
application developed with AMAS up to date. Examples of other potential applications 
are air traffic control, and transportation logistics (UM Translog). 
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• Case-based, decision-theoretic, HTN planning. When we want to apply classical planning 
systems to problems that occur in uncertain, dynamic environments such as the real 
world, we find that the assumptions they make can be severely limiting. Actually, each 
one of these assumptions leads the planner agent to ignore relevant aspects of most real 
world planning domains. In fact, the real world is characterized by the presence of 
uncertainty in different forms. In order to overcome these limitations, various 
probabilistic planning systems (decision-theoretic planners) have been developed. 
However, many planning decisions made in the real world are done in a hierarchical 
manner. This motivated the development of the HTN planning technique, which relies on 
the application of reduction schemas (methods) to generate a hierarchy of tasks. However, 
for many real-world applications, developing a collection of methods that completely 
models plan generation has been found to be unfeasible. Case-based planning is a 
promising technique to overcome this problem. This thesis includes the description of a 
planner, called ProCHiP, that combines ideas from case-based planning, HTN planning, 
and decision-theoretic planning to deal with all these problems. It involves learning 
actions and their utility value. 
 
Other aspects that also characterize this thesis are: 
• Map quality evaluation. The maps built by the explorer agents must be assessed so that 
conclusions can be drawn with respect to their performance. We propose an approach that 
consists in comparing the maps built with those that should be built if the agent were an 
ideal agent, i.e., with a map that correctly represents the environment. In simulation 
experiments this can be easily achieved by comparing the maps cell by cell, counting the 
differences between them. 
• Computational model of hunger. This model is quite simple, reflecting the need of an 
energy source by an agent. This is simply expressed by the difference between the total 
amount of energy that an agent can store and the amount of energy that is available at a 
given time. 
• Autonomous generation and ranking of goals. In order to be fully autonomous, agents 
must be able to generate their own goals. Besides, when there are multiple goals 
occurring at the same time, it is impossible to accomplish them simultaneously. 
Therefore, agents should be able to prioritize them according to some ranking rule. We 
propose an algorithm to generate and rank goals autonomously. The generation phase is 
based on adapting goals from past plans to the entities that are within the agent’s sensors 
range. Prioritization is achieved by taking into account the EU computed for each goal. 
6.2 Future Work 
The work presented in this thesis is but a step on the long road to examining the use of affective 
agents to perform tasks such as exploring unknown environments. Yet, the thesis has provided a 
solid foundation for an exciting and important topic for autonomous agents and multi-agent 
systems. While it gives a promising demonstration of the benefit and influence of emotions and 
motivations on the exploration of unknown environments, it raises a number of questions we have 
left unanswered and leaves room for further work in many areas. In fact, as any other research 
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work, it should be no surprise that it raises many more questions than it answers. As Bertrand 
Russell [B. Russell, 1959] states, “what is important is not so much the answers that are given, but 
rather the questions that are asked”. Some of those questions and further work are listed below. 
• The generality of AMAS relies mainly on a specification of the world, of the agents, and 
the plans available for the agents. The first two specifications do not require developing 
code in any specific programming language. However, the latter specification – of plans – 
requires implementing the primitive tasks in C++. Up to date the modules of basic desires 
and feelings are confined to the set of basic desires and feelings that are essential to 
exploration. Likewise, the primitive actions of the plans are confined to those required by 
exploration. Extending this platform so that it can be used to develop other applications 
requires the extension of the modules of basic desires and feelings, the implementation in 
C++ of other primitive tasks, and the extension of the module of autonomous generation 
of goals so that other goals could be generated by making use of adaptation strategies 
other than substitution, or by permitting agents to accept goals from other agents. 
Therefore, other feelings should be modelled such as fear, anger, etc. With respect to the 
primitive actions, they are now confined to PTRANS, ATTEND, and INGEST, which are 
based on the primitive acts of Schank [Schank, 1972]. We believe it is possible to deal 
with other applications by implementing all the primitive acts of Schank. This would be 
an important contribution to the generality of AMAS, since if all of them were 
implemented, the specification of an application would not depend on C++ code. 
However, only by considering other concrete applications can definite conclusions be 
drawn. The extension of the module responsible for the autonomous generation and 
ranking of goals (addressed in another item below) relies mainly on considering other 
adaptation strategies. 
• The memory of the agents would benefit from considering qualitative/topological maps in 
addition to the already considered metric maps. Metric and qualitative maps exhibit 
orthogonal strengths and weaknesses. Contrarily to metric maps, qualitative maps contain 
no geometric or metric information, but only the notions of proximity and order. 
Topological maps are more efficient representations for structured environments (e.g., 
buildings), where distinctive places (e.g., corridors, doorways, etc.) are more frequent. 
The agent navigates locally between places and therefore movement errors do not 
accumulate globally as happens in metric maps where there is a single, global coordinate 
system. Conversely, in unstructured environments, where place recognition is more 
complex, a robot using purely topological information for localization, can easily become 
lost. So, it is reasonable to consider the combination of both approaches so that the 
strengths of both representations can be used. This enables the map representation to 
benefit, for instance, from the efficiency of topological maps, and from the spatial 
consistency and accuracy of metric maps. 
• In the current version of AMAS the agent is abstracted of the generation of the analogical 
representation from the propositional counterpart and vice-versa [Kosslyn, 1980, 1985; 
Kosslyn et al., 1988]. However, this conversion is required so that agents can be 
embodied in the physical world. 
• The present model of surprise assumes that surprise is elicited by entities. An extension of 
this model of surprise to deal with events (conflict between future events and the 
expectations for them – incorporated already in probabilistic actions) is required. In fact, 
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surprise is not only elicited by entities, but also by a conflict between expectations and the 
information acquired from the environment. Since expectations may also be created, for 
instance, for actions, the present model of surprise is certainly not complete. 
• Implement PTRANS using a deterministic variant of value iteration, a popular dynamic 
programming algorithm [Bellman, 1957; Howard, 1960]. This is an approach followed by 
[Anguelov et al., 2002; Biswas et al., 2002]. 
• It would be interesting to study the inclusion of reactive behaviour giving rise to a hybrid 
architecture. Perhaps the best architecture for building agents is that of combining the 
deliberative and reactive ones. An agent with such architecture exhibits two components: 
one that enables the agent to plan or decide what to do in a more complex fashion based 
on symbols; another that enables the agent to react to external events in a faster and 
simpler way. In addition, we might also consider other components such as reflective 
reasoning or meta-management which would enable agents to exhibit self monitoring and 
self evaluation by reasoning about the internal information and reasoning processes. 
• The current version of AMAS includes an algorithm for autonomously generating and 
ranking of goals. The algorithm for generating goals relies on reusing past goals and 
adapting them to the present state of the environment. The adaptation strategies are 
confined to substitution. Therefore, in order to make AMAS more general, additional 
adaptation strategies should be considered. Moreover, the ranking of goals should be 
more dynamic, i.e., it should be possible to generate goals during the execution of another 
goal and rearrange them continuously. The current version of AMAS includes agents that 
exhibit a simple decision-making process that involves, among other limitations, the fact 
that after a goal task is selected and a plan generated for it, it is not permitted, until that 
plan is completely executed, that other goal tasks may be generated and force the 
suspension of that goal task under achievement. So, further studies should be performed 
to assess the benefits and drawbacks of such new decision-making process. This requires 
additional work concerning the suspension of goals. In order to be suitable for multi-agent 
planning, AMAS should include processes for resolving conflicts between goals. 
• In the current version of ProCHiP, probabilities and effects of the tasks of an abstract plan 
are learnt from tasks of past plans. ProCHiP also predicts the possibility of computing the 
EU of the tasks based on a non-procedural component. By taking into account the non-
procedural component of the effects, we avoid the computations of the intensities of the 
feelings. In fact, by doing so, we are taking into account their intensities in previous 
occurrences of the tasks and respective effects. This emotional/motivational information 
collected from previous occurrences of a task is similar to Damásio’s somatic marker 
[Damásio, 1994]. For this reason, tasks should be called somatically-marked tasks. When 
a task is about to occur again, the planning agent may compute its EU based on this data. 
In fact, this seems to be faster than the alternative approach of estimating the emotions 
that a task may elicit based on the values of the variables of the state of the world such as 
the time duration, fuel consumed, etc. This is part of our ongoing work, and although 
most of the technique is already implemented it requires tests. This approach also requires 
that unsuccessful plans should be stored in an especial place of the episodic memory 
reserved for failure cases. These would be essential in order to update the probabilities of 
the effects of the primitive tasks. Not considering them might generate high probabilities 
for positive effects and low probabilities for negative effects of the primitive tasks. This 
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may distort reality since some tasks that lead to unpleasant effects would be considered 
more useful than they really are. 
• The structure of the tasks of the plans, mainly the inclusion of the identifier of the agent 
that executes the task, enables multi-agent planning. However, multi-agent planning is far 
more complex than single agent planning, as multi-agent planning requires robust 
techniques to resolve conflicts and to make the plans sound. This issue is related with 
incorporating sophisticated negotiation, collaboration and coordination techniques in 
AMAS. 
• AMAS is a prototype of a multi-agent tool. This multi-agent system may evolve to an 
agent-oriented programming language that could be used to generate more easily various 
applications in various domains. We highlight a few of these in the following item. To 
design and implement a new programming language powerful enough to be used in 
commercial software implementation requires far more resources than a Ph.D. project can 
afford. Hence, further improvements are necessary, such as the improvement of the 
collaboration, coordination, and negotiation capabilities of agents, as well as a more 
user-friendly specification of the settings of the components of the multi-agent system 
(environment, agents of the system, plans). Amongst the required tools that should be 
provided are: 
ο An agent definition editor for describing agents (memory, basic desires, feelings, 
goals, and plans); 
ο A plan definition editor for describing plans (including a task/action description 
editor for describing the attributes of tasks); 
ο Visualization tools to collect information on agent activity, interpret it and 
display various aspects in real-time. To this end, the following tools should be 
included: 
 A society viewer that shows all known agents, their organizational 
relationships and the messages they exchange. This challenge may be met 
using computer graphic tools such as OpenGL; 
 A reports tool that shows the society-wide decomposition/distribution of 
active tasks and the execution states of the various tasks; 
 A statistics tool that displays individual agent and society-wide statistics 
in a variety of formats; 
 An agent viewer that enables the internal states of agents to be observed 
and monitored; 
 A control tool that is used to review and/or modify the internal states of 
individual agents remotely; 
• Using such a multi-agent tool, a broad number of applications might be developed (it 
depends on changing the environment, the goals/plans from the memory of the agents, 
and the further improvements required to make the tool more general as described in a 
previous item) such as: 
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ο Exploration of the Web (in this case the agent that represents someone models the 
emotions of the individual, selecting the web pages that are potentially more 
interesting for him/her by being more surprising, novel and uncertain). In this 
case the agent acts on behalf of an individual, acting as an information gathering 
system, but richer in the sense that it is acting proactively. This application is 
analogous to the application considered in this thesis. 
ο Exploration of data bases (similar to the previous item, by changing the 
environment from the web to a data base). 
ο Air traffic control, and traffic control 
• This thesis is about software agents inhabiting a simulated physical environment. 
However, by making a few modifications the softbots may be embodied, i.e., the software 
may be incorporated in a robot in a physical environment, and therefore field tests might 
be performed. This is actually one the requirements to fully assess the application 
developed. To this end, further improvements are necessary: 
ο Incorporating SLAM. Mapping is already addressed to some extent, but a method 
to localize the robot in the map that allows us to relax the assumption of knowing 
the position of the agent (notice that it is assumed that agents use GPS). Several 
methods have already been developed so far, such as EM [Burgard et al., 1999; 
Liu et al., 2001; McLachlan & Krishnan, 1997]. 
ο Incorporation of a model of pattern recognition (for instance [Margaritis & 
Thrun, 1998]) so that the shape of the entities can be recognized and the 
propositional description be generated autonomously (for now this is abstracted 
from the agents since it is performed by the model of the environment) 
• In addition to exploration, we have been working on the production of creative products. 
This is not exactly future work because we have been developing this investigative 
direction in parallel with the research described in this thesis. When performing 
creatively, an agent generates goals for the creation of novel, original and valuable 
entities (goals of the kind createObj) and builds a plan for each one. Just as in 
exploration, goals and plans that are expected to reduce or maximize particular feelings 
are preferred. Feelings such as surprise and curiosity that capture variables such as 
unexpectedness, or novelty and uncertainty, respectively, are hence important for 
creativity 
• More research is required in cooperation and coordination methods for the exploration of 
unknown environments. 
• AMAS is suitable for dealing with dynamic environments. However, we have not yet 
explored this feature when developing the application of the exploration of unknown 
environments described in this thesis. So, a future research direction may be the extension 
of the current application to deal with exploration of unknown, three-dimensional, 
dynamic environments, which is one of the hardest challenges within the exploration 
domain. 
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Appendix A 
Environments 
This appendix presents the environments used in experiment II and III. 
The description of the entities (buildings) is presented as follows. Each environment contains 
all or a subset of these entities. In the latter case, it means it contains repetitions of at least one 
entity. In this case, the similarity of entities is shown by x=y, meaning that entity x is similar to 
entity y. 
Entity 1: Function: house; Door: squared; Windows: squared; Facade: rectangular; Roof: 
pentagonal 
Analogical description: 
 
 
Entity 2: Function: church; Door: squared; Windows: pentagonal; Facade: rectangular; Roof: 
pentagonal 
Analogical description: 
 
 
Entity 3: Function: house; Door: rectangular; Windows: squared; Facade: rectangular; Roof: 
pentagonal 
Analogical description: 
 
 
Entity 4: Function: house; Door: pentagonal; Windows: triangular; Facade: rectangular; Roof: 
pentagonal 
Analogical description: 
 
 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
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Entity 5: Function: house; Door: squared; Windows: hexagonal; Facade: rectangular; Roof: 
pentagonal 
Analogical description: 
 
 
Entity 6: Function: house; Door: pentagonal; Windows: pentagonal; Facade: rectangular; Roof: 
pentagonal 
Analogical description: 
 
 
Entity 7: Function: house; Door: hexagonal; Windows: hexagonal; Facade: rectangular; Roof: 
pentagonal 
Analogical description: 
 
 
Entity 8: Function: church; Door: pentagonal; Windows: pentagonal; Facade: pentagonal; Roof: 
triangular 
Analogical description: 
 
 
Entity 9: Function: house; Door: triangular; Windows: rectangular; Facade: pentagonal; Roof: 
triangular 
Analogical description: 
 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
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Entity 10: Function: hotel; Door: squared; Windows: pentagonal; Facade: triangular; Roof: 
triangular 
Analogical description: 
 
 
Entity 11: Function: house; Door: squared; Windows: pentagonal; Facade: hexagonal; Roof: 
triangular 
Analogical description: 
 
 
Entity 12: Function: hospital; Door: squared; Windows: squared; Facade: triangular; Roof: 
pentagonal 
Analogical description: 
 
 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
298  Appendix A 
 
Environment: Low1 
 
Environment: Low2 
 
 
10=2 
(2,10) 
9=1 
(2,15) 
8=1 
(2,25) 
6=1 
(11,15) 11=2 
(10,5) 
7=1 
(10,26) 
5=1 
(12,12) 
12=2 
(17,7) 
2 
(15,15) 
1 
(20,20) 
3 
(16,24) 
1 
(22,15) 
Agt 
(26,26) 
10=2 
(2,10) 
9=1 
(2,15) 
8=2 
(2,25) 
6=1 
(11,15) 11=1 
(10,5) 
7=1 
(10,26) 
5=1 
(12,12) 
12=2 
(17,7) 
4=1 
(15,15) 
1 
(20,20) 
3 
(16,24) 
2 
(22,15) 
Agt 
(26,26) 
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Environment: Low3 
 
Environment: Medium1 
 
10 
(2,10) 
9 
(2,15) 
8 
(2,25) 
6=3 
(11,15) 11 
(10,5) 
7=5 
(10,26) 
5 
(12,12) 
12 
(17,7) 
4=1 
(15,15) 
1 
(20,20) 
3 
(16,24) 
2=1 
(22,15) 
Agt 
(26,26) 
10=1 
(2,10) 
9=1 
(2,15) 
8=1 
(2,25) 
6=2 
(11,15) 11=2 
(10,5) 
7=1 
(10,26) 
5=1 
(12,12) 
12=2 
(17,7) 
2 
(15,15) 
1 
(20,20) 
3 
(16,24) 
1 
(22,15) 
Agt 
(26,26) 
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Environment: Medium2 
 
Environment: Medium3 
 
 
10 
(2,10) 
9 
(2,15) 
8=7 
(2,25) 
6=2 
(11,15) 11 
(10,5) 
7 
(10,26) 
5=2 
(12,12) 
12=1 
(17,7) 
4=1 
(15,15) 
1 
(20,20) 
3=2 
(16,24) 
2 
(22,15) 
Agt 
(26,26) 
10 
(2,10) 
9 
(2,15) 
8=2 
(2,25) 
6 
(11,15) 11 
(10,5) 
7 
(10,26) 
5=4 
(12,12) 
12 
(17,7) 
4 
(15,15) 
1=2 
(20,20) 
3=2 
(16,24) 
2 
(22,15) 
Agt 
(26,26) 
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Environment: Medium4 
 
Environment: Medium5 
 
10=4 
(2,10) 
9 
(2,15) 
8=6 
(2,25) 
6 
(11,15) 11=1 
(10,5) 
7 
(10,26) 
5 
(12,12) 
12=2 
(17,7) 
4 
(15,15) 
1 
(20,20) 
3=2 
(16,24) 
2 
(22,15) 
Agt 
(26,26) 
10=4 
(2,10) 
9 
(2,15) 
8=6 
(2,25) 
6 
(11,15) 11=1 
(10,5) 
7 
(10,26) 
5 
(12,12) 
12=2 
(17,7) 
4 
(15,15) 
1 
(20,20) 
3 
(16,24) 
2 
(22,15) 
Agt 
(26,26) 
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Environment: Medium6 
 
Environment: High1 
 
10 
(2,10) 
9 
(2,15) 
8 
(8,25) 
6 
(11,15) 11 
(10,5) 
7 
(10,26) 
5 
(12,12) 
12 
(17,7) 
4 
(15,15) 
1 
(20,20) 
3 
(16,24) 
2 
(22,15) 
Agt 
(26,26) 
10=1 
(2,10) 
9=2 
(2,15) 
8 
(2,25) 
6 
(11,15) 11 
(10,5) 
7 
(10,26) 
5=2 
(12,12) 
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Environment: High2 
 
Environment: High3 
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Appendix B 
SPSS outputs of Experiment II 
This appendix presents the SPSS outputs of Experiment II. Because of the extension of these 
outputs, the contents of this appendix are included in the CD attached to this thesis. 

 307 
Appendix C 
Paths of Experiment II 
This appendix shows the paths of the agents for each trial of Experiment II for the environment 
Medium1. 
 
Environment: Medium1; Strategy: hunger; Visual Field: 10 
 
Environment: Medium1; Strategy: curiosity; Visual Field: 10 
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Environment: Medium1; Strategy: curiosity+hunger; Visual Field: 10 
 
Environment: Medium1; Strategy: surprise; Visual Field: 10 
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Environment: Medium1; Strategy: surprise+hunger; Visual Field: 10 
 
Environment: Medium1; Strategy: surprise+curiosity; Visual Field: 10 
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Environment: Medium1; Strategy: surprise+curiosity+hunger; Visual Field: 10 
 
Environment: Medium1; Strategy:classical; Visual Field: 10 
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Environment: Medium1; Strategy: hunger; Visual Field: 50 
 
Environment: Medium1; Strategy: curiosity; Visual Field: 50 
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Environment: Medium1; Strategy: curiosity+hunger; Visual Field: 50 
 
Environment: Medium1; Strategy: surprise; Visual Field: 50 
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Environment: Medium1; Strategy: surprise+hunger; Visual Field: 50 
 
Environment: Medium1; Strategy: surprise+curiosity; Visual Field: 50 
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Environment: Medium1; Strategy: surprise+curiosity+hunger; Visual Field: 50 
 
Environment: Medium1; Strategy:classical; Visual Field: 50 
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